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Foreword:
It is with great pleasure that I bring this volume to publication, a report 
summarizing JICA’s experience with, and knowledge of, sub-Saharan 
African development. Drawing on literature surveys, empirical research 
and/or practical cases from JICA’s on-the-ground experiences, the 
volume contains chapters that address, collectively, a range of issues of 
special pertinence to Sub-Saharan Africa’s development. It starts with 
discussions on how to transform the agricultural and rural sector. It then 
discusses the need to diversify the economic structure, which should be 
buttressed by infrastructure and human resource development. Two 
chapters discuss how to prepare for and respond to shocks and threats, 
such as climate change and political instability. Finally, the volume also 
contains a chapter on mutual learning through South-South and 
triangular cooperation, along with a historical overview of the TICAD 
process. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is much richer than it was twenty years ago, when 
the TICAD process began in 1993, and the continent is likely to continue 
its remarkable growth in the coming years and decades. We must 
acknowledge, however, that there remain cautious observers who point 
to the precarious sides of its development, such as sluggish poverty 
reduction, a declining manufacturing sector, a weak job market, and 
increasing inequalities among various segments of society. These 
obstacles must, and in my view can, be overcome with careful policies by 
the leaders and peoples of Africa, with continued support from the 
international community. 
If this is the challenge that is facing Africa’s development today, the issue 
to be discussed at TICAD V and beyond is how to sustain robust 
development over the long term, such that the benefits are shared widely 
both within and across countries. That is the view underpinning the 
current volume, which we titled For Inclusive and Dynamic Development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. “Inclusive and dynamic development” has been part 
of JICA’s corporate mission statement since its organizational rebirth in 
2008, and we believe it is an important prerequisite for human security.  
Japan has been a consistent supporter of African development, and 
JICA, as chief implementing agency of Japan’s development 
cooperation, has been devoting considerable effort to that cause. We 
vhave compiled this report in the hope that it will help us share our views, 
noteworthy cases, and practical knowledge, with a wide range of 
decision makers and practitioners involved in the development of Sub-
Saharan Africa. I hope you will enjoy reading it. 
Akihiko Tanaka
President
JICA
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1Executive Summary: 
For Inclusive and Dynamic Development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges and Responses
Hiroshi Kato
1. What Is This Volume and What Is Its Purpose? 
This volume is a compilation of JICA staff members’ views on Sub-
Saharan African development1, as well as the views of the lead 
researcher of a research project being conducted at the JICA Research 
Institute.2 
The chapters vary in their approaches and frameworks. In terms of 
methodology, some rely primarily on literature reviews, others on case 
analyses, and the rest on empirical research. In terms of message, some 
offer recommendations to all the stakeholders of African development, 
while others offer recommendations for consideration by the Japanese 
government. Though varied, however, the common thread running 
through them is the desire to share JICA’s experiences on the ground 
and/or its research findings with various stakeholders, in order to enrich 
the international debates on African development. 
The plan of this volume has been formulated keeping in mind the 
ongoing discussion on TICAD V. Specifically, the chapters have been 
prepared so that collectively they would address the major themes of the 
conference, which are, as of March 2013, as follows: (1) Robust and 
Sustainable Economy, (2) Inclusive and Resilient Society, and (3) Peace 
1. This volume chiefly addresses the developmental challenges of Sub-Saharan African 
countries, based on the understanding that firstly, although they are much wealthier and are 
dynamically developing, they still need strong international attention; and that secondly, 
even though they do share certain development challenges with their North African peers, 
SSA countries are faced with substantially different and serious developmental challenges.
2. As such, the views expressed herein do not necessarily represent the official views of the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA.), though the authors have been encouraged 
to incorporate comments they have received during the internal peer review. 
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and Stability.3 This report could also contribute to the discussion on the 
post 2015 agenda since Africa will be the major target region.
2. Africa’s Challenge: Inclusive and Dynamic Development 
Africa today is much wealthier and is developing much more 
dynamically than it was twenty years ago, when the TICAD process 
started in 1993. Currently, more than 23 Sub-Saharan African countries 
(including Sudan) have become categorized as middle-income countries 
with per capita GDP greater than $1,000. If seen as a single country, 
Africa is already a middle income country with per capita GDP circa 
$1500. And given the high price of food and natural resources likely to 
remain into the foreseeable future, it is not at all too ambitious to predict 
a high growth rate of the African economy in the coming years or 
decades. The African Development Bank predicts that, on certain 
assumptions, per capita GDP of Africa will be close to $4,000 in 2040, an 
income level comparable to Indonesia today. 
The progress is not limited to income growth measured in terms of GDP. 
As the overview chapter (Ch. 1) summarizes, over the past decades, the 
continent has claimed a number of successes. These include, among 
others: 
 ✓ Modest but symbolic progress in poverty reduction, with the 
poverty rate falling below 50% for the first time, and Africa’s 
poverty headcount falling for the first time since the start of 
official records keeping in 1981. 
 ✓ Large reductions in infant and maternal mortality.
 ✓ Large gains in enrollment of primary education.
 ✓ Improved macroeconomic stability (low inflation, rising domestic 
resource mobilization, good fiscal health), and,
 ✓ A reduced incidence of conflict. 
The question is how to sustain such robust African growth of Africa for 
the long term; let us be reminded quickly that the long term prediction 
cited above by the African Development Bank is based on the 
assumption that a growth rate of close to 5% is maintained for 30 years 
3. Important issues such as financial markets, urbanization, demographic changes and 
natural resource management have had to be left out; we will try to address them at another 
time.
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between 2010 and 2040, which can actually be quite a bold assumption. 
Past experience shows that the economic growth rate of SSA has not 
been very stable. Skeptics point to the lack of improvement in 
governance indicators, insufficient good job opportunities, falling levels 
of manufacturing, little productivity growth in agriculture, sluggish 
progress in learning achievement in schools, and inadequate service 
delivery systems, including health, increasing vulnerability against 
climate change; and the list goes on.
In view of this, one cannot agree more with the organizers of the TICAD 
for choosing the themes of the upcoming conference: (1) Robust and 
Sustainable Economy, (2) Inclusive and Resilient Society, and (3) Peace 
and Stability. These three agenda items are intricately linked, and failure 
in achieving one of them will inevitably affect the performance of Africa 
in the other two.  
It is based on the above that we have titled this small volume “For 
Inclusive and Dynamic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa.” This 
summarizes a widely shared conviction at JICA (and perhaps elsewhere) 
that Africa must continue developing dynamically by reducing the 
vulnerability of its economic structure (hence “Dynamic Development” 
is indispensable), while at the same time such dynamic development 
must be realized in such a way that disparities between the rich and poor 
do not expand beyond a tolerable threshold; and that everybody in 
society is given opportunities to take part in the productive process 
(hence “Inclusive Development” is also imperative).4 
The phrase “Inclusive and Dynamic Development” has been JICA’s 
mission statement since its rebirth as a new JICA in 2008, coinciding with 
TICAD IV. Ever since, we have been working hard in Africa to realize 
this ideal with our partners around the world, and today we are ready to 
work harder than ever before with our African and international 
partners to achieve this same ideal.
3.Emerging Challenges
The biggest news at TICAD V is that in the period since 2008 Africa has 
4. Our view shares perspectives with the debate which has been described in terms of a 
contrast between “Big development” and “Small development (Woolcock 2012).
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continued to maintain its good track record of economic growth, despite 
the worst global financial crisis in half a century. This in itself is cause for 
celebration, but should not be a source of complacency. As the essay 
contained in Chapter 1 makes clear, the sources of Africa’s sustained 
growth remain quite limited, and Africa’s growth appears vulnerable. 
The three major challenges identified below share a common underlying 
cause. Seen from an Asian perspective, structural change in Africa since 
its growth “turn around” in 1995 has been very limited. Agricultural 
productivity has been largely stagnant. The region’s share of 
manufacturing in GDP is less than one half of the average for all 
developing countries, and it is declining; and FDI remains almost wholly 
in natural resources. Three significant risks appear to threaten the 
region’s sustained progress for 2013-2018.
Jobs and poverty
Africa is not creating enough jobs to absorb the 10-12 million young 
people entering its labor markets each year. Today, according to the 
African Development Bank, less than one fifth of Africa’s young workers 
find wage employment. Unemployment in Sub-Saharan Africa seems 
low. In 2009 it was about six percent. This is not because Africa is doing 
well at generating wage-paying jobs. Eighty percent of job seekers find 
themselves in informal employment, self-employment or family labor. 
These are not good jobs. In 2011, eighty-two percent of African workers 
were classified by the ILO as working poor. The sources of Africa’s 
recent growth – improved economic management, strong commodity 
prices and new discoveries of natural resources – are not job creators.
The region’s lack of “good” jobs – those capable of paying good wages 
and offering the potential to acquire skills – has also meant that 
compared with other developing regions, especially East Asia, growth 
has not resulted in rapid poverty reduction. Africa has the lowest 
elasticity of head count poverty to growth of any developing region. Jobs 
and poverty are closely linked, and will need to be urgently addressed.
New discoveries of natural resources
Ironically, one of the main drivers of Africa’s current economic success 
may prove its long term undoing. New resource discoveries since 2008 
have redrawn the map of natural resource rich economies across the 
continent. Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda have all 
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recently had major discoveries of hydrocarbons, and newly resource rich 
economies are likely to increase in the future. Africa is richly endowed 
with metal and non-metal minerals, as well as energy resources. 
Although precise data are not available – principally because much of 
the continent is under-explored – it is likely that Africa hosts about 30 
per cent of the world’s mineral reserves.
In Africa, countries dependent on oil, gas, and mining have tended to 
have weaker long run growth, higher rates of poverty, and higher 
inequality than non- mineral dependent economies at similar levels of 
income. But geology is not destiny. Some societies have succeeded in 
harnessing natural resources for sustained increases in production, 
while others have not. The long run success or failure of resource rich 
economies depends on the choices made as to how resource riches will 
be used. Making the right choices with respect to public financial 
management and strategies for economic diversification will become 
increasingly important for a growing number of countries and their 
development partners.
Lack of export dynamism
For poor Asian countries the export has been the main source of rapid 
growth. There is persuasive evidence that what an economy makes 
matters for its long-term development. More diversified economies tend 
to have higher levels of income, and economies that produce and export 
more sophisticated goods tend to grow faster. Africa has had little export 
success: manufactured exports per person are less than 10 per cent of the 
average for low income countries. Industry in Africa has declined as a 
share of both global production and trade since the 1980s. Africa as a 
whole has become a net importer of food and of agricultural products 
(FAO 2012). 
While manufacturing is most closely associated with rapid export 
growth, there are also “industries without smokestacks” in agriculture 
and services that can create export dynamism. Investors in these 
industries, however, do not see Africa as an attractive location. Domestic 
private investment has remained at about 11 percent of GDP since 1990. 
This is well below the level needed for rapid export growth. 
Diversification into new products and markets will be a daunting 
challenge for both resource poor and resource rich economies alike. 
Breaking into non-traditional export markets will demand a coordinated 
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set of public investments, policy reforms and institutional innovations 
more characteristic of Asian than African economies. 
4. Appropriate Responses
The essays contained in the volume offer insights into a wide range of 
JICA’s operational engagements in Africa. From these, three areas of 
activity have been selected to demonstrate Japan’s distinctive role as a 
development partner, and offer the potential to address the three 
challenges described above.
Transforming agriculture
Given Africa’s projected increase in food requirements and the limits to 
extensive agricultural growth, progress in agricultural yields is vital. 
Increasing yields and adapting to climate change will require African 
farmers to have access to new varieties of crops that are better adapted to 
the changing agro-climatic conditions. Chapter 3 makes a persuasive 
case that existing improved varieties in rice – originally developed for 
Asia – offer the potential for significant yield increases in Africa, if 
coupled with appropriate farming technologies and inputs. Japan 
should continue to take a leadership role both in the dissemination of 
existing technologies and in the development of new technologies.
Agricultural innovations alone will not be sufficient to transform African 
agriculture. A large number of complementary institutional and policy 
reforms will be needed. Agricultural innovation systems will need to 
adapt to cover a range of activities from development of new, 
appropriate agricultural technologies to the dissemination of good 
practices, and to the development of value chains. Investments in 
irrigation and a shift from dry land to irrigated agriculture will also be 
required. The essays in this volume show how Japan is responding to 
those challenges; Chapter 4 introduces a farming as business approach 
for value chain development through the empowerment of small scale 
farmers commonly called SHEP; Chapter 5 explains agricultural 
inclusive development by encouraging private responsible investment; 
and Chapter 11 describes how to make agriculture more resilient to 
climate change. 
Entering these value chains will require public actions to improve 
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logistics capability. Physical infrastructure is particularly important at 
points of export (airports and seaports) and in connecting production 
centres to ports (roads and railways). The two essays that cover the 
Nacala corridor in Mozambique (Ch. 5 and 8) illustrate one approach to 
this problem.
Building capabilities in industry and service delivery in education and 
health
“Firm capabilities” – the know-how and working practices used in 
production – largely determine quality and productivity. Globally firms 
compete in capabilities. As the essay on industrial development (Ch. 6) 
argues, Africa needs higher capability firms to join the global game. 
Value chain relationships between local firms and foreign investors 
(FDI) are a good way to learn global best practice. Thus, policies and 
institutions for attracting FDI are a key capability building tool. 
Capabilities can also be taught through management training.
Despite substantial increases in budget commitments, the essays on 
education and health (Ch. 9 and 10) show that there have not been 
commensurate improvements in social sector outcomes. Service delivery 
remains poor. Educational quality and health service coverage are a 
particular concern. While better service delivery has a direct relevance to 
attainment of the MDGs, it can also – as illustrated by the East Asian 
Miracle countries – be an important component of a “shared growth” 
strategy to address poverty.
Strengthening infrastructure
Japan has been a consistent – and often lonely – advocate for the need to 
focus development assistance on infrastructure. As Chapter 7 reports, 
firm level studies in Africa highlight infrastructure deficiencies as a 
significant barrier to greater competitiveness. Sub-Saharan Africa lags at 
least 20 percentage points behind the average for low income countries 
on almost all major infrastructure measures. In addition, the quality of 
service is low, supplies are unreliable, and disruptions are frequent and 
unpredictable. 
As the essays illustrate, infrastructure directly affecting the 
competitiveness of traded goods producing activities has been 
neglected. Road infrastructure has received only inadequate attention. 
While increasing investments in the power sector must be emphasized, 
8Executive Summary
for improved industrial and export performance, investment in 
infrastructure in the area of trade logistics must also be promoted. 
Japan’s efforts to improve connectivity through physical infrastructure 
and institutional reform – such as one stop border posts – represent 
major contributions to improving trade logistics (Ch. 8). 
The Nacala project – and to some extent the Mombasa corridor – go even 
further. These have the potential to become regional Special Economic 
Zones5 – often called “growth corridors” – developed around key 
natural resource investments and associated infrastructure (ports, roads, 
power projects). Developing growth corridors is attractive for three 
reasons. First, they emphasize the complementarities between transport 
infrastructure and resource- or agriculture-based projects within a 
region, and highlight the possible complementarities between 
investment projects (for example, agriculture and agro-processing). 
Second, the approach can help to solve coordination problems between 
investments in related projects, increasing the prospect of rapid private 
sector responses to infrastructure improvements. Third, it is possible 
that in resource concentrated zones, the bulk of capital spending on 
infrastructure (both transport and power) can be financed by the 
resource projects themselves. 
5. The Features of Japan’s Cooperation
The chapters that deal with JICA’s specific projects and programs 
capture some of the salient features of JICA’s approach to giving aid and 
supporting transformation. Three features seem to stand out. 
The first is an emphasis on scaling up, which could take a variety of 
routes and methods. The programs in agriculture (CARD initiative, 
SHEP, and Win-Win-Win approach) all illustrate attempts to scale up 
desirable actions. Projects of School Based Management and Teachers’ 
training (Ch.9), as well as the introduction of Kaizen to hospital 
management (Ch.10) are examples of gradual expansion of activities 
proven effective initially in one country. Also, the emphasis on the use of 
south-south cooperation (Ch.13) as an instrument for propagating and 
5. While traditionally defined special economic zones (SEZs) are reported to have a mixed 
record (WDR 2013: p.221), regional SEZs or regional development corridors as advocated 
here are based on a different concept. 
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institutionalizing successful interventions embodies horizontal scaling 
up
The second feature is the emphasis on learning and continuous 
improvement, the importance of which Japan has learned through its 
own history of development. Chapter 3 argues for the applicability of the 
Asian rice cultivation techniques to Africa; the chapters on industrial 
development (Ch. 6) and health (Ch. 9) illustrate the attempt to impart 
successful Japanese management practices – such as Kaizen and total 
quality control – to firms of all sizes, and to adapt them to service 
providers in health. The efforts to promote FDI described in Chapter 6, 
speaking to the need to develop effective institutions to attract FDI to 
Africa, are an example of sharing experiences of Asia and Japan; and 
again, various and developing practices of South-South and triangular 
cooperation are instruments of knowledge sharing and co-creation. 
And thirdly, though perhaps not unique to Japan’s cooperation, many 
projects and programs have attempted to combine financial resources 
and knowledge transfer, in view of realizing comprehensive 
cooperation. This feature is particularly salient in infrastructure (Ch. 7 
and 8), but is also highlighted in projects in other areas such as 
agricultural development (Ch. 5) and climate change (Ch. 11). 
6. General Chapter Summary
Following the overview chapter (Ch.1), the essays in the volume can 
roughly be divided into two categories. There are analytical chapters 
which examine various aspects of the transformation process that are 
pivotal for Africa. Second, there are more programmatic chapters which 
describe JICA’s approaches to supporting transformation in partner 
countries 
The analytical chapters, respectively, ask how agricultural productivity 
can be enhanced (Ch. 2 and 3), look at the challenges in infrastructure 
development (7); explore what it would take to achieve universal access 
to health care (9), discuss how to improve quality of education (10), 
assess the challenges of building resilience to climate change (11), and 
explore how the capacity and legitimacy of the state can be strengthened 
to mitigate potential conflict risks (12).
10
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The more programmatic chapters share JICA’s experiences in agriculture 
(Ch.4 and 5), industrialization (6), infrastructure (8), and South-South 
and triangular cooperation (13). 
Chapter 1:  Achieving Economic Transformation for Inclusive and 
Sustained Growth in Africa: Prospects and Challenges (Kei 
Yoshizawa) 
This chapter attempts to give an overview of recent development in 
Africa as a prologue to the subsequent chapters.  
The basic view of the chapter on Africa is that while the recent high 
economic growth in Africa is appreciated, an economic transformation is 
called for. A transformation is needed to break away from the current 
dependence on primary products, from inadequate and uneven progress 
in poverty reduction, and from the alarming trend of the increase in the 
working age population and unemployment, with a transformation 
toward a more diversified economic structure that enables inclusive and 
sustained economic growth.  
In terms of development strategies, the author argues for what he calls a 
“diversified and customized approach for development.” He means that 
now as different countries are starting to follow different development 
paths, differentiated approaches should be applied to countries with 
different needs. He also emphasizes the importance of a regional 
approach, which has consistently been an important agenda issue 
throughout the TICAD process. 
Chapter 2:  Boosting Sustainable Agricultural Growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Koji Makino)
This chapter serves as a stage setter for the following three chapters (3 
through 5) on agriculture. It argues that JICA/Japan has been 
cooperating and will continue to cooperate with its African partners 
using four approaches. The first one is productivity increase on specific 
commodities of strategic importance in Africa, exemplified by the CARD 
initiative launched at the time of TICAD IV in 2008. The third is an 
approach that attempts to take advantage of the private sector in 
agricultural development, while at the same time increasing the 
productivity and hence the earnings of small scale famers. An example 
of this approach is the Mozambique-Brazil-Japan tripartite cooperation 
titled ProSAVANA. And the third is an attempt to encourage small 
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farmers to be more sensitive and responsive to market signals, the 
effectiveness of which has been proven by JICA’s experience in Kenya. 
Finally, he states that JICA will continue to build up resilience of African 
agriculture against risks such as climate change and food price hikes. 
Chapter 3:  How Promising Is the Rice Green Revolution in Sub-Saharan 
Africa? - Evidence from case studies in Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana  (Keijiro Otsuka)
This chapter is written by Professor Keijiro Otsuka of the National 
Graduate Research Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) of Japan, and 
leader of an empirical investigation by the JICA Research Institute on the 
possibility of rice production expansion in the countries participating in 
the CARD initiative. 
Starting with his premise that Sub Sahara Africa (SSA) needs a Green 
Revolution, the author argues that the most promising path for 
achieving a Green Revolution in SSA is through the development of 
lowland rice production. To support this claim, he presents two sources. 
The first is a macro level analysis: comparing SSA and Asia, he argues 
that there remains ample room for productivity improvement in rice. 
And second, he argues that the research conducted in Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Ghana demonstrates that a significant increase in 
per hectare yield is possible both in irrigated and rain-fed areas by 
combining certain rice production techniques, which the author calls 
“Asian type production techniques” like bunding and leveling, together 
with the use of high yielding modern variety seeds and the application 
of fertilizer. 
Chapter 4:  The Inclusive Development Approach among Farmers, 
Private Partners and Government through the Promotion of 
Responsible Investment for Agricultural Development (Koji 
Makino) 
This chapter starts by recognizing that investments both by the private 
sector and by farmers are essential for agricultural development, and 
argues that the issue is how countries can manage to secure “responsible 
investment” in agriculture. Specifically, the author argues that 
appropriate measures to promote responsible investment should be 
designed and put into practice in accordance with internationally agreed 
norms. 
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The chapter then introduces the case of the project entitled 
“ProSAVANA.” A project of national priority for Mozambique, it aims to 
contribute to the improvement of income among inhabitants in the 
Nacala Corridor, suited to agricultural production but inhabited by 
many small scale farmers. The project intends to build up agricultural 
inclusive development models through dialogues with farmers and civil 
societies under the government’s ownership.
Chapter 5:  Initiatives of SHEP and SHEP UP   
- Capacity development of small-scale farmers for increased 
responsiveness to market needs (Jiro Aikawa)
This chapter reports an encouraging outcomes being observed in a JICA 
supported project called SHEP and SHEP UP in Kenya, on developing 
the capacities of small-scale farmers. The idea is to help them be more 
responsive to the signals from the market and, at the same time, capable 
of strategically planning their production, and putting such plans into 
implementation. To that end, the project has devised a carefully 
designed model to motivate the farmers and provide appropriate 
assistance to help them overcome the information asymmetry and to 
upgrade their production and marketing techniques. 
The achievements so far have been very encouraging: the unit yield and 
income of the farmers participating in the project increased dramatically. 
Encouraged by the success of the project, the model is being scaled up 
nationwide. 
Chapter 6:  Industrial Development of Africa  
– JICA’s commitment at TICAD IV and its follow-up   
(Go Shimada, Toru Homma and Hiromichi Murakami) 
To address the de-industrialization issue in SSA, this chapter argues for 
measures of promoting industry for the creation employment and added 
value, for private sector development, and for promotion of foreign 
direct investment. 
The paper then looks at the history of three cases of cooperation projects 
that have been developing since TICAD IV in 2008. The idea 
underpinning these projects is that state has a role to play in promoting 
economic growth while maintaining equity, an idea that was stressed at 
the symposium held in 2008 as a side event to TICAD IV, participated in 
by African leaders as well as Prof. Stiglitz of Columbia University. 
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Presented in the paper are two projects in Ethiopia, one concerning 
industrial policy dialogue and productivity improvement, and the other 
quality and productivity improvement (Kaizen), as well as a project in 
Zambia for investment promotion and diversification entitled “Triangle 
of Hope.” 
Chapter 7:  Policy Challenges for Infrastructure Development in Africa 
- The way forward for Japan’s Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) (Yasuo Fujita, Ippei Tsuruga, and Asami Takeda) 
This chapter proposes three recommendations for the government of 
Japan, based on an analysis of data provided by the Infrastructure 
Consortium for Africa (ICA) and JICA’s internal information.
First, it argues that reallocation of resources to needier sectors, 
particularly to the power sector, is a high priority. Secondly, the chapter 
argues that the Japanese government may wish to expand its financial 
support for the operation and maintenance of infrastructure, which is at 
present left as the responsibility of recipient governments. And thirdly, 
the authors recommend more support for governance and management 
reform of public utilities; especially, the paper calls for intensified efforts 
to create effective organizations, like government agencies and public 
utilities in which, with appropriate external support, positive and 
immediate achievements can be expected in their organizational 
reforms. 
Chapter 8:  Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI)  
(Kaori Matsushita)
This chapter begins with a summary of the current situation of transport 
of goods in Africa and an overview of the CBTI development in the 
continent, and then introduces the three approaches that Japan has been 
pursuing for the development of CBTI, with specific examples.
The first is corridor development, one example of which is the project in 
an area connecting the Mombasa Port (Kenya) and inland countries of 
Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. It aims to upgrade the functions of the 
Port of Mombasa along with the development of roads connecting the 
port with the three countries, thereby encouraging the transport of 
goods as well as economic activities in the region. Another example of 
this approach is the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique, aiming to develop 
an area connecting the Nacala Port and the inland countries of Malawi 
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and Zambia. The second approach is pursuing border formalities 
facilitation, through the introduction of One Stop Border Posts (OSBP), a 
system that neighboring countries jointly conduct immigration, control 
customs clearance and quarantine. And the third approach aims to 
harmonize the transport rules and regulations across the borders, to 
alleviate problems arising from different regulations on road traffic on 
both sides of the borders. 
Chapter 9:  Toward Universal Health Coverage in Africa   
- Achieving MDGs with equity, and beyond (Ikuo Takizawa)
While noting that SSA has experienced quite impressive strides in 
improving a number of health indicators, this paper warns that there is a 
considerable disparity in the pace of progress within and among 
countries, and we cannot be complacent with the status quo. 
Now that equity in terms of essential health service coverage is 
becoming a major issue, the paper argues that it is increasingly necessary 
to focus on health system issues, and especially equity in access and 
financial protection, which, together, call for concerted efforts toward 
universal health coverage (UHC). As well, in making efforts toward 
UHC, the chapter calls for a paradigm shift in the usage of development 
assistance for health (DAH). Specifically, it is argued that DAH should 
be provided more strategically and catalytically in a way to increase the 
allocation of domestic resources for health. Secondly, DAH should also be 
provided in a way to improve the management of health systems and 
programs.
Chapter 10:  Challenges in Educational Development in Africa and 
JICA’s Approach (Kazuro Shibuya)
While acknowledging significant advancement in education in Africa, 
the author states that challenges remain, first in the persistent disparity 
among and within countries, and second in the quality of education. The 
paper points out as well that higher education in the African continent is 
also inadequate. 
Taking note of the shifts in the international education agendas from 
those of “Education for All” to “Learning for All,” the author discusses 
the validity of approaches that Japan has developed that are consistent 
with such globally shared trends in education and different needs of 
partner countries. These include those for the improvement of school 
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management and strengthening of teacher training. The author also 
emphasizes that JICA could play a role in facilitating feedback from the 
good practices on the ground to education policymakers in the central 
government, with its comparative advantage as a donor covering a wide 
spectrum of activities from the ministry level to local governments and 
communities levels.
Chapter 11:  Countermeasures against Climate Change in Africa  
(Tomonori Sudo)
This chapter discusses the challenges and potentials of Africa in terms of 
climate change. The paper argues, on the mitigation side, that though 
Africa is a region where the level of greenhouse gas emissions is the 
lowest in the world, ample possibilities for mitigating the climate change 
effect exist, especially in view of the robust economic growth foreseen 
for the continent in the coming decades. Such possibilities lie in energy 
and transportation, and forest management. 
On the adaptation side, the author lists, among others, three major 
challenges. First, measures to reduce the agricultural sector’s 
vulnerability must be strengthened because of its high dependency on 
rainwater and the inadequate product distribution system. Equally 
serious risks that warrant attention are those associated with natural 
disasters such as floods, droughts, coastal erosion, and mudslides. And 
third, water resources management is also a huge challenge in view of an 
unstable and insufficient water supply, the expansion of agriculture, 
industry and other sectors. The presence of international rivers in the 
continent also calls for effective cross border water resource 
management systems.  
Chapter 12:  State-building and Conflict Prevention in Africa   
(Ryutaro Murotani) 
This chapter argues that post-conflict state-building processes must 
focus not only on public safety but also on assuring people’s livelihood; 
livelihood improvement is necessary in order for people to perceive the 
dividend of peace and to accept the state as legitimate. In dealing with 
humanitarian crises, these perspectives for long-term institution 
building have to be introduced in the early stages of emergency 
responses to humanitarian crises. 
The chapter then shares some research findings to identify important 
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factors of building up the state’s legitimacy, as well as some examples of 
JICA’s projects helping to improve people’s livelihood, states’ capacities, 
and eventually the people’s trust of government institutions, 
contributing to improved state legitimacy.  
Chapter 13:  South-South and Triangular Cooperation for Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s Development    
- With special emphasis on knowledge exchange and co-
creation  
(Shunichiro Honda, Hiroshi Kato and Yukimi Shimoda)
This chapter looks at South-South cooperation (SSC) and Triangular 
Cooperation (TrC) for SSA development. SSC has a long history starting 
in the 1950s. Since its genesis, Africa, along with Asia, has played a 
leading role in its promotion.  The TICAD process has played an 
important role since 1993 in promoting the momentum of SSC.  
The paper pays special attention to knowledge exchange and co-creation 
through SSC and TrC. Drawing on the cases of TrC supported by JICA, 
the paper demonstrates that there are a number of possible ways of 
encouraging knowledge exchange and co-creation, from highly 
institutional models to more flexible ones, where institutional 
arrangements develop over time as the network among the participants 
develops. The paper also argues that knowledge sharing and co-creation 
should not be monopolized by a small number of actors but is a 
possibility to all aspiring countries and organizations.  
Appendix: The TICAD Process and Japan (Kei Yoshizawa)
This essay looks back at the 20 years since the first TICAD in 1993. It 
traces how the TICAD process has contributed to ever-changing 
development issues in Africa, with each of the quinquennial meetings 
focusing on different issues and the priorities of the time. It also gives 
attention to the institutional development of the process, including 
result-focused orientation demanding action plans with numerical 
targets, and its follow-up mechanism. The author finds the significance 
of the whole process in its development as an open international forum, 
through which ideas and concepts such as the respect of African 
ownership, human security, and south-south cooperation have been 
incorporated into the debate on African development. 
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Chapter 1: 
Achieving Economic Transformation for 
Inclusive and Sustained Growth in Africa: 
Prospects and Challenges
Kei Yoshizawa
Summary
<Current status of development in Africa>
 • The economic growth rate in Africa since 2000 has generally been 
good, driven in many countries by commodity exports, mainly 
energy and mineral resources, and helped by the progress in 
economic reforms and generally stable political conditions. However, 
poverty reduction is slow, unemployment, especially among youths, 
is serious, and progress is steady but slow in many MDGs.
 • Under such circumstances, achieving economic transformation – 
transformation from dependency on the export of energy and natural 
resources into a more diversified economic structure – is imperative, 
so that economic growth becomes more robust and the benefits are 
widely shared by the poor, and most notably the young. In other 
words, a transformation of the economic structure is needed to 
enable inclusive and sustained economic growth in Africa.
<For achieving economic transformation and inclusive, sustained 
growth in Africa> 
 • Productivity improvement in agriculture, Africa’s major production 
sector, is urgently needed; this should be promoted by the public 
sector as well as by the increased participation of the private sector in 
both agriculture and its related agro-industries. 
 • A slump in manufacturing has continued for many years. Efforts to 
promote industrial development should be intensified, learning from 
a number of successful cases in Africa as well as from experiences 
from other continents, particularly Asia. 
 • Africa has a rich human capital to be developed and mobilized in the 
coming decades to achieve inclusive and sustained growth. Investing 
in effective education and healthcare system is imperative to increase 
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labor productivity and per-capita income. Creating sufficient and 
decent employment is critial to mobilize the increasing working-age 
population to growth. 
<Toward a differentiated and customized approach for development>
The continent-wide regional integration perspective, which has been 
one of the principles underpinning the TICAD process, is important and 
must be further promoted. Along with this, however, the widening 
diversity of situations and stages of development among countries must 
be taken into consideration. Therefore, in working out its Action Plan for 
TICAD V, African leaders and their partners must make sure that each 
country is encouraged to seek differentiated and customized 
development strategies to meet its specific needs, while strongly 
upholding the perspective of regional integration and cooperation.
1. Current Status of Development in Africa 
1.1 Rate of economic growth 
In recent years, the growth of African economies has received increasing 
attention. Between 2003 and 2008, the rate of economic growth in Africa, 
including North Africa, was maintained at a high level, between 5.3% ~ 
6.2%. With a small variation, it has continued to grow at a stable pace: 
3.1% (2009) → 5.0% (2010) → 3.4% (2011) → 4.5% (2012 – estimate) → 
4.8% (2013 – estimate) (OECD et al 2012, p.243). The growth in 2009 was 
affected by the global recession and the financial crisis in 2008. Unlike 
the long slump after the oil shocks of the 1970s, however, the African 
economy showed a rapid recovery in 2010, a remarkable shift away from 
its dependence on the economies of developed countries in the past. It is 
also worthwhile noting that while the growth rate in sub-Saharan Africa 
was 5.1% (IMF 2012b, p.88), that of North Africa was 0.5% (OECD et al. 
2012, p.24), which shows a remarkable slowdown in growth in North 
African countries, generally due to the area’s political turmoil.
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Figure 1.  Change in the rate of economic growth of Africa (2001 ~ 2013)
  (OECD et al. 2012, P.16)
Such economic growth has been possible mainly due to price hikes in 
energy and mineral resources since 2000. Mckinsey Global Institute 
(MGI) estimates that the sum of the increase in earnings from the export 
of energy and mineral resources and government spending on energy 
and mineral resource development accounted for 32% of economic 
growth in 2000-2008 (MGI 2010, p.2). Hirano (2009, p.220) estimates that 
78.2% of the exports of sub-Saharan African countries in 2006, excluding 
South Africa, were from the mining sector and that there has been a 
strong correlation between the oil prices and the GDP (in nominal US 
dollars) of sub-Saharan Africa (correlation coefficient of 0.902 (1970-
2007)) (ibid, p.202).1 It is expected that the prices of energy and mineral 
resources will exceed the pre-2009 levels and the favorable economic 
environment for African countries will continue for the time being, 
accordingly (OECD et al. 2012, p.17, IEA 2012).
While oil-exporting countries2 have benefited a lot from the above price 
hikes, oil-importing countries are also growing strongly with an 
economic growth rate similar to oil-exporters. While the rate of 
economic growth of oil-exporting countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
6.0% ~ 7.1%, that of oil-importing countries (except South Africa) is 5.8% 
~ 6.0% (IMF 2012b, p.88). 
1. See also Hirano (2013) pp.76-80 for updated information.
2. IMF (2012a) defines Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Nigeria and South Sudan as oil-exporting countries, and the others as oil-importers. 
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The prices of agricultural commodities also have been on a strong 
upward trend since the early 2000s (IMF 2013). However, a number of 
the oil-importing countries, which have been growing strongly, as 
mentioned above, have not benefited from these favorable external 
conditions, as the terms of trade of the non-resource-rich fast growers3 
had been remaining stable or declining since the early 1990s (Figure 2). 
This trend has been continuing despite strong and sustained growth 
except in Mali (IMF 2012 pp.99). Hirano (2009, pp.205-213) also suggests 
that the impact of the price hikes in agricultural raw materials and 
edibles on growth rates have been important but much weaker than 
those of energy and metals since the 1990s. 
IMF (2008) notes that, while the fast growers4 have had a variety of 
experiences with their terms of trade as in Figure 2, the most important 
factor for the fast growers has been a significant increase in total factor 
productivity, and that this underscores the role of strong policies and 
broad reforms by the fast growers, especially non-resource-rich 
countries (pp.26-27, p.30, pp.41-42). IMF (ibid p.31) also suggests that 
growth opportunities based on geography and endowments are not 
necessary conditions for fast growth based on recent experiences among 
fast growers in Africa.
Benno Ndulu et al. (2007 p.16) and Jorge Arbache et al. (2007 p.41, 2008 
pp.27-28) also argue that the role of policy reforms undertaken in Africa 
since the 1990s was the most important growth factor since the late 
1990s. They also suggest that the quality of policy and governance 
matter a great deal for growth, rather than initial conditions of 
geography and natural resources, which matter mostly for income 
levels, not for growth. 
Collier and O’Connell (2007), however, propose a classification of Sub-
Sahara African countries into three groups reflecting their initial 
geography and natural resource conditions: resource-rich, coastal 
resource-scarce, and landlocked resource-scarce (p.8) and suggest that a 
different policy choice for growth is required to overcome the 
3. See footnote 4. 
4. IMF (2008) defines “fast growers” as countries which had average annual real per capita 
GDP growth above 2.25% for 1995-2007. The group includes 4 oil exporters (Angola, Chad, 
Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria), 2 resource-rich countries (Botswana, Sao Tome and Principe), 
and 11 non-resource-rich countries (Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda) (pp.26-27, p.53).
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disadvantages for each group in terms of geography and natural 
resources (pp.55-58).
As above, the views on the role of initial geography and natural resource 
conditions for growth, especially those of landlocked resource-scarce 
countries, are mixed. Collier (2007) defines “landlocked with bad 
neighbors” as one of the major development traps in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and argues that growth in landlocked resource-scarce countries depends 
strongly on the performance of the neighbors. IMF (2008 p.31) notes that 
the growth acceleration of the five landlocked and non-resource-rich fast 
growers5 may be partly explained by improvements in their neighboring 
high-growth coastal economies, which are increasingly pulling their 
landlocked neighbors. IMF (2012a p.27), however,  estimates that the 
spillover effect from South Africa and Nigeria through trade, investment 
and finance is growing but the role of EU, US, Chinese and Indian 
markets continues to be the most important for the majority of African 
countries.6
Figure 2. Sub-Saharan Africa Terms of Trade since late 1980s
    (IMF 2008, p.33)
5. Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, Rwanda, Uganda (ibid p.31)
6. In regard to the role of the spillover effect through intra-regional trade, IMF (2011a) 
estimates the ratio of intra-regional trade to the total amount of trade by Sub-Sahara Africa 
still remained at 14% in 2010, while WEF et al. (2011, p.17) and Afrika and Ajumbo (2012) 
argue that informal cross border trade (ICBT) is also to be considered as important as official 
intra-regional trade despite difficulties in data collection and analysis (see Section 1.8 of this 
chapter).
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The biggest constraint to economic growth in Africa is political 
instability (including civil war, conflicts and political unrest). The rate of 
economic growth of the 12 fragile countries7 in sub-Saharan Africa was 
2.3%8 in 2011; this figure was affected by the unrest in the Cote d’Ivoire,9 
a figure significantly lower than that of the entire sub-Saharan Africa of 
6.3% (IMF 2012a, p.76). The slowing down of the economic growth of 
North African countries caused by political turmoil also shows the 
magnitude of political risk (OECD et al. 2012, p.24).
Table 1. Growth rate by type of countries in Africa (%)
Calendar year 2010 2011 2012 2013
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.3 5.2 5.0 5.7
Oil-exporting countries 6.6 6.3 6.7 6.0
Middle-income countries, excluding South 
Africa
6.5 8.2 5.6 5.9
South Africa 2.9 3.1 2.6 3.0
Low-income countries, excluding fragile 
countries
6.4 5.5 5.9 6.1
Fragile countries 4.2 2.3 6.6 6.5
North Africa 4.1 0.5 3.1 4.0
Africa total 5.0 3.4 4.5 4.8
(Prepared by the author based on IMF 2012a, p.76 and OECD et al. 2012, pp.24, 243)
1.2  Economic relationship with foreign countries (trade, foreign direct 
investment, emigrant remittances and foreign aid)
Currently, the international balances of trade, foreign direct investment, 
remittances and foreign aid receipts are all surplus in contrast to the 
1990s when Africa was plagued by debt problems and a deficit in its 
international balance from weak commodity prices. In 2005, foreign 
direct investment exceeded the amount of foreign aid for the first time 
and it was said that “Africa has become a target for investment and not a 
subject for aid”. This does not mean, however, that Africa no longer 
needs aid; the most recent statistics show that foreign aid amounts to 
$47.9 billion (2010), a figure comparable to the surplus of $48.4 billion 
7. IMF (2012a) defines Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Togo and Zimbabwe as the Fragile States in sub-Saharan Africa.
8. Growth rate of Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 was -4.7%.
9. It is expected, however, to recover rapidly after 2012 due to improved political stability in 
Côte d’Ivoire.
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(2010) in foreign direct investment, and $38.0 billion (2009) in 
remittances. (OECD et al. 2012, p.261, p.263 and p.281) 
Figure 3.  Change in foreign direct investment, emigrant remittances and foreign 
aid in Africa (2000 ~ 2012)
  (OECD et al. 2012, p.41)
The fiscal balance continues to show a deficit both in oil-importing and 
oil-exporting countries because of their expanded public spending 
policy after the financial crisis in 2008. It is expected that while oil-
producing countries will improve their fiscal balance (to about 2% of 
GDP) through the improvement in oil prices, non-oil-producing 
countries will continue to show a higher budget deficit (to about 5% of 
GDP) (OECD et al. 2012, pp.32-33). Although fiscal and monetary 
policies have been generally tightened, the budget deficit still continues. 
High inflation has been observed in Eastern Africa resulting from the 
expansion of government spending on infrastructure investment and 
soaring food prices in the “Horn of Africa”. The levels of budget deficits 
and borrowing are under control at the moment, but some non-oil-
producing sub-Saharan countries depend on foreign aid to finance 
government spending and international balance payments. Overall, it 
continues to be a challenge for African countries to control and manage 
their budget deficits and public debt. (IMF 2012b, pp.11-13)
Foreign direct investments are focused mainly on energy and natural 
resource development. Investments in energy and natural resource 
sectors are focused on Western Africa (e.g., Nigeria, Ghana 
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(development of new oil fields)), in Southern Africa (e.g., Angola), and in 
Central Africa (e.g., Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the 
Congo), while investments in Northern Africa have dropped by 42% 
over the previous year ($9.48 billion in 2011) due to the political turmoil. 
However, there are signs of diversification in foreign direct investment,10 
such as growing investments in the ICT sector since the 2000s, and 
strong investment in non- oil-producing countries like Morocco ($3.44 
billion, 2011) (OECD et al. 2012, p. 44).11 Ernst & Young (2012) also 
suggests a growing share of manufacturing and service sectors in FDI 
into Africa12 as an important lead indicator of a broader process of 
economic diversification from dependence on natural resources and 
commodity prices. 
1.3 Progress of economic reform 
Economic reform in African countries is progressing. Although the 
average CPIA13 score for 38 IDA-eligible countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
(= 3.2) is a bit lower than that of countries in other areas (= 3.4), the level 
of economic reforms in African countries, excluding fragile countries 
(=3.514), is mostly similar to that of developing countries in other areas 
(=3.615). The trend for improvement in CPIA scores in fragile countries is 
also remarkable16 and economic reforms in Africa as a whole are 
10. Nishiura and Fukunishi (2008) reports the following six industries as major areas of 
foreign direct investment in Africa other than energy and mining: Automobile (South Africa), 
Horticulture (Kenya, Ethiopia, Zambia), Garment (Lesotho, Swaziland, Kenya, 
Madagascar), Aluminum (Mozambique), Retail Trading (South Africa, Zambia, Malawi), 
Mobile Phone. 
11. Morocco was nominated as the “Top Investment Destination for 2012” by the Financial 
Times. (OECD et al. 2012, p.44). World Bank’s Doing Business 2012 introduced Morocco as 
the country that most improved its ranking (ranked 115 ⇒ 94) (World Bank 2012d, p.13).
12. Ernst & Young (2012, pp.27-28) suggests the following key findings on the FDI into Africa 
during 2003-2011: i) The share of the FDI capital that has gone into the extractive sector is 
27.6%, ii) Over 50% of the FDI projects have been in the service sector, iii) 70% of the FDI 
capital has gone into manufacturing and infrastructure sectors, iv) the manufacturing sector 
alone accounts for 40% of all new FDI-related job, v) 64% of the FDI capital invested in the 
manufacturing sector has gone into processing and beneficiation-type activities in the 
extractive sectors. 
13. Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rates countries against a set of 16 
criteria grouped in four clusters: (a) economic management, (b) structural policies, (c) 
policies for social inclusion and equity, (d) public sector management and institutions. 
14. The average CPIA score of non-fragile countries (21 countries).
15. The average CPIA score of non-fragile countries in other areas.
16. When compared between 2009 and 2011, the number of countries that showed an 
improvement in CPIA scores was 8 out of 21 Non-Fragile States in 2009, and 10 out of 17 
Fragile States in 2011.
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progressing. (World Bank 2012c. p.5)
Seventy-eight percent of sub-Saharan countries implemented some 
economic reforms in 2010 and 2011, an improvement from the average 
56% between 2006 and 2011; it is widely recognized that the speed of 
economic reforms has considerably increased (Figure 4). Countries that 
have raised the Doing Business ranking by implementing reforms in 
more than three items include Morocco (115 ⇒ 94), Sao Tome and 
Principe (174 ⇒ 163), Cape Verde (129 ⇒ 119), Sierra Leone (150 ⇒ 141) 
and Burundi (177 ⇒ 169) (World Bank 2012d, p.1 and p.13).
Despite the progress in economic reforms, the absolute level of their 
business environment still remains low with many challenges still to be 
addressed. Out of 183 countries, 43 of 51 African countries score below 
94th among 183 countries ranked in the Doing Business Report 2012; 
improvement in the business environment in African countries is still 
constrained.
Ernst & Young (2012), however, points out the need to bridge the 
perception gap among world investors and business leaders many of 
whom still view Africa as being a more challenging place to do business 
in than other emerging market regions, despite the fact that 14 African 
countries are ranked ahead of Russia, 16 ahead of Brazil and 17 ahead of 
India in the above Doing Business rankings (pp.5, 10). 
Figure 4. Progress of economic reforms in sub-Saharan Africa
(World Bank 2012d, P.1)
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1.4 Good governance and anti-corruption
UNECA (2009, p.1 and p.12) measures the progress on governance in 
Africa by using the benchmarks of the first edition of the Africa 
Governance Report in 2005. It concludes that economic management, 
pro-investment policies and efficiency of the tax system have made some 
notable progress; however, corruption has made no progress or a 
marginal decline of the corruption control index. This shows that 
corruption remains the most important challenge to the eradication of 
poverty, the creation of a predictable and favorable investment 
environment and in general, socio-economic development in Africa.
UNECA and AU (2011, p.4) reports that the socio-economic and political 
cost of corruption in Africa was estimated at over $148 billion per year in 
2004, which is equivalent to three times the amount of the current 
foreign direct investment into Africa in 2010, and that 50% of tax 
revenue, 25% of the continent’s GDP and that $30 billion in aid for Africa 
are eaten up by corruption. World business leaders raise corruption as 
the second most problematic factor for doing business in Africa, 
following lack of access to financing (WEF 2011, p.12). Out of all the 53 
countries in the African continent except South Sudan, 48 countries17 are 
ranked below 50 in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2012, which 
shows that public institutions need to be more transparent and powerful 
officials more accountable in these countries (Transparency International 
2012). 
Many experts suggest a variety of measures to combat corruption in 
Africa; however, their views are mixed, as follows: 
 ➢ UNECA (2009, p.235) proposes three priority areas for African 
countries: 1) strong institutions including parliament, judiciary, 
office of auditor-general, public procurement system, anti-corruption 
bodies, etc., ii) powerful anti-corruption constituency with civil 
society and media, and iii) better remuneration for public servants to 
reduce petty and grand corruption undermining all the development 
and anti-corruption efforts. 
 ➢ Hanson (2009, pp.5-6) of the US Council on Foreign Relations is 
suspicious about the effects on African governments brought by 
donor intervention in an anti-corruption context, while reserving 
evaluation on some anti-corruption practices such as Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC), and Extractive Industries 
17. Five countries ranked over 50 in the CPI 2012 are Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, 
Rwanda, and Seychelles.
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Transparency Initiatives (EITI). 
 ➢ Global Integrity (2011) suggests that the “implementation gap” 
between progress in anti-corruption frameworks and results should 
be addressed more since the implementation gap in many countries, 
including those in Africa, is widening. It also notes that the 
establishment of an anti-corruption agency is relatively ineffective in 
strengthening transparency and accountability. 
 ➢ Some academics are very pessimistic about combatting corruption; 
Collier (2007) raises “Bad Governance in a Small Country” as one of 
the four major Development Traps that African countries suffer from. 
Moyo (2009) insists on cutting off foreign aid which, she argues, has 
brought corruption rather than development to Africa.
Across these discussions, the following could be noted as a broad and 
minimum consensus on corruption in Africa: i) corruption is 
undoubtedly the most pressing governance and development challenge 
that Africa is confronted with today (UNECA and AU 2011, p.3), ii) the 
progress of anti-corruption is quite slow or making no progress (UNECA 
2009, p.1), iii) effective measures and actions are urgently needed. 
1.5 Economic growth and poverty reduction
The percentage of the population living below $1.25 a day in sub-
Saharan Africa has decreased and is expected to continue as follows: 58% 
(1990) ⇒ 59% (1995) ⇒ 51% (2005) ⇒ 47.5% (2008) ⇒ 38% (estimate for 
2015) (IMF 2011a, p.14, World Bank 2010a, p.11). In addition, the number 
of people in poverty in sub-Saharan Africa decreased by 8 million from 
2005 to 2008. The World Bank reports that this was the first time that the 
absolute number (not the rate) of people in poverty in sub-Saharan 
Africa decreased since the Bank began to record poverty-related 
statistics (World Bank 2012a).
However, sub-Saharan Africa18 as a whole is unlikely to achieve the 
MDG target of halving the poverty rate in 1990 by 2015 (from 58% in 
1990 to 29% by 2015) (UNECA et al. 2012, p.3, Table 6). While four 
countries19 in Sub-Saharan Africa have already achieved the target, and 
five countries20 are expected to achieve it, the other countries are lagging 
18. North Africa, by contrast, has already achieved the goal of halving the proportion of the 
population living in poverty (5%) in 1990 by 2015; the rate was lowered to 2% (2008) (United 
Nations 2012).
19. Cameroon, Kenya, Mauritania and Senegal
20. Central Africa, Ethiopia, Ghana, Seychelles and Swaziland
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behind (World Bank 2010a).
Figure 5.  Proportion of Population Living in Poverty in sub-Saharan Africa and 
other regions (1990-2008)
         (UNECA et al. 2012 p.3)
IMF (2011a) suggests that in sub-Saharan Africa the relationship 
between per capita GDP growth and poverty reduction is weak, and that 
it is imperative to realize economic growth in such a way to further 
accelerate poverty reduction. IMF (2011a) also notes that in high-growth 
sub-Saharan countries,21 an increase by 1% in the growth rate 
corresponds to a decrease by about 1% in the poverty reduction rate, 
showing a clear relationship between economic growth and poverty 
reduction. And according to case studies on some of the high-growth 
sub-Saharan countries, job creation in the agricultural sector has a high 
impact on poverty reduction. 
However, it is reported that no such relationship between economic 
growth and poverty reduction was observed in low-growth sub-Saharan 
countries. 
When compared with Asia, the poverty reduction effect of economic 
21. IMF (2011a) defines high-growth countries as countries with an average annual growth 
rate of real GDP per capita of over 2.25% during 1995 and 2010. Low-growth Sub-Saharan 
countries are those other than the high-growth countries. 
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growth is modest in sub-Saharan countries; in high-growth Asian 
countries, an increase by 1% in the growth rate corresponds to a decrease 
by 2.3% in the poverty reduction rate. 
This shows that more efforts are required in Sub-Saharan Africa to make 
growth more inclusive and to enable more people to enjoy the fruits of 
growth. 
1.6 Demographics, employment and urbanization
It is expected that the population and working-age population will 
increase in the coming decades in Africa. As of 2008, the youth 
population (aged 15-24) and that of working-age people were 200 
million and 550 million, respectively. The working-age population is 
increasing by 2.7% every year and is expected to reach 1.7 billion and 
overtake that of China and India by 2040 (OECD et al. 2012, p.99).22 In 
most African countries, unemployed youths account for 60% of all the 
unemployed, and the youth unemployment rate is double the adult 
unemployment rate (ibid. p.100). As 72% of youths have an income of 
less than $2 a day (ibid. pp.99-100), it is imperative to reduce poverty 
among youths through job creation. In addition to unemployment, 
underemployment and working poverty are also to be addressed as low-
skilled and low-wage employment are so broad in Africa especially in 
the informal sector.  
The employment situation in Africa varies depending on the situation of 
individual countries, but generally, there is a tendency that higher 
income per capita is associated with a lower employment rate of the 
working-age population (OECD et al. 2012, p.108 and Figure 6). In low-
income sub-Saharan African countries,23 the employment rate of the 
working-age population is about 70%, which is comparable to China and 
Brazil. However, employment in low-income countries has a weak 
impact on poverty reduction and human resource development because 
a large part of employment is in the informal sector that depends on low-
22. African Development Bank Group (2011) estimates that the working-age population in 
2010 was 399 million people with a growth rate of 3.5%, and the working-age population in 
2040 will be in the range of 1.07 billion ~1.12 billion people.
23. Based on the Statistics by the World Bank in 2011, low-income countries (LICs) (less than 
$1.025 per day) include Kenya, Ethiopia, DRC, Tanzania, Uganda and Mozambique, while 
lower-middle-income countries (LMICs) ($1.026 – 4.035 per day) include Cameroon, Ghana, 
Egypt, Morocco, and Nigeria, and upper-middle-income countries (UMICs) ($4.036 – 
$12.475 per day) include Angola, Algeria, Gabon, South Africa, and Tunisia, etc.
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skilled, low-wage labor. On the other hand, in middle-income sub-
Saharan African countries,24 the employment rate of the working-age 
population is much lower, below 50%, and therefore, a quantitative 
improvement of employment is strongly needed rather than quality 
improvement. As the youth unemployment rate is quite high,25 it is 
imperative to promote youth employment for new entrants in the labor 
market. (OECD et al. 2012, p.100).
Figure 6.  Comparison of the employment rate of the working-age population by 
country income groups in Africa and others
   (OECD et al. 2012, P.108)
Figure 7 below shows that higher educational record, including 
vocational training, does not necessarily contribute to a decrease in the 
unemployment rate; conversely, a higher educational record tends to be 
associated with higher rates of unemployment in middle-income 
countries. This means that the improvement in the education system or 
labor market legislation alone will not suffice; massive creation of 
employment opportunities driven by the private sector is called for, to 
accommodate the increasing number of youths and their improving 
educational records.
There is also a number of challenges in terms of the quality of education, 
especially the employability of graduates, ranging from basic education 
to higher education, and both in levels and content. While the 
24. Including both lower-middle-income countries and upper-middle-income countries.
25. 23.4% in North Africa (3.8 times higher than the adult unemployment rate), and 48% in 
South Africa (2.5 times higher than the adult unemployment rate) 
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enrollment rate for primary and secondary education has been 
remarkably improved, the low quality of education, or a decline in 
quality in some countries, has been growing as a major challenge. It is 
reported that the average academic achievement of sixth-grade children 
in sub-Saharan Africa is at the same level as that of second-grade 
children in OECD countries.26 In addition to the lack of basic literacy and 
numeracy, the achievement test scores of students in some African 
countries have dropped when compared to those in the 1990s (MGI 2010, 
pp.20-21). Also pointed out is the lack of practical skills and knowledge 
in school education curriculum, as well as a mismatch between the 
educational content and employment needs (OECD et al. 2012, pp.141-
144).
Figure 7.  Comparison of the employment rate by education and  
country income groups in Africa
   (OECD et al. 2012, P.142)
Urbanization in Africa, which is expected to rapidly spread, is to be 
addressed as a major urgent policy challenge. Urban population levels in 
Africa have been consistently increasing since the 1950s. In 2009, 395 
million people, equivalent to about 40% of the population were living in 
urban areas, and the number is increasing by about 13 million annually 
(UN HABITAT 2010). The increase in the urban population in sub-
26. See Chapter 10 of this volume.
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Saharan Africa is consistent even during low growth periods,27 as shown 
in Figure 8. The insufficient government measures to address 
urbanization have been exacerbating difficulties such as urban poverty, 
prevalence of slums, and informalization of the urban economy, which 
are becoming more critical issues to be tackled by African governments 
and the international community.28  
Figure 8. Urban demographics in Africa (1950-2050)
   (UN HABITAT 2010 P.1)
The presence of the informal sector has been a buffer to absorb the 
increase in the urban population and working-age population. So far, 
however, the response of the international community and African 
countries to the increase of the informal sector has been insufficient. The 
dependence on the informal sector may deepen difficulties in urban 
areas, lead to the further expansion of low wages, low-skilled labor and 
vulnerable employees.
27. In Africa, from 1970 to 1995, GDP per capita fell by 0.7% annually, but the urban 
population increased by 4.7% annually. This is reported as “urbanization without economic 
growth” (Watanabe 2010). As will be mentioned in Chapter 2, although the cropland per 
capita of the agricultural population in Africa has been decreasing, the increase of the rural 
population cannot be absorbed in agriculture, resulting in the above continuous population 
shift to urban areas. In addition, though experts’ views are varied, it is also possible that 
modernization in agriculture could accelerate the increase in the urban population, since, as 
some argue, that the improvement in agricultural productivity produces a surplus in the 
agricultural labor force rather than an increase in employment in the non-agricultural sectors 
in rural areas (Ranis and Gollin 2012).
28. In the case of Kenya, 60% of the urban population of Nairobi (3.36 million (2007)) live in 
slums and the informal sector accounts for 60% of overall employment in the country. The 
unemployment rate in the slums of Nairobi is 26% and that of youths (15-24 years) and 
women is even higher, reaching 49%; this situation is reported to have contributed to the riots 
after the presidential election in early 2008 (Watanabe 2010, p.137).
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The creation of sufficient formal sector employment is an imperative for 
Africa in order to achieve sustained economic growth, reduce poverty, 
and develop and make use of human resources to support its future. 
Employment is to be created by improving the business environment, 
i.e., management of local small to medium-sized businesses, 
development of infrastructure (particularly, stable power supply), 
improvement of access to finance, promotion of capital investment, 
improvement of labor productivity, promotion of human resource 
development, and employment creation that can result in an increase in 
per capita income. (OECD et al. 2012, pp.135-140)
The informal sector, where most Africans work and will continue to 
work, plays an important role in poverty reduction and equitable 
growth. The World Bank (2011c, pp.9-14) argues that even rapid growth 
of the formal sector is unlikely to keep pace with the growing number of 
new entrants to the labor market since private wage employment in the 
formal sector has a very limited share in the labor market of low-income 
African countries.29 The cross country analysis (Figure 9) suggests that 
the ratio of household enterprise employment to total employment 
increases rapidly with growth of GDP per capita and surpasses the 
increase of wage employment, by absorbing employment shifting out of 
family farming, the most dominant type of employment in most low-
income African countries. Against this background, World Bank (2011c) 
suggests that raising productivity and income in the informal sector, 
notably household enterprises,30 should be recognized as an important 
challenge of employment in low-income African countries. 
29. In the case of Uganda in 2003-2006, although wage employment grew at 13% per annum, it 
only accounted for 20% of the new jobs created. In the case of Tanzania in 2000-2005, private 
wage employment grew at 11.2% per annum, which was surpassed by household enterprise 
employment growth at 12.9% per annum.  
30. World Bank (2011c, p.14) also notes that more “formality” of household enterprise may 
not be the answer when the cost and benefits of more regulation are carefully considered. It 
also notes that legal regulations on household enterprises, as well as local taxes imposed on 
them, exist in many African countries. 
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Figure 9.  Cross Country Analysis of Distribution of  
Primary Employment by Type
      (World Bank 2011c, p.10)
1.7  Current situation and future expectations for achieving main goals 
of MDGs 
According to the assessment of the progress of MDGs in Africa (UNECA 
et al, 2011 and 2012), Africa has recorded remarkable progress in the 
areas of the primary education enrollment rate, gender equality in the 
primary education enrollment rate, improvement in the literacy rate of 
15-24 year olds, women’s participation in political decision-making, 
immunization for children, prevention of the spread of tuberculosis and 
HIV/AIDS and the decrease in the malaria mortality rate. A remarkable 
decrease has also been observed in the under-five infant mortality rate in 
post-conflict countries.
However, progress is slow in other areas: in halving the poverty rate, 
creating productive employment and decent work, and reducing hunger 
and malnutrition. Youth unemployment is also high. Although the 
primary education enrollment rate has risen, the primary education 
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completion rate has not risen enough to match the enrollment rate 
progress. The gender equality in secondary education and higher 
education is off track. Despite a substantial improvement, the access to 
safe drinking water target is unlikely to be achieved by 2015. The 
progress in improving access to sanitation is extremely slow. 
The MDGs 2012 Progress Chart (United Nations 2012) shows that sub-
Saharan Africa has only two goals that it is likely to achieve by 2015: 
“Equal girl’s enrollment in primary education” and “Halt and begin to 
reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS”. The other 14 goals are assessed as 
“Progress insufficient to reach the target if prevailing trends persist.” 
With respect to the “Reduce maternal mortality by three quarters,” 
though, the prospects are improving.31 In North Africa, 9 of the 16 goals 
are within the “Target already met or expected to be met”, but the “Halt 
and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS” is classified as “No 
progress or deterioration”.
As shown above, the progress of MDGs varies by goal and by country, 
and it is difficult to make sweeping statements about the development 
goals and policies for Africa beyond 2015. The following, however, are 
common and major challenges remaining in the post-2015 era:
 ➢ Acceleration of poverty-reducing policies or implementation of 
adequate policies (job creation, agriculture and rural 
development) toward inclusive growth.
 ➢ Initiatives to address the quality of education to upgrade and 
enhance the curriculum to meet society’s needs, while 
maintaining momentum toward the quantitative improvement 
toward universal basic education.
 ➢ Expansion of access to health services in the field of infectious 
disease control and maternal and child health, and further 
expansion of access to safe drinking water and sanitation facilities.
 ➢ Continuation of support for achieving MDGs beyond 2015 in 
countries which will not have achieved them, with diversification 
of programs and approaches to adapt to conditions of different 
countries and regions.
31. The progress on this goal was assessed as “No progress or deterioration” in Progress 
Chart 2011, while the assessment in the 2012 edition improved to “Progress insufficient to 
reach the target if prevailing trends persist.” 
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1.8  Diversification of trade partners and the progress of intra-regional 
integration
Until the 1990s, the African economy used to be heavily dependent on 
the European market; however, since the 2000s, economic ties have been 
strengthened with emerging countries (particularly, China, India and 
Brazil). As a result, the trade with these emerging countries and intra-
regional trade have come to account for 50% of exports and over 60% of 
imports (IMF 2011a, p.39).
Intra-regional trade has come to account for about 14% due to the 
development in intra-regional economic integration (ibid p.41). 
Advancements in this respect are facilitated by development of regional 
infrastructure, promotion of a customs union and common market by 
regional economic communities (RECs) and elimination of non-tariff 
barriers. The advancement of intra-region trade is making some African 
economies less vulnerable to external shocks. For example, EAC 
countries, which are more dependent on intra-regional trade and are 
diversified in terms of trade partners compared to countries in other sub-
regions, are considered to be more resilient to external economic shocks 
than countries in other sub-regions; EAC countries experienced a 
relatively moderate slowdown of economic growth following the 
financial crisis in 2008, with their growth rate reaching 4.7% in 2009. 
(WEF et al. 2011, p.16-17)
Despite difficulties in data collection and analysis, informal cross border 
trade (ICBT) is also quite extensive within Africa. For example, in 
Uganda, informal exports in 2009 ($1.56 billion, all of which is for 
neighboring countries) were equivalent to formal exports ($1.57 billion, 
44% of which is for neighboring countries) (WEF et al. 2011, p.17). Afrika 
and Ajumbo (2012) estimates that ICBT is a source of income for 43% of 
Africa’s population, and stands at $17.6 billion per year in the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) region, accounting for 20% of 
GDP in Nigeria and 75% in Benin. 
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Figure 10. Change of trading partners of Sub-Saharan Africa
(IMF 2011a, p.41)
1.9 Development risks in Africa
Having looked at the current situation, as well as the challenges to 
economic growth and the achievements of MDGs since the 2000s, we 
now move to see the risk factors for Africa, among the most notable of 
which are political instability, global economic downturn, climate 
change and food security as well as debt sustainability.
1.9.1 Risk of political instability 
Political risks, including the possibilities of civil wars and political 
turmoil, exemplified in the “Arab Spring” in North Africa, pose the 
biggest risk to economic and social development in Africa. While a 
number of civil wars and conflicts have been settled thanks to the efforts 
of African countries throughout the African Union and the support of 
the international community, there is always a risk of recurrence. With 
this recognition, efforts must continue by individual countries as well as 
by regional and international communities to support the peace-
building, reconstruction and state-building of conflict-affected or 
conflict-prone countries. And, in the longer term, countries must achieve 
inclusive growth for socio-economic stability, since, as seen in the case of 
the Arab Spring, at the root of political and social unrest lies people’s 
discontent about persistent unemployment and disparities. 
1.9.2 Risk of the impacts of a global economic downturn
Africa always faces the risk of economic slowdown caused by a global 
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economic downturn such as the financial crisis in 2008, and the recent 
Euro crisis. Countries with close links to the global economy tend to be 
strongly affected by such external shocks. South Africa, for example, 
which has close economic ties with Europe, recorded a considerable 
slowdown in its growth rate following the financial crisis in 200832 and 
there is similar concern in countries in North Africa where export and 
tourism revenue strongly depends on Europe.33 Also, as we saw in the 
previous section, Africa is coming to have closer ties with emerging 
countries like China, India and Brazil. Any economic downturn in these 
economies will inevitably affect Africa’s economy. 
1.9.3 Risk of climate change and food insecurity
While Africa is the region with the least amount of GHG emissions, it is 
the region most vulnerable to climate change. The risk of climate change 
in Africa was widely recognized in COP17, which was held in 
Johannesburg in 2011, and owing to the drought in the Sahel region and 
the Horn of Africa during 2011-2012. At the Camp David Summit in May 
2012, G8 and African Leaders agreed upon forming a New Alliance for 
Food Security and Nutrition in Africa.
UNFCCC (2007 pp.18-20) highlights some impacts of climate change in 
Africa on key sectors including: increasing risk of drought, flooding, and 
inundation due to sea-level rise in the coastal areas; increasing water 
scarcity and stress; loss of agricultural land and declining production of 
subsistence crops; increasing infectious diseases such as malaria, 
tuberculosis and diarrhea; malnutrition for both adults and children; 
loss of biodiversity; and damage to coastal infrastructure.
The annual cost of adaptation in Sub-Saharan Africa is estimated at 
$16.9-18.9 billion (2010-15),34 which is lower than those of East Asia and 
Pacific ($19.5-28.7 billion) and Latin America and the Caribbean ($16.8-
22.5 billion); however, in terms of share of GDP, Sub-Saharan Africa 
32. South Africa’s average growth rate was 4.9% during the 5-year period between 2004-2008. 
It dropped to -1.5% in 2009, and is expected to recover only to 3.0% in 2013. (IMF 2012a, p.76).
33. OECD et al. (2012 p.33) reports that a 1% decline in the economic growth rate in OECD 
countries will cause a 0.5% decrease in economic growth in Africa and a 10% drop in export 
revenue in Africa.
34. In sector analysis, water supply and flood protection ($6.2-6.6 billion), coastal zone ($4.0 
billion) and agriculture ($3.3 billion) are the important sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
cost of infrastructure is forecast to increase significantly from $1.1 billion (2010-19) to $6.0 
billion (2040-49). 
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(0.70%) is much higher those of East Asia and Pacific (0.20%) and Latin 
America and Caribbean (0.30%) (World Bank (2010b)).35 
The Copenhagen Accord, which was agreed in COP15 in December 
2009, recognizes Africa as the most vulnerable developing region for 
which enhanced action and international cooperation on adaptation is 
urgently required, and also funding for adaptation will be prioritized in 
the future climate change financing mechanism, which aims at 
mobilizing $100 billion per year by 2020 (para 3, 8). The High-Level 
Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (2010), established by the 
UN Secretary-General in February 2010, also suggests that grants and 
highly concessional loans are crucial for adaptation in the most 
vulnerable countries including those in Africa (pp.5, 10). Against this 
background, the African Development Bank Group (2011) proposes to 
establish the African Green Fund to complement existing instruments 
and enhance the ability of African countries to respond to Climate 
Finance challenges.  
Africa has the potential for mitigating the negative impact of climate 
change. It is endowed with a variety of abundant natural renewable 
energy resources such as hydro, geothermal, solar and wind power, 
though much of this potential remains to be developed. Climate change 
mitigation will increasingly be a challenge for the continent, for it will 
have to expand its energy production to meet the continent’s ever-
increasing demand coming from growing economies and increasing 
populations. 
Africa could improve its energy efficiency by taking such measures as 
the development of renewable energies, installation of high-efficiency 
natural gas and coal-fired power plants, and reduction of power-
transmission loss. Outside the power sector, Africa can also contribute to 
the mitigation of climate change by conserving the tropical rainforests of 
the Congo Basin and in other areas, and by developing energy-efficient 
urban transportation networks.
1.9.4 Debt sustainability 
Sub-Saharan countries are employing cautious debt management 
policies, and debt sustainability has continuously improved. The ratio of 
35. World Bank (2010b pp.1, 13) also notes that flexible policies and more research are needed 
due to the imprecision of existing studies and models providing a wide range of estimates.
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the external public debt over the GDP of sub-Saharan countries has 
significantly improved from 31.0% in 2004 (55.8% when South Africa 
and Nigeria are excluded) to 9.7% in 2011 (18.5%, ibid.). Especially, the 
improvement between 2004 and 2007 was significant36 due to the debt 
reduction in the mid-2000s which has led to a considerable reduction in 
the debt burden. In addition, the outstanding debt has continued to 
decline since the late 2000s.37 It should be noted, however, that the 
outstanding debt of oil-importing countries excluding South Africa as of 
2011 is 24.0%, which is much larger than the 4.8% of oil-exporting 
countries (IMF 2012b, p.112 and Table 9).
Table 2.  Outstanding government debt of sub-Saharan countries (% of GDP)
Calendar year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Whole of sub-Saharan 
Africa
31.8 23.0 14.6 12.1 11.2 12.1 10.0 9.7
Excluding Nigeria and 
South Africa
55.8 45.2 31.0 24.4 20.9 22.6 19.2 18.5
Oil-exporting countries 38.8 20.3 6.8 6.6 5.3 6.1 5.4 4.8
Oil-importing countries 
(excluding South Africa)
61.1 52.4 38.2 30.0 27.2 28.0 23.9 24.0
(Prepared by the author based on IMF 2012b, P.112)
The sustainability of African debt is not an immediate concern, but it 
depends to a great extent on the macro-economic policy, fiscal policy, 
and debt management ability of each country. According to the IDA 
traffic lights (fiscal 2012/2013), the number of countries in high or 
medium risk regarding debt sustainability (red and yellow) accounts for 
the majority among IDA-eligible countries in Africa38 and thus, it is 
necessary to monitor the performance of each country. Also important is 
to keep track of the borrowing trend from emerging non-Paris Club 
countries, such as China, and also borrowings from international 
financial markets through bond issuance, etc. 
36. 31.0% in 2004 (55.8% excluding South Africa and Nigeria) ⇒12.1% in 2007 (idem 30.0%)
37. 12.1% in 2007 (30.0% excluding South Africa and Nigeria) ⇒ 9.7% in 2011 (idem 18.5%)
38. Red: 7 countries, Yellow: 14 countries and Green: 15 countries
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2.  Toward the Structural Transformation of African Economies 
and the Achievement of Inclusive and Sustained Growth
2.1 Medium to long-term prospects of African economies 
Since the 2000s, while maintaining economic growth primarily led by 
the export of energy and mineral resources, Africa has also diversified 
trading partners and regions, deepened intra-continent regional 
economic integration, expanded the internal market, increased middle 
class consumers, and improved fiscal and monetary policies as well as 
debt management. These structural changes seem to have made the 
African economy more resilient to external shocks, such as sharp 
declines in energy and resource prices.39 
Based on the assumption that the current economic growth will 
continue, the African Development Bank Group (2011a) envisions the 
African economy and society in the year 2040 as follows:40
 ➢ Assuming an economic growth rate of 4.9% to 5.5%, its GDP will 
grow from $1.7 trillion in 2010 to $5.9 trillion in 2040, while the 
GDP per capita will grow from $1,667 in 2010 to $3,733 in 2040, 
reaching the range between today’s Indonesia ($2,974) and China 
($4,328).
 ➢ The population growth rate will drop from 2.27% in 2010 to 1.37% 
in 2040, but the total population will increase from 1.03 billion in 
2010 to 1.59 billion in 2040, which will exceed the prospective 
population of both China and India in 2040 (estimated to be 
around 1.5 billion).
 ➢ The working-age population (aged 15-64) will increase from 400 
million in 2010 to 1.07 billion in 2040, and the ratio of the working-
age population over the total population will increase from 40% 
(2010) to 67% (2040). This is comparable to the current rate of the 
working-age population of Asian countries which are thought to 
enjoy a demographic dividend (JICA 2008, p.26).
 ➢ The number of middle class people41 whose daily income ranges 
from $4 to $20 (equivalent to an annual income of $1,460 to $7,300) 
39. IMF (2011a p.7) remarks “the region’s recent sustained strong growth represents a sharp 
break with the past, when the region lagged far behind other parts of the developing world.”
40. The forecast is a 50-year forecast until 2060. Here, we are presenting the estimate in 2040. 
There are 2 types of simulations, i.e., High-Case Scenario and Low-Case Scenario and the 
following is all based on Low-Case Scenario.
41. Mckinsey Global Institute defines the middle class in a more precise manner: as a 
household with an annual income of more than $5,000, which is a threshold where 
expenditure other than the necessities of daily life such as food increases, and forecasts that 
the number of middle class households will increase from 85 million in 2010 to 128 million in 
2020 (MGI 2010, pp.3-4). 
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will increase from 360 million in 2010 to 620 million in 2040; and 
the ratio of middle class people over the total population will 
increase from 34% (2010) to 38% (2040). However, the percentage 
of the population with daily income of less than $1.25 will only 
decrease from 44.15% in 2010 to 37.77% in 2040; if this forecast 
comes true, the poverty reduction target of MDGs (to halve the 
poverty population rate of 1990 (58%) to (29%) in 2015) will not be 
achieved even in 2040 (African Development Bank Group 2011a, 
p.70).42
2.2 Prospects for the transformation of African economies
As shown above, even with the assumption of 30-year, continuous 
economic growth of 5%, in 2040, as much as 37.77% of the total 
population in Africa will still be living on a daily income of less than 
$1.25. Given this kind of gloomy prediction on the one hand, and the 
brighter-looking forecast of GDP per capita close to $4,000 on the other, it 
will be critically important for the African economy to realize “sustained 
growth” and “inclusive growth,” which will allow the broader 
population as well as the poor and vulnerable to enjoy the fruits of 
economic growth in the next few decades.
In order to make such economic development a reality, Africa needs to 
realize the following:
 ➢ Transformation from an economy dependent on energy and 
mineral resources into an economy led by new leading sectors 
such as  
i) agricultural sector revitalized through agricultural productivity 
improvement resulting in increased agricultural production and 
growth of agro-industries and agro-business,   
ii) labor-intensive manufacturing industries, especially local 
industries that respond to increasing demand from the emerging 
middle class consumers and regionally integrated market, and 
iii) modernized and private-sector-led service sector combined 
with highly educated human capital, innovative technology and 
better quality of service delivery.
 ➢ Provision of employment for a rapidly growing, working-age 
42. The African Development Bank Group states that it is necessary to achieve economic 
growth of over 7% on average in order to produce rapid poverty reduction. In this redar (note: 
what does ‘redar’?), the growth rate of this forecast is insufficient (African Development 
Bank Group 2011, p.12).
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population, especially for youths, through fostering of the 
manufacturing and service sectors. 
 ➢ Equitable income distribution: through job creation, and increase 
in per capita income through improving labor productivity and 
agricultural productivity. This must be accompanied by the 
development and effective use of human capital and the 
strengthening of social services and a social safety net for the poor 
and vulnerable.
 ➢ Infrastructure development: to support increasing demand for 
transport, energy and water driven by long-term economic 
growth, population growth and improvement in living standards. 
The necessary amount of investment is to be mobilized to fulfill 
the estimated funding gap of $40 to $50 billion per annum (World 
Bank 2008).
In the following sections, the term “transformation” is used to mean a 
change in economic structure, which, as described above, will 
simultaneously bring about the shift from the dependence on energy 
and mineral resources through the diversification of growth sectors and 
trading partners (hereafter termed as “sustained growth”), and the 
enjoyment of the fruits of growth by a broader population through 
employment and social services (hereafter termed as “inclusive 
growth”).43 
We will now discuss the diversification of sources of wealth (i.e., 
agriculture, manufacturing and service sector) in sections 2.2.1 through 
2.2.3, and the investment in human capital and its use (i.e., education, 
employment and labor productivity) in section 2.2.4. 
2.2.1 Potential of African agriculture
Unlike agriculture in Asia and Latin America, African agriculture has 
not gone through the transition process to modern agriculture and 
adoption of agricultural technology through the Green Revolution, and 
agricultural land productivity improvement has been stagnant. The 
increase in food demand due to population growth has been met so far 
by the expansion of cultivated land and increased food imports. As 
43. IMF (2012a), based on the definition that the Structural Transformation is the shift of 
workers from low to high average productivity activities and sectors, P.51), analyzes the 
structural transformation of sub-Saharan Africa by taking the labor mobility between sectors 
as the main indicator. IMF (2012a) also indicates some good examples of structural 
transformation such as: Burkina Faso (agriculture), Tanzania (manufacturing), Namibia 
(manufacturing), Mauritius (service industry) and Kenya (service industry) (idem, P67-71).
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African governments have not tended to prioritize agricultural 
modernization since their independence, farmers have returned to stable 
cultivation of subsistence crops since the economic slump in the 1970s 
(Hirano 2009, pp.109-102), and the cropland per capita of the agricultural 
population decreased by 40% between 1960 and 2003. However, as 
agriculture is still the main sector in Africa, accounting for 32% of the 
GDP, it is critical to improve productivity through the introduction of 
modern agricultural technology for achieving sustained growth in the 
African economy.44
MGI (2010) estimates that, with 60% (590 million ha) of the world’s 
uncultivated arable farmland (970 million ha in total),45 Africa has the 
potential to increase its current agricultural production from $280 billion 
(2010) to $500-880 billion in 2030, through enhancing agricultural land 
development, increasing agricultural productivity and transitioning to 
high-value-added crops. The Coalition for African Rice Development 
(CARD),46 which aims at doubling rice production in sub-Saharan Africa 
from 14 million tons in 2008 to 28 million tons by 2018, shows good 
progress toward the achievement of the above goal with the production 
of 18.4 million tons in 2010.47 
In recent years, investment in agriculture by the private sector is 
growing, which has the potential to bring productivity improvement, 
new technology, agricultural land expansion, supply chain and value 
chain development, etc., resulting in comprehensive development of 
agricultural production and creation of added-value. One example of 
efforts to take advantage of private sector investment is a regional 
development program in Mozambique supported by the Japanese 
government (JICA) to promote agriculture in the Nacala Corridor in the 
north of the country. In a similar context, the G8 Summit held in Camp 
David in May 2012 announced a joint action plan, “New Alliance for 
Food Security and Nutrition”, backed by G8 and African countries for 
44. See also Hirano (2013), pp.123-127, Takahashi (2010), pp.145-203, and chapters 2 and 3 of 
this volume.
45. Sudan (72 million ha), Democratic Republic of Congo (66 million ha), Angola (53 million 
ha), Zambia (53 million ha), Mozambique (49 million ha), Central African Republic (45 
million ha), etc. (MGI 2010).
46. Joint initiative of 23 African countries and 11 institutions centered on JICA and AGRA 
(Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa) a private organization formed by African farming 
experts, following TICAD IV Yokohama Action Plan for doubling rice production in 10 years.
47. For more detailed discussions on the CARD initiative, see chapters 2 and 3. 
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the purpose of promoting private investment in African agriculture and 
dissemination of agricultural technology. 
On the other hand, large farmland acquisition by the private sector may 
cause conflicts over land and water resources with local populations and 
farmers. To prevent such risks, a framework for the protection of the 
rights of local populations and farmers is needed to create an 
environment benefitting both private investors and local populations 
and farmers.48 Government should play an important role in creating 
such investment climate, in addition to its traditional roles such as in the 
provision of economic and technical assistance to local farmers and in 
agricultural technology development and dissemination. 
Agriculture can boost the African economy. Despite the low 
performance of exports (cocoa, coffee, and tea) since the 1990s,49 
encouraging cases are emerging in export promotion through 
developing new products with new technology, such as horticultural 
products in Eastern and Southern African countries. Also encouraging is 
the expansion of the intra-African market50 due to economic growth; this 
can bring a huge business opportunity for exports within the continent. 
The expansion of agricultural production could boost the development 
of the agro-industry and agro-business such as agro-processing, food 
processing, distribution, transportation, and finance, leading to rural 
employment and improvement of the livelihood of the non-farming 
population, which accounts for half of the total population in rural areas. 
It could also lead to foreign currency savings through reducing food 
48. As an example of such an initiative, a set of Principles for Responsible Agricultural 
Investment (PRAI) was proposed by the Japanese government and adopted at L’Aquila G8 
Summit in April 2009.
49. The share of agricultural exports from Sub-Saharan Africa in world agricultural trade 
decreased from 5.4% (1995-97) to 2.7% (2006-08). Such sluggish development may be 
attributable not only to the stagnation of agricultural productivity, but also to high indirect 
costs such as transportation costs, underdeveloped infrastructure and business environment 
(WEF et al. 2011, pp.18-19).
50. For example, MGI (2010) reports that food products and beverages markets are expected 
to grow from $369 billion in 2008 to $544 billion in 2020 (p.39). CAADP Pillar II Experts 
Reference Group (2009) notes that demand in local and regional urban food markets across 
Africa is expected to increase from US$50 billion to US$150 billion in 2000-2030, while foreign 
demand for agricultural commodities and high-value exports is projected to grow from 
US$11 billion to US$20 billion in the same period (p.21).
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imports, which exceed that of Japan.51
African agriculture has significant potential but faces various 
development challenges. To summarize, it should be remembered that 
the vision of the original Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Programme (CAADP) in 200352 remains relevant to the 
current major challenges of African agriculture. It is also to be noted that 
the market-oriented approach and the small-scale farmers’ approach, 
which are discussed in the following chapters 4 and 5, respectively, are 
both to be addressed in a balanced and integrated manner as described 
in the original CAADP.   
2.2.2 Potential of African manufacturing industry 
Manufacturing is important for the African economy due to the 
following reasons: for the diversification of its economy, reduction of 
external vulnerability, job creation for the working-age population 
(especially for youths), improvement in the trade balance, notably for 
non-oil-producing countries with trade deficits, etc. The potential for 
manufacturing in Africa stems mostly from the prospective market 
expansion due to economic growth, increasing population, growing 
middle class consumers, increasing working-age population and effect 
of the future demographic dividend.53 The MGI (2010) states that the 
consumption markets within Africa have already reached $860 billion 
(2008), which are equivalent to those of India and Russia. It also 
estimates that they will grow to $1.38 trillion in 2020, and the number of 
middle class households with an annual income of over $5,000 is 
expected to increase from 85 million in 2008 to 128 million in 202054 
51. According to FAO data, agricultural exports from Africa amount to $34.2 billion (2009), 
agricultural imports to Africa amount to $53.2 billion (2009), and with a deficit amounting to 
$19.0 billion. Agricultural imports exceed that of Japan ($35.7 billion). 45% of rice and 85% of 
wheat consumed in Africa are imported in 2009 (WEF et al. 2011, p.19).
52. The vision for agriculture is that the continent should, by 2015: attain food security (in 
terms of both availability and affordability and ensuring access of the poor to adequate food 
and nutrition); improve the productivity of agriculture to attain an average annual growth 
rate of 6%, with particular attention to small-scale farmers; especially focusing on women, 
have dynamic agricultural markets between nations and regions; have integrated farmers 
into the market economy; including better access to markets, with Africa to become a net 
exporter of agricultural products, achieve the more equitable distribution of wealth; be a 
strategic player in agricultural science and technology development; and practice 
environmentally sound production methods. (NEPAD 2003 p.9)
53. Please see MGI (2010), IMF (2011b)
54. IMF (2011b) also features an article on the expansion of the internal market and the middle 
class in Africa.
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(ibid). 
In fact, in recent years, manufacturing exports in Africa are increasing to 
neighboring countries in the continent. For example, the value of exports 
of eight African countries55 increased from $1.5 billion in 2000 to $10 
billion in 2008, and the proportion of manufactured exports in total 
exports increased as follows: Kenya: 21% (2000) → 37% (2008), Uganda: 
6% (2000) → 30% (2008), and Senegal: 27% (2000) → 30% (2008). The 
main export items are processed fuels, food, chemical products, clothing 
and cosmetics (MGI 2010). 
However, manufacturing in Africa has not emerged from the 1980s 
slump and it accounts for less than 10% of GDP in many African 
countries.56 In terms of the share of world exports for developing 
countries and regions, East Asia showed rapid growth of 3.3% (1980) ⇒ 
8% (1995) ⇒ 14% (2008), and other regions are also generally in the 
process of expansion. By contrast, Africa has experienced a modest 
expansion of 1.3% (1990s)⇒1.6% (2000s) and moreover, it is due mainly 
to the export of primary products (WEF et al. 2011, pp.3-4). The share of 
industrial products of sub-Saharan countries in world trade is declining, 
where light industrial products showed a decline of 1.2% (1980) ⇒ 0.9% 
(2008) and heavy industrial products showed a marginal increase of 
0.3% (1995-97) ⇒ 0.4% (2000-2008) (WEF et al. 2011, p.15-20).
The slump in manufacturing in Africa is attributed to various factors: 
underdeveloped infrastructure (especially, power and transportation), 
inadequate business environment, relatively high labor cost (excluding 
the informal sector), low education, health and sanitation levels, 
insufficient financial access, high socio-political risks, and so on. It is 
important to comprehensively address these issues; particularly in sub-
Saharan countries, high indirect costs due to the underdevelopment of 
infrastructure, business environment and financial systems are reported 
to be the main causes of high manufacturing costs, although the issue of 
human capital such as insufficient education and relatively high labor 
costs are also raised. (WEF et al. 2011, p.12, OECD et al. 2012, p.21)
55. Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia
56. In the following 11 countries, the manufacturing industry accounts for 15-20% of GDP: 
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, South 
Africa, Tunisia and Zimbabwe. (OECD et al. 2012).
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In 1980s’ Asia, having overcome these constraints (except labor costs), 
economic growth through the development of labor-intensive industry, 
poverty reduction through job creation and increases in per capita labor 
productivity and income were achieved simultaneously. The Asian 
experience in development provides rich experience and lessons to be 
referred to for African development. Africa may take advantage of the 
increasing working-age population and improving education levels, 
while addressing issues such as high cost in manufacturing, service 
reliability in logistics and energy supply. Consistent investment is 
needed in infrastructure and human resource development and in 
creating an enabling business environment to meet the needs of industry. 
However, Africa now finds itself in a quite different environment from 
what it was in the 1980s and 1990s, when Asia began to rapidly grow. 
Today, as low-wage, labor-intensive export industries have developed 
nearly all over the world except Africa, Africa has some disadvantages in 
the international business environment for promoting labor-intensive 
industries.57 As Noman and Stiglitz (2012) states, there is no policy 
package that fits all countries, so adopting one specific development 
strategy in Africa, such as low-wage, labor-intensive export industrial 
development, is to be avoided.58 While the Asian experience might be a 
useful reference, African countries must be flexible and selective in 
policy formulation to fully take advantage of their respective 
comparative advantage and resource endowments, such as the 
availability of raw materials and the level of local labor costs.
2.2.3  Potential of the service sector in Africa (Trade, transportation, 
telecommunications, finance) 
The service sector’s59 share of total GDP in Africa has increased from 
44.4% in 1980 to 53.1% in 2009. (World Bank 2011a). This is in sharp 
contrast to other sectors: the share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries60 
in total GDP in Africa has decreased from 17.2% in 1980 to 13.1% in 2009, 
57. IMF (2012a) p.62-63
58. Noman and Stiglitz (2012) p.40
59. Including wholesale and retail trade (including hotels and restaurants), transport, and 
government, financial, professional, and personal services, such as education, health care, 
real estate, and all other branches of economic activities that are not included in agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries and industry sectors (World Bank 2011a, p.136).
60. Including forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as crop cultivation and livestock 
production. (World Bank 2011a, p.135)
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and that of the industrial sectors61 likewise has decreased from 38.4% to 
33.8%, and the manufacturing sector from 10.7% in the 1980s to 8.5% in 
the 2000s (ibid). 
While the service sector’s increasing share in GDP is helped by the 
relative slump in other sectors, the sector is expanding thanks to 
growing private sector participation facilitated by deregulation and cost 
reduction through technology innovation. A typical example is the 
mobile phone service, which is expanding rapidly, as the 
telecommunications sector is a “high growth sector” comparable to 
energy and resource sectors. Demand in the trade and transport sectors 
is also expanding, presumably due to the increase in logistics caused by 
economic growth, rapid increase in final consumption expenditure62 and 
the expansion of the intra-African market. 
IMF (2012a) refers to Kenya as a good example of the development of the 
service sector. In Kenya, the contribution of the service sector to GDP 
was strong, ranging between 2 and 5% in 2005-2011, while that of 
agriculture and manufacturing stagnated, with less than 2% or negative 
growth rates. This was made possible by, along with the country’s 
relatively high education standards, the increasing demand for 
transport, telecommunications and financial services against the 
backdrop of Eastern African regional integration and strong ICT service 
exports; ICT accounted for over 10% of the service exports of the country 
during 2007-2011. 
Within the service sector, lagging behind is the financial sector, except in 
South Africa， Mauritius，Tunisia，Morocco，Cape Verde，Namibia, 
Nigeria, Egypt, and Kenya;63 the importance of developing the financial 
sector in Africa is to be emphasized for the mobilization of domestic 
capital for investment, particularly in view of a substantial expansion in 
national savings that is expected to occur thanks to the demographic 
61. Including mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, gas, and water (World Bank 
2011a, p.136).
62. Final consumption expenditure per capita in Africa increased as follows (US dollars: 
nominal): 541 (1980s) ⇒ 586 (1990s) and ⇒756 (2000s), in particular it soared in the late 2000s 
(600 (2003) ⇒ 1,082 (2009)). This trend is seen both in Sub-Saharan countries (487 (2003) ⇒ 864 
(2009)) and in North Africa (1,179 (2003) ⇒ 2,240 (2009)). (World Bank 2011a)
63. In these countries, the ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP, a proxy of financial 
market development, exceeded 30% in 2009 (World Bank 2011a p.65).
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dividend in the coming decades.64
Transformation of the service sector will have far-reaching impacts on 
other sectors: it will not only help facilitate the modernization of 
traditional services through encouraging technological innovation and 
market integration and deregulation, but it will also improve 
productivity, strengthen competitiveness and encourage investment and 
reduce costs in agricultural and industrial sectors. To make this happen, 
however, African countries need to enhance the supply of highly skilled 
human capital through higher education in science and engineering. 
They also need to take measures to address the sector’s current over-
dependence on the informal sector65, which contributes little to human 
resource development.
2.2.4  Investment in human capital (education, employment, labor 
productivity)66
Africa needs to develop education not only in quantity but also – and 
more importantly – in quality. Quantity-wise, many African countries 
have made substantial strides in basic education; many have introduced 
a policy of free primary education since the 1990s, resulting in the 
improved net enrollment rates in primary and secondary education 
rising from 58% (1999) to 76% (2009), and from 19% (1999) to 29% (2009), 
respectively. Quality-wise, however, much remains to be done, for the 
academic performance of children is still quite low in Africa. This needs 
to be urgently addressed given the plausible correlation between the rate 
of economic growth of a country and academic achievement of school 
children.67 
Higher education and vocational technical education in Africa are 
undergoing rapid development. However, here again, a lot of challenges 
still remain; they include: the improvement of the basic quality of 
education and research, securing employment of graduates (refer to 
Figure 7 in Section 1.6), and the issue of the ‘brain drain’. Added to these 
is the need to satisfy the changing and growing demand for highly 
64. Currently, the national savings rate is around 15% over the GDP.
65. According to Watanabe (2010), the informal service sector accounted for 34% of 
employment in Nairobi in 2002 and the formal service sector 4%. The informal sector 
accounts for nearly 90% of employment for the whole of the service sector, including formal 
and informal sectors.
66. For discussions on physical infrastructure development, see Chapter 7 of this volume.  
67. See Chapter 10 of this volume.  
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skilled labor from the newly growing service sector including ICT, and 
to cope with the needs of the globalizing environment. The current 
system of higher education and vocational training, including the stock 
of teaching faculties, seems incapable of satisfying these changing 
demands of society, and needs to be systematically reviewed and 
improved upon.
There are indeed mounting expectations and needs for improved human 
resources in Africa on the one hand and, on the other, there has been a 
steady improvement in the supply of better-educated human resources. 
Under these circumstances, the most critical issue is to provide sufficient 
employment to young people who possess improved academic 
capabilities. This is becoming a huge challenge both in low- and middle-
income countries. Low-income countries, where the informal sector 
accounts for the majority of employment, are often unable to provide 
appropriate job opportunities that are on a par with the skill levels of 
better-educated youths; the informal sector is also weak in providing the 
workers with opportunities to further upgrade their skills. In middle-
income countries, by contrast, unemployment of highly educated youths 
is a serious problem, resulting from the mismatch between the needs of 
industry and the qualifications of graduates coming from higher 
education and vocational/technical education. (See Figure 7 in Section 
1.6).
These immense challenges appear to require comprehensive approaches 
that look simultaneously at the supply and demand sides of human 
resources, for the above-mentioned puzzle can be solved only by the 
coordination of investment in human capital (education) and its effective 
use (employment). World Bank (2012e) cites an example of a 
comprehensive promotion program of employment and labor 
productivity in Ethiopia; it reports that policies that address the labor 
market (like deregulation and vocational training), private sector 
productivity (like company managers’ training), and the industry as a 
whole (like industrial promotion measures) are called for. 
Also encouraging might be to look at the effects of various human 
capital development measures on the academic ability and 
employability of children and youth. Such measures include, for 
example, promotion of pre-primary education, incentivizing of parents 
to educate children (e.g., conditional cash transfers, meal provision 
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schemes, and scholarships), childhood nutrition and health support 
(e.g., parasite control), and prevention of sexually transmitted infections 
(e.g., provision of contraceptives and promotion of family planning). 
The effectiveness of these interventions on education and employment 
are being clarified with massive empirical studies, providing useful 
insights on policy.68 Policy debate on human resource development and 
employment may have a lot to gain from learning from the achievements 
of such studies.
3.  African Development beyond TICAD V: Toward a Differentiated 
and Customized Approach for Development 
The approach based on intra-regional integration responding to 
geographical proximity and common interests of neighboring African 
countries has been attempted in various ways.69 Since the 2000s, its 
importance has been newly highlighted in New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD 2001), and the African Union and Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs)70 are promoting a variety of regional 
integration programs and initiatives including cross-border 
infrastructure development and promotion of intra-regional trade. This 
development perspective through regional integration and cooperation 
must be the central thrust in African development. 
However, countries are quite varied; as seen above, since the 2000s, some 
countries have achieved steady economic growth and social 
development, while others are still in need of continued assistance on 
their way towards achieving MDGs and/or post-conflict state-building. 
Thus, the needs for development have come to be increasingly 
diversified and complicated. Given these variances, it is important that 
African countries adopt policies best suited to their different needs. The 
68. See, for example, Bertrand and Crepon (2012).
69. Many of the regional economic communities (RECs) include regional cooperation 
mechanisms founded in the early 1960s to 1970.
70. The African Union Commission established close cooperation with the following 8 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as one of the pillars of the basic strategies of 2009-
2012: Community of Sahel Saharan States (CEN SAD), Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
Intergovernment Authority for Development (IGAD), Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA). (African Union Commission 
2009)
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international development community must make sure that individual 
countries are given sufficient policy space to pursue their developmental 
goals, recalling that their policy recommendations since the days of 
structural adjustments in the 1980s have often been criticized as being 
too rigid with no policy space for African governments. Actually, similar 
arguments calling for customized or differentiated approaches for 
countries at different stages are emerging with respect to the discussions 
on the post-2015 development agendas; the argument goes that different 
targets must be provided for countries and areas that are likely to 
achieve MDGs by 2015 and those which are not (UNECA et al. 2011). 
It is expected that the action plans to be adopted at TICAD V will 
incorporate these diversified and complicated development needs. In 
working out these plans, African countries and their partners, while 
upholding the perspective of regional integration and cooperation, must 
make sure that African countries are encouraged to seek differentiated 
and customized development strategies to meet their specific needs. 
These two approaches, i.e., the regional integration approach and the 
“differentiated and customized approach” must be the central 
philosophy underpinning the upcoming new TICAD V Action Plan.
3.1. Regional integration approach 
The regional integration approach comprises a variety of programs, 
including cross-border infrastructure development, corridor 
development, intra-regional trade promotion, support to regional 
economic communities (RECs), and rural infrastructure development. 
African Union, NEPAD and RECs are positioned as central promoters of 
the most important initiatives for regional integration, such as the 
Program of Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), and Action 
Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade.
 
The importance of regional integration was also highlighted in the 
TICAD IV Yokohama Action Plan.71 Various partners of Africa have been 
supporting moves along the lines of this approach. Japan and JICA have 
been providing support to regional infrastructure development and 
“one stop border posts (OSBP)” as their flagship projects listed in the 
Action Plan;72 the African Development Bank Group considers regional 
71. See the section of “accelerated growth” and “infrastructure” of TICAD IV Yokohama 
Action Plan 
72. For more details of the OSBP, see Chapter 8. 
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integration as a strategic priority at the regional level in its mid-term 
business strategy 2008-2012 (African Development Bank Group 2008, 
p.11); the World Bank considers regional integration as a key instrument 
to implement its African regional strategy, in addition to responses to 
middle-income countries and fragile states (World Bank 2011b, pp.29-
31).
The perspective of regional integration must also be incorporated in 
individual countries’ development planning. In other words, 
governments and donors must make sure that their development 
strategies are worked out so that they promote the interests not only of 
the country but also of neighboring countries in the region. Formulation, 
prioritization and sequencing of development projects must take into 
consideration their regional integration effects; for example, Kuchiki 
(2010, p.121) is proposing the formation of industrial clusters in 
Mozambique and its neighboring region based on the experience in the 
industrial cluster policy in Northern Vietnam and in the Eastern 
Seaboard Development Plan in Thailand. 
Rural areas are also to be incorporated into the regional integration 
approach to enhance urban-rural connectivity and to develop 
agricultural potential, by investing in rural infrastructure such as 
transport, telecommunication and irrigation, strengthening access to 
market, finance and technology, and creating employment in 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors in rural areas. Only one-third 
of Africans living in rural areas are within two kilometers of an all-
season road, compared with two-thirds of the population in other 
developing regions (World Bank 2011d). In this context, the 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) 
proposes the Framework for the Improvement of Rural Infrastructure 
and Trade-Related Capacities for Market Access (FIMA) as the second 
pillar of CAADP. 
3.2. Differentiated and customized approach 
While maintaining the regional integration perspective, countries must 
pursue customized strategies to meet their specific needs. Though not 
exhaustive, the following are proposed for countries under different 
circumstances:
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3.2.1. Development challenges in fragile states 
While many African countries are starting to show high economic 
growth rates, some other countries lag behind, and some are still on their 
way to post-conflict state building. Many of these countries are called 
“fragile states.” Though there is no single effective prescription for the 
development of such countries, several points are worthy of 
consideration. First, short-term humanitarian assistance in the 
immediate aftermath of conflict and long-term development assistance 
for state building must be coordinated to avoid any gap between the 
two. Second, states must have the capacity to provide their citizens with 
basic services such as food, health, and education, along with the ability 
to secure law and order; the former is very important for the state to be 
regarded as legitimate by its people. 
With this in mind, support for countries in fragile situations must 
incorporate not only assistance for improved governance such as the 
restoration of political stability and strengthening of security sectors, but 
also a well-balanced economic and social assistance program in the 
fields of infrastructure development, job creation and food security as 
well as healthcare.73
3.2.2. Development challenges in resource-rich countries 
As IMF (2012b) defines 20 Sub-Saharan countries as Resource Intensive 
Countries74 and notes that several countries75 are expected to soon join 
the ranks of significant natural resource exporters, given recent 
discoveries and exploration results, “Mineral Governance” (World Bank 
2012b) is newly focused as a major development challenge of Africa.  
The debate on the “resource curse” is still going on. Paul Collier (2007) 
cites a natural resource trap or resource curse as one of the four 
development traps76 preventing Africa from escaping poverty. World 
Bank (2012b), on the other hand, maintains that there is hardly any 
73. For more detailed discussions on state-building in fragile states, see Chapter 12 of this 
volume.  
74. 7 countries (Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Nigeria) as oil-exporters, and 13 countries (Botswana, DRC, Guinea, Central African 
Republic, Ghana, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe) as other-resource intensive countries (IMF2012b, p.62). In North Africa, Algeria 
and Libya are traditional oil-exporters and Morocco is a phosphate-exporter. 
75. Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritania, Mozambique, South Sudan, Sudan, and 
Uganda etc. are expected to be new resource-exporters in the IMF ranking. 
76. The other three development traps are: conflict trap, landlocked with bad neighbors, and 
bad governance in a small country.
60
Chapter 1
empirical data that endorses the resource curse theory77 and calls for 
policy initiatives directed at sustained development by making use of 
abundant resource-derived revenue in order to achieve the economic 
development and growth of resource-rich countries.
Even supposing, as Paul Collier (2007) indicates, a negative impact of 
some degree of natural resource exports on economic development and 
growth, it should be possible to promote economic development and 
growth through a combination of effective policies.78 Such policies can 
include: effective use of resource revenues generated from natural 
resources for productive investment in infrastructure and human 
capital; strengthening of transparency and accountability for resource 
revenue spending and prevention of corruption; and robust fiscal policy 
and prudent public investment policy. Thus, there must be strong needs 
for assistance for resource-rich countries for their policy system reforms, 
strengthening of governance, and diversification of economic structure.
In addition, the private sector is greatly interested in resource-rich 
countries and they, too, have a strong interest in the improvement of the 
investment climate, comprising, most importantly, of well-developed 
infrastructure and capable human resources, stable macroeconomic 
management, and accessible long-term development financing. Thus, 
there is strong demand in the private sector for increased public support 
measures for resource-rich countries, which could be promoted either 
through official development assistance (ODA) or through public-
private partnership arrangements. Such support measures could 
contribute directly to business environment improvement, or, as a long-
term initiative, could help reduce investment risks through improved 
socio-economic stability through social development and diminished 
social disparities.
77. Lederman and Maloney (2008) reviewed the past empirical analysis on the resource curse 
that regarded the indicators such as the ratio of resource exports to GDP or to the total exports 
as a proxy of the degree of resource dependence. As a result of reviewing the analysis method 
and using the net resource exports per head of the working population, they reported that 
there was a positive correlation between the degree of resource dependence and GDP per 
capita and that the per capita resource exports have a positive impact on GDP per capita.
78. The Commission on Growth and Development (2008, p.80) argues that the problem is not 
the resources themselves, but how the proceeds (or “rents”) are handled. It also suggests the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as a successful initiative jointly managed 
by a broad coalition of governments, companies, industry associations, investors, the World 
Bank, and non-governmental organizations like Transparency International and Global 
Witness (p.81). 
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3.2.3.  Comprehensive yet differentiated approach for countries with 
varying performances with respect to MDGs79
Since MDGs were agreed on in 2000, a lot of effort has been made toward 
their achievement, receiving broad international support. Overall, these 
efforts have resulted in significant advancement in many countries and 
are to be highly appreciated. However, these efforts toward MDGs 
inevitably tended to concentrate on the achievement of indicators and 
numerical goals itemized in the MDGs, resulting in insufficient resource 
mobilization for objectives not explicitly included in the MDG 
framework, such as income disparity, quality of primary education, 
health systems improvement, climate change and governance. Also, 
there was a tendency for policymakers’ attention to be focused on the 
overall achievement of the targets, resulting in insufficient attention 
being paid to disparities among and within countries. 
The upcoming post-2015 development agenda should be agreed on in 
such a way that individual countries are encouraged to pursue their 
development goals. Such country-wise development goals should be 
based primarily on the country’s achievement of the goals in 2015. In the 
post-2015 era, countries must be guided by a comprehensive yet simple 
and easy-to-understand framework of development norms like the 
current MDGs. They must, at the same time, be allowed to flexibly 
pursue their development agenda, employing development policies 
most appropriate for their needs. 
Though quite challenging, the international community must seek a 
developmental framework that has this comprehensiveness and 
flexibility to allow development policies to be selected to meet differing 
and complicated needs and to incorporate the country’s various 
developmental conditions.
As the post-2015 development agenda will be so broad including 
inclusiveness, equity and sustainability of economic growth, quality of 
education and health services, addressing climate change challenges and 
environmental sustainability, peace and security for development, 
transparency and accountability of governance, Human Security is 
expected to be an overarching principle to lead and promote the post-
79. The discussion in this clause is mainly based on preliminary discussions on the post-2015 
agenda in UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda (2012) and 
UNECA et al (2012).
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2015 development agenda across the broad needs and areas of the post-
2015 agenda, by focusing on empowering people, managing downside 
risks and addressing vulnerability and resilience in a comprehensive 
manner.80 
Concluding Remarks
We have broadly looked at the current situation and future challenges of 
African development, with the focus on “inclusive and sustained 
growth.” More detailed discussions will follow in the subsequent 
chapters on agriculture, industry, infrastructure, health, education, the 
environment, state-building and South-South cooperation.
The needs and challenges of African development are increasingly 
becoming more diversified and complicated. Despite this, TICAD V 
must come up with a simple, clear, forward-looking proposal, as well as 
a powerful message establishing a path for collective and individual 
actions for African development, and provide policy makers and aid 
practitioners with guidance so that they can respond appropriately and 
effectively to such diversified and complicated challenges and needs for 
African development.
 
80. In regard to the concept and action agenda of Human Security, please see the final report 
by Commission on Human Security (2003), co-chaired by Ms. Sadako Ogata and Mr. 
Amartya Sen.
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Rural Development and Food Security
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Chapter 2:  
Boosting Sustainable Agricultural Growth in 
Sub-Saharan Africa
Koji Makino
In transformation of the global food security, agriculture in Africa is 
dynamically and rapidly developing. This chapter tries to review 
African Agriculture, to identify its challenges, and then shares recent 
topics of agricultural development such as investments, resilience issue 
and CAADP. Finally it discusses JICA’s support for African agricultural 
development with an eye toward TICAD V. This chapter provides a 
general overview for subsequent three chapters as an introduction.
1. Overview of African Agriculture
1.1 Global food security surrounding Africa
In recent years, agricultural and food issues have been attracting much 
more attention in the international arena. The G20 meeting held in 
France in June 2011 placed these issues at the top of its agenda, and 
adopted the Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture. 
Meanwhile at the G8 meeting held in the United States in 2012, 
agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa was discussed, it being 
the region most susceptible to food crisis. These issues have been 
frequently brought up in the media in the past. But why are they 
drawing so much of the international community’s attention now? It is 
primarily due to the record-breaking rise in international food prices and 
concerns over food security (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. FAO Food Price Index
Source: FAO (as of July 2012)
Since 1990 when the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) began 
measuring the Food Price Index, it experienced a sharp increase in 2008 
followed by a sharp decline after the Lehman shock, and reached its 
peak (the nominal highest value) in February 2011. Even though there 
were signs of slight stability in 2012, the effects of serious drought in the 
United States, the world’s largest food exporter, became apparent in 
July; therefore it is presumed that food prices would increase in the near 
term.
The steep rise in world food prices can be caused by the following short-
term and structural factors:
① Short-term (shock) factors-
 ➢ Crop damage caused by poor weather and natural disasters 
(drought, flooding, typhoons, etc.)
 ➢ Overheated investment (financialization of agricultural 
commodities)
 ➢ Increases in energy costs (rising costs of transportation and 
input goods, such as fertilizer)
② Structural factors
 ➢ “Thin” and volatile international market structures (lower 
export rates compared to mineral or industrial products, and 
the concentration of exporting countries and regions)
 ➢ Demand increase in emerging countries (cereal import volume 
tripling from 1990 in China and India; cereal consumption in 
both countries accounts for about 40 percent of the total 
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volume of cereal production in the world)
 ➢ Medium and long-term constraints on the supply side 
(constraints on the area of arable land and water resources, 
slowing in agricultural productivity, effects of climate change, 
etc.)
 ➢ Pressure of demand increase due to expansion in biofuel 
production.
According to estimates by the United Nations and the FAO, the world 
population, which is expected to reach 9.1 billion in 2050 (7 billion as of 
2012), will require a 70 percent increase in food production by that time. 
With this situation surrounding global agriculture and food supplies, 
poor countries that need to import their food are the ones most affected. 
Sub-Saharan Africa has the largest number of such countries. It is 
therefore no exaggeration to say that agricultural and food issues 
discussed in the international arena are significant problems for Africa.
In the midst of rapid globalization, it should be kept in mind that global 
issues have a direct impact on Africa. High food prices in recent years 
have caused the attention of African governments, donors, and 
international organizations to “return” to agriculture and food security. 
This has led them to attempt to reform agricultural policies and mobilize 
resources; this has also motivated domestic and foreign farmers and 
firms to increase their production, beginning with investment 
incentivization from private sectors. This can be regarded as an 
opportunity in some respects, and it is quite timely and appropriate for 
the international community, including Japan, to re-strengthen their 
efforts to increase food production in sub-Saharan agriculture.
1.2 Overview and challenges in African agriculture 
(1) Overview
In Africa, agriculture is the principal source of wealth and of poverty 
reduction. Agriculture has a strong presence in Africa, accounting for 64 
percent of its employment, 34 percent of its GDP, and its growth explains 
one-third of economic growth (World Bank 2008). Facing the most 
serious starvation in the world with a 27 percent starvation rate (FAO-
WFP 2012), tackling agricultural development for African food 
production is an immense challenge.
The real GDP growth rate for the agricultural sector remained low with a 
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2.2 percent average between 2002 and 2006, but it showed a recovery 
trend with a 4.4 percent average between 2007 and 2011 (Figure 2). Grain 
production in Africa tripled from 1961-1963 to 2008-2010 (UNDP 2012) 
mainly because of an expansion in the harvested areas (Figure 3), while 
agricultural productivity itself (cereal yield per hectare) stagnated with 
only slight growth (Figure 4). This contrasts with Asia, which achieved 
its green revolution and substantially increased its production mainly on 
the basis of steady improvements in its agricultural productivity.
Figure 2. Agricultural Growth Rate in Sub-Sahara Africa
                        Source: World Bank World Development Indicator
Figure 3.  Increases in Cereal Production in Sub-Saharan Africa Come More from 
Expanding Harvested Area than from Boosting Yields,  
1961–1963 to 2008–2010
                                    Source: UNDP 2012
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Figure 4. Cereal Yields Stagnated for Decades in Sub-Saharan Africa
                           Source: UNDP 2012
Even though Africa supposedly has room for expansion of land devoted 
to agriculture on average compared to other regions, uncultivated areas 
that can be easily cultivated are shrinking and arable land is increasingly 
marginalized due to pressure from population growth. The cultivated 
land per agricultural worker has steadily decreased by 59 percent from 
1960 to 2009 (World Bank Institute). Less favored land was being 
cultivated and fallow periods were shortened, causing negative impacts 
on land productivity since soil fertility was not restored over time.
In other words, although Africa increased its production through 
expansion of cultivated land in the past, the decrease in per-capita 
cultivated land due to population pressure and stagnant land 
productivity resulted in a 13 percent reduction in per-capita cereal 
production between 1961-1963 and 2008-2010. (During the same period, 
a 44 % increase in Asia and a 48 % increase in South America were 
experienced. Thus, Africa will need to swiftly improve its agricultural 
productivity in order to expand its agricultural production in the years 
ahead.
The rapid increase in food consumption demand was caused by strong 
population pressure and economic growth, which resulted in an 
imbalance between domestic supply and demand. This led to higher 
dependency on imports as the demand was compensated by quickly 
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boosting the volume of cereal imports for Africa (Figure 5). This would 
cause even more serious limitations on foreign currency reserves of 
African countries. Dependence on imported wheat is at 74 percent and 
imported rice is 41 percent (2010 statistics; OECD-FAO 2011). Food 
expenses account for 50 to 70 percent of each household’s budget, much 
higher than that of families in other regions. As a result, some 
vulnerability to external conditions, such as price hikes and poor 
weather, can be observed both at the national and household budget 
levels. Figure 2 above shows volatile fluctuations in agricultural growth 
rates, indicating instability of agricultural production in Africa.
Figure 5.  The Trade Deficit in Cereals Has Widened for Sub-Saharan Africa over 
the Past Four Decades
                        Source: UNDP 2012
(2) Challenges
Why has Africa failed to achieve sufficient improvement in its 
agricultural production? Reasons for the failure include various factors 
such as: delay in development and dissemination of appropriate 
technologies; input (seeds, fertilizer, machines, etc.) supplies; lack of 
irrigation systems; lack of efficient value chains or markets; soil 
degradation; lack of financial access; limited public and private 
investments; and capacity problems in government administrations. 
These challenges will be discussed below.
In Africa, insufficient research and development for improving 
79
Boosting Sustainable Agricultural Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa
agricultural productivity and quality persist due to constraints on 
budgets, organizations, personnel, and so on. Also the connection 
between research institutes at the central level and regional 
organizations is weak, resulting in an insufficient application of research 
results to conditions of different regions, translating them into 
technologies usable on site. It is also necessary to widely disseminate 
appropriate new technologies among farmers via agricultural extension 
workers and through other channels. However, in Africa, there are issues 
of budget constraints, the limited number and quality of the extension 
workers, underdeveloped dissemination systems, and a lack of 
appropriate curriculum and teaching materials.
Since water sources (precipitation) are regionally concentrated with 
large seasonal and annual variations and are affected by climate 
changes, irrigation plays a significant role in enabling stable use of water 
and improving productivity. However, African agriculture depends 
largely on rainwater, and only 4 % of its cultivated land is provided with 
irrigation systems. (A significantly lower level when compared to the 
Middle East and North Africa with 33 % and Asia with approximately 30 
to 40 %). As well, the rate of fertilizer usage is low, with 13 kilograms per 
hectare, compared to other regions which use between 73 and 190 
kilograms. The usage rate of improved varieties of cereal in Africa 
remains at 24 percent, despite a sign of increase, and is still low in 
comparison with the rate of 45 to 85 percent in other regions (World 
Bank 2008).
A series of value chain processes needs to function smoothly and 
dynamically in agriculture- that is: “input → production → processing 
(post-harvest handling) → transportation and storage → sale and 
distribution.” Promotion of improved seeds and the use of fertilization 
in regions other than Africa were accompanied by the development of a 
value chain, including building irrigation systems, rural roads, sales 
infrastructure, financial services and markets, leading to the 
improvement of productivity and increases in production. 
In Africa, however, this process is being hampered by various obstacles, 
such as inadequate infrastructure, enormous losses due to insufficient 
post-harvest technologies, lack of financial access, undeveloped market 
facilities and functions, and delays in governmental regulatory reforms. 
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Take infrastructure as an example; the paved road ratio in Africa is only 
18 percent (33 to 59 percent in other regions), and the electrification ratio 
remains at 33 percent (62 to 93 percent in other regions) (UNDP 2012). 
Two-thirds of the African rural population is living in areas that have 
low potential for agriculture, or poor market access, or both, while the 
corresponding number for South Asia is only 25 % (World Bank 2008).
As a result of the structural adjustments in the 1980s, the system of 
public agencies providing farmers with access to land, credit, insurance, 
inputs, and cooperative organizations was dismantled (World Bank 
2008). It was expected that once excess government intervention was 
gone, private-sector-led market mechanisms would become more active 
and effectively function in place of the previous system. In Africa, 
however, this was not fully accomplished. Governments should play an 
important role together with private sectors in agriculture. In this 
context let us recall that Asian governments allocated 20 percent or more 
of their public expenditure when promoting the green revolution, 
whereas Africa spent only 5.6 percent (2005-2009 average) (UNDP 2012). 
Thus, Africa needs to devote more effort to increasing allocation of its 
public investment towards agriculture.
2. Recent Topics on Agriculture in Africa
2.1. Agricultural investments
It has been observed that foreign agricultural investments in Africa are 
on the rise, being stimulated by high food prices in recent years. As more 
data on land investments is becoming available lately, we will present an 
overview of agricultural investments in recent years as well as issues 
relating to them.1 
Throughout developing countries, it is estimated that land investments 
covering a total of 70.9 million hectares in 1,155 projects have been 
approved or were in the process of approval by the governments of 
those countries over the 10 years from 2000 to 2010. Africa accounts for 
48 % of the total investments followed by 40 % in Asia and 9 % in Latin 
America. Much of the investment in Africa (36 %) comes from Asia.
1. The discussions in the following paragraphs rely on data from the Land Matrix Project, the 
world’s largest scale database of international land transactions. The Project is run by a group 
of organizations, including the Agricultural Research for Development (CIRAD), a French 
agricultural research center, the University of Bern, and the International Land Coalition 
(ILC), with support from the European Union and other parties.
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Investments in Africa (based on the area size) can be broken down into 
the following purposes: 55 % for biofuel, 13 % for food crops, and 6 % for 
forests; thus agriculture-related investment accounts for 74 % of the 
entire investment in Africa. The large area-wise share of investment for 
biofuel can be explained by the interest of developed countries in 
measures against climate change, and by the fact that these investments 
tend to employ extensive farming resulting in a large area-per-
investment. In comparison, investments for food crops, though perhaps 
more numerous, tend to have smaller area-per-investment figures. 
In terms of investment trends over the past 10 years, investments had 
been on the rise since 2005, peaked in 2009 triggered by the food price 
hikes in 2008, and rapidly slowed due to the Lehman shock in 2010. It is 
expected that investment will continue to rise in the future.
Several factors must be behind the growth of agricultural investments. 
On the investors’ side, the reasons include: concern for food security and 
the need for an alternative area for biofuel production; the appreciation 
of the value of African land as an investment target after the financial 
crisis; and the increasing potential of its forest resources, including that 
of emissions trading. In this kind of environment, African countries have 
the opportunity to attract more investments and welcome investors in 
general.
Agricultural investments can have both advantages and disadvantages. 
Some important ones can include the following:
(1) Possible Advantages
 ➢ As a result of the introduction of new agricultural technologies, 
productivity and quality improve. Acquisition of foreign 
currency, and an increase in tax revenues can be expected.
 ➢ Development of value chains, such as improvement in the 
agricultural infrastructure as well as social services 
(construction of schools, clinics, etc.) and improved market 
access can be expected.
(2) Possible Disadvantages
 ➢ Disputes over land and water resources may occur between 
investors and local residents. There is a possibility that local 
residents who originally used the land, etc. may lose their rights 
due to a weak legal system. In particular, women tend to be 
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affected negatively.
 ➢ The use of mechanized farming has a low job creation effect; 
moreover the use of imported inputs has only a limited ripple 
effect on relevant local industries.
 ➢ Profits generated by investments are not equally distributed.
As an international response to these agricultural investments, the 
Committee on World Food Security (CFS), a standing committee of the 
FAO, has compiled the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (VGGT), with a 
focus on securing the rights of small-scale farmers, endorsed in May 
2012. Japan has also led the effort to establish guidelines for promoting 
responsible international agricultural investments ensuring that no 
forced displacement takes place, and that the process is transparent. A 
draft of the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI) 
has been prepared while more discussions are held for finalizing the 
draft proposals.
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The important point is to establish a win-win relationship advantageous 
to both investing firms/individuals and small farmers through 
agricultural investments; and it is crucial to incorporate such a mutually 
benefitting structure into the programs and project designs. Various 
measures must be taken to assure such development, including that of 
government regulatory reform, the strengthening of farmer support 
systems, and continued support from the international community.
2.2. Vulnerability/resilience
From 2010 to 2011, the Horn of Africa region was affected by a serious 
drought, leaving approximately 10 million people in severe food 
insecurity. The Sahel region in West Africa still suffers from the impact of 
drought today. Due to its dependency on rainwater and underdeveloped 
distribution systems, Africa is traditionally vulnerable to shocks, such as 
drought and floods. It has periodically suffered a great deal of damage, 
and the cycle has been more irregular in recent years, while precipitation 
itself is in decline (Figure 6).
Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI)
Principle 1: Existing rights to land and associated natural resources are 
recognized and respected.
Principle 2: Investments do not jeopardize food security but rather 
strengthen it
Principle 3: Processes relating to investment in agriculture are 
transparent, monitored, and ensure accountability by all stakeholders, 
within a proper business, legal, and regulatory environment.
Principle 4: All those materially affected are consulted, and agreements 
resulting from consultations are recorded and enforced.
Principle 5: Investors ensure that projects respect the rule of law, reflect 
industry best practice, are economically viable, and result in durable 
shared value.
Principle 6: Investments generate desirable social and distributional 
impacts and do not increase vulnerability.
Principle 7: Environmental impacts of projects are quantified and 
measures are taken to encourage sustainable resource use, while 
minimizing the risk/magnitude of negative impacts and mitigating them.
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Figure 6.  Rainfall Has Declined Most in Sub-Saharan Africa,  
1951–1980 to the 2000s
                          Source: UNDP 2012
The general risks in African agriculture consist of:
①  Climate and natural disaster risks
②   Biological and environmental risks such as pests and soil 
degradation
③   Market risks such as high or low food and input prices and 
seasonal supply and demand variations
④   Logistics and infrastructure risks such as transportation, 
communication, energy, and sales networks
⑤   Management and technical risks of farmers or firms 
(cultivation, inputs such as seeds and fertilizer, finance, etc.)
⑥  Policy and system risks in governments
⑦  Political and security risks
To reduce risks or respond to the occurrence of shocks, governments 
have developed systems with support from donors, and achieved 
certain positive results. In Ethiopia, for example, an early warning 
system has been developed. This system, including the Productive Social 
Safety Net Programme covering 7.8 million people (somewhat less than 
10 percent of its population as of September 2011) has been created, and 
worked well in the serious aforementioned drought in the Horn of 
Africa.
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In addition to such direct and expedient approaches, it is essential over 
the medium and long terms to build up the society’s capability - that is 
the society’s “resilience”- to withstand such shocks and, once they occur, 
to minimize their damage. Such medium and long term measures may 
also include increasing production in highly productive areas in order to 
quickly distribute food to affected areas via a distribution network when 
shocks occur; securing water at the community level; and the 
introduction of crops and cultivation methods that are resistant to 
natural disasters. 
Unfortunately, the emergency humanitarian support and medium and 
long-term approaches tend to be planned and carried out independently 
of one another by government departments and donors, sometimes with 
avoidable overlaps. To overcome this tendency, there have been some 
attempts to coordinate all parties to create efficiency and synergistic 
effects, such as the Nairobi Declaration from the Summit on the Horn of 
Africa held in September 2011.
2.3. International frameworks for African agricultural development
Starting with the 2008 G8 Toyako Summit and the 2009 G8 L’Aquila 
Summit, global leaders expressed alarm at the effects of food price spikes 
and agreed on taking decisive action for ensuring food security, while 
recognizing the importance of providing support to Africa, considered 
to be the most vulnerable region. Various efforts have been made on a 
global scale since then to promote food security and sustainable 
agricultural production while taking into account actions primarily for 
Africa. However, lack of sufficient policy coordination among them still 
remains a challenge which needs to be strategically addressed. Here are 
some of the strategies taken by the international community:
(1)  The Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture from the 
2011 G20 Summit in France.
In 2011 several working groups on agricultural and food security were 
set up within the G20 framework including member countries, 
international agencies, and governments of developing countries, some 
from Africa. As a result of their active discussions, a ministerial 
declaration entitled “The Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and 
Agriculture,” consisting of the following points, was adopted prior to 
the G8 Summit in Cannes:
①   Improve short and long-term agricultural production and 
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productivity to respond to increasing demands for agricultural 
commodities
②   Improve market information and transparency to respond 
further to the needs of governments and economic operators
③   Increase confidence in international markets, prevent food 
market crises more efficiently, and strengthen international 
policy coordination for responding to the crises
④   Especially in the poorest countries, improve and develop risk 
management tools to be used by governments, firms, and 
farmers for establishing the capability to manage and ease 
risks accompanying food price volatility
⑤   Improve functioning of agricultural commodity derivatives 
markets
This declaration was a major milestone in the sense that it reviewed all of 
the existing efforts, and then adjusted them according to their mutual 
consistency and level of strategy, simultaneously clarifying insufficient 
points and suggested actions, and identifying monitoring methods and 
implementing agencies in a comprehensive manner. Many of the specific 
projects and initiatives supported or suggested in the declaration are 
currently in progress or under preparation. The importance of rice in 
Africa and the Coalition for African Rice Development (CARD), 
supported by Japan (the Japan International Cooperation Agency, JICA), 
are included in the Action Plan and both are recognized as significant 
initiatives.
(2)  The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition from the 2012 
G8 held in the United States
In May 2012, the G-8 Action on Food Security and Nutrition was 
announced at the G8 Camp David Summit held in the United States, and 
a commitment was made with the announcement of the New Alliance 
for Food Security and Nutrition in support of Africa. This is a framework 
aiming to pull 50 million people out of poverty over the next 10 years 
through promoting private and public investments; advancing technical 
innovations, risk management, and other tasks; and promoting 
agricultural development in Africa. Six countries, Tanzania, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Mozambique, Cote d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso were selected as 
pilot countries.
Since 2011, the Grow Africa Agricultural Investment Forum has been 
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held (in November 2011 and May 2012) under the leadership of the 
World Economic Forum (the Davos conference) for the promotion of 
private investments in agricultural fields as a major pillar of African 
development. The New Alliance incorporates actions of Grow Africa 
and is a positive step towards strengthening the promotion of private 
investments. 
It can be said that the New Alliance reinforces the weaker part of actions 
taken by the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development 
Programme (CAADP), to promote private investment. Cooperation 
frameworks (agreements) to be created for execution at the level of each 
country will include government commitments for improving 
investment environments, prospects for donor funding for relevant 
fields, and detailed statements of intent from the private sector for 
investments. As such, it is drawing attention as the first attempt for 
governments, donors, and the private sector to share cooperative 
frameworks.
(3) CAADP
The Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme 
(CAADP) is an African initiative and framework aimed at revitalizing 
African agriculture. It is specified as a program to achieve growth in 
food security, nutrition, and rural income, in the Maputo Declaration 
adopted at the Assembly of the African Union (AU) held in Maputo in 
July 2003. The Maputo Declaration consists of goals for African countries 
to: achieve economic growth, end hunger, reduce poverty, and work on 
agricultural reforms pertinent to policy and capability issues in African 
agriculture, targeting an annual average growth rate of 6 % in 
agricultural fields by 2015. It also includes a decision to allocate 10 % of 
the national budget in each country to agricultural programs.
Specifically, the goals are to be accomplished by achieving the following 
four pillars:
①   Improve land and water management (expanding the area of 
farmland under a sustainable land and water resource 
management system)
②   Improve market access (expansion of market access through 
development of rural infrastructure and improvement in trade 
and transaction related measures)
③   Fight hunger through expansion of food production (increase 
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food supplies and reduce hunger by improving productivity of 
small-scale farmers and improve responses to food crises)
④   Promote agricultural research and dissemination (improve 
agricultural research systems for disseminating appropriate 
new technologies and strengthen support enabling farmers to 
employ the technologies)
The main process entails: holding a roundtable meeting in each country 
first; signing a strategic agreement called a compact between the 
government and donors for comprehensive agricultural development; 
and then creating an investment plan laying out detailed actions and 
costs. (As of November 2012, 40 countries have been involved in the 
CAADP process, and 30 of them have signed compacts while 27 of them 
have developed investment plans.)
In Africa, there have been some attempts at creating agricultural sector 
programs to be managed within the framework of the Sector Wide 
Approaches (SWAPS), accomplishing certain positive results. However, 
some of these did not necessarily match with the actions taken under a 
government’s own budget and had weak ties with investments in 
related fields such as rural infrastructure development. In view of these 
experiences, CAADP can be regarded as a comprehensive strategic 
framework for organizing and integrating existing policies, programs, 
and cooperation frameworks in each country. Nonetheless, compacts 
and investment plans that have been already shared tend to look more 
like shopping lists itemizing necessary policies and actions, without due 
consideration for such factors as investment environment. To make them 
truly useful for strategic planning, more work is deemed necessary in 
order to narrow down the measures, assign priorities, improve the 
accuracy of cost accumulation, sort out timeframes and steps, and 
strengthen the collaboration with private investors.
3. Direction of Support in TICAD V
Having looked at the global circumstances surrounding Africa as well as 
some recent topics in African agriculture, we turn now to a discussion of 
JICA’s support for African agricultural development with an eye 
towards TICAD V.
3.1 Direction of JICA’s support (overview)
The share of agricultural support in the total amount of official 
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development assistance by all donors in Africa kept shrinking until 2004 
when it was reversed; then the average share was 6 %. Meanwhile, Japan 
was consistent in its support for African agriculture, devoting an 
average 11 % of its budget for agriculture during the same period.
As we saw earlier, agriculture still has a strong presence in Africa, where 
64 percent of households depend on it and it accounts for 34 percent of 
Africa’s GDP. Agriculturral growth has a high poverty reduction effect 
by its effects (more than twice as much as that of other sectors (World 
Bank 2008)) and the continent has a comparative advantage in it. 
Overall, it can be thought of as an excellent source of increasing wealth 
and of poverty reduction.
Now that the possibility of production increase by land expansion has 
become limited, every possible attempt must be made to improve 
agricultural productivity. As before, JICA will place the improvement of 
agricultural productivity and support for production expansion at the 
center of its support program at TICAD V and beyond. Also emphasized 
in JICA’s support is the development of value chains, covering both 
upstream (such as inputs production) and downstream (such as post-
harvest and distribution) activities, for achieving improved productivity 
and expanded production. JICA will provide support while 
strengthening its partnerships with private firms as agents. It is also 
important that small farmers themselves make efforts in marketing and 
building highly profitable farming systems. Agricultural investments in 
Africa are on the rise in recent years, and by leveraging this trend, a win-
win relationship between firms and small farmers should be developed 
so that it leads to their production expansion and income improvement.
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Figure 7. The direction of JICA’s support to agriculture
Meanwhile, to deal with negative risks, since African agriculture does 
depend on rainwater and is vulnerable to shocks including climate 
change and drought, as well as price fluctuations, it is essential to 
provide support for strengthening the resilience of African agriculture. 
In promoting such measures, JICA will take into consideration the 
mutually reinforcing relationship between productivity improvement 
and reduction of vulnerability; increased productivity is expected to lead 
to better resilience, and vice versa. With all of these measures, JICA is 
determined to contribute to the achievement of the annual agricultural 
growth rate of 6 % and to help to establish the continent’s food security, 
as agreed to in the Maputo Declaration by the AU in 2003. These are the 
broader points of discussion regarding the direction of support for 
Africa, at the core of which is assistance for small farmers.
There are several core approaches towards putting these policies in 
practice. The first is the support for the expansion of rice production; 
taking advantage of Japan’s strength in rice production, JICA will 
continue to support CARD (the Coalition for African Rice Development) 
in terms of commodity-based productivity improvement and 
production expansion. The CARD initiative aims at doubling rice 
production by 2018. The second is the promotion of the inclusive 
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development approach among the government, farmers and private 
partners by means of the promotion of Responsible Investment for 
agricultural development. This approach aims to facilitate synergistic 
effects among the partners, with an aim towards attracting investments 
from the private sector and improving the production and livelihoods of 
small farmers. The third approach is named “the Smallholder 
Horticulture Empowerment Project (SHEP) approach,” aimed at 
achieving a better livelihood for small-farmers through improving their 
market access. Fourthly, to strengthen the resilience of African 
agriculture, JICA will attempt to develop irrigation and food reserve 
systems, and to strengthen the community capacity development from 
the bottom-up, while exploring the possibility of introducing various 
innovative schemes such as weather index insurance. It also aspires to 
making intellectual contributions leading to innovative solutions 
through, for example, sharing of experiences in Asia in food reserve 
systems. Figure 8 summarizes these approaches and activities.
Figure 8. Japan’s Focus for Agriculture / Food Security under TICAD V
Over the years, JICA has continuously provided support for improving 
the productivity of small farmers with numerous successful 
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achievements, and a substantial body of knowledge and know-how has 
now been accumulated. This emphasis on productivity improvement, 
JICA’s consistently-held principle, seems to be being re-evaluated in the 
development community; those donors who used to prioritize the 
development of value chains by leveraging market mechanisms over the 
support for production, seem to be increasing their support for 
production and productivity improvement, especially after the food 
price spike of 2008. Arguably, JICA’s approaches and past achievements 
are gaining renewed recognition.
In the sections that follow, we will have a closer look at the four 
approaches outlined above.
3.2  Coalition for African rice development (CARD) (doubling rice 
production)
Rice consumption has rapidly increased in Africa, and its import has 
risen accordingly, bringing more pressure for foreign currency 
constraints. (The share of rice in the total amount of cereal imports in 
2010 was about 40 percent (OECD-FAO 2011).) Rice is one of the few 
cereals among major cereals in Africa that have a high potential for 
expansion of its production in the region. In TICAD IV held in 2008, JICA 
and the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) jointly 
announced the launch of the Coalition for African Rice Development 
(CARD), with a goal of doubling rice production in Africa in the 10 years 
ending in 2018. This is an international platform for promoting rice 
development, comprising international organizations and donors such 
as the World Bank and the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD); research institutes such as the International Rice 
Research Institute (IRRI), the Africa Rice Center (AfricaRice), the Japan 
International Research Center for Agricultural Sciences (JIRCAS); non-
governmental organizations, and South-South cooperation countries 
(such as Vietnam).2 CARD countries consist of a total of 23 African 
countries that are divided into a first group of 12 countries with 
relatively high importance of rice in the country/region, and a second 
group of 11 countries catching up with the first.
Within the CARD framework, each country has set up a task force for 
rice cultivation development and drawn up its National Rice 
2. For the discussion of the CARD initiative as an example of South-South cooperation, see 
Chapter 13.
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Development Strategies (NRDS), with relevant agencies providing 
support on the basis of the NRDS. JICA has mainly provided support for 
productivity improvement, including dissemination and expansion of 
appropriate cultivation technologies and seeds (such as the New Rice for 
Africa (NERICA)) among farmers and dissemination staff; JICA is 
carrying out about 60 projects as of August 2012 (including training in 
Japan). Rice production is steadily making progress from a baseline of 14 
million tons prior to CARD to 18.41 million tons as of 2010.
JICA plans to steadily cooperate with the first group of participating 
countries as well as to increase support for the second group, expanding 
comprehensive support covering the development of value chains, and 
strengthening cooperation with private firms and other partners (the 
Unites States, South Korea, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and 
BRAC).
3.3  Inclusive development approach among Governments, farmers 
and private partners through the promotion of responsible 
investment for agricultural development 
The Mozambique agricultural development program of triangular 
cooperation between Japan, Brazil and Mozambique (ProSAVANA) 
offers an agricultural development program with an aim of achieving a 
better livelihood for small farmers and the promotion of agricultural 
investments by the private sector, and to create their synergistic effects. 
Along with specific policy suggestions made at a national level in the 
draft of the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI) 
led by Japan, attempts towards realizing synergistic effects of 
agricultural development and distribution infrastructure development 
hold unique additional values in Africa.
For increasing the agricultural productivity of small farmers and their 
earnings, not only the refining of their technologies but also the 
improving and reforming of value chains both upstream (inputs such as 
seeds and fertilizer) and downstream (post-harvest handling, 
distribution, etc.) are essential. Private firms play a great role as main 
players in this effort, and their investments must be increased. JICA will 
attempt to expand its approach for similar development in countries 
with potentials for future agricultural investments.
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3.4  Smallholder horticulture empowerment project (SHEP) approach: 
reform in small farmer’s approach from “selling after harvesting” 
to “harvesting to sell”
Currently, the second phase of SHEP (SHEP UP) is in progress in Kenya 
with the goal of carrying it out nationwide. It has achieved doubled 
earnings for farmers by inducing a change in their management model - 
a change from one based on the mindset of “selling crops after 
harvesting” to the one based on “harvesting to sell,” and has been well-
received by the Kenyan government and other donors. This is a market-
oriented type approach that encourages small-scale farmers to perform 
their own market research to select crops to be sold and learn market-
competitive cultivation technologies, instead of harvesting crops first 
and then looking for a place to sell. As a result of promoting women’s 
active involvement in farming with this approach, men and women 
have worked together to achieve more efficient farming. This case was 
presented in the meeting of the DAC Network on Gender Equality in 
2011, receiving high praise from its participants.
Using this success as a foothold, JICA will seek to further generalize and 
consolidate the approach to be expanded as a regional program with 
SHEP in Kenya as a base, supplemented by training in Japan.
3.5 Toward strengthening resilience
In recent years, African agriculture has been exposed to increasing risks, 
such as climate change and food price hikes, and the resilience of 
countries and communities, i.e., their response capabilities against these 
risks must be strengthened. Since the severe drought in the Horn of 
Africa in 2011, JICA has been administering regional programs, which 
attempt to resolve the gap between humanitarian support and medium-
term development to assure human security of the people. The idea of 
the programs is to help people to be “independent players in the 
economy” rather than “subjects of social protection.” Specifically, 
programs are offered to pastoralists and others for strengthening their 
resilience (response capability) against drought in their communities in 
Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. A similar project is underway in West 
Africa.
JICA hopes to implement similar projects and, at the same time, provide 
support in building irrigation facilities and develop capacity for 
operating and maintaining them for the effective management and use 
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of water. It also hopes to provide more support in establishing networks 
of small-scale food reserves with high mobility. Furthermore, it may be 
possible for JICA to contribute to food reserve system development (at 
the regional level), such as the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) on the basis of experiences in the ASEAN Plus Three 
Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR). JICA intends to consider support 
for innovative systems such as weather index insurances. As stated, JICA 
will take into consideration the mutually reinforcing relationship 
between productivity improvement and the reduction of vulnerability. 
Increased productivity is expected to lead to better resilience, and vice 
versa.
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Chapter 3:  
How Promising Is the Rice Green Revolution in 
Sub-Saharan Africa?  
- Evidence from case studies in Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana1
Keijiro Otsuka
1. Introduction
While the population continues to grow rapidly, the pace of area 
expansion has slowed down considerably in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
due to the gradual exhaustion of uncultivated areas. On average, 
cultivated land per farming population has declined by about 40% since 
the 1960s and value added per worker now averages around 12% below 
1980 levels. Investments in the development of new technologies have 
declined in recent years even though their adoption rates are low 
compared to other regions. In order to reduce widespread and persistent 
rural poverty in SSA, it is imperative to increase food production by 
increasing the productivity per unit of land. 
We believe that what is urgently needed in SSA is a Green Revolution, 
which has successfully increased rice and wheat yields in tropical Asia 
over the last several decades. In Asia, small farmers actively adopted 
new improved technologies (David and Otsuka 1994), and there is no 
reason to assume that small farmers in SSA will not adopt new profitable 
technologies (Otsuka 2006; Otsuka and Kijima 2010). Yet the appropriate 
strategies to realize a Green Revolution in SSA are still unclear. Recent 
studies edited by Otsuka and Larson (2013), which compare the 
experience of the Asian Green Revolution with current grain farming in 
SSA, suggest that lowland rice is the most promising grain. This is 
1. This is a result of a research project being conducted at JICA Research Institute to 
empirically analyze how best the CARD initiative (See Chapter 2, Section 3) can serve to 
increase rice productivity and reduce poverty. I am heavily indebted to its members, namely 
Yoko Kijima, Kei Kajisa, Yuko Nakano, and Takeshi Sakurai. I would also like to thank JICA 
Research Institute for the intellectual and financial support it provided for this project.
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essentially because high-yielding rice technology can be directly 
transferable from tropical Asia to SSA (Estudillo and Otsuka 2012; 
Nakano et al. 2012).
This is illustrated by Figure 1, which compares changes in grain yields 
over time in India and SSA and their differences between the two 
regions. India is chosen for comparison because among Asian countries 
India is agro-climatically similar to SSA and, hence, cropping patterns 
are not so different (Tsusaka and Otsuka 2013a, 2013b).2 Several 
important observations can be made. Firstly, grain yields were generally 
similar between India and SSA in the early 1960s before the Green 
Revolution began, which indicates that the difference in agro-climatic 
conditions alone cannot explain the large yield difference between the 
two regions at present. Secondly, the yields of sorghum and millet did 
not increase much even in India and the yield gap between the two 
regions is nil, which suggests that the potential of a Green Revolution in 
these crops is limited in SSA. Thirdly, the current yield gap is substantial 
in the case of wheat and rice, even though their yields increased 
appreciably in SSA. Since wheat can be produced primarily in a 
temperate zone, its potential production area is more limited than rice in 
SSA due to the dominance of a tropical climate. Thus, rice is likely to be 
critically important for the expansion of grain production in SSA. 
Furthermore, rice consumption has been increasing dramatically in this 
region in the past few decades. Lastly, the yield gap is only modest in 
maize, even though maize is the most important crop in SSA in both 
production and consumption. It is likely that the productivity gain in the 
maize sector in SSA from a technology transfer from Asia will not be 
large. 
Although rice looks a promising crop from the aggregate data, micro-
level evidence is needed to substantiate the argument that rice is the 
most promising crop in SSA. The first purpose of this study is to analyze 
the potential of a rice Green Revolution in SSA based on recently 
completed cases studies of rice-growing households in Mozambique, 
2. For example, sorghum and millet are grown in many countries in SSA but primarily in 
India in Asia. Analytically, however, a comparison between tropical Asia as a whole and SSA 
does not lead to major changes in our discussion (Estudillo and Otsuka 2012). 
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Tanzania, Uganda, and Ghana.3 The second purpose is to draw up the 
implications of an effective strategy for a rice Green Revolution in SSA. 
We believe that, if successful, a rice Green Revolution can be a role model 
for Green Revolutions in other grains, particularly in maize production. 
2. Is Asian Rice Technology Transferable to SSA?
Asian rice technology. Although the rice yield is still low in SSA, we 
should not overlook the fact that it has increased from 1.25 tons per 
hectare in the early 1960s to 1.8 tons per hectare in the late 2000s. In 
tropical Asia where lowland rice production dominates, the rice yield 
before the Green Revolution was 1.5 tons per hectare (see Figure 1).4 
Also, note that half of the rice area in SSA is upland, where the yield is 
substantially lower than in lowland paddy fields (Balasubramanian et al. 
2007). Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that if new technology is not 
introduced and production is carried out under rain-fed conditions, the 
lowland paddy yield will range from 1.0 to 1.5 tons per hectare. We also 
hypothesize that the average rice yield has increased in SSA primarily 
due to the introduction of Asian-type improved rice technology.5
We focus on lowland rice, not upland rice, primarily because the 
prospect for a large improvement of the yield is much greater for 
lowland rice than upland rice. We also did not encounter upland rice, 
such as NERICA (new rice for Africa), in our study sites except in 
Uganda. Kijima et al. (2006, 2008, 2011) found that NERICA is potentially 
high-yielding but sensitive to rainfall and that the rate of discontinuation 
of NERICA adoption is also high, indicating that NERICA was grown in 
unsuitable areas or that sustainable management was not well 
understood by farmers. Also, the NERICA yield is exceptionally high in 
Uganda compared with other countries in SSA (Otsuka and Larson 
2013). The tentative conclusion of this study is that upland rice is not 
particularly promising, even though there were great expectations for 
3. Senegal is also included in this project but the data collection has been delayed, so its 
analytical results will be reported later. Note, however, that according to our preliminary 
survey, the average irrigated rice yield in the Senegal River basin exceeds 5 tons per hectare, 
which is comparable to the irrigated yields in Asia.
4. Nearly half of the paddy fields were irrigated in Asia but the difference in yield between 
rain-fed and irrigated areas was not large before the advent of MVs.
5. This is consistent with the results of a review of rice farming in SSA by Balasubramanian et 
al. (2007).
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the impact of NERICA on the upland rice yield. 
The Green Revolution in Asia is alternatively called the seed-fertilizer 
revolution because the engine of growth was the development and 
diffusion of fertilizer-responsive, high-yielding modern varieties (MVs) 
of lowland rice (David and Otsuka 1994). It is also important to realize 
that paddy fields were bunded and leveled almost without exception in 
Asia when the rice Green Revolution began.6 Bunding is needed to store 
water in the paddy fields to reduce weed growth, whereas leveling is 
necessary for even growth of rice plants and germination of directly 
broadcasted seeds. In other words, these production practices are 
essential for water and weed control and healthy growth of lowland rice 
plants. Draft animals or tractors are usually used for bunding and 
leveling, but they are often not used in SSA, as will be shown shortly. No 
less important than these production practices is straight-row 
transplanting, which provides space for weeding. Instead of 
transplanting, direct seeding can be adopted without sacrificing yield if 
paddy fields are bunded and leveled well and if herbicide is used. 
Herbicide, however, may not be available or may be too expensive, even 
if available in SSA. In the African setting, direct seeding is not generally 
recommended and transplanting is the generally preferred option. A 
major contribution of this study is to establish that these improved 
production practices are highly complementary to improved seed-
fertilizer technology. 
The case of Mozambique. Table 1 compares yields and production practices 
across rain-fed and irrigated areas in Mozambique (Kajisa and 
Payongayong 2011a, 2011b). Thirty-three villages in 9 districts in 
Zambezia and Sofara provinces in the Central region are chosen as 
representative rain-fed areas in this country, whereas the Chokwe 
irrigation scheme in the southern region is chosen as the irrigated study 
site. As in other countries in SSA, the irrigated area accounts for a small 
proportion of paddy area in this country. Furthermore, MVs are seldom 
adopted, chemical fertilizer is not used, and animal and tractor use is nil 
in rain-fed areas. Under such conditions, the rice yield is very low and 
unstable with the average being a mere 1.1 tons per hectare, which is 
consistent with our expectations. The yield per hectare is not very high 
6. There is no clear evidence on the prevalence of bunding and leveling in paddy fields in Asia 
in the 1960s and 1970s. My argument is based on interviews with rice scientists who worked 
in Asia in the 1970s.
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in the Chokwe irrigation scheme either, mainly because the irrigation 
facilities are not well maintained. In fact, the top 20% of farmers, who 
receive adequate water, adopt MVs, and apply fertilizer, achieve a rate as 
high as 3.9 tons per hectare. Note that popular MVs are old MVs 
developed in Nigeria (ITA312) in the late 1970s by crossing Asian MVs 
and African local varieties.7 This clearly shows that there has been no 
attempt to transfer new Asian-type varieties to Mozambique. The yield 
could be higher if more modern improved MVs had been disseminated 
in Chokwe. 
The case of Tanzania. The case of Tanzania is more revealing (Table 2). The 
three major rice growing districts with distinctly different production 
environments were chosen for this study. First, the average yield in rain-
fed areas ranges from 1.6 tons per hectare in the Shinyanga region to 2.0 
tons per hectare in the Morogoro region, which is much higher than in 
rain-fed areas in Mozambique. This relatively high yield in rain-fed 
areas in Tanzania can be attributed, at least partly, to some adoption of 
MVs, some chemical fertilizer application, and the adoption of some 
improved production practices. Second, the yields are considerably 
higher in irrigated areas. The adoption rate of MVs is very high in the 
Morogoro region, whereas chemical fertilizer use is high in the 
Morogoro and Mbeya regions. Note that there is no tradition of rice 
production in Tanzania, so even “traditional varieties” are imported 
improved varieties from abroad. This would explain why the yield is as 
high as 4.6 tons per hectare under irrigated conditions in the Shinyanga 
region, even though the adoption rate of MVs is very low. Third, the 
adoption rates of bunding and leveling are close to 100% in irrigated 
areas, which seems to help explain the considerably high yields in 
irrigated areas in Tanzania. Thus, it is clear that a combination of 
improved seeds, improved production practices, and irrigation leads to 
significantly high yields, resulting in a “mini” Green Revolution in this 
country.
The case of Uganda. The importance of improved production practices can 
also be clearly seen from the case study of basically rain-fed areas in the 
Eastern Region in Uganda (see Table 3), as reported by Kijima, Ito, and 
Otsuka (2011, 2012). Note that Bugiri and Mayuge were sites of a 
participatory rice training program offered by JICA, whereas no such 
7. To our surprise, C4, which was developed in the early 1960s by the University of the 
Philippines, Los Banos, was adopted in 22% of the paddy fields in Chokwe.
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training was offered in Bukedea and Pallisa. Also note that the 
demonstration of a simple irrigation scheme was implemented only in 
Bugiri. Roughly speaking, the difference between Bugiri and Mayuge is 
due primarily to the presence of irrigation in the former, whereas a major 
part of the difference between Burigi-cum-Mayuge and Bekedea-cum-
Palissa is due mainly to the implementation of a rice training program in 
the former areas, even though some yield differences can be attributed to 
differences in agro-climate. In Bugiri, where Asian-type MVs are 
adopted in more than 40% of paddy fields, the yield and the number of 
improved production practices adopted are positively correlated, 
indicating that MVs and improved production practices are 
complementary. Considering that chemical fertilizer is not applied in 
Uganda, the yield of more than 4 tons per hectare is impressively high, 
indicating the high potential of rice yields in this country due to 
relatively high precipitation and fertile soil. It is likely, however, that 
such high yield is unsustainable, unless fertilizer is applied to maintain 
soil fertility.8 The yield in Mayuge is reasonably high if all four improved 
production practices are adopted. In contrast, the yields are much lower 
and variable regardless of the adoption of improved practices in 
Bekedea and Palissa. Even if improved production practices are 
adopted, whether they are adopted properly can be questioned, as these 
areas were not covered by the training program. The average yield in 
these two sites is 1.8 tons per hectare, which is not low compared with 
other rain-fed areas in SSA. A critically important finding of the Uganda 
case study is that the rice training program encouraged the adoption of 
improved production practices and improved the profitability of rice 
farming (Kijima, Ito, and Otsuka 2012).
It must be pointed out that the rain-fed area in Uganda is located at the 
bottom of a valley. Although it is rain-fed, its production environment is 
favorable for lowland rice production, because the soil is fertile and 
moist. In my observations, such production environments are abundant 
in SSA, and most have been unused until recently. Probably for rice 
production such rain-fed area is more favorable than rain-fed areas in 
Asia, most of which are located in flat areas. The Northern Region in 
Ghana is another example of a rain-fed area at the bottom of a valley 
with mild slopes, which has huge potential to increase rice production. 
8. In the Doho irrigation scheme located in the Easter Region, the rice yield is about 3 tons per 
hectare, even though double cropping of rice has been practiced for a few decades without 
chemical fertilizer (Nakano and Otsuka 2011).
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The case of Ghana. The case study in Northern Ghana is unique in that it 
compares the rice farming performance between villages where the 
Lowland Rice Development Project (LRDP) was implemented and 
villages where no such project was implemented (deGraft-Johnson et al. 
2012). Twenty project villages and 40 non-project villages were selected 
randomly for this study and in each village 20 rice-farming households 
were surveyed.9 Out of 40 non-project villages, 20 are located within a 
20-kilometer radius of any of the project villages and the other 20 are 
located beyond the 20-kilometer radius. The former are called “nearby 
villages” and the latter “remote villages.” The LRDP, which was 
implemented from 1998 to 2003, was designed to promote the 
dissemination of MVs, chemical fertilizer use, bunding, leveling, and 
dibbling.10 Aside from the practice of dibbling, the four technologies are 
essential components of Asian Green Revolution technology. Thus, in a 
sense, the purpose of LRDP was to transfer Asian Green Revolution 
technology to SSA. Transplanting was not recommended because this 
area suffers from floods and seedlings cannot survive under submerged 
conditions. 
According to Figure 2, improved technologies were seldom adopted 
before the implementation of the LRDP. During the LRDP 
implementation period they were adopted primarily in the project 
villages, whereas they were diffused to nearby villages after the LRDP 
period, suggesting technology spillovers from the project to other 
villages. The adoption rates of new technologies are generally low in 
remote villages.11 It is clear that the adoption rates of both MVs and 
chemical fertilizer are equally high, which indicates the strong 
complementarity between fertilizer-responsive MVs and fertilizer. 
Leveling is adopted by about half of the sample farmers at present, 
whereas bunding and dibbling are not widely adopted. Another 
important observation is that the rate of dis-adoption, i.e., adoption in 
the past but discontinuation later, is high for dibbling. According to our 
respondents, dibbling is highly labor-intensive, and this is the major 
reason for dis-adoption. Thus, we suspect that dibbling may not be 
appropriate technology in this region.
9. Reliable data were obtained from 545 households. 
10. Dibbling is a crop establishment method in which seeds are planted in holes created by 
sticks. Dibbling is not needed, if paddy fields are well bunded and leveled so that 
broadcasted seeds are germinated well. 
11. Socio-economic conditions are very similar between the project and nearby villages, 
whereas the remote villages are far from the capital city and endowed with large land areas. 
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Table 4 summarizes the technology adoption, paddy yield, labor use, 
and the factor share of labor. It is clear that the rice yield is lowest among 
non-adopters of new technology, which is 1.5 tons per hectare and falls 
in the expected range under rain-fed conditions without new 
technologies. The yield becomes higher as larger amounts of new 
technologies are adopted. It is interesting to observe that an average 
yield of 2.6 tons per hectare among full-package technology adopters is 
almost identical to the average lowland rice yield under rain-fed 
conditions in Asia in the late 1980s reported by David and Otsuka (1994). 
This indicates that the yield potential under rain-fed condition in SSA is 
not inferior to that in tropical Asia. While it is true that labor use per 
hectare becomes larger with increases in the adoption of new 
technologies, the factor share of labor tends to decline, which indicates 
that new technologies are not labor-using.
In sum, our case studies demonstrate large potentials to increase rice 
yields in SSA by disseminating Asian Green Revolution technology. 
Although we did not discuss in detail in this article, our case studies 
indicate that new technologies are not only productive but also 
profitable. In short, Asian rice Green Revolution technology is directly 
transferable to SSA.
3. Key Questions
Before recommending further dissemination of new technologies, we 
must ask a few key questions. The first question is whether the benefit of 
new technologies accrues to small farmers. If these new technologies are 
adopted primarily by large farmers, their contribution to poverty 
reduction is limited, because it is small farmers who suffer from poverty 
(Yamano, Otsuka, and Place 2011). The second question is what the 
major constraints are on the adoption of new technologies. In order to 
disseminate new technologies to wide areas, we have to remove such 
constraints.
Commonly our case studies do not find any significantly positive effect 
of farm size on technology adoption. In the case of Ghana, it has a 
negative and significant effect on the adoption of dibbling, which is 
highly labor-intensive. In both irrigated and rain-fed areas in 
Mozambique (Kajisa and Payongayong 2011a, 2011b) and Uganda 
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(Kijima, Ito, and Otsuka 2011), the effects of farm size on paddy yields 
are found to be negative, implying that the yield per hectare is higher on 
smaller farms. These findings are consistent with the negative 
correlation between farm size and yield widely observed in SSA recently 
(Larson et al. 2012), which can be explained by the higher intensity of 
family labor on smaller farms.12 While the effect of farm size on rice 
income per hectare is negative and significant in Tanzania (Nakano and 
Kajisa 2012), no effect on profit is found in Uganda and Ghana (Kijima, 
Ito, and Otsuka 2012; deGraft-Johnson et al. 2012). Thus, there is no 
evidence that new rice technologies particularly favor large farms. On 
the contrary, they seem to be conducive to equitable distribution of 
income in rural communities in SSA by offering expanded work 
opportunities for family labor, which is a major resource of poor small 
farmers. This is consistent with the observations in Asia that the impacts 
of the rice Green Revolution technology are neutral with respect to farm 
size (David and Otsuka 1994). 
While irrigation is found to be an important determinant of rice yield, 
there is no evidence that it is necessary for the adoption of new 
technology. Considering that rain-fed areas dominate in SSA, a critically 
significant finding of this study is that the improved rice technologies 
have significant impacts on the rice yields under rain-fed conditions. 
Judging from the results of studies in the rain-fed areas of Uganda and 
Ghana (Tables 3 and 4), it seems possible to increase rice yield by 50 to 
100% by adopting the improved technologies. In order to increase the 
rice yield much further, irrigation is needed. Whether irrigation 
investment pays is an important issue to be examined carefully.
The finding that training activities with demonstration plots are effective 
in the dissemination of the new rice technologies in Uganda and Ghana 
suggests that a major constraint on the wider adoption of the new 
technologies is the farmers’ lack of knowledge on new technologies. 
According to the case study in Ghana (deGraft-Johnson et al. 2012), the 
spillover effects of new technology adoption in the project villages on the 
adoption in non-project villages are significant in the case of bunding 
and leveling but not in the case of MVs and fertilizer applications. The 
authors argue that this is due to the fact that while the bunding and 
12. Monitoring of hired labor in a spatially wide environment in agriculture is costly, so that 
the endowment of family labor relative to farm size is the critical determinant of crop yield 
(Hayami and Otsuka 1993).
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leveling are visible and imitable, the know-how on appropriate 
cultivation of MVs with fertilizer cannot be easily copied. If this is true, it 
may be a good idea to set up a relatively small number of demonstration 
plots compared with the number of locations where training programs 
are offered. 
Kijima et al. (2011) find that the dis-adoption rate of NERICA is very high 
(i.e., in the vicinity of 50%). This is either because NERICA was 
disseminated to unsuitable areas for production or because sustainable 
management was not well understood by farmers. Indeed, there is the 
indication that yields of NERICA decline over time due to the 
deterioration of self-produced seeds or soil quality. In either case, the 
major problem is that appropriate production knowledge of NERICA 
was not disseminated to rice farmers.
It is clear that the absence of an effective extension system is a major 
constraint on the rice Green Revolution in SSA. In Ghana, even though 
the LRDP was an effective program, similar programs have not been 
implemented for nearly 10 years. In Uganda, the geographical coverage 
of the training program is very small. It is worse in Mozambique where 
no extension program for rice farming has been carried out. Actually, 
there are a very small number of agricultural extension workers in SSA. 
Furthermore, only a few of them are knowledgeable about rice farming. 
Unless we invest in the capacity building of extension workers, the 
target of CARD (Coalition for African Rice Development), that is the 
doubling of rice production in ten years from 2008, may not be achieved. 
Another possible constraint on technology adoption is the lack of credit. 
Kajisa and Payongayong (2011) argue that the lack of credit access leads 
to the insufficient application of chemical fertilizer as well as hired labor 
use in the Chokwe irrigation scheme in Mozambique. Similarly, Nakano 
and Kajisa (2011) report that the access to formal credit is an important 
determinant of fertilizer use, but not MV adoption in Tanzania. MV 
seeds can be self-produced and, hence, credit access is unlikely to be 
important in MV adoption. While improving access to credit is likely to 
be important to increase fertilizer application, it is also remarkable to 
realize that considerably high rice yields are achieved without 
functioning credit markets in our four study sites. Therefore, it seems 
fair to conclude that improved credit access is desirable but not essential 
for the improvement of rice yields in SSA. Furthermore, according to our 
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ongoing research in the Mwea irrigation scheme in Kenya, which is a 
large irrigation scheme consisting of 12,000 hectares with well-
maintained facilities, rice yields are as high as 5 to 7 tons per hectare and 
credits are supplied not only by agricultural cooperatives but also by rice 
traders, as in many rice growing areas in Asia. It may well be that large 
demand for fertilizer induces the development of informal credit 
markets, where standing crops serve as the role of credit.
4. Concluding Remarks
The four case studies we have reviewed in this article clearly 
demonstrate that in order to realize the rice Green Revolution in SSA, 
high-yielding MV seeds, application of fertilizer, and the adoption of 
bunding and leveling are essential. We found that very high yields are 
realized in some irrigated areas in Tanzania and Uganda and reasonably 
high yields are achieved in some rain-fed areas in Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Ghana. Commonly in these areas, Asian type-MVs as well as bunding 
and leveling practices are adopted. These findings indicate that Asian 
rice technology can be directly transferable to SSA.13 On the other hand, 
there are many areas in SSA where unimproved varieties are adopted, 
chemical fertilizer is not used, and paddy fields are not bunded and 
leveled. In such areas, the rice yield is low and ranges from 1.0 to 1.5 tons 
per hectare, which is close to rice yields in Asia before the Green 
Revolution. These observations strongly indicate that a strategic priority 
on the capacity building of extension specialists on rice and 
strengthening extension activities for rice production will be warranted, 
in order to realize a rice Green Revolution in SSA.
So far, however, inadequate resources have been allocated to the capacity 
building and extension. Unless more resources are allocated to these 
activities, the efforts to realize a rice Green Revolution in SSA are bound 
to fail.
Since MVs are fertilizer-responsive, once they are adopted, demand for 
fertilizer will increase, which, in turn, will increase the demand for 
credit. Similarly, since MVs are more productive under irrigated 
conditions, adoption of MVs will increase the demand for irrigation 
13. Asian varieties, however, are susceptible to yellow mottle virus, which is unique to SSA. 
Thus, MVs tolerant to this virus must be developed urgently (Balasubramanian et al. 2007).
110
Chapter 3
water. Thus, the benefit and cost of credit programs and irrigation 
projects must be carefully reassessed, while considering the large 
expected gains in productivity and profitability of rice farming in SSA.
We have been conducting research on lowland rice production partly 
because it is the most promising crop and partly because the success of 
the developing rice sector in SSA can provide a model for a successful 
Green Revolution in SSA. According to Otsuka and Larson (2013), 
profitable and productive maize technology is yet to be established. 
Indeed, although maize is the single most important crop in SSA, we 
seldom observed impressively high maize yields anywhere in SSA. It 
seems to us that the prerequisite for a maize Green Revolution is the 
development of truly profitable and productive maize seeds and 
farming practices for this crop. Once such technology is developed, it 
will trigger the change towards the maize Green Revolution in SSA. It is 
our hope that successful development of the rice sector can be a role 
model of the Green Revolution in other crops in this region.
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Table 1. Paddy yields and production practices in Mozambique
Chokwe 
irrigation 
scheme
Rain-fed areas in central region
Bottom 1/3 Middle 1/3 Top 1/3
Yield per ha (tons)
Use of MVs (%)
Fertilizer use (%)
Plots with bund (%)
Animal use (%)
Tractor use (%)
No. of sample 
households
2.1
92
52
100
48
55
176
0.3
0.0
0.0
52
0
2
66
0.8
0.0
0.0
41
2
5
66
2.2
3.0
0.0
43
5
2
65
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Table 2.  Rice yields, the use of modern inputs and improved production 
practices by region and irrigation status in Tanzania
 Morogoro Mbeya Shinyanga
 Rain-fed Irrigated Rain-fed Irrigated Rain-fed Irrigated
Paddy yields (t/ha) 2.0 3.8 1.6 3.5 1.7 4.6
Modern inputs use
Share of modern 
varieties (%)
17.8 87.5 0.0 2.1 1.9 13.1
Chemical fertilizer use 
(kg/ha)
11.7 40.4 10.7 31.7 0.9 0.0
Improved practices
Share of bunded plots 
(%)
8.2 84.8 16.3 89.6 95.3 100.0
Share of leveled plots (%) 22.0 69.6 38.5 78.1 87.6 100.0
Share of straight row 
transplanting plots
4.4 47.8 3.8 22.9 6.4 0.0
No. of sample 
households
182 46 104 96 234 10
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Table 3.  Rice yields (ton/ha) according to the cultivation practices adopted in 
September 2008 – August 2009 in Uganda a
All Bugiri Mayuge Bukedea Pallisa
4 practices 4.13 4.47 2.89 1.22 0.37
3 practices 3.20 4.15 1.89 --- 1.54
2 practices 2.25 3.07 2.00 3.95 2.26
1 practice 1.81 2.30 1.91 1.89 1.38
Non-adopters 1.33 --- 0.79 b 1.42 0.66 c
Fertilizer use 7.55c 7.55 d --- --- ---
Adoption of MVs (%) 19.6 43.8 40.0 5.0 1.6
No. of sample households 300 75 75 75 75
a.  The numbers show the means for the rice yield in tons per hectare. The adoption of 4 practices means 
bunding, leveling, proper timing of transplanting, and straight-row planting.
b. Only 1 observation. 
c. Only 3 observations. 
d. Only 4 observations.
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Table 4.  Technology adoption, paddy yields, labor inputs,  
and factor share of labor in Northern Ghana
No 
adoption
Partial adoption
Full 
adoption
Modern 
inputs 
onlya
Some 
modern 
inputs
Modern 
inputs, 
bunding, 
and 
leveling
Some 
modern 
inputs, 
bunding 
and 
leveling
No. of households
(%)
Yield (ton/ha)
Labor (days/ha)
Factor share of 
labor (%)
63
(11.6)
1.46
102
61.5
78
(14.3)
1.70
152
62.6
349
(64.0)
1.95
187
54.6
37
(6.8)
1.98
204
52.8
84
(15.4)
2.33
238
49.5
47
(8.6)
2.59
264
47.6
a. Modern inputs refer to the adoption of MVs and chemical fertilizer application.
b. Factor share of labor is the total cost of labor divided by the total value of production.
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Figure 1. Grain yields in India and SSA, 3-year moving averages.
Figure 1a. India
Yield (Ton/ha)
                          Source: FAOSTAT
Figure 1b. SSA
Yield (Ton/ha)
                          Source: FAOSTAT
Rice
Wheat
Maize
Millet
Sorghum
Wheat
Rice
Maize
Sorghum
Millet
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Figure 2.  Adoption of new technologies before, during, and after the Lowland 
Rice Development Project (LRDP) in Northern Ghana.
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Chapter 4: 
The Inclusive Development Approach among 
Farmers, Private Partners and Government 
through the Promotion of Responsible 
Investment for Agricultural Development
Koji Makino
1. Investment in Agriculture by the Private Sector 
1.1 The role of the private sector in agriculture
For robust development, the agricultural sector needs to have well 
functioning value chain systems consisting of input (seed, fertilizer, 
machinery, etc.) → production → processing and shipment → 
transportation and storage → sales and distribution. Such value chain 
development has been behind the development of agriculture in Asia 
and other areas, where the widespread use of improved seeds and 
fertilizers was subsequently accompanied by the development of value 
chains stretching from production to distribution, resulting in 
productivity improvement and production expansion. Such systems, 
however, are seriously underdeveloped in Africa. 
For example, the use of improved seeds and fertilizers as input goods is 
not widespread among many of the small scale farmers in Africa because 
they are either too expensive or simply unavailable locally and also 
fertilizer responding seeds have not yet been well developed except for 
rice and wheat. Low productivity persists due at least partly to lagging 
mechanization, although the dependence on family labor does 
contribute to employment. The post-harvest processing of agricultural 
produce also poses a problem. A significant amount of crops is lost or 
wasted, for example, in rice production, due to farmers’ poor grain 
threshing and drying techniques as well to the poor techniques of rice 
millers, who in many cases are equipped with inadequate milling 
machines. 
Another problem is distribution. Some farmers are placed in a weak 
position as sellers of their own products. Though they do have a desire 
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to market their products at the highest possible price, without adequate 
storage facilities, they have difficulty to adjust the timing of the sales, nor 
do they have marketing channels to rely on other than a small number of 
brokers or intermediaries that come to them to buy up their produce. It is 
observed in fields, thus, they sometimes end up selling the products to 
brokers at less than optimal prices.
In developing such value chains, the private sector could play a critical 
role in Africa, as in many other areas. While the government could 
facilitate the process by providing incentives through subsidies and by 
developing financial systems, it is primarily the role of the private sector 
to supply improved seeds and fertilizers, and to provide post-harvest 
processing and distribution services. One cannot overemphasize the 
importance of the roles of the private sector in the reduction of poverty 
by means of productivity improvement and livelihood betterment of 
farmers, including small scale farmers. 
1.2 Investments in agriculture 
The promotion of private sector activities in agriculture requires 
investment, and for that, investment both by the private sector as well as 
by farmers needs to be encouraged. Investment in agriculture could 
have a high socio-economic spillover effect, as growth in agriculture is 
said to have a poverty reduction effect twice that of other sectors (World 
Bank 2008).
The government will continue to play an important role in fulfilling 
functions that the private sector or the market cannot fully provide. 
These include, for example, development of improved seeds and 
dissemination of agricultural technologies, development of 
infrastructure, and the development of an enabling environment for 
investment, as well as the promotion of land reform. When a ‘green 
revolution’ was achieved in Asia, the governments in Asia allocated 
more than 20 % of government spending to agriculture (UNDP2012). In 
Africa, however, the allocation to agriculture is only 5.6 % (average 
between 2005 and 2009) and it is only about half of the targeted 10 % of 
the CAADP (Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme). In this context the need for efforts to promote private 
investment is apparent, along with more efforts to increase government 
spending on African agriculture.    
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Despite its importance, however, agricultural investment must be 
promoted with caution. Particularly those investments in the productive 
sectors such as crop production, fuel crop production or forestry 
development often require the acquisition of extensive farmlands, and 
such acquisition of land can lead to conflicts over land and water 
resources between private companies and local inhabitants. In extreme 
cases, situations (often dubbed as ‘land grabbing’) arise where small 
farmers are removed from the lands they traditionally owned. There are 
many reports of such cases: in one case, an area of land stretching over 
tens of thousands of hectares was leased to a private company for 
growing plants and planting trees for biofuels without local people’s 
prior knowledge, who, according to the plan, were to be obliged to 
relocate. In other reported cases, land lease contracts have become 
effective with an authorization by the government, but the land has been 
left unused for a long period of time without actual development.
This is indeed a difficult issue, but the author is of the view that it is not 
an all or nothing type of question on which there are only two 
alternatives, i.e., whether private investment in agriculture in Africa is to 
be promoted or not. Rather, what is important is to promote appropriate 
investment and restrain inappropriate investments in line with the 
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, 
Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security and the 
Principles of Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI) both of which 
are touched on later. This middle ground approach must be pursued 
because, as mentioned earlier, the private sector plays the primary role in 
providing input goods and post-harvest processing as well as 
distribution. 
Interviews conducted recently with government officials of African 
countries generally indicate that they believe they must promote those 
investments that will benefit local communities and agricultural growth, 
while excluding inappropriate ones. They also say that for this purpose, 
they are prepared to make efforts for the establishment and registration 
of ownership of farmers’ lands and for the improvement in land 
management capacity. If that is the African governments’ policy, donors 
should actively help governments in pursuing their efforts to improve 
their capacity for agricultural investment administration, land 
management, and agricultural investment programs formulation, as 
well as for system and/or regulatory reforms. 
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In promoting private sector participation in agriculture, one interesting 
business model is what is called the “Inclusive business model” (FAO 
2012). It has been drawing attention in the agricultural production sector, 
where private companies become engaged in production by actively 
involving small farmers, while providing them with various services 
and inputs; these are meant to improve the productivity and livelihood 
of the contracted small farmers, while increasing production and 
corporate profits. One example is the case of a company that operates a 
chicken farm where the company makes a contract with farmers and 
provides them with well-bred chicks, gauges (cages for rearing) and 
feed, in addition to providing training on breeding technology. Another 
example is a case where beer factories (companies) commission groups 
of farmers to produce raw materials such as barley and corn and at the 
same time provide them with various services and supports: input 
goods such as seeds and fertilizers, extension services by their staff, and 
the installation of small-scale warehouses. These cases illustrate that this 
kind of partnership between private firms and farmers can not only help 
farmers to improve productivity and obtain benefits (surplus) even 
when the input cost is deducted from the sales, but also help the 
company to increase production and profits. In the future, this and other 
kinds of business models that involve farmers’ participation in an 
inclusive manner will be worth supporting.    
1.3 Formulation of international rules on investments in agriculture
(1)  Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Land, 
Fisheries and Forests
Countries with weak land governance tend to be targeted for global land 
investment, and in such countries the rights to land and livelihood of 
local residents are likely to be threatened. The need for the establishment 
of an international guideline for supporting governance of natural 
resources of each country, including lands, has been voiced and the 
Committee on World Food Security (CFS), a standing committee of the 
FAO, has led the formulation of Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the 
Context of National Food Security (hereinafter guidelines).   
These guidelines are positioned as a practical and comprehensive guide 
for the governance of land and other natural resources, to be used by 
governments, communities and the private sector for complementing 
similar existing international or regional initiatives and policies of each 
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government. The work to develop the guidelines started in 2009, and 
they were officially approved in May 2012. The contents of these 
guidelines are as follows:
Contents of Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of 
Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food 
Security
Part 1: Preliminary 
1. Objectives 
2. Nature and scope 
Part 2: General Matters 
3. Guiding principles of responsible tenure governance 
4. Rights and responsibilities related to tenure 
5. Policy, legal and organizational frameworks related to tenure 
6. Delivery of services 
Part 3: Legal Recognition and Allocation of Tenure Rights and Duties 
7. Safeguards 
8. Public land, fisheries and forests 
9. Indigenous peoples and other communities with customary 
tenure systems 
10. Informal tenure 
Part 4: Transfers and Other Changes to Tenure Rights and Duties 
11. Markets 
12. Investments 
13. Land consolidation and other readjustment approaches
14. Restitution
15. Redistributive reforms 
16. Expropriation and compensation 
Part 5: Administration of Tenure
17. Records of tenure rights 
18. Valuation 
19. Taxation
20. Regulated spatial planning
21. Resolution of disputes over tenure rights
22. Transboundary matters
Part 6: Responses to Climate Change and Emergencies 
23. Climate change
24. Natural disasters
25. Conflicts in respect to tenure of land, fisheries and forests 
Part 7: Promotion, Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation
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(2) Principles of Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI)
At the G8 L’Aquila Summit in July 2009, Japan proposed the 
establishment of a platform for discussing the development of a 
guideline to promote transparent and responsible international 
investment in agriculture that does not involve land confiscation. In 
order to develop a joint proposal on principles and best practices for 
international agricultural investment, the summit declaration contained 
the commitment by the G8 countries to address the issue with each 
partner country and world organization.
Based on the senior officials meeting (roundtable) on the promotion of 
responsible international investment in agriculture, which was 
organized as a side event to the United Nations General Assembly by 
Japan and co-sponsored by the World Bank, FAO, IFAD and UNCTAD in 
September 2009, the World Bank, FAO, IFAD and UNCTAD jointly 
announced the draft of “Principles of Responsible Agricultural 
Investment (PRAI)” (refer to the box in Chapter 2 for the draft contents 
of Principles) in February 2010. Currently, discussions are under way to 
approve the draft in the Committee on World Food Security (CFS). At the 
same time, a pilot project to substantiate the draft is being implemented 
through Japan’s funding to the World Bank.
1.4  The inclusive development approach among farmers, private 
partners and government through the promotion of responsible 
investment for agricultural development
1.4.1 Direction of the Approach
JICA considers it important to help promote responsible investments 
and restrain inappropriate investments in line with the Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries 
and Forests in the Context of National Food Security and the Principles 
of Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI). The following are 
concrete measures that JICA is prepared to promote, which can be taken 
as a single intervention or in combination. 
(1) Support for the formulation of agricultural development programs 
and institutional reforms aiming at benefiting both farmers and private 
companies and which protect the interests of small farmers
Support for the formulation of agricultural development programs 
targeted at specific areas. Such programs will, as a matter of course, be 
based on the analysis of both the natural environment and the economic 
potential of the area, but at the same time will aim at nurturing core 
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farmers, increasing employment of small scale farmers and introducing 
appropriate sustainable technologies. Typically such programs will 
include recommendations of crops to be cultivated in the area and 
agronomical technologies to be introduced, the details of which 
will be planned through dialogue with farmers’ organizations and 
NGOs. JICA will also provide support at the policy level for the 
improvement of the land tenure system and of the 
administration’s capacity  to manage investment and land. JICA 
will also support governments with such policy measures as 
deregulation of investment and protection of intellectual property.
(2) Support for the development of technology infrastructure in target 
areas
Technical support including the introduction of appropriate seeds and 
the development and diffusion of cultivation and soil conservation 
technologies based on the careful analysis of the natural environment, 
social and economic situation and administrative systems of target areas. 
This will allow farmers and companies to enhance productivity 
and reduce risks in technology adoption and investment. These 
supports should also be designed to help improve the 
administrative capacity of the public sector and regulatory 
systems to enhance the environment for productivity 
improvement. 
(3) Support for the promotion of investments by agriculture related 
companies (such as suppliers of seeds, fertilizers, agricultural 
machinery, and distributors, etc.) for the development of value chains.
Support for potential investors - both local and foreign companies - in 
obtaining information regarding the agricultural potential and 
agriculture related investment opportunities in the country through 
workshops and other means. When an investment plan prepared by 
any interested company is judged as having potential benefit such 
as for poverty reduction of farmers, it will be supported with 
research and project cost subsidies. Further, if judged useful, 
support will be provided for value-chain-related research on 
specific agricultural products and/or agriculture related 
industries, the findings of which will be published for reference by 
a wide range of potential investors.  
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(4) Development of infrastructure for transportation and distribution
Support for the development of transportation and distribution networks 
to smoothly and efficiently distribute agricultural products from 
producers to consumers or between markets. These include, for 
transportation: trunk roads, rural roads, ports, etc., and for 
distribution: facilities of wholesale and retail markets, storage and 
refrigeration and product delivery/collection facilities. This 
support could also include the development of a system of 
agriculture-related information - such as market information – 
accessible to farmers. Support in the operation and maintenance 
of these infrastructures may also be included.  
(5) Demonstration and application of inclusive models that will benefit 
both farmers and companies
Support for the demonstration and application of “win-win” business 
models that will contribute both to an increase in farmers’ income and in 
private firms’ corporate income. This support can take a variety of 
forms, in which farmers can collaborate with companies either on 
their own or as a group. Specifically, support for this purpose 
could include the provision of input goods such as improved seed 
varieties and fertilizers as well as technical support and diffusion 
services using pilot farms. With these, the support aims at the 
improvement of farmers’ productivity and an increase in 
corporate production. This support can be accompanied by 
assistance of the government in developing regulatory 
frameworks on the incentive (or penalty) system, and contract 
formats for promoting the inclusive business model.  
1.4.2 Points to Consider in the Implementation of the Approach
Below is a summary of various points to be considered in the 
implementation of the above approach, including those mentioned 
earlier. 
 • For livelihood improvement in and poverty reduction among 
farmers in Africa, and particularly small scale farmers, the role of 
the private sector and private investment is indispensable. The 
problem, however, is that there are actually cases of inappropriate 
investments, to which reality we must not turn a blind eye. Thus, 
the course of action for Africa is to promote responsible 
investment and restrain inappropriate investment in conformity 
with principles such as the PRAI. 
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 • It is essential to have a dialogue with the local people and the civil 
society in the target areas who know their areas and their own 
needs, and to reflect their needs in the project design and its 
implementation. The government, for its part, has an important 
role to play with respect to research and development, system 
reforms, and development of infrastructure. With these in mind, 
the farmers, residents of the area, and civil society and the 
government must sit together for a balanced discussion.
 • Infrastructure development is essential for the development of 
value chains. Its physical development must be accompanied by 
the institutional and management capacity development needed 
to support it, which tends to lag behind. Thus, efforts to 
synchronize these components are important.
 • Investment in agriculture in developing countries tends to 
fluctuate: it has increased rapidly, pushed by a sharp rise in food 
prices; dropped temporarily following the Lehman shock in 2008, 
and now it is coming back. In view of this volatility, some 
measures for its stabilization should be considered, such as 
through public finance systems for mid- and long-term 
investment stability.
 • While it is important to invite investments of international private 
companies, what is more important is to foster the local private 
sector, including small and medium sized companies.
 • As a prerequisite for effective program implementation, it is 
essential to develop human resources both in the public and 
private sectors, which are in short supply in Africa. 
 • Agricultural development, especially that which is supported by 
the inclusive development approach, can help to reduce poverty 
and improve the health of mothers and children; and hence 
contribute to the gender issues. It is important and useful to 
incorporate such points of view and components in order to 
address such needs.
2.  The Triangular Cooperation Program for Tropical Savannah 
Agricultural Development among Japan, Brazil and 
Mozambique (ProSAVANA-JBM)
This section discusses the ProSAVANA-JBM program in Mozambique as 
a concrete example of the inclusive development approach among 
128
Chapter 4
farmers, private partners and government through the promotion of 
responsible investment for agricultural development.
2.1 Background of the program
The Nacala Corridor situated in the northern part of Mozambique 
originates from the port of Nacala on the Indian Ocean coast and 
traverses from east to west leading to Kuanba and Mandimba in the 
province of Niassa via Nampula, the capital of the province with the 
same name. The corridor is connected with inland Malawi and Zambia. 
In recent years, the corridor has been positioned as one of the region’s 
most important development corridors by the Government of 
Mozambique, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) of the 
African Union.  
The tropical savanna zone that spreads through this corridor receives a 
certain amount of rainfall and has extensive arable land for agriculture. 
Its potential for increasing agricultural production, therefore, is very 
high. Approximately 720,000 farming families (2.56 million people), who 
account for about one quarter of all the farmers in the country, are 
distributed throughout the area. The average land area per household in 
the tropical savanna zone, however, is 1.0 hectare, which is below the 
national average of 1.3 hectares, and the poverty rate is higher than other 
areas. The number of small farmers who own less than 1.0 hectare of 
land accounts for about 60 percent of all the farmers in the area and those 
who own less than 2.0 hectares of land account for about 90 %. 
Many farmers engage in traditional farming methods, which result in 
poor productivity both for subsistence and commercial crop production. 
Even for medium to large scale farmers, their agricultural technologies 
are not advanced and productivity is not high. Naturally, the question 
arises as to why the area, which is said to have such high potential, 
cannot sufficiently realize this potential. As a matter of fact, there are 
numerous and diverse problems in agriculture in the area, which are also 
common to other areas in the country and other countries in Africa. The 
summary of these problems is as follows: 
1  There is no comprehensive agricultural program covering the 
whole of the Nacala Corridor and there is no strategic 
coordination among individual development programs, which 
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results in inefficiency.
2 There is a lack of modern farming technology.
3  Land area per household is too small and farming largely depends 
on rainwater. 
4  Markets and distribution systems (infrastructure and systems) are 
underdeveloped.
5  Access to input goods such as fertilizers, improved seeds, 
agricultural machinery, etc., is difficult. 
6  Agricultural diversity and the agricultural processing industry 
are underdeveloped.
7 Farmers are poorly organized or not organized. 
8  Finance and insurance systems are underdeveloped, resulting in a 
lack of access to funds for farmers, which further increases their 
vulnerability.
9  There are land related issues. Only 20 to 30 % of land is registered. 
Customary law and modern law are not integrated. The 
administrative capacity for land management is low.
10  Systems of agricultural extension services are underdeveloped.  
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In an area where such a variety of problems need to be urgently 
addressed, it is essential that a comprehensive and strategic agricultural 
development program is planned and promoted. It is also an urgent 
matter to develop adequate agricultural technologies and spread them 
among the farmers, promote adequate private investment for the 
enhancement of agriculture related industries, and to improve 
agricultural productivity and increase production through the 
development of value chains. Against such a backdrop, the triangular 
cooperation program ProSAVANA-JBM has been agreed on and is being 
implemented. 
2.2 Partnership between Japan and Brazil
The Government of Japan and the Government of Brazil started 
triangular cooperation in 1985 and concluded the Japan Brazil 
Partnership Program (JBPP) in 2000 in order to launch a new initiative 
for promoting a new form of triangular cooperation. A series of technical 
cooperation projects (triangular cooperation projects) between Japan 
and Brazil and involving a final beneficiary country in Africa was started 
in 2007, covering such global issues as food security, infectious disease 
control, and countermeasures against climate change. 
Japan, through JICA, supported agricultural development in the 
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Cerrado (region) of Brazil for over 20 years from the late 1970s and 
contributed to the transformation of the area once called a “barren land” 
into one of the world’s leading agricultural areas. The basic cooperation 
framework for ProSAVANA-JBM, targeted at the Nacala Corridor, was 
agreed upon by JICA, the Brazilian Agency for International 
Cooperation (ABC) and the Ministry of Agriculture of Mozambique in 
September 2009, taking advantage of the experience and knowledge 
regarding agricultural development in tropical savanna acquired in the 
development of the Cerrado of Brazil.
There are some similarities in terms of agronomy between the savannah 
zone of Mozambique and the Cerrado of Brazil. For this reason, some 
individual technologies and know-how acquired in the Cerrado, such as 
tropical varieties of major temperate grains and cultivation systems, are 
considered applicable in Mozambique. As another possibility, the 
technology developed to improve acidic soils in Brazil could also be 
effective for the improvement of the salt (crop nutrients) leached soils in 
some parts of Nacala. Other helpful experiences acquired in the Cerrado 
include: the process of technological innovations at the initial stages of 
development; organizational reforms; development of value chains; and 
environmental conservation measures. 
Notwithstanding all these, it is impossible to simple-mindedly apply the 
agricultural development model of the Cerrado as it was developed in 
Brazil to the Mozambican savannah zone; there are many differences in 
the natural environment, such as water, geography, soils, and vegetation, 
and the social, economic and administrative systems. The project does 
not in any way attempt such mechanical transfer of technology or 
experiences. 
Rather, under these circumstances, what is attempted is to build a new 
development model for the Nacala Corridor of Mozambique utilizing 
the know-how and technologies of Brazilian people and organizations 
that have experienced many trials and errors in the development of the 
Cerrado, and Japan’s many years of experience gained in supporting the 
process. In the process, the project will certainly take advantage of a 
number of individual technologies developed in the Cerrado, 
exemplified above. 
In fact the project has abundant resources of technologies and 
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experiences at its disposal: EMBRAPA (Brazilian Agricultural Research 
Corporation), one of the world’s leading agricultural research institutes; 
JIRCAS (Japan International Research Center for Agricultural Sciences), 
which has supported the Cerrado process over many years; FGV 
(Getulio Vargas Foundation), a world-renowned think tank; MDA (the 
Ministry of Agricultural Development) and EMATER (the Institute of 
Technical Assistance and rural Extension of Brazil) with ample 
experience in program coordination for the promotion of family farming 
and farmer participatory systems; the SENAR (National Service of Rural 
Learning) with abundant resources in vocational training modules and 
teaching methods in farming villages; and JICA with the accumulated 
experience and know-how of support to Africa over many years, that 
can also mobilize technologies and the international expertise of 
Japanese development consultants. 
2.3 Objectives and characteristics of the program 
The objectives of the ProSAVANA-JBM are to contribute to the poverty 
reduction of farmers, improve food security, and enhance economic 
development. This consists of promoting agricultural development by 
improving productivity and developing value chains through the 
promotion of adequate private investment in the Nacala Corridor, which 
is making poor development progress despite its high potential for 
development and increased agricultural production. The target area is 
situated from 13 degrees to 17 degrees latitude south in the northern part 
of Mozambique. At present, 19 districts in the three provinces of 
Nampula, Niassa and Zambezia in the Nacala Corridor are considered 
as target areas for development.
For successful agricultural development in the area, well-functioning 
value chains must be in place, including supplies of input goods, post-
harvest processing, and distribution both on the upstream and 
downstream of production, which, in itself, must be upgraded through 
the improvement of farmers’ technology and farming methods. For this 
purpose, JICA will support the introduction of crop varieties suitable to 
the Nacala Corridor, as well as the development and diffusion of 
cultivation and soil conservation technologies. At the same time, it will 
support the Government of Mozambique in developing a 
comprehensive master plan for agricultural development focused on the 
development of a value chain including adequate investment planning 
and land use as well as system reforms targeted at the whole of the 
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Nacala Corridor. It is the aim of the master plan to propose system 
reforms to promote responsible investment and restrain inappropriate 
investment.
The “Nacala Corridor Development Program” is the key Japanese aid 
program in Mozambique. In combination with support for building an 
agricultural development model through ProSAVANA-JBM, Japan 
provides technological and financial support that will contribute to the 
development of infrastructure such as trunk roads for distribution and 
ports for export and import. At the same time, with a view to achieving 
inclusive growth, the development of educational infrastructure and 
health infrastructure, as well as improvement in water access will be 
supported. In other words, the “Nacala Corridor Development 
Program” and ProSAVANA-JBM are characterized by (1) triangular 
cooperation between Japan, Brazil and Mozambique based on 
accumulated past experience, (2) comprehensive support for the whole 
of the value chain including not only production but also distribution, 
(3) cross sectoral support including agriculture and infrastructure, and 
(4) a synergistic WIN-WIN effect among farmers and companies. These 
characteristics correspond to all the issues included in the inclusive 
development approach among farmers, private partners and 
government through the promotion of responsible investment for 
agricultural development referred to in Section 1.4. In addition, the 
programs will be able to deal with many of the agriculture problems in 
the Nacala Corridor mentioned in Section 2.1.
As mentioned earlier, this program presupposes the participation of 
private investment in the future and, bearing this in mind, many 
activities have already been carried out such as international seminars 
and public and private joint missions comprising members from Japan, 
Brazil and Mozambique. With these activities, the program expects to 
work out more specific and realistic development programs beyond a 
simple blueprint plan.  
2.4 Description of the projects
In its first stage, ProSAVANA-JBM aims to consolidate the technologies 
and administrative capacity bases for the whole program. This stage will 
comprise three main technological cooperation projects: Improving 
Research and Technology Transfer Capacity for Nacala Corridor 
Agriculture Development, Support for Agricultural Development 
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Master Plan for the Nacala Corridor, and Establishment of a 
Development Model at the Community Level through Nacala Corridor 
Agricultural Development. 
In its second stage, the program’s aim shifts to the implementation of the 
technologies, development models and/or projects that have been 
developed, demonstrated and/or proposed in the first stage in 
cooperation with the private sector. Financial assistance is also 
envisaged at this stage. This second stage will be initiated even before 
the completion of the first stage. Activities for the development of 
infrastructure, such as the construction of trunk roads, will be carried 
out throughout the two stages. As a matter of fact, the term “stage” 
simply indicates the gradual shifts of focus of activities, and individual 
work will be performed flexibly. The ProSAVANA-JBM program will be 
put into practice with full coordination among the government, farmers, 
private sector, NGOs and other parties involved in the development, as 
well as international development organizations. 
A summary of individual projects is outlined below:
• First stage
[Improving Research and Technology Transfer Capacity for Nacala 
Corridor Agriculture Development] – Period of cooperation: 2011-
2016 (5 years)
This project aims to build a technical foundation. It aims at 
strengthening research systems at the agricultural experiment station 
for the northeast in the province of Nampula, and that of the 
northwest in the province of Niassa. It is also aimed at transferring to 
the pilot farmers around the stations adequate soil improvement as 
well as cultivation technologies that will have been developed based 
on prior investigations and evaluation of the natural resources and 
social and economic situation of the Corridor. 
[Support for Agricultural Development Master Plan for Nacala 
Corridor] – Period of cooperation: 2012-2013 (1.5 years)
This is a project aimed at formulating a master plan for agricultural 
development that will contribute to social and economic 
development in the Nacala Corridor area with a view to promoting a 
sustainable agricultural production system (value chain) and 
reducing the poverty of small scale farmers. In a context where a 
number of foreign and domestic companies have already expressed 
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interest in investing in agriculture in the area, the project allows the 
planning of an adequate development project based on the Principles 
of Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI) and takes the 
initiative in institutional reforms for land use and social environment 
consideration, which will eventually restrain inappropriate 
investment. It is the aim of the project to urge the private sector, 
government and donors to swiftly invest in projects with high social 
and economic effects.   
[Establishment of a Development Model at the Community Level 
through Nacala Corridor Agricultural Development] – Period of 
cooperation: 2013 – 2018 (6 years)
This is a project aimed at establishing an inclusive agricultural 
development model according to the various scales of farming. It also 
aims at helping such farmers and farmers’ organizations that have 
adopted the inclusive model to actually increase production through 
the intensification of the agricultural extension service. It is the aim of 
the project not only to help the government improve the currently 
inadequate agricultural extension service, but also to foster core 
farmers, and to demonstrate and disseminate business models with 
high social benefits led by companies and farmers’ groups.  
• Second stage
The second stage is basically the application and expansion stage of 
the developed technologies, verified development models, or 
proposed development programs in cooperation with farmers’ 
groups, the private sector (promotion of investment) and the 
government, with enhanced capacity to manage and support the 
programs. JICA will provide support for the scaling up of funds and 
support for capacity building for project coordination. 
•  Common projects between the first stage and second stage 
(development of infrastructure)
 · Support Project for the Formulation of an Economic Development 
Strategy for the Nacala Corridor
 · Nampula-Cuamba Road Upgrading Project
 · Montepuez-Lichinga Road Upgrading Project
 · Cuamba-Lichinga Road Upgrading Project
 · Ile-Cuamba Road Bridge Construction Project
 · Urgent Rehabilitation Project of Nacala Port
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 · Nacala Port Development Project
 · Construction of Secondary Schools in the Nampula Monapo 
Primary Teachers Training School Project
 · Construction of the Nacala Health Science Institute 
2.5 Points to consider
As mentioned earlier, though there are many similarities in terms of 
agronomy between the savannah zone of Mozambique and the Cerrado 
of Brazil, there are a lot of differences in the natural environments and 
social, economic and administrative systems. This makes it impossible to 
simply transfer the agricultural development model of the Cerrado as it 
was developed in Brazil to the Nacala Corridor area. What needs to be 
achieved is to provide support for the building up of a new agricultural 
development model that will meet the needs of Nacala under the 
ownership of the government and the farmers and for this, the capacity 
and individual technologies acquired in the development of the Cerrado 
can be taken advantage of. In implementing the program, it is very 
important to maintain sufficient dialogue with local farmers who know 
best about their land and at the same time are the biggest beneficiaries of 
ProSAVANA-JBM, in order to reflect their views and opinions in the 
project implementation.
Another point of caution is that support for agricultural development 
programs like the one in the Nacala Corridor must be placed in the 
perspective of national policy, for there are institutional and policy 
matters that affect individual projects. A simple example is that land 
tenancy of up to 1,000 hectares is granted by the provincial governor, but 
if the area is larger than that up to 10,000 hectares, the grant must be 
made by the Minister of Agriculture, and beyond that, the grant must be 
made by the Council of Ministers. Thus, the central government must be 
appropriately involved. 
The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, which was agreed 
upon at the G8 meeting in the US in May 2012, is a framework whereby 
agricultural development in Africa is enhanced through the promotion 
of private investment in compliance with the principles of responsible 
agricultural investment and voluntary guidelines, and Mozambique is 
one of the six target countries. The cooperation framework created for 
the execution of this New Alliance (agreement) includes land policy, 
institutional reforms on investment, and considerations for small 
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farmers. Acting as a co-chair with the US, Japan has supported the 
formulation of this cooperation framework; JICA is prepared to be 
continuously involved in supporting such reforms at the central 
government level.   
3. Conclusion
This chapter has argued for the usefulness of the inclusive development 
approach among farmers, private partners and government through the 
promotion of responsible investment for agricultural development, 
based on the discussion in Section 1, which stressed the importance of 
the private sector and its investment in agriculture. Section 2 discussed 
the ProSAVANA-JBM program in Mozambique as a concrete case of this 
approach including a detailed explanation, meaning and points to 
consider. 
In recent years, JICA has been accumulating a wide range of experience 
in similar cases such as in the Philippines where stakeholders, including 
distributors, formed a banana industry cluster around a core groups of 
farmers; a case in Pakistan where a project aimed to improve the 
productivity of small livestock farmers and include them in a value 
chain; cases in Nigeria and Uganda where projects aimed to improve the 
post-harvest processing of rice millers; and a case in Burkina Faso where 
a project aimed to formulate a market oriented agricultural master plan. 
As mentioned in section 1.4, the inclusive development approach can 
encompass a wide range of variations, and they could be applied to 
different needs flexibly, either as a single intervention measure or used in 
combination, and drawing on actual experiences accumulated in many 
countries. .  
Recently in the international arena, research and discussions related to 
the problems and effectiveness of investment in agricultural 
development, and in particular, related to inclusive models (often called 
win-win business models), are becoming active, and a number of 
practical projects have come to be conducted. To contribute to such 
intellectual exercises, Japan has provided funding to the World Bank and 
is supporting empirical studies on the usefulness of the principles of 
responsible agricultural investment. JICA must learn from the findings 
of this and other research and cases for its own support projects in the 
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future. JICA must also contribute to policy development and system 
reforms by actively participating in international initiatives such as the 
New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition and Grow Africa while 
learning from the knowledge and experience of its international 
partners.  
The discussions so far have been focused on the field of agriculture. If we 
look at international cooperation in a broader perspective, the relative 
presence of ODA (Official Development Assistance) has declined over 
the years as a result of a rapid expansion of overseas direct investment 
and flows of private funds such as from the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, or aid other than ODA provided by emerging countries 
such as China and Brazil (Kharas, Makino and Jung 2011). So, what is the 
role to be played by ODA? The answer may be that it could play the role 
of a catalyst, going beyond simple aid, towards bringing together 
diverse players and developing countries and actively urging the 
players to get involved in these countries in an appropriate manner. 
Consistent with this orientation, there have been operational and 
organizational changes within JICA to promote collaboration with the 
private sector; for example, JICA now has the Private Sector Partnership 
and Finance Department, which provides support for research expenses 
for overseas investment and investment promotion. JICA is also 
deepening cooperation with emerging countries such as China, Brazil 
and Indonesia. Given these movements, perhaps the business model and 
project we have been discussing- the inclusive development approach 
and the ProSAVANA-JBM project – must be understood in that larger 
perspective.  
Finally, I would like to reiterate the critical role of the private sector in 
agricultural development as an engine for economic growth and 
reducing poverty, through the improvement of productivity and 
betterment of the farmers’ (and especially small farmers’) livelihood. For 
it to happen, I have argued that private investment in agriculture must 
be promoted. True, private investment in the agricultural sector can take 
a variety of forms, and some of them can cause negative impacts on local 
residents and farmers. Under such circumstances, the appropriate and 
realistic course of action for African governments must be to promote 
responsible investments and restrain inappropriate investments in line 
with the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure 
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of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security 
and the Principles of Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI). They 
could employ a variety of policies to achieve an improvement in 
investment quality; for example, they could adopt measures such as the 
provision of incentives such as tax cuts and credits. Putting into practice 
these steps is an urgent matter for African countries, and their 
international partners, including bilateral donors like Japan, and 
international organizations, should provide adequate support. The 
challenge is enormous, and while fully recognizing the difficulty of the 
tasks at hand, we, Africa’s partners, must listen carefully to the voices of 
African governments and local farmers, and proceed with our support 
activities in an open manner.     
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Chapter 5:  
Initiatives of SHEP and SHEP UP 
- Capacity development of small-scale farmers1 
for increased responsiveness to market needs
Jiro Aikawa2
1. Background Leading to A Market-oriented Approach
According to the World Development Report 2008, the poverty rate 
among farmers is affected by access to market, along with other factors 
such as climate. The Report features improvement in market access and 
promotion of market participation by small-scale farmers as important 
poverty reduction measures. To realize these, the Report called for 
measures to improve farming techniques, sustained water and soil 
management, improvement in public extension services, capacity 
development of human resources, and infrastructure development. 
Governments and development partners are realizing that group 
marketing, rather than individual marketing by small-scale farmers, 
encourages market participation. A hurdle discouraging farmers’ 
participation in the market is the information gap between the marketers 
and farmers. These market players have abundant information about 
product supply and demand – information many small-scale farmers 
don’t have access to. 
Supply of and demand for horticultural products tend to increase with 
economic growth. Kenya’s GDP has grown more than other African 
1. The term “small-scale farmers” as used in this chapter refers to farmers with a farmland 
ownership of less than 2 hectares following the term’s usage in Kenya. In the projects that will 
be discussed in the chapter, the average area of farmland owned by the target small-scale 
farmers and dedicated exclusively to horticultural crops was less than 0.4 hectares.
2. I would like to thank Ms. Etsuko Ikeda and Ms. Fumie Saijo of OPC as well as Ms. Hiromi 
Ikeda of HANDS for the data for the tables and figures for this report. Mr. Naoki Hashimoto, 
Ms. Harue Kitajima and Mr. Mitsuhiro Kato, JICA experts of the SHEP UP, contributed to the 
paper by providing the author with a variety of information. I would like to take this 
opportunity to thank them.
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countries, and likewise the supply of vegetables has grown more rapidly 
than in other East African countries, a trend comparable to the vegetable 
supply trend in Asia since the 1990s (see Figure 1). The recent increase in 
demand for horticultural products in Africa seems to have been due to 
the diversification of food consumption brought about by the economic 
growth and increasing middle-income consumers. 
Figure 1. Change in supply of vegetables in Asia, Eastern Africa, and Kenya
Vegetables Supply Quantity
(kg/capita/year)
However, farmers have certain problems: compared to grain production, 
horticulture is labor-intensive, requiring finer techniques and bigger 
inputs, e.g., seed, fertilizer and pesticides, though its land profitability is 
high if properly managed. The selling prices of horticultural products 
are affected by market fluctuations because of low storability. On the 
other hand, horticulture is important not only as a means of developing 
cash crops, but also as a means to improve people’s nutritional 
condition. 
Thus, some African countries stress the need for converting from the 
subsistence- oriented approach into more commercially oriented 
agriculture. For example, Kenya has formulated a policy for “modern 
and competitive agriculture based on innovation and commercial 
thinking” in its “Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) 
(2010-2020)”, aimed to “strengthen competitiveness of agricultural 
products and business, improve productivity and promote 
commercialization.” In addition, the policy of the Ministry of 
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Agriculture of Kenya advocates “Farming as Business”.  
Among the various challenges in improving small-scale farmers’ market 
access, their capacity development (discussed in the subsequent sections) is 
an important factor.
2. Overview of SHEP and SHEP UP
Background for the implementation of the projects
Horticulture is a promising sub-sector of Kenya because of the country’s 
favorable environment. According to data from the Horticultural Crops 
Development Authority in Kenya, the sector has achieved an average 
annual growth rate of 20% since the 2000s. 
However, the producers, and particularly small-scale farmers, who 
produce more than 60% of horticultural products traded in the country, 
are facing problems: weak organizations, low production, limited 
marketing channels, unstable selling prices, and underdeveloped 
production infrastructure, so their income remains low (Dolan 2010). 
In order to improve the situation, the Kenyan Government conceived the 
idea of a project to address these challenges, and requested the 
Government of Japan to implement a technical cooperation project 
aimed at strengthening the organizational management capacity of 
small-scale farmers. Thus, the “Smallholder Horticulture Empowerment 
Project” (SHEP) was launched in November 2006. 
Overall, the SHEP has been successful, doubling the income of targeted 
small-scale farmers through activities such as market surveys by 
farmers, strategic selection of crops to plant, development of action 
plans by farmers’ groups, and technical assistance.
Encouraged by the effectiveness of the project’s model, the Kenyan 
Ministry of Agriculture set up the “Smallholder Horticulture 
Empowerment and Promotion Unit” (SHEP Unit). The objective was to 
support small-scale horticulture farmers using the SHEP project model. 
In support, Japan, through JICA, has been implementing a five-year 
technical cooperation project: “Smallholder Horticulture Empowerment 
and Promotion Unit Project” (known as SHEP UP3), since 2010. This 
3. The initiatives and outcome of the SHEP and SHEP UP were presented in the Camp David 
Accountability Report of the G8 held at Camp David in 2012. 
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project aims at the organizational development and capacity 
development of the SHEP Unit. 
Activities of SHEP
The SHEP project was implemented for three years from November 2006 
and covered areas from the western and central part of Kenya: the 
counties of Bungoma (Western Province), Kisii (Nyanza Province), 
Nyandarua (Central Province) and Trans-Nzoia (Rift Valley Province), 
chosen because of the widespread poverty therein despite their high 
potential for horticulture cultivation. The Kenyan organizations 
responsible for the project were the Horticulture Division under the 
Ministry of Agriculture, and the Horticultural Crops Development 
Authority.
The project aimed at developing the capacity of smallholder horticulture 
farmer groups and verify if it actually brought about the net income 
increase of the members of the smallholder horticulture farmer groups 
supported by the project.  
The initial step of the project was to sensitize the stakeholders to the 
project’s idea and familiarize them with the market-oriented approach 
(the SHEP approach). To do so, the project organized “Sensitization 
Workshops,” where briefings were given to the participants, including 
ministerial officials, provincial, district and divisional staff, extension 
officers, and targeted farmers. 
Next was to survey the condition of the horticultural production of the 
area as well as the farmers’ capacities. The survey collected data on 
horticultural crop production,4 production techniques,5 and the farmers’ 
groups’ capacity as an organization.6 This survey provided data for the 
project and an opportunity for the farmers to be better acquainted with 
their own farming and for the groups to understand their current status.   
Secondly, the project organized opportunities where the model farmers’ 
groups and stakeholders related to horticulture could meet in the 
“FABLIST Forum: Farm Business Linkage Stakeholder Forum.” The 
4. Such as on cultivation area, yields, production costs, sales prices, and income by crop 
planted in the previous year.
5. This covered various aspects of production techniques being used by the farmers.
6. This measured the current level of organizations, using Group Empowerment Indicators 
(GEIs), which allows the evaluation of organizational capacity in terms of leadership, 
cooperation among members, and gender structure. 
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stakeholder participants included suppliers (seed, fertilizer and agro-
chemical and agricultural equipment companies), agro-processing 
companies, financial institutions, agricultural research institutes, retail 
lenders, government agencies and NGOs. Each of them displayed 
products and provided information. The farmers’ group representatives 
and extension officers visited the booths to hold business talks and 
understand the horticulture market environment. Stakeholders were 
provided with profiles of the participating farmers’ groups7 and vice 
versa. This was intended to facilitate exchange and interaction among 
the participants. 
After the forum, the project held a “Joint Extension Staff and Farmers 
Dual (2) Gender Training” (JEF2G Training) targeted at the 
representatives from model farmers’ groups and extension officers. 
Since women were responsible for about 70% of the farming activities, 
the same number of men and women were to be invited from the model 
farmers’ groups. The program mainly focused on training comprising 
modules such as market survey, crop selection, problem analysis and 
gender awareness training.
After the training, “Group Exercises” were held to put into practice the 
lessons learned. These group exercises consisted of performing a market 
survey led by the farmers’ representatives who had taken part in the 
training with the assistance of an extension officer. Based on the survey 
results, the participants selected what crops to produce, and formulated 
an action plan for marketing them at reasonable, profitable prices. 
Subsequently, the project organized the “Facilitators’ Training for 
Farmers’ Demand-Driven Extension” to provide extension officers with 
the knowledge and techniques needed to support the model farmers’ 
groups in putting into practice the action plans. 
The training even contained modules on road maintenance using sand 
bag technology: it was included because the participators had to know 
how to maintain roads, which often deteriorate during the rainy season. 
Implementation of road maintenance was positioned as part of the 
project outcome, and thus it was encouraged as a village-wide activity 
involving local communities led by the model farmers’ groups. 
In this manner, capacity building of extension officers was performed 
through demand-driven technical training to meet the needs of the 
farmers’ groups. 
7. The data included the name of the group, location, number of farmer members, contact 
information, cultivation items, yields, income, all collected from the Baseline Survey.
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After the training, the trained extension officers began teaching the 
techniques learnt to the model farmers’ groups to help them materialize 
their action plans. This was done through “In-field Training,” allowing 
the farmers to acquire the knowledge and techniques needed for the 
production of the crops selected. 
Taking nearly a year, the activities were implemented in two periods, 
dividing the farmers’ groups in the 4 target counties into two groups of 
42 and 80. The number of farmers of each group ranged between 15 and 
50, with the average being 24. The project monitored the status of 
production and cultivation technique of horticultural crops of the model 
farmers’ groups in a manner similar to the baseline survey. 
   
Activities of SHEP UP
The SHEP Unit supports small-scale horticulture farmers through 
activities developed in the SHEP. JICA has been supporting the SHEP 
Unit since its establishment with a project called SHEP UP.  
Activities developed in the SHEP are now being implemented in the 
country’s 8 provinces in 4 cycles, with 2 provinces being covered per 
year. In each province, the activities cover 10 districts. These districts 
were selected based on the scores they got on the submitted proposals. 
Each district had five target farmers’ groups.8 To promote the replication 
of the SHEP approach, the project envisaged that the district staff would 
implement activities on their own, using the resources of the district and 
provide support for other farmers’ groups, and by working together 
with the SHEP Unit. 
Two new practices have been introduced since the implementation of the 
SHEP UP. One had to do with the selection of the target districts. Before, 
they were selected by the central government on certain criteria without 
involving district staff. Since the SHEP UP, however, a new system was 
introduced whereby interested districts must submit a proposal to the 
Provincial Director of Agriculture. The proposals were evaluated by the 
SHEP UP in accordance with criteria including the interest and 
motivation of district staff, depth of understanding of the SHEP 
approach, and the district’s horticultural cultivation potential. The final 
8. This seemingly small number of farmer’s groups per district is due to the size of each 
district being reduced through the country’s administrative reform.
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selection decision was made by the Selection Committee in the 
Provincial Agricultural Office. 
The second new practice was the “Organizers’ Training on the Basic 
SHEP Approach,” aimed at the staff of the selected districts. It is mainly 
intended to provide training on the SHEP Approach planning and 
implementation of the activities, and the development of a work plan 
and budget for the continuous implementation of the activities. As part 
of the training, district staff visited high-performing model farmers’ 
groups. On the final day of training, the participants took the 
“Examination on the Basic SHEP Approach.” 
While there has been no fundamental change in the structure of activities 
developed by the SHEP, the contents have been revised on-site. By the 
end of 2012, around 460 farmers’ groups have taken part in the project in 
60 districts and 6 provinces.
The table below shows a summary of the SHEP and SHEP UP.
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Table 1.  Smallholder Horticulture Empowerment Project (SHEP) and 
Smallholder Horticulture Empowerment and  
Promotion Unit Project (SHEP UP)
SHEP SHEP UP
Period November 2006 ~ November 2009
(3 years + a follow-up period of 4 
months) 
March 2010 ~ May 2015 (five 
years)
Target area 22 districts (4 provinces), mainly 
in Western Kenya
80 districts across Kenya 
(basically 10 districts each from 8 
provinces)
Target 
farmers
About 2,500 (122 groups) About 20,000 (640~800 groups)
Implementation 
institutions 
SHEP team composed of 6 
dedicated staff assigned from the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the 
Horticultural Crops Development 
Authority
SHEP UNIT (12 dedicated staff 
assigned by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Horticultural 
Crops Development Authority) of 
Horticulture Division, Directorate 
of Crops Management of the 
Ministry of Agriculture
Overall 
goal
Improved livelihoods of 
smallholder horticulture farmers 
in the target districts
Livelihood of horticulture 
smallholders in implementing 
districts is improved.
Project goal Developed capacity of the 
smallholder horticulture farmers’ 
groups supported by the Projects.
Effective support system for 
horticulture smallholders 
nationwide is established.
Outcome 1. Target groups (smallholder 
horticulture farmers’ groups) gain 
bargaining power in marketing 
their produce.
2. Target groups increase the 
production of better quality crops.
3. Target groups develop capacity 
to improve rural infrastructure for 
production and transportation.
1. The SHEP Approach is adopted 
by the Unit and become ready for 
implementation.
2. Farmers’ groups’ income from 
horticulture produce is improved.
3. The SHEP Approach is properly 
replicated by the implementing 
districts based on the Outcome 2.
4. Information Management 
System for the SHEP Approach is 
established.
Characteristics Development and 
implementation of a series of 
approaches from organizing to 
productivity improvement for 
improving horticultural-related 
income of small-scale farmers.
Provision of support to the SHEP 
UNIT established by the Ministry 
of Agriculture of Kenya to spread 
the SHEP approach across the 
country.
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3. Survey on Income from Horticulture in the SHEP 
1) Method (baseline survey and periodical monitoring)
The project started with a baseline survey targeted at 3,6239 individual 
farmers belonging to 154 farmers’ groups in the target counties. It was 
conducted in May and June 2007, 7 months after the launch of the 
project. The survey was intended to obtain data on a sampling basis to 
understand the current condition of the areas at the beginning of the 
project, where most of the farmers were engaged in horticulture as their 
primary farming activity. The survey items included cultivation area, 
yield, selling prices and costs of horticultural products grown in the 
previous year as well as income from them. The survey was conducted 
by the district staff in the target areas and they were assisted by their 
project counterparts. 
The final monitoring was carried out in October 2009 just before the 
termination of the SHEP project period. The survey covered a total of 
2,177 individual small-scale farmers belonging to 114 of the 122 model 
farmers’ groups from which data could be obtained in a similar manner 
to the baseline survey.  About 80% of the 114 farmers’ groups, that is, just 
over 70% of the 2,177 farmers, had been covered in the baseline survey.10 
2) Results
As shown in Table 2, the average per group horticulture-related net 
income of the 154 organizations that took part in the baseline survey was 
536,257 Ksh, and the average per farmer net income of those who 
belonged to these groups was 22,642 Ksh. In October 2009, the average 
per group horticulture-related net income of the 114 organizations was 
900,030 Ksh, showing a 67% increase over the baseline survey; while the 
average per-farmer net income was 47,131 Ksh, showing a 106% increase 
over the baseline survey. While income increased for both men and 
women, the gap between them fell from 31% at the time of the baseline 
survey to 15%11 at final monitoring.12 
9. In the Baseline Survey, farmers not belonging to the groups or farmers with poor activity 
results also took part. So, there is a difference in the total number of farmers before and after 
the survey. That is, the Baseline Survey data is an average including members of the model 
farmers’ groups and non-model farmers’ groups.
10. As some names were illegible, the number is approximate. 
11. Husbands and wives cultivated and owned different farmland. Generally, husbands 
cultivated crops with high cashability and wives grew crops for subsistence. 
12. A gender survey conducted after the start of the project revealed that many farmers had a 
separate household budget according to gender.
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Table 2.  Horticulture-related net income:  
per farmers’ group and per farmer (men and women) (Ksh*1)
Farmers’ 
Groups
Farming 
households
Men Women
Baseline Survey
(May and June 2007)
536,257
(154)*2
22,794 
(3,623)
26,642 
(1,940)
18,359 
(1,683)
Final Monitoring
(October 2009)
900,030 
(114)
47,131
(2,177)
50,221
(1,111)
42,711
(1,066)
*1 Exchange rate as of January 2013 (1USD = 84.5Ksh)
*2  The numbers in parentheses shows the number of farmers’ groups and that of 
farming households
4. Essence of Success of the SHEP
Though incomplete in the absence of control groups, the simple analysis 
above indicates the likelihood that the SHEP has been useful in 
improving the net income of farmers who participated in the project. 
Based on that assumption, the following sections will try to identify the 
factors that may have been behind the performance of the farmers 
practicing the SHEP approach; they are: the introduction of market- 
oriented agriculture, improvement of farming efficiency, introduction of 
appropriate techniques, and the utilization of existing administrative 
structures. 
1) Introduction of market-oriented agriculture
First and foremost, it was the introduction of market-oriented 
agriculture that seems to have been very effective in improving the net 
income of the farmers. The most fundamental change was observed in 
the farmers’ mindset. With the project, the farmers’ attitude toward 
marketing was transformed from passive to more positive, or from the 
one based on the mindset of “harvest (crops) first and then sell”, to the 
one based on the mindset of “harvest (strategically) to sell.” To nurture 
such attitudes, the project encouraged the farmers to conduct market 
surveys and problem analysis as well as to create action plans by 
themselves. To that end, the project encouraged the farmers, for 
example, to consult on their own such materials as “A Market 
Facilitator’s Guide to Participatory Agro-enterprise Development” 
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(Ferris, et al. 2006) of the CIAT (The International Centre for Tropical 
Agriculture), rather than directly feeding them with periodical market 
information. 
Especially, the market survey was found quite instrumental in helping 
the farmers. According to the final evaluation report prepared at the end 
of the SHEP, 56% of 276 farmers and 70% of 40 extension staff responded 
that they found the market survey important as a technique to help 
increase income (JICA 2012). Actually, the market survey received the 
highest evaluation score among the 15 training contents evaluated by the 
respondents. The market survey enabled the target farmers to know 
what crops are selling best, how prices fluctuate by season and how 
much of their products of what quality can be marketed at what timing. 
Through market surveys, farmers also became acquainted with multiple 
buyers to deal with. Based on such knowledge, farmers started to select 
crops that they believed would yield greater profits and to decide when 
to produce them. In other words, they were now able to visualize 
potential buyers and expected profits when they start sowing. Being able 
to negotiate with multiple buyers, their position in relation to them also 
strengthened, and they became more organized, once they realized that 
collective marketing works to their advantage. There were cases where 
some groups of farmers, though unsuccessful at their initial attempts, 
eventually succeeded in increasing income through market surveys and 
cultivation of adequate crops. All this indicates that the introduction of 
market-oriented agriculture played a significant role in increasing the 
farmers’ income. 
 
2)  Improvement in farming efficiency: an effective approach to gender 
and use
The SHEP emphasized gender-related activities, and at its initial stage, 
the project devised plans for gender-related activities.13 The project not 
only provided training opportunities to women who were responsible 
for more than 70% of horticultural work, but also encouraged men 
(husbands) who still had the upper hand in the household to understand 
the role of women in farming. That is, explanations with illustrations 
were provided to men about gender consideration and code of conduct 
that would benefit all the family members. In both the SHEP and SHEP 
UP, as part of gender-related activities, the project performed a series of 
awareness-enhancing exercises that included the introduction of a daily 
13. This job was facilitated by Japanese short-term gender experts.
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activity calendar and a list of gender–based division of labor in 
horticulture, and an analysis of access to and control of resources by 
gender. In order to overcome gender-related obstacles for increasing 
income, the project also encouraged the farmers’ groups to develop their 
gender action plans. By providing training on family budgeting, the 
project also emphasized the importance for the husbands and wives to 
have talks about domestic finance. This helped the farmers to save 
money necessary for the next season such as fertilizer and seeds, and 
contributed significantly to their horticulture production. 
According to the evaluation at the end of the SHEP, 40% of 276 farmers 
who responded to the questionnaire found gender-related activities as 
having contributed to the increase in production and income, giving it 
third place among the 15 training contents in terms of importance. The 
gender-related activities encouraged husbands, who used to be farm 
managers, and wives, who used to be laborers, to become management 
partners, and contributed to a fairer division of household labor among 
them leading to efficient farming (JICA 2012).
3) Introduction of appropriate techniques
Various techniques were introduced in the project. They were simple 
and applicable, using materials easily available to the farmers. In fact, in 
Kenya, a country where they have reached a certain level of 
technological know-how at the research station, the issue was not how to 
develop new technologies, but how to validate existing technologies 
from the farmers’ perspective and put them to practical use. Based on 
this understanding, the project focused on the introduction of techniques 
that were “immediately usable the moment they were learned,” such as 
the technique for correct planting using twine. The guidance on these 
techniques was provided jointly by Kenyan experts with abundant 
experience in horticulture-related guidance and Japanese experts who 
could provide advice from an outsider’s point of view. Even when 
introducing technologies quite new to the farmers, the project made sure 
that they would be applicable with the materials and techniques already 
existing locally; such technologies included road maintenance using 
sand bags (“Do-no,”), fermented organic manure (“BOKASHI”), and 
easy-to-handle weeding tools. 
In both projects, the policy was never to force the use of specific 
techniques from outside but to inspire the farmers to be motivated into 
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introducing new techniques before they are taught about the 
technologies. With this policy, the project saw steady introduction of 
new techniques by the motivated farmers, which resulted in the increase 
of crop yield. As shown in Tables 3 and 4, the yield of horticultural crops 
increased; for example, tomatoes in Bungoma County registered a 396% 
increase, and onions in Kisii County a 596% increase. The crop yield 
increased in other areas as well (Kitajima et al. 2011). These increases in 
yield significantly contributed to income increases for farmers.    
Table 3 Change in yield by unit area in three key crops in Bungoma County
Item April 2007
(kg/10a)
October
2009 
(kg/10a)
Rate of 
Increase
(No. farmers’ groups/total 
no. of farmers’ groups)*3
Tomato 1,157.1
(±53.7)*4
4,577.0
(±429.9)
296% 17/30
Kale 876.1
(±16.5)
3,212.9
(±256.9)
267% 11/30
Onion 671.0
(±19.0)
799.9
(±170.0)
19% 9/30
*3 Number of farmers’ groups that selected the above items as priority crops after the market survey.
*4 Mean ± standard error
Table 4 Change in yield by unit area in three key crops in Kisii County
Item
April 2007
(kg/10a)
October
2009 
(kg/10a)
Rate of 
Increase
(No. of farmers’ groups/total 
no. of 
farmers’ groups)
Tomato 1,451.2
(±32.0)*6
4,250.0
(±333.7)
193% 16/31
Traditional
Vegetable*5
607.6
(±2.8)
1,716.1
(±135.2)
183% 8/31
Onion
418.7
(±13.1)
2,189.5
(±380.1)
424% 6/31
*5 Leafy vegetable called Black Nightshade.
*6 Mean ± standard error
4) Utilization of existing administrative structure (establishment of 
SHEP Unit)
Both projects were designed to fully take advantage of the country’s 
existing administrative structure for extension services. This project’s 
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architecture was chosen on the obvious assumption that the activities 
introduced by the projects would continue after the end of the project. By 
adding nothing new and complicated to the existing routines, this 
structure helped local administrators to continue pursuing their 
activities. At the time of the start of SHEP (2006), the flow of extension 
services consisted, from top to bottom, of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Provincial Office of Agriculture, District Agricultural Office, Divisional 
Agricultural Office and frontline extension officers. The roles of each of 
these actors in the project were determined so that the project activities 
may not deviate from their respective day-to-day responsibilities.
In the SHEP, however, the project team was established as a special unit 
for the project made up of Japanese experts and full-time staff assigned 
from the Ministry of Agriculture. Just before the completion of the SHEP, 
the “SHEP Unit” or the “Smallholder Horticulture Empowerment and 
Promotion Unit” was established at the Ministry of Agriculture of 
Kenya. The mandate of the Unit is to support small-scale farmers across 
the country using the SHEP approach. The Unit will continue the project 
after the end of JICA’s involvement.
5. Philosophy behind the SHEP Approach 
Use and application of the motivation theory
The basic concept behind the SHEP approach is the motivation theory. 
By applying it, the projects introduced a mechanism in which the roles 
and responsibilities of the different actors (from the Ministry of 
Agriculture at the top down to the farmers) are clarified, and to allow 
each of the actors to spontaneously undertake actions. This mechanism 
is consistent with the discussion going on in the international arena in 
recent years about ownership and capacity development. 
The structure of the project activities has been based on the motivation 
theory of Deci et al. (1995) in order to guarantee that the project activities 
will continue and expand with increasing creativity, moving toward the 
achievement of the ultimate goal. Deci classified motivation into 
intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation and concluded that 
intrinsically motivated activities are sustainable. Amabile (1996) argued 
that while extrinsic motivation deprives people of creativity, intrinsic 
motivation leads to creativity. 
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In projects like SHEP, external actors like project staff and Japanese 
experts have no choice but to start by providing the people they work 
with with extrinsic motivation. Thus, assuming the arguments of Deci 
and Amable to be correct, the critical question was how to start with the 
provision of extrinsic motivation and shift to a situation where the 
targeted actors become intrinsically motivated and keep up their own 
creativity. To that end, the projects incorporated a variety of measures for 
each activity to encourage the smooth transition to intrinsic motivation. 
In the process, the following motivating factors were used: (1) self-
determination: self-determination easily encourages subsequent 
development of ownership; (2) affinity motivation: creation of a mutual 
relationship encourages positive actions; (3) sense of achievement and 
feeling of competence: the sense of achievement that one feels after 
spontaneously solving a problem, and the feeling of competence that 
one feels when recognized by others when contributing to the 
continuation and further development of actions. It often happens that 
when an intrinsically motivated person receives an excessive reward 
from outside, the reward becomes his/her objective and the intrinsic 
motivation decreases (this is called the undermining effect). The project 
carefully planned its activities in such a way that the participants’ 
intrinsic motivation would not be adversely affected; for example, 
material inputs were limited only to those cases where they were 
absolutely needed, like in the demonstration of technologies.
In this manner, the project’s approach is based on the motivation theory 
and it was intended and designed so that an activity causes changes in a 
stakeholder’s mind and behavior, and a chain of such changes will 
eventually make him/her intrinsically motivated. This transition of 
stakeholders from being extrinsically motivated to intrinsically 
motivated does not only contribute to the attainment of the project goal, 
but also to the securing of the sustainability of activities after the end of 
the project. Intrinsically motivated stakeholders, including the farmers 
and those who support them, will be able to tap their potential to the 
fullest, and to pursue their activities with creativity. 
Design of activities in logical sequences
Having the motivation theory as its conceptual base, the project’s 
activities were designed such that the individual activities form a clear 
and firmly connected chain of achievements and subsequent steps; in 
other words, the activities are sequenced so that once a participant 
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completes an activity, he/she is expected to have reached a certain level, 
based on which he/she will be facing a next activity step. Broadly, this 
consists of two steps. In the first step, a project participant is provided 
with an opportunity to raise his/her awareness. Such opportunities 
included, for farmers, for example, a match-making forum for 
stakeholders involved in the horticulture industry; the opportunity of 
conducting a market survey by farmers’ groups itself constituted an 
opportunity to enhance their awareness of the outside world; and 
activities related to different gender-based roles in the household 
mentioned above also provided an opportunity. 
The second step was for the participants to work out, based on enhanced 
awareness, a plan of action for improving the current situation and 
implement the plan. The project participants got assistance from the 
project in their plan-making and implementation of such plans. Through 
this series of events, including awareness building, planning of actions 
and their implementation, participants’ capabilities were gradually 
strengthened (JICA 2012). 
To make sure that this kind of sequence happens, SHEP and SHEP UP 
projects instituted a detailed work procedure that leaves no logical gaps 
between the individual activities or outcomes. For example, a farmer is 
presented with a visible goal such as an increase in his/her profit 
through the sale of horticultural crops. He/she will then be encouraged 
to steadily go forward by taking the steps to achieve the goal. Further, 
they were enabled to envision how, when and where their own crops 
will be traded through the match-making forum and market surveys. 
The project visibly displayed the steps to follow for achieving such 
goals, and provided the farmers with the necessary skills in taking such 
steps. 
Using this kind of mechanism, overall, the projects provided the farmers 
both with the motivation and necessary skills to realize their targets. 
And that kind of steady support for farmers through the project was 
made possible by designing the activities in a sequence where the steps 
are logically connected with one another, as will be explained in the next 
section. 
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6.  Internal and Behavioral Changes in Activities of the SHEP and 
SHEP UP
This section will look at how the individual activities of the projects 
helped, step by step, the cycle mentioned above: enhancing awareness 
and motivation, and acquiring skills to realize the goals. Detailed 
information is shown in the Appendix.
Figure 2 is a diagrammatic illustration of the development of farmers’ 
intrinsic motivation and skills. The thick red line shows the enhanced 
intrinsic motivation formed in farmers by the series of activities 
described in the table in the Appendix, and the green dotted line, the 
change in their skills level. Initially, the progress of both the levels of 
intrinsic motivation and improvement in skills was slow, in the period 
from the Sensitization Workshop through FABLIST Forum (match-
making) to the market survey practice in the JEF2G Training. Then, 
farmers’ skills improve significantly when they conducted the market 
survey. Subsequently, farmers’ intrinsic motivation was significantly 
enhanced when they determined, on their own, the target crops to 
produce based on the result of the market survey they had conducted. 
This, in turn, increased awareness and motivated the farmers to more 
thoroughly learn techniques in the In-field Training. When the farmers 
succeed in marketing their products, this successful experience further 
promoted their sense of competence, leading to even more enhanced 
intrinsic motivation. Thus, the whole process can be described as an 
interaction between enhanced intrinsic motivation and increased skills 
levels complementing and reinforcing each other, leading to sustained 
growth.  
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Figure 2.  Relationship between farmers’ motivation and skills in  
the SHEP Approach
7.  The enabling Conditions for the SHEP Approach and Future 
Challenges
There are several conditions that enabled the SHEP approach to produce 
encouraging results. 
First, the role of the Ministry of Agriculture of Kenya was significant in 
the success of the SHEP and the effective promotion of the SHEP UP 
activities. The Ministry of Agriculture of Kenya understood, up-front, 
that the key to success was the improvement of the abilities of the 
farmers and the staff of the Ministry. It was fully aware that it takes a 
certain amount of time for people’s capacity to develop, including 
intrinsic motivation, and that any hasty and/or excessive provision of 
material incentives such as agricultural materials and equipment may 
actually hamper such intrinsic motivation/capacity development. 
One lesson from this experience is that it is necessary for the government 
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to distinguish what to do or not to do. The government must have a clear 
vision on the roles to be played by the administration and farmers 
(private sector), to achieve long-term sustainable development. After all, 
agricultural support is a form of industrial support. For it to be effective, 
the administration must have a deep understanding how   commercial 
agriculture works.
The SHEP approach, which has been successful so far in Kenya, may not 
always be successful in other conditions. Several factors seem to have 
worked behind the SHEP’s performance. In the first place, in terms of 
natural conditions, the target areas were suitable for horticultural 
cultivation with respect to rainfall, sunshine, temperature and soil 
conditions (Figure 3 and Figure 4). Obviously, this approach would not 
have achieved the same results in more adverse conditions. 
Figure 3.  Precipitation in Africa and 
 SHEP target areas
Socio-economically, the target area had a high population density 
compared with other parts of Kenya or other African countries (Figure 5 
and Table 5). A high population density means high intra-regional 
consumption, providing the buyers, brokers and processors with an 
advantage.  It also made public extension services efficient. High 
population density allowed buyers, brokers and processors to purchase 
Figure 4.  Temperature in Africa and 
SHEP target areas
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products in bulk, and the administration to efficiently provide training 
opportunities to a large number of farmers. The number and quality of 
existing horticulture-related private enterprises, including brokers, is 
also an important factor to help drive the approach. In Kenya, which has 
a long horticultural industry history and high potential, private 
enterprises are conducting business to varying degrees, and that has 
helped the SHEP approach achieve its objectives.
Any project intending to develop horticulture using the activities similar 
to those of the SHEP must consider the external conditions mentioned 
above and adjust the activities in accordance with the situation of the 
target country/region.
Although it is important to take into consideration the varieties of 
external conditions under which projects are implemented, it is possible 
to apply the gist of the SHEP approach to any project, not necessarily on 
horticulture but on other crops and for other purposes like irrigation 
management; the series of activities shown above or a part of them and 
the underlying philosophy are applicable to a wide range of projects. For 
example, in a small-scale irrigation project, the project might select target 
Population Density
Target areas of SHEP 367.9
Kenya 66.4
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics 
(August 2010) ‘2009 Kenya Population 
and Housing Census’
Table 5.  Population density of Kenya 
and the SHEP target areas
Figure 5.  Population density in Africa 
and the SHEP target areas
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counties for small-scale development, using the proposal system used 
for the selection of districts implementing the SHEP UP. This process 
would ensure that the selected counties will be willing to manage the 
facility voluntarily after their initial development.
There are a number of examples of actual agricultural development that 
support the validity of the SHEP approach. In Japan, for example, the 
role of advanced farmers and agricultural cooperatives was significant 
in developing clusters of producers to meet the market needs. And 
generally, it seems that for a business to succeed there should be a proper 
relationship between the state and the private sector including farmers. 
Such cases of productive collaboration between the state and the private 
sector could be used as a reference for the implementation of the SHEP. 
The SHEP UP activities are currently being scaled-up across the country. 
They are also expanding across national boundaries: the personnel who 
have been trained and qualified in the SHEP and SHEP UP would assist 
other African countries as experts. In addition, interested parties in 
African countries could be invited to Kenya for field visits and training.
8. Summary and Conclusion
The SHEP and SHEP UP are good cases highlighting the importance of 
capacity development of stakeholders, including small-scale farmers, in 
improving the market access of small-scale farmers in Africa. The 
projects helped the farmers to improve their situation by encouraging 
them to do various activities including their own market survey. The 
projects also bridged the gap between market-related personnel and 
farmers, which brought about benefits to both parties: market-related 
personnel became able to buy products that met their standards at an 
appropriate time, and farmers to obtain profits by supplying such 
products. In the process, farmers were supported by the administration. 
Overall, the project was an attempt to comprehensively address the 
issues facing horticultural farmers in Kenya. The project helped the 
farmers acquire the habit of securing the marketability of the products 
before starting to grow a crop, which was a necessary undertaking for 
them in view of the low storability of horticultural crops. The project also 
introduced gender-related activities, which also significantly 
contributed to the improvement in their farming methods.  
The SHEP and SHEP UP started with the premise that horticultural 
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farming is an industry, no matter how small the scale of the market as a 
whole or the farming of individual farmers. Based on that premise, the 
projects developed a series of activities to encourage the farmers to 
develop behavior to respond to the needs of the market, using it both as 
the starting point of their strategy as well as their ultimate goal. 
As mentioned earlier, many African countries are encouraging their 
farmers to transform their current subsistence-oriented agriculture into a 
more commercially-oriented venture. However, small-scale farmers in 
Africa did not know how to achieve it, though they had been conducting 
farming as a business unit based on rational decision making. The 
project filled this gap. A remark by the District Agricultural Officer in the 
SHEP UP accurately describes the characteristics and effects of the 
initiatives of the project: “Although the philosophy of ‘Farming as 
Business’ had been repeatedly stated by the Ministry, we did not know 
what we could do about it. The SHEP UP, however, has taught us how to 
implement it at the field level.”   
Since the 1990s, many donors have been providing support for value 
chain development. Their support had tended to focus on the 
downstream part of the supply chain from production through to sales, 
or the portion close to post-harvest processing and sales. By contrast, the 
SHEP and SHEP UP provided support to small-scale farmers with every 
step from production through to sales, covering various aspects of the 
activities in ways that are adoptable by the farmers. 
In doing so, the project always put the farmers at the center in designing 
its activities and refining its methods. “Does it move the people?” – this 
was the question that was repeatedly asked all through the project. From 
this perspective, and referring to the motivation theory, the project 
designed its activities in sequences of steps firmly connected with one 
another by causal relations and logic. This “people-centered” 
perspective has been applied to all activities. For example, when 
choosing a technology to recommend to farmers, the project thoroughly 
examined its desirability from the farmers’ point of view: in terms of 
their merits, contribution to income gains, and technical sustainability.14
14. One reason why this perspective could be uncompromisingly applied may have been the 
business model of JICA’s technical cooperation that emphasizes interaction and joint work 
among people. In this case, it was the interaction among farmers, Kenyan administrators and 
Japanese experts that made the “people-centered” approach possible. 
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However, one may say that in essence there is nothing new in the 
activities and approaches established in the SHEP and SHEP UP: for 
example, the importance of capacity development through enhanced 
motivation had long been emphasized as an essential component of 
technical cooperation; logically coherent project structure is an ABC of 
development project design. It was perhaps the combination of these 
basics that made the SHEP successful in helping small-scale 
horticultural farmers to double their income, and the SHEP UP be 
adopted as an authorized administrative mechanism. 
A combination of existing knowledge can sometimes create something 
new. Take, for example, the “iPhone” and “iPod” of Apple Inc. It is said 
that the materials and technologies used in these new gadgets were not 
newly invented by Apple Inc. or Steve Jobs (Kitani 2012). They have, 
however, achieved great success by combining existing materials and 
technologies, and anticipating the needs of the times. In an interview, 
Steve Jobs said that an innovation does not necessarily mean inventing a 
new thing or new technology, but it comes about by transforming a 
combination of existing technologies and ideas into a new technology, a 
product or a service (Gallo 2011). In the same vein, probably, the secret of 
the success of the SHEP and SHEP UP lies in the fact that it combined the 
concept of capacity development, which is the basic premise of Japanese 
technical cooperation, with careful planning of activities based on the 
firm logical sequence of activities and the motivation theory.  
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1. Introduction
In the 1960s, there were high hopes for newly independent Sub-Saharan 
African countries. At that time, Africa was economically better off than 
Asia. In 1970, Zambia’s GNI per capita was $432 and that of Malaysia, 
$392 (at current prices), indicating that the Zambian economy was doing 
better than Malaysia’s. In 1968, Gunnar Myrdal published Asian Drama, 
which was very pessimistic about the development prospects of South 
and South East Asia.
Almost a half century later, however, the situation has reversed and 
Asian economies have surpassed African economies. In 2011, GNI per 
capita was $9,656 for Malaysia and $1,425 for Zambia. This leads to a 
question: What were the reasons for this divergence between the two 
regions? This question was one of the issues heavily discussed at TICAD 
IV.
After TICAD IV, building on its analytical work concerning the Asian 
growth experience and African development, JICA enhanced support of 
industrial development to follow up the meeting. JICA has launched a 
comprehensive approach to support African industrial development, 
i.e., combining policy-level support with concrete project assistance to 
private sector development. Such initiative has matched the challenges 
and priorities of African development today, as well as the political 
commitment of African leaders, and has developed into tangible actions 
in Ethiopia and Zambia, among others. 
This chapter will first discuss the need for the industrial development of 
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Africa in order to achieve its sustainable economic growth, touching 
upon issues such as youth unemployment, de-industrialization 
processes, diversification of economic structure, and investment climate 
improvement. It will then examine strategies to tackle these challenges 
and the strong determination of African leaders to industrialize. These 
will be followed by three cases of JICA’s cooperation for Africa since 
TICAD IV, which include (1) research of the Asian experience and 
African development, (2) industrial policy dialogue and quality and 
productivity improvement (kaizen) in Ethiopia, and (3) support for 
investment promotion and economic diversification (“Triangle of Hope” 
approach) in Zambia.
2.  Possibilities and Challenges – Necessity of Industrial 
Development of Africa
Africa’s long-term prospects for growth are good. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU) (2012) has forecast that average growth of the 
regional economy in 2013-16 will be around 5% a year. The economic 
performance of Sub-Saharan Africa, as Figure 1 shows, has been better 
than that of most developed countries. 
There are challenges, however, to sustain this economic growth. First, 
the youth population in Africa (including North Africa) is rapidly 
expanding, with close to 200 million people aged between 15 and 24. 
Although the expansion means a demographic bonus in the future and 
will make Africa a huge market by 2050, it also means that creating jobs 
for the younger generation will be a critically important issue. 
Otherwise, the dividend could become a curse. This has an important 
bearing on political stability as well as inclusive growth in the region. 
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Figure 1. Africa’s sustainable GDP growth 
(Source: International Monetary Fund (2012), World Economic Outlook Database, October 2012)
Second, despite the importance of the industrial sector in creating jobs, 
the employment share of this sector in Sub-Saharan Africa was only 
10.6% of the overall population in 2009 (ILO 2011). Furthermore, the 
share of the manufacturing sector as a percentage of GDP has been 
declining since the 1980s (Figure 2) (Page 2012 and Page 2013). Industrial 
development is the key to creating more productive jobs, transforming 
the economic structure from rural agriculture-based economies to more 
diversified economies with much larger industrial and service sectors.1 
This includes light manufacturing, such as the agro-processing industry, 
which adds value to primary products. 
1. Benin et al. (2010) estimates that agriculture’s share of GDP fell at an average annual rate of almost 
7% between 2003 and 2009.
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Figure 2. Share of manufacturing in GDP
                                              (Source: Lin 2012)
Third, to transform the Sub-Saharan African economy, private sector 
development needs to be promoted. In a large number of Sub-Saharan 
African countries, the general operating environment for the private 
sector remains difficult, with more complex and expensive regulatory 
processes and weaker legal institutions, compared with any other 
regions (World Bank and IFC. 2012), and the manufacturing sector is still 
weak. 
The fourth issue concerns foreign direct investment (FDI) promotion. 
Even though Africa has largely been enjoying an investment increase 
since 2000, most investment goes into the natural resources or mining 
sector. As Table 1 shows, the top 20 African countries that have the 
largest inward stock of foreign direct investment in 2011 are mainly 
natural resource-rich countries, and just 10 countries count for almost 
80% of the investment amount into Africa. This means investment in 
Africa is highly concentrated and in specific sectors. 
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Table 1. FDI inward stock in 2011, top 20 African countries (mil $)
(Source: by this author based on data from UNCTAD World Investment Report 2011 and 2012)
Figure 3 shows that a gradual sectoral shift of investment is taking place. 
Investment in the service sector is emerging in particular. Contrary to 
popular perception, investment in primary industry is declining in the 
long run. This trend, however, does not necessarily mean a decline in the 
presence of primary industry. For example, coke and petroleum 
products are emerging in the manufacturing sector and many 
investments in the manufacturing sector play a supporting role for the 
extractive industry. UNCTAD (2012) describes this shift of investment as 
a diversification of natural resource-related activities rather than a 
decline of the extractive industry. This indicates that the industrial 
structure still heavily depends on natural resources.
Diversification of economic structure is imperative. First, natural 
resource-rich countries must diversify their economies to correct their 
over-dependency on their given endowments (natural resource curse 
and Dutch disease) and promote other sectors with more job creation 
effects, such as the manufacturing and service sectors. Resource-poor 
countries, on the other hand, need to diversify their economies by 
developing local industry, adding value to agricultural products (value-
chain development).2 To make these strategies work, African countries 
also need to diversify investment.
2. The One Village One Product Program (OVOP) could be one of the effective approaches.
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Figure 3.  Value of greenfield investments in Africa, by sector, 2003–2011
 (Billions of dollars)
 (Source: UNCTAD 2012).
3.  Africa’s Leaders’ Determination to Industrialize – Accelerated 
Industrial Development of Africa (AIDA)
Africa’s leaders have shown strong determination to industrialize their 
countries. One occasion at which such determination was articulated 
was the January 2008 African Union Summit that focused on the 
Industrial development of Africa. The African Union (AU) (2008) 
adopted the Action Plan for the Accelerated Industrial Development of 
Africa (AIDA). This is the declaration by African leaders for national 
development through industrial development. 3
“[I]t is Africa’s turn.... No country or region in the world has achieved 
prosperity and a decent socio-economic life for its citizens without the 
development of a robust industrial sector” (AU 2008:1). 
AU (2008) emphasized that the crucial factors for African industrial 
development are, among others, general skills, stimulating productivity, 
promoting investment, providing infrastructure, technology transfer, 
and upgrading enterprise operations.
Development partners must increase their support for industrial 
development, aligning their support with the African initiative. JICA has 
3. In line with such determination of African leaders for industrial development, there have 
been support activities from African academics; the establishment of the African Center for 
Economic Transformation (ACET) in 2007 by K.Y. Amoako is an example of the initiatives 
from the academic side to support governments with rigorous policy research and advice on 
transforming their economies.
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been aligning its assistance to AIDA, and as a part of the AIDA 
monitoring process, in 2010, JICA and its partner, the National Graduate 
Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), were invited to make presentations 
in the Addis Ababa meeting organized by the AU and the Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA) to introduce Japan’s SME development 
policy (ECA 2010; Shimada 2010). This illustrates the growing interest in 
Asia’s development experience on the part of Africa, especially in terms 
of Asia’s industrial development.
There are numerous constraints for industrial development, ranging 
from lack of basic education to infrastructure. In the next two sections, 
we will focus on two aspects. One is how to make realistic strategies for 
industrial development. The other is how to promote more FDI, 
especially for non-resource-based sectors.
4. Development Strategies toward Industrial Development
At TICAD IV, held when there was a growing interest among African 
leaders in the Asian development experience, the JICA Research 
Institute organized a symposium on “Economic Development in Africa 
and the Asian Growth Experience.”4 The symposium aimed to hear 
African leaders’ insights on the relevance of the Asian experience in 
accelerating economic growth in Africa. The symposium particularly 
highlighted the role of the state in promoting economic growth while 
maintaining equity through appropriate public policy.5 Professor Stiglitz 
emphasized the relevance of the Asian lessons to strike a good balance 
between the state and the market (JICA 2008a). 
Following TICAD IV and the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit, held in 
4 . The symposium featured several eminent African leaders as panelists: H.E. Jakaya Mrisho 
Kikwete, President of the United Republic of Tanzania and Chairman of the African Union; 
H.E. Meles Zenawi, the late Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia; 
H.E. Joachim Alberto Chissano, former president of the Republic of Mozambique; and Dr. 
Donald Kaberuka, President of the African Development Bank Group. Professor Joseph 
Stiglitz of Columbia University also joined the discussion via a video link. Mrs. Sadako 
Ogata, then President of JICA, served as Chairperson.
5 . The main points of the discussion in the symposium were as follows. It was noted that 
Africa is certainly growing; but the challenge is how to sustain accelerated growth. For this 
purpose, Africa needs to have an appropriate development strategy in which government is 
given more policy space to design a practical strategy that suits the unique situations in 
respective African countries.
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Japan just one month after TICAD IV, JICA started several initiatives to 
follow up on Japan’s commitment to Africa at the two meetings. One of 
them is research collaboration between the JICA Research Institute and 
Professor Stiglitz’s Initiative for Policy Dialogue (IPD) with the late 
Prime Minister Meles of Ethiopia participating. The research aimed to 
open a debate on facilitating economic growth and poverty reduction in 
Africa by applying Asia’s development lessons, and also to promote a 
more active role of governments in economic policies. The published 
results of the research called for fresh approaches to learn the lessons 
from successes both within and outside Africa, particularly drawing on 
the experiences of Asia.6 While they maintain there is no policy package 
that fits all sizes, they argued that at the center of the policy misstep in 
Africa was a failure to get the balance right between the state and the 
market.7
After a JICA-IDP meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the then Prime 
Minister Meles made two requests to JICA (Ohno 2011; Shimada 2010; 
Kuwajima 2011). One of these requests was to help formulate industrial 
development policy. The other proposal was to support and nurture 
private companies. In response to these requests by the Prime Minister, 
JICA has taken a comprehensive approach to the issue of industrial 
development in Ethiopia. 
JICA’s comprehensive approach is based on the assumption that as the 
following figure shows, industrial development needs a multifaceted 
policy and actions (Shimada 2013). 
6. The research resulted in the publishing of a book, which was brought out by Oxford 
University Press (Noman et al. 2012), titled “Good Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking 
Development Strategies.”
7. This book addressed the following important questions: Why has the overall economic 
growth performance of Africa been disappointing during the past 50 years? More 
importantly, what are the policy options for reversing that trend? What are the possibilities 
and policies for Africa?
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Figure 4: Comprehensive approach to industrial development 
First, at the policy level, macro-policy such as a five-year development 
plan must be in place to set the overall policy goal and plan. A lack of 
clear policy and plan on the part of the government generates a sense of 
uncertainty among the private sector, resulting in less-than-optimal 
investments.
Second, in addition to the five-year development plan, detailed sectorial 
policy and SME development policy are needed to provide more precise 
guidance for policy implementation.
Third, at the private firm level, human capital accumulation (learning) is 
essential to improve productivity. There are two types of knowledge that 
need to be learnt. One is new skill/technology, and the other is 
management capabilities. These two components are inseparable for 
successful industrial development. 
With the above comprehensible approach in mind, in response to the 
two requests from the late Prime Minister Meles, JICA started its 
initiatives. Regarding the first request, in partnership with GRIPS 
Development Forum, JICA decided to conduct a policy dialogue with 
Ethiopian authorities on the country’s industrial development. Hand in 
hand with the policy dialogue, regarding the second request, JICA 
initiated a project on quality and productivity improvement (kaizen), 
aiming to improve productivity in the industrial sector in Ethiopia 
(Shimada 2011; GRIPS Development Forum 2011). 
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4.1  Industrial policy dialogue and productivity improvement in 
Ethiopia
The policy dialogue with Ethiopian authorities, headed by the Prime 
Minister, covered issues from the policy level to actual implementation 
on the ground. The dialogue started with “policy visions,” which is an 
overall long-term policy guidance. The visions included Agricultural 
Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) and Democratic 
Developmentalism (DD), which are the guiding principles that the 
Ethiopian government has been adhering to. Discussions then moved 
toward the five-year development plan, “the Plan for Accelerated and 
Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) (2005-2009),” and 
culminated in a debate over the new five-year plan, “the Growth and 
Transformation Plan (GTP) 2010/11-2014/15.” Also discussed were 
sector policies such as those for basic metals and engineering industries. 
The sector survey provided a useful reference in the design of an 
industrial master plan.
The dialogue tried to fill in the gap in terms of the mindset and 
methodology of industrial policy making, mostly based on international 
comparison of good practices in Asia such as Japan, the Asian Tigers, 
and ASEAN. It was pointed out that self-study, learning from neighbors, 
and trial and error are the factors commonly found in the Asian 
experience. Further, it was argued that simply copying specific policies 
of an Asian country would not be a solution. The understanding was 
that there is a set of policy menus for industrial policy, and specific 
policies should be selected and adjusted to the unique conditions of each 
country, creating a climate of collaboration for Private-Public 
Partnership (PPP) (Ohno, K. 2011 and 2012). 
Another factor emphasized as important was the coordination among 
government ministries in formulating industrial policy (Ohno, I. 2011). 
This coordination was the key to the success of Asian countries. In Asia, 
the functioning coordination mechanism among the government 
bureaucracy as well as with the private sector helped to make 
development policy making transparent and accountable, and to avoid 
the politicization of the process.
Based on the policy dialogue, the GTP expanded the policy scope to 
include the promotion of import-substitution industries. The new Micro 
and Small Enterprise (MSE) Development Strategy also encourages the 
183
Industrial Development of Africa 
– JICA’s commitment at TICAD IV and its follow-up
introduction of the kaizen concept.8 
4.2 Quality and productivity improvement (kaizen)
The kaizen project started in October 2009, together with the policy 
dialogue.9 Kaizen is a Japanese word that in this context refers to 
“continuous improvement” of productivity and quality without 
additional cost, promoted in a participatory process and through a 
bottom-up approach. Various instruments are used, such as the working 
environment improvement methodology called “5S”: Seiri (orderliness), 
Seiton (tidiness), Seiketsu (cleanliness), Seisou (cleaning up), and Shitsuke 
(discipline); these terms are normally referred to in English as Sort, Set in 
Order, Shine, Standardize, and Sustain. 
Japan itself introduced productivity and quality improvement in 1955 at 
the start of the country’s era of rapid economic growth, learning from the 
business management tools from the United States. This management 
practice method has spread among Japanese companies operating in 
Japan and abroad. JICA has also offered assistance to spread the practice 
of kaizen to many developing countries in Asia. In 1983, JICA started 
cooperation with Singapore’s National Productivity Board (NPB), which 
evolved into the present SPRING-Singapore. After the success of the 
project, cooperation expanded to Thailand, the Philippines, Hungary, 
Brazil, Tunisia and Ethiopia, among others (Ueda 2009). 
In terms of sustainable private sector development, the introduction of 
management tools is critical. Otsuka and Sonobe (2011) explain this 
process as follows (see Figure 5): once a new business is established, the 
pioneer receives sizable profits. The success of the pioneer firms will 
attract imitators to the industry, and in this way an industrial cluster is 
formed. During the early period when profits are reasonably high, 
entrepreneurs are not interested in introducing new ideas and 
knowledge. However, with more companies entering the industry, 
profitability of the firms starts to decrease. Without introducing new 
ideas and knowledge to improve operations, especially management 
tools, the profitability of many firms will decrease, making it impossible 
for them to continue business, and as a result, the number of companies 
8. In a meeting, the late Prime Minister evaluated the JICA-GRIPS exercise as “filling the 
knowledge gap.”
9. Before JICA’s initial technical assistance, the Kaizen Unit was created in the then Ministry 
of Trade and Industry (now the Ministry of Industry), and local kaizen leaders were devoting 
themselves to kaizen promotion.
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will decrease (as shown by the dotted line in Figure 5). Many empirical 
studies have proven that management skill improvement is the key for 
cluster development (Sonobe and Otsuka 2011; Sonobe et al. 2011). This 
is why the Government of Ethiopia and JICA-GRIPS agreed to start 
introducing kaizen as a component of the country’s industrial 
development.
Figure 5.  An illustration of industrial cluster development patterns in terms of 
changing profitability and the number of firms.
              (Source: Otsuka and Sonobe 2011)
To provide guidance on the kaizen approach, a team comprising JICA 
and Ethiopian experts visited a total of 30 selected private 
manufacturing companies, each of which received 10 consultation visits 
from the team. The team’s method was not to give readily available 
solutions to the problems that the companies had, but to ask them 
questions on what the companies needed to think about to improve their 
operations. After the 10 consultations, extending over a half-year, as 
Table 2 shows, the 30 firms had obtained an average benefit of Ethiopian 
Birr (ETB) 500,000 (equivalent to around $30,030). Given that the average 
number of employees was 402 per company, the pilot project generated a 
benefit of ETB 1,240 ($74.5) per head, which almost equaled the 
prevailing gross monthly wage ($75). Various quantitative data on 
successful cases are shown in Table 2. The highest benefit to a single 
company was ETB 3.25 million, around $195,195. 
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Table 2: Quantitatively measured results from the kaizen pilot project
Company Notable results
Overall Average quantitative benefit of ETB 500,000 ($30,030) 
per company.
Given that the average number of employees is 402 
per company, the average benefit per head is ETB 
1,240 ($74.5), which is comparable to the prevailing 
gross monthly wage ($75).
Company A (Metal) Recovered ETB 118,995 ($7,146) as additional value. 
Per-head value is ETB 1,000 ($60).
Company B (Metal) Reduced lead time from two weeks to one week.
Company C (Textile) Halved time wasted by 780 min./month for a certain 
process and 624 min. for another process.
Company D (Chemical) Reduced overproduction waste by 50%.
Increased motion and movement by 100%.
Company E (Agro) Additional production of 12,000 liters/day, which 
accounted for ETB 204,000 ($12,252) 
Company F (Metal) Regained reusable materials worth ETB 2,400,000 
($144,144), compared to company capital of ETB 
770,000 ($46,246). Per-head regain is ETB 58,500 
($3,513).
Company G (Agro) Identified, repaired, and reused machinery and 
equipment worth ETB 3,250,000 ($195,195), compared 
to company capital of ETB 20,000,000 ($1,201,201). 
Per-head benefit is ETB 9,420 ($566).
(Source: By this author)
Figure 6 shows pictures taken before and after the project. The top-left 
pictures show the disorganized stock conditions before kaizen, and the 
pictures on the right, the conditions after kaizen. Everything became 
easier for factory workers to manage. They no longer needed to waste 
time in looking for misplaced materials. The bottom pictures show a 
small improvement at a metals factory, where they simply installed a 
table. With this table, workers could do away with heavy lifting work, 
thus reducing wasted time and effort.
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Figure 6: Visual comparison of before and after the pilot project
       (Source: By this author)
There are also challenges. The pace of progress is different among 
companies participating in the kaizen movement. The key lies in the 
corporate mindset. Workers should actively participate in improving 
productivity and directors have to listen to the workers’ voices. 
Leadership is indispensable to thoroughly apply such a working 
method.
It must be highlighted that this success has been brought about by the 
initiatives of Ethiopian experts, who work enthusiastically with factory 
workers at private companies to improve their operations. This 
management skill was new to the Ethiopian experts before the project, 
but after the project, six out of nine experts who worked for the project 
became classified as consultants, authorized as competent in providing 
consultancy services, and three experts were classified as assistant 
consultants. 
The initial project successfully ended in June 2011, including the kaizen 
dissemination plan. Encouraged by this achievement, the Ethiopian 
Government, in October 2011, established the Ethiopian Kaizen Institute 
(EKI), under the Ministry of Industry, with 65 technical staff. The 
institute is the world’s first ever governmental institute that has the term 
kaizen in its name. The Ethiopian Government and JICA began the Phase 
2 Kaizen Project in November 2011 for capacity building of EKI and 
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related organizations in order to disseminate kaizen throughout the 
country. This project is expected to contribute to establishing a system to 
disseminate kaizen in Ethiopia in a sustainable manner.
JICA’s cooperation to support kaizen in Ethiopia was the first case of its 
kind in Sub-Saharan Africa. The experience and the results of this project 
will form a useful basis for further projects in other African countries in 
the future.
Though not a magic wand, kaizen could be a useful method that will 
contribute to private sector development in Africa; if appropriately 
introduced, it will bring about changes in motivation and consciousness 
and help the acquisition and/or creation of knowledge and skills in the 
process for effective production and quality management. 
To support the kaizen approach in other countries in Africa, it is crucial to 
secure an empirical base to provide a rationale for the conditions under 
which the approach will be functional and effective, and to identify what 
constraints should be overcome. From such a point of view, a greater 
emphasis on scientific analysis of individual projects with appropriate 
data is warranted.
5.  Investment Promotion and Diversification through “Triangle 
of Hope” Approach in Zambia
Turning now to investment promotion and diversification, which are 
other important factors for economic transformation, we would like to 
present a case study from Zambia. Zambia has been struggling to put an 
end to its over-reliance on mineral resources and to diversify its 
economy, as suggested in the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) 
formulated in 2011. The promotion of FDI in various sectors is 
considered one of its solutions. Zambia has been addressing this issue, 
and JICA has been supporting the comprehensive approach towards 
investment promotion, through the project called “Triangle of Hope 
(TOH),” that contributes to economic diversification.10 The “triangle” 
represents a tripartite combination of (1) government will, (2) 
streamlining public administration, and (3) private sector participation. 
The idea was devised by Dato’ J. Jegathesan, who was the former 
10. JICA’s assistance was first initiated as the “Project for Triangle of Hope, Strategic Action 
Initiative for Economic Development (TOH-SAIED)” (referred to as the Phase 1 Project) 
implemented from 2006 to 2009. Then the Phase 2 Project called the “Zambia Investment 
Promotion Project – Triangle of Hope – (ZIPP –ToH)” followed from 2009 until 2012.
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Deputy Head of the Malaysian Industrial Development Agency (MIDA) 
and JICA consultant for the project.11 
Impacts and contributions of the project are summarized as follows 
(JICA 2012b; Homma 2013). First, the project successfully brought 9 
investment projects to Zambia. (One of the investments is worth over 
$200 million. These investments include Africa’s first mobile phone 
factory; a large-scale university invested in by Malaysian investors; and 
a hospital project invested in by an Indian medical enterprise group.) 
Second, the project diversified investment from the mining sector 
towards non-traditional sectors such as education and health. Third, the 
project contributed to improvement of the Doing Business environment. 
For example, Zambia was identified as the world’s 7th top reformer in 
Doing Business 2011 (World Bank and IFC 2010). Fourth, the project 
contributed to a dramatic increase of FDI inflow (FDI inflow for 2011 
became 4 times larger than that of 2006). Last but not least, the project 
enhanced the capacity of the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) as an 
investment promotion agency and improved services for investors.12  
To achieve these results, a strong government will was initiated by the 
late President Dr. Levy Patrick Mwanawasa. Under his direction, 12 
taskforces were formulated and 12 Action Agendas were prepared for 
development of 12 diversified areas.13
Throughout its cooperation period, the project focused on capacity 
building by the Zambian Government, in particular ZDA. The capacity 
building streamlined public administration on investment approval by 
reforming the investment application process, preparing manuals/
guidelines, establishing one-stop shops, monitoring processes by tracer 
studies and others. It also aimed at promotional activities such as 
11. MIDA was renamed as the Malaysian Investment Development Authority in 2011.
12. ZDA was established under Zambia’s Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry by 
merging five governmental agencies, namely Zambia Privatisation Agency, Zambia 
Investment Centre, Export Board of Zambia, Zambia Export Processing Zones Authority and 
the Small Enterprises Development Board. Although the ZDA has multiple functions, the 
basic function to promote inward FDI as the investment promotion agency (IPA) does not 
significantly differ from other countries’ IPAs which are exclusively established for 
investment promotion purposes.
13. The twelve areas are as follows: education, medical and health, tourism, agriculture, 
cotton, banking and finance, air cargo hubs and inland ports, government streamlining, 
information and communication technology (ICT), Multi Facility Economic Zone (MFEZ), 
mining and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME).
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dispatching targeted investment promotion missions for Malaysia, 
India, South Africa and Japan and preparing promotional materials such 
as guidebooks, websites and sector/project profiles. The missions were 
sometimes implemented in the form of public-private joint missions. 
These activities contributed to further private sector participation in 
investment in Zambia even in the sectors which were not traditionally 
considered to be associated with private investment. 
The TOH approach shows the importance of integrated efforts at the 
policy making level and implementation level to promote investments. 
This is an innovative approach and the difference from prior efforts in 
this area. It is also suggested that the TOH approach, including 
investment diversification, could serve as one of the solutions for 
African natural resource-rich countries which need economic 
diversification.
6. Ways forward
As we have seen, the keys to sustainable economic growth in Africa are 
industrial development (job creation), doing business improvement, and 
investment diversification. This chapter examined strategies to tackle 
these challenges and African initiatives for industrial development, 
AIDA, taking up cases of JICA’s cooperation for Africa, which include 
(1) the analytical work of the Asian experience and African 
development, (2) industrial policy dialogue and quality and 
productivity improvement (kaizen) in Ethiopia, and (3) support for 
investment promotion and economic diversification (“Triangle of Hope” 
approach) in Zambia. These results of the projects designed and 
implemented as follow-up activities after TICAD IV imply that these 
approaches should be scaled up after TICAD V in accordance with 
AIDA. The international community is expected to support this African 
initiative. 
The subsequent chapters will discuss the role of infrastructure. Without 
soft and hard infrastructure, such as Special Economic Zones (SEZ), 
roads, bridges, electricity and operational systems for industrial 
promotion, it is impossible to industrialize. Infrastructure is also very 
important to encourage the private sector, including Japanese 
companies, to invest more in Africa. In the process of the development of 
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Asia, this ODA-FDI linkage worked very well in countries such as 
Thailand and Vietnam.
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Chapter 7: 
Policy Challenges for Infrastructure 
Development in Africa - The way forward for 
Japan’s Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) 
Yasuo Fujita, Ippei Tsuruga and Asami Takeda
This chapter examines how Japan’s ODA can more effectively assist 
Africa’s infrastructure development in consideration of a 
comprehensive study by the donor consortium. It recommends that 
Japan should consider, as short-term measures, sectoral reallocation of 
its assistance, financial assistance for maintenance, and management 
reform of public utilities, while supporting various reforms from a long-
term perspective.
1. Introduction
Infrastructure1 development in Africa is generally lagging behind other 
parts of the world, though there are variations between countries and 
sectors (see Section 2), hampering economic growth2 and poverty 
reduction (for example, Calderón and Servén 2010). One of the serious 
problems was that the real picture of infrastructure in African countries 
could not be seen due to lack of data, preventing policy interventions 
and investment.
The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA)3 conducted Africa 
infrastructure country diagnostic studies and published a flagship 
report titled Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation in late 2009 
1. In this chapter, infrastructure includes: power; transport (roads, seaports, airports, and 
railways; water supply and sanitation; information and communication technology (ICT); 
and irrigation.
2. As pointed out in Chapter 6, infrastructure development would promote economic growth 
through industrial development while removing the cost penalties of economic activities.
3. ICA was established in 2005, following the G8 Gleneagles summit at which assistance for 
Africa was one of the main agenda topics. For details of ICA, see http://www.icafrica.org/
en/
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(hereinafter referred to as AFD-WB 2009). The values of this report 
include that current status and problems are analyzed through 
quantitative data; that infrastructure needs and funding gaps are 
estimated by sector and country type; and that policy interventions are 
prioritized through cost-benefit analyses. At the same time, however, it 
reveals that Africa’s infrastructure challenges are overwhelming and 
complex, and require sustained and concerted efforts by African 
countries, regional organizations, and development partners.4
This chapter aims to discuss what Japan’s ODA should place its 
emphasis among recommendations of AFD-WB 2009 in donor 
community’s concerted efforts, in order to effectively contribute to 
address Africa’s infrastructure challenges.5 This exercise is useful 
because infrastructure has always been one of the priority areas for 
Japan’s assistance for Africa to boost the region’s economic growth as in 
the TICAD IV Yokohama Action Plan 2008, and Japan has provided 
financial resources and technical assistance.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the current 
status of infrastructure development through available statistics; Section 
3 reviews Japan’s recent ODA for infrastructure in Africa; Section 4 
discusses the future direction of Japan’s ODA; and Section 5 is the 
conclusion.
2. Overview of Infrastructure Development in Africa
2.1 Current infrastructure in Africa
Table 1 shows the current status of infrastructure development in Africa 
based on available statistics such as World Development Indicators 
(WDI) of the World Bank, and the Global Competitive Index (GCI) of the 
World Economic Forum (WEF). The countries are categorized into five 
groups6 – North Africa, middle income countries, oil exporting 
4. Development partners here include non-traditional funders such as China, Korea. Figure 2 
shows their great contribution to infrastructure development.
5. Therefore, this chapter focuses only on how Japan’s ODA can better meet Africa’s 
infrastructure development needs; and does not directly consider the interests of Japanese 
industries in infrastructure business in Africa.
6. This chapter adopts the categorization of countries of IMF 2011, 80, which is a little different 
from AFD-WB 2009, 51. Fragile countries are low-income countries that face particularly 
severe development challenges, such as weak governance, limited administrative capacity, 
violence, or the legacy of conflict (AFD-WB 2009, 51).
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countries, low-income nonfragile countries, and low-income fragile 
countries7 - because they are different in infrastructure development and 
challenges. This section basically focuses on sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries because the quality and quantity of infrastructure in North 
Africa and small, middle-income island countries, including Mauritius 
and Seychelles, are relatively higher in almost all the sectors. As shown 
in Figures A1 to A6, there is generally a positive correlation between 
infrastructure development and GDP per capita, but, the degree of 
correlations is different across infrastructure sectors.8 This suggests that 
the countries can improve some infrastructure regardless their income 
levels. The current situation of Africa’s infrastructure by sector is as 
follows:
Power: Power is by far Africa’s largest infrastructure challenge, with 30 
countries facing regular power shortages (AFD-WB 2009, 5) and more 
than half of the population having no access to electricity except in 
North Africa, Mauritius and South Africa. SSA countries have low rates 
of electrification – the average rate for SSA countries is only 32%, 
compared to the average of low and middle income countries (LMIC) 
throughout the world, which is 74%. As for electricity consumption per 
capita, the average of SSA countries is only 517kWh, which is 
substantially lower than the world LMIC average (1,527kWh), with the 
exception of South Africa (4,532kWh) and Libya (4,170kWh). 
Furthermore, SSA countries’ rate of electric power transmission and 
distribution loss9 (11.2%) is almost the same as the world LMIC average 
(11.1%). The loss is higher in the whole of the African region particularly 
in middle-income (35%) and oil-exporting countries (24%), indicating 
operating inefficiency of power utilities.
Transport: The average roads pavement ratio in SSA countries is only 
19% compared with the world LMIC average of 45%. The road pavement 
ratio in oil-exporting countries is very low. In addition, regarding road 
density (total road length per land area), the figures in many African 
countries are lower than the world LIMC average (21.5 km/100km2). It 
is urgent that African governments should address the poor condition 
7. Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries are subdivided to the latter four groups.
8. The road pavement ratio and the electricity power consumption per capita are more 
correlated with per capita income. The electricity power consumption and distribution 
losses, improved access to water sources, agriculture irrigation land, and mobile 
subscription per 100 are less correlated with per capita income. (Figures A1 to A6)
9. Measured in percentage of electricity power output (World Bank.2012a)
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and low density of their road networks. In addition, to keep the road 
network in good condition, maintenance is another challenging task in 
Africa since it requires huge investment. Infrastructure development of 
other transport modes such as airports, seaports and railways in Africa 
face same challenges and ineffective linkage between different transport 
modes, declining air connectivity, poorly equipped ports and aging rail 
networks are key problems facing Africa’s transport system (AFD-WB 
2009, 233).
Water supply and sanitation (WSS): Only 61% of SSA countries’ 
population has access to safe drinking water, which is below the world 
LMIC average of 86% and MDG’s target rate of 75% by 2015. The rates 
are below 50% in Somalia, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Madagascar, Mozambique and Niger. Urban and rural 
disparities are also prominent – more than half of the rural population 
has no access to safe water in SSA countries. Access to adequate 
sanitation is even worse. Only 30% of the population in SSA countries 
lives in households with access to adequate sanitation and the rate is 
lower in rural areas. There are 12 low-income countries where more than 
90% of the population has no access to adequate sanitation in rural areas. 
Irrigation: While more than two-thirds of Africans rely on agriculture for 
a living, the average amount of arable land developed for irrigation is 
only 6% for a selected 28 African countries, compared with 39% in Asia 
and nearly 30% in Latin American countries (Bluffstone and Kohlin 2011, 
6). Low levels of irrigation mean that few SSA countries can sustain yield 
increases, even with abundant rainfall (UNDP 2012). The amount in 
Egypt is exceptionally high (99.7%) since Egypt’s agriculture depends 
entirely on irrigation. Further improvement is an urgent requirement for 
sustainable food production in Africa.
Information and communication technology (ICT): Approximately 
three-quarters of the world’s inhabitants have access to mobile phones 
(World Bank 2012b, 23). The number of mobile subscriptions in use 
worldwide has grown from 1 billion in 2000 to over 6 billion in 2012, of 
which nearly 5 billion are in developing countries (ibid.). This trend is 
also true for some African countries. The number of mobile 
subscriptions per 100 people has increased dramatically since 2000; in 
2010, North Africa (111 subscriptions) and some middle-income 
countries exceeded the world average (78 subscriptions). As for the 
penetration of telephone lines and the Internet, Africa still has low rates 
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especially in oil-exporting countries and low-income countries, 
suggesting the digital divide is a critical issue. It is still essential for 
African governments to develop the telecommunications sector.
2.2 Infrastructure by country groups
The infrastructure challenge differs among country type (Table 1). North 
Africa showed the highest level of infrastructure in quality and quantity 
in all the sectors. However, its electricity consumption per capita is still 
insufficient (average 1,751kWh per capita) compared with the world 
average (2,807kWh), though it exceeds the world LMIC average (1,527 
kWh). As for the middle income countries in Africa, further 
improvement in both quality and quantity in the energy sector is 
necessary; and particularly, the rate of electric power transmission and 
loss is the highest among all the country groups (35%), due to the high 
figure for Botswana (79%).
Recent economic growth in Africa is attributed to price hike in energy 
and mineral resources10 and oil exporting countries play a great role in 
economic growth of Africa. However, infrastructure development in oil 
exporting countries is stagnant, despite their higher GDP per capita and 
abundant natural resources revenue.11 In particular, the level of 
infrastructure stock and quality in the transport sector are lower than 
low income countries. In addition, oil-exporting countries significantly 
lag in terms of quantity and quality in electricity services. Therefore, 
considering how to allocate additional fiscal resources from natural 
resources to infrastructure effectively (particularly in transport and 
energy sector) is urgent. 
The low income African countries are facing a severe situation in all the 
sectors of infrastructure. The available data shows that there is no 
significant difference in infrastructure between fragile and non-fragile 
countries. In particular, power is the largest infrastructure challenge, 
especially in non-fragile countries (average rate of access to electricity is 
only 23% and electricity consumption per capita is the lowest, 240kWh), 
and both quantity expansion and quality improvement are urgent 
requirements.
10. Refer to Introduction of this report.
11. This is because they used most of their revenue from oil exports for debt repayment (AFD-
WB 2009, 76).
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2.3 Infrastructure and a country’s competitiveness
It is useful to see the perception of private businesses regarding 
infrastructure as one of the key components to a country’s 
competitiveness. WEF 201112 shows that almost all African countries are 
assessed as inferior to the world average in terms of quality except 
Tunisia, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Gambia and Rwanda (Figure 
1). Poor infrastructure quality in oil-exporting countries is noticeable 
mainly due to the poor reliability of the electricity supply. The 
infrastructure index ranking shows 24 out of 33 African countries are 
ranked below 100 out of 142 surveyed countries. It is obvious that the 
poor infrastructure quality of SSA countries negatively affects a 
country’s global competitiveness.
Figure 1. Infrastructure quality of selected African countries
12. WEF 2011 covers 33 African countries.
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2.4 Infrastructure spending needs and funding and efficiency gaps
Infrastructure of all sectors is substantially underdeveloped in Africa, 
though variations exist between countries and sectors. Special attention 
should be paid to the power sector (by sector), and to the low income 
countries (by country groups). According to AFD-WB 2009, the cost of 
addressing Africa’s infrastructure needs for 2006 through 2015 amounts 
to US$93 billion a year, about one third of which is for maintenance 
(Table 2).
Africa’s annual infrastructure spending (2001 to 2006)13 is estimated at 
US$45.3 billion. 66% of the overall spending is financed by the domestic 
public sector, and the rest, 34%, (US$15.5 billion) is from external 
sources, where the share of ODA is 7.9%, non-OECD financiers 5.5% and 
private sector 20.7% (AFD-WB 2009, 8-9).
Given infrastructure annual spending needs (US$93.3 billion) and the 
annual existing spending (US$45.3 billion), the annual financial gap is 
estimated at US$48 billion, comprising of an efficiency gap (US$17 
billion) and funding gap (US$31 billion). Electricity is the sector most in 
need of additional funding, followed by WSS and irrigation. These have 
an aggregate need of US$23 billion while ICT and transport receive more 
than their needs (Table 2).
Table 2.  Africa’s infrastructure spending needs, and funding and  
efficiency gaps, 2006-1514
13. The study identifies four major financial sources including: domestic public sector, ODA 
from OECD member countries, non-OECD countries like China, India and the Arab states, 
and private sector; and sum up their spending on the capital investment and O&M in 
electricity, ICT, irrigation, transport, water supply and sanitation and cross-sector projects 
(AFD-WB 2009, 66-67).
14. AFD-WB 2009 (66-67) identifies four major financial sources including: domestic public 
sector, ODA from OECD member countries, non-OECD countries like China, India and the 
Arab states, and private sector; and sum up their spending on the capital investment and 
O&M in electricity, ICT, irrigation, transport, water supply and sanitation and cross-sector 
projects.
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3. Trend of Financial Resources for Infrastructure and Japan’s Aid
3.1 Infrastructure financing source and gap
In response to financial needs, the financial commitment of external 
sources rapidly increased from 2005 to 2010 (ICA 2011, 20). In addition, 
the share of the power sector, whose financial gap is the largest among 
the sectors (Table 2), accounted for 44% in 2010 (ICA2011, 22). The share 
of Japan’s ODA in 2010 was 5% of total commitments by external 
sources, or 10% of commitments by ICA members (Figure 2). This 
increasing trend regarding Japan’s commitment is a recent phenomenon 
because the high indebtedness of African countries prevented loan 
assistance until 2005, and political instability and conflicts hampered 
new infrastructure investment. Japan has waived debt repayments for 
African countries under the international debt relieve initiatives,15 and 
commenced the Enhanced Private Sector Assistance for Africa (EPSA) 
initiative in 2005, pledging US$1 billion in ODA loans to Africa for five 
years. TICAD IV in 2008 has also contributed to speed up infrastructure 
assistance.
Figure 2. ICA Members Financial Support for African Infrastructure
3.2 Japan’s infrastructure assistance
A more detailed picture of Japan’s ODA for Africa’s infrastructure is 
reviewed through the original database of yen loans and grants for 2005 
15. For Africa, Japan waived debt repayments amounting to JPY 765.3 billion (ODA debt JPY 
440.2 billion and non-ODA JPY 325.1 billion) from 2003 to 2011 (MOFAJ 2011).
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to 2011, and technical cooperation (TC) for 2005 to 2010 constructed from 
the JICA project database.16 The data for grants or loans is based on 
commitments in the period (as of the signing of the Exchange of Notes), 
while that of TC is on an actual disbursement basis.17 The loans and 
grants assistance is usually provided for new capital investment or 
rehabilitation projects; in addition, the loan projects often include the 
capacity building components of executing agencies. Japan’s TC is 
provided as grants, and includes project formulation studies, the 
dispatch of experts, training of recipient government officials, and 
provision of equipment.
3.2.1 Japan’s loans and grants assistance
Japan’s ODA loans/grants average annual commitment (2005-2011) for 
Africa’s infrastructure amounts to Yen 77.8 billion (65%) out of the total 
annual commitment of Yen 119.0 billion18 (Table 3). Out of this annual 
average commitment for infrastructure, North Africa receives Yen 30.2 
billion (39%) and SSA countries receive Yen 47.5 billion (61%). As for the 
proportion between loans and grants, while loans accounts for 96% in 
North Africa, in SSA countries the loan/grant proportion is almost equal 
(loans 52% and grants 48%), reflecting the different income levels and 
borrowing capacity of the two groups (Table A2, Figure 3).
Regarding the sectoral breakdown (Africa total), transport has the 
largest share (38%), followed by power (32%) and WSS (23%). In North 
Africa, power is the largest (37%), followed by WSS (31%) and transport 
(24%). In SSA countries, transport represents a much higher share (46%), 
followed by power (29%) and WSS (19%) (Table A2, Figure 4).
16. Although the JICA project database covers all ODA loan projects, it does not cover all 
grants and TC projects. Nevertheless, it is sufficient to review the overall picture of Japan’s 
grants and TC assistance because of the substantial coverage of the JICA database.
17. The data is on a calendar year basis. The sectoral category is in accordance with that of 
OECD-DAC. Since TC projects are basically on a shorter implementation period, the time lag 
of commitment and disbursement is generally small.
18. The total commitments include ODA loans amounting to JPY 7.4 billion (annual average 
2005-2011) to African Development Bank (AfDB) for private sector -lending programs, which 
cannot be broken down to individual infrastructure sectors.
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Table 3. Japan’s Financial Commitment Regarding Africa’s Infrastructure
Figure 3.  Modality Share of Japan’s Financial Commitment Regarding Africa’s 
Infrastructure
Source: Compiled by author from JICA project database
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Figure 4.  Sectoral Share of Japan’s Financial Commitment Regarding Africa’s 
Infrastructure
          Source: Compiled by author from JICA project database
Figure 5.  Sectoral Trend of Japan’s Financial Commitment Regarding 
Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa
             Source: Compiled by author from JICA project database
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We will review Japan’s ODA loans/grants regarding infrastructure in 
SSA countries in more detail. While the annual commitments of loans/
grants noticeably fluctuate, the commitment to the power sector in 2010 
was quite high (Figure 5). This increase was because several project 
loans, which had been under preparation, were provided in this single 
year. Within the transport sector, road and bridge projects account for 
75%, while seaports receive 25%. As for the proportion of loans and 
grants, it is almost equal in transport; 77% of the commitment in power 
is by loans; and WSS is mostly funded by grants (89%). This difference of 
loan/grant proportion by sector is mainly due to the different economic 
and financial returns of these sectors because both African countries and 
Japan prefer using grants to lower return projects.
Within SSA countries, the eastern Africa region (11 countries) accounts 
for 61%, followed by the southern African region comprising 15 
countries (22%). This is because the western and central African 
countries include more fragile states and oil producing countries. As to 
the country’s income categories, the low-income non-fragile countries 
(15 countries) received 77%, and the shares of the other three categories 
are between 7% and 8%. The low income non-fragile states are the main 
target of infrastructure assistance because of their income levels and 
absorption capacity. Low-income fragile states received a small share of 
infrastructure assistance (7%), which is for transport and WSS funded 
only by grants, because of serious constraints owing to peace and order 
issues, debt sustainability, and aid absorption capacity.
3.2.2 Japan’s technical cooperation (TC)
The annual average disbursement of TC (2005-2010) amounts to Yen 30.4 
billion, of which 20% is for infrastructure, and 80% is for non-
infrastructure (Table 4). This is in sharp contrast to the loan/grant 
assistance which is used for upfront infrastructure investment. The 
sectoral breakdown of TC for infrastructure shows another contrast with 
the loan/grant assistance. WSS has the largest share (36%), followed by 
transport (27%) and irrigation (18%); and far less input into power (9%). 
Geographically, 84% of TC goes to SSA countries, so, the sectoral 
breakdown of SSA countries is almost the same as that of the African 
total as mentioned above. Within SSA countries, the share for western 
Africa is higher in TC (21%) than in loans/grants (14%) (Table A3). 
Distribution among the income groups is dominated by the low income 
non-fragile states (75%), and the other groups’ shares are between 6 and 
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10%, which is almost the same pattern as that for loan/grant assistance.
Table 4. Japan’s Technical Cooperation Regarding Africa’s Infrastructure
Figure 6.  Sectoral Share of Japan’s Technical Cooperation Regarding Africa’s 
Infrastructure
Source: Compiled by author from JICA project database
It is natural that the sectoral breakdown of TC does not coincide with 
that of loan/grant assistance, because there are TC projects which are 
closely related to investment projects and those which are not, as 
follows:
 ➢ TC is closely related to capital investment supported by loans/
grants: pre-investment studies, capacity building of executing 
agencies, dispatch of experts, etc.
 ➢ When it is premature or difficult to implement investment projects 
due to economic and/or capacity constraints of countries, TC is 
provided mainly for efficiency improvement, for training of 
government officials, project identification, master planning, 
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provision of equipment, etc.
However, it may be reasonable to reallocate the TC resources to fulfill the 
efficiency gaps of Africa, which is one of the targets of assistance through 
TC, since the efficiency gaps of infrastructure is clearly estimated by 
AFD-WB 2009. As Table 2 shows, the efficiency gap is the largest in the 
power sector (US$6 billion annually), followed by transport and WSS, 
while the allocation of Japan’s TC is weighted on WSS, transport and 
irrigation in order.
Figure 7.  Sectoral Trend of Japan’s Technical Cooperation Regarding 
Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa
Source: Compiled by author from JICA project database
3.3 Policy implications
Japan’s recent allocation of loan/grant assistance does not appear to 
match the spending needs or funding gap across the infrastructure 
sectors as in Table 2. Japan’s loan and grant assistance for investment 
purposes is dominated by the transport sector, which is estimated to 
have a financial surplus by the AFD-WB 2009. Japan’s TC, which can 
improve efficiency and facilitate infrastructure investment through 
capacity development and project preparation, is provided for the WSS 
(36%) and transport (27%) sectors in SSA countries. As seen in Table 2, 
the power sector in Africa has the largest funding and efficiency gaps 
among the sectors. Since private investment is playing a major role in the 
power sector (ICA2011), it does not necessarily mean that public funds, 
including Japan’s ODA, should be used for capital investment in power 
projects. In addition, Japan’s ODA has strengths and emphasis in certain 
sectors, including WSS (particularly in TC) and transport (both in loans/
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grants and TC). However, it would be appropriate to consider how 
Japan’s ODA – loans, grants, and TC – can better contribute to improve 
infrastructure investment in needy sectors such as power, and to more 
effectively remove infrastructure inefficiencies.
4.  Policy Challenges Regarding Infrastructure Development in Africa 
and Future Direction of Japan’s ODA
It appears that there is room for Japan’s ODA to take more into account 
the recommendations of the AFD-WB 2009 (Box) for promoting 
infrastructure development in Africa. The most important characteristic 
of the recommendations of AFD-WB 2009 is the emphasis on closing 
efficiency gaps in Africa’s infrastructure, though most of the 
recommendations are common to other parts of the world.19 All of these 
recommendations are essential for infrastructure development in Africa, 
and should be pursued in the long term. This section discusses three key 
issues that Japan should urgently consider based on the analysis of 
Section 3 in relation to the recommendations (Box). The three issues are 
selected according to the following general criteria: they are areas where 
(i) African countries’ needs are unmet; (ii) higher development impact is 
expected; and (iii) development impact is realized relatively in a short 
period of time, though we do not underestimate the importance of long-
term interventions.
Box: 10 recommendations by AFD-WB 2009
1.     Address Africa’s infrastructure efficiency gap as a pressing policy 
priority
2.     Make greater efforts to safeguard maintenance-related spending
3.     Tackle inefficiency through institutional reform
4.     Include line ministries and budgetary processes in the 
institutional reform agenda
5.     Use administrative and regulatory reforms to get full value from 
existing infrastructure
6.     Pursue regional integration to reduce infrastructure costs
7.     Take a spatial view of infrastructure development priorities
8.     Rethink infrastructure social policy
9.     Find practical ways to broaden access to infrastructure services
10.   Close the infrastructure funding gap
Source: AFD-WB 2009
19. For example, see twelve recommendations of ADB-JBIC-WB 2005 ( xlvi – lvi) for East Asia.
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4.1 Rethinking of sectoral allocation of Japan’s ODA
The transport sector, especially roads, has received the largest share of 
Japan’s ODA. While Japan’s country assistance strategies for African 
countries give emphasis on infrastructure development, there is no clear 
policy on the allocation of funds between the sectors. Since Africa’s 
infrastructure needs and funding gaps are estimated, it is time to rethink 
the allocation of Japan’s ODA so that needy sectors can receive more 
support for more investment and efficiency improvement. In fact, JICA 
has recently been increasing loan/grant assistance to the power sector, 
and project preparation in Africa’s power sector has been strengthened 
as shown in the increase of TC in the power sector (Figures 5 and 7).
Nevertheless, we do not mean that Japan’s grant/loan assistance should 
immediately and directly go to financing power sector investment 
projects. It should be noted that the power sector (particularly power 
generation) is one of the few sectors which can expect capital investment 
by the private sector even in low-income countries (Leigland 2010). 
Japan’s ODA to the power sector needs to be more carefully examined by 
sub-sector, as follows:
 ➢ Power generation: The possibility of private sector capital 
investment should always be explored in power generation 
projects. For this purpose, JICA should assist with the preparation 
of bankable projects through TC, regardless of whether they will 
be financed by the private or public sectors. When private capital 
investment is not possible, JICA should provide loans/grants for 
capital investment. Areas for Japan’s ODA financing for 
investment would include: thermal plants in which private 
investors are not interested, renewable energy projects (e.g., 
geothermal and wind-power) whose investment risk is usually 
higher than conventional thermal plants; and hydropower 
projects which require social and environmental considerations. 
Some recent project examples include a geothermal project in 
Kenya and a wind power project in Egypt.
 ➢ Transmission, distribution and rural electrification: These sub-
sectors would qualify for public sector funding because the 
private sector is less interested due to generally low commercial 
viability. Assistance both for project preparation and investment 
would be necessary.
In a hydropower project in Uganda, while the power station is invested 
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in by the private sector, the associated transmission lines are funded by 
JICA and AfDB through concessional loans. This sort of division of labor 
between private and public funds is common in power projects in Asia.
On the other hand, it is difficult to expect private sector capital 
investment in the WSS and irrigation sectors due to low commercial 
viability; and, therefore, public financing is expected to close the funding 
gap. In WSS, while Japan’s ODA appears to place emphasis on efficiency 
improvement through TC, the low access rate to WSS is a serious 
problem (Section 2), suggesting room for Japan’s assistance for WSS 
investment. Likewise, raising productivity in agriculture is essential for 
Africa’s food security and economic transformation. Irrigation facilities 
are a vital component, together with improved inputs including 
fertilizers as shown in the green revolution in Asia. JICA should consider 
the possibilities of supporting new investment through loan/grant 
assistance in these two sectors.
Lastly, there is an important caution to be placed on the reallocation of 
Japan’s assistance among the sectors. The estimation of the funding gaps 
is made on the assumption that current spending continues (Table 2). If 
all development partners shift from the transport to other sectors at 
once, there is the risk that the transport sector would be in deficit. In 
addition, as in Section 2, there are variations in infrastructure between 
sectors and countries and the infrastructure deficits of sub-sectors 
(particularly, roads, ports and railways) within the transport sector vary. 
Therefore, sectoral reallocation needs coordination with recipient 
countries and other development partners, and a careful review of 
infrastructure needs and gaps in each country should be undertaken. (If 
the current resource allocation to the transport sector is reconsidered, the 
prioritization of spending is necessary within the transport sector, 
including emphasis on regional connectivity discussed in Chapter 8, 
financial support for road maintenance in the next Sub-section 4.2, and 
reallocation between transport sub-sectors.)
4.2 Financial assistance for maintenance
Japan has always emphasized the importance of maintenance of 
infrastructure over the years through TC projects (e.g., road 
maintenance) and ex-post evaluation of projects. Japan’s ODA, however, 
do not finance operation and maintenance expenditures, which shall be 
shouldered by recipient countries through their budget and user 
charges. Japan’s assistance for strengthening infrastructure maintenance 
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has been through capacity building of maintenance techniques, financial 
management, etc., through technical assistance and overseas training. 
Japan only provides budget support, which possibly finances 
maintenance expenditures, on a limited basis in Africa, almost all in 
Tanzania.
JICA’s ex-post evaluations found financial weaknesses in JICA-assisted 
infrastructure projects at the operation and maintenance stage in 
Africa.20 JICA 2011 and 2012 include post-evaluations of fourteen (14) 
infrastructure projects funded by loans or grants in Africa. Out of 8 
projects whose sustainability is rated “medium,” six (6) projects (43%), 
which are rated “medium,” have problems related to insufficient budget 
allocation or low cost recovery at the operation and maintenance stage.21
Ultimately, there are only two financing sources for infrastructure 
investment, operation and maintenance: tax and user charges.22 
Therefore, in order to have the financial resources for infrastructure, 
governments, developers and service providers need to adopt cost-
reflective tariffs when service charges are collected, and exert tax 
collection efforts to cover the cost in the case of non-revenue generating 
projects. Careful attention should be paid to affordability by poorer 
sections of society, for example, through designing targeted subsidy 
schemes and adopting more cost effective technologies. In the long run, 
Japan’s ODA should help developing countries in Africa take the self-
help approach
In the short run, however, Japan should reconsider its approach to 
strengthening maintenance in Africa. The finding that insufficient 
budget and cost recovery caused insufficient maintenance in JICA-
funded projects means that non-financial capacity building alone cannot 
address insufficient maintenance. Japan’s financial assistance for 
maintenance, through (sector) budget support or sector program loans, 
20. Insufficient maintenance due to insufficient budget and low cost-recovery is a problem 
common for most developing countries (JICA 2012).
21. In JICA post-evaluation, the rating of “sustainability” is in three grades: high, medium 
and low. Out of the 14 evaluated projects, 6 projects get high ratings and 8 projects get 
medium ratings regarding sustainability. There are no low-rated projects regarding 
sustainability in JICA 2011 and 2012.
22. “Financiers – whether the private sector, or official lenders and donors - can change the 
requisite time profile of taxes or user charges by providing financing in the form of loans or 
equity, but eventually those loans need to be repaid or remunerated.” (ADB-JBIC-WB 2005, 
30)
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can play an important role in the sustainability of infrastructure.
In addition, the financing of maintenance would have some advantages 
over new investments given the current situation in Africa: higher return 
and quicker impact. While a new investment project takes time from 
project preparation to completion, maintenance investment generally 
requires a shorter time because of minimal environmental 
considerations, a shorter time for contractor selection, less technical 
complexities, etc. Particularly, the economic return for road maintenance 
in SSA countries is quite high (138.8%) according to AFD-WB 2009 (70-
71). If this statement is combined with the argument in Sub-section 4.1 – 
sectoral reallocation of resources – the policy implication is that a portion 
of the funds for new road investment should be shifted to road 
maintenance.
Before embarking on financial assistance for maintenance in Africa, there 
are two important considerations. First, it can and should be selective in 
terms of recipient countries and sectors. As in JICA 2011 and 2012, it 
should be noted that 57% of projects still have no problem with budget 
allocation or cost recovery. In addition, capacity constraints on the Japan 
side and fiduciary risks of recipient countries should also be taken into 
account. Countries and sectors for financial assistance regarding 
maintenance should be carefully selected in consideration of capital 
investment projects in the past and if there are on-going projects. Second, 
Japan should have a phase-out policy from this type of assistance since 
maintenance cannot be supported forever. It has to be undertaken 
together with capacity development TC for budget management, 
infrastructure asset management, and maintenance techniques.
4.3 Assistance regarding management reform of public utilities
Three recommendations of AFD-WB 2009 (Nos. 3 to 5 of the Box) are 
regarding institutional and regulatory reforms. AFD-WB 2009 also finds 
that governance reform of public utilities is more successful in countries 
where broader governance reforms are in progress, and that some 
countries do well despite broader governance reform being delayed 
(106-108). The latter finding is consistent with the argument of pockets of 
effective agencies in weak governance states – “it is well established that 
even in countries that have poor governance and a weak public sector, 
exceptional well-functioning government and government supported 
agencies do exist”(Leonard 2010).
216
Chapter 7
While there is no doubt that broader governance reform should be 
pursued, it would take time to produce results due to the political 
economy of African countries. Therefore, a realistic approach would be 
that while broader governance reform is executed, efforts should be 
made to create effective organizations which are expected to produce 
positive results through organizational reforms in the short run.23 Japan 
should identify government agencies and public utilities of past, 
ongoing, and/or future Japan ODA projects, and should consider 
support for internal management and organizational reforms, and cost 
recovery mechanisms.
5. Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed the current status of infrastructure, and recent 
Japan ODA projects, and discussed three issues that Japan’s 
infrastructure assistance should consider in light of the findings and 
recommendations of AFD-WB 2009. We have suggested rethinking 
resource allocation between sectors, financial assistance for 
infrastructure maintenance, and the organizational reform of executing 
agencies.
One of the strengths of Japan’s ODA is that it can contribute both to 
address efficiency gaps and to close funding gaps through the three 
modalities: loans, grants and TC. These three modalities can be 
effectively used for various types of countries and sectors, depending on 
the stages of infrastructure development and the country’s needs. One 
important note is that loan assistance is indispensable to increase Japan’s 
financial support to Africa’s infrastructure. In view of the fact that the 
high indebtedness of some African countries hampered Japan’s 
infrastructure assistance, it is essential to pay careful attention to debt 
sustainability issues to sustain Japan’s infrastructure assistance. In close 
coordination with other development partners, it would be more 
effective to reconsider Japan’s infrastructure assistance strategy in Africa 
with new data and findings, and to take one step further by setting up an 
infrastructure assistance strategy for individual countries.
23. Some pockets of effective organizations in weak governance states were created through 
long-term management practices and strong organizational culture. This sort of effective 
organization cannot be created over a short period of time (Fujita 2011).
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Figure A1. Log of roads, paved (% of total roads)
 Source: World Bank 2012a
Figure A2. Log of Electricity power consumption (kWh per capita)
 Source: World Bank 2012a
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Figure A3.  Log of electric power transmission and distribution losses (% of 
output)
 Source: World Bank 2012a
Figure A4.  Log of Improved access to water sources (% of population with 
access)
 Source: World Bank 2012a
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Figure A5. Log of Agriculture irrigated land (% of total arable land)
 Source: ICID2010
Figure A6. Log of Mobile subscription per 100 people
 Source: World Bank 2012a
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Chapter 8:  
Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI)
Kaori Matsushita
Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI) is indispensable to 
economic activities in Africa. However, the high cost of distribution due 
to the limited capacity of infrastructure facilities and inefficient 
customs/cross-border formalities constrains economic and social 
development in Africa. Under the circumstances, TICAD IV, held in May 
2008, designated regional infrastructure development as a key task and 
have been striving to improve both the physical and software sides of 
CBTI in Africa in order to improve the efficiency of physical distribution.
This report summarizes the current situation of trading and physical 
distribution in Africa, discusses the importance of CBTI, and proposes a 
course of action for assisting CBTI. 
Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI) is defined as follows:1 CBTI 
is a comprehensive and necessary infrastructure for cross-border 
transportation between countries. Such infrastructure includes physical 
infrastructure such as ports, railroads, main roads, transshipment 
facilities, border facilities including one-stop border posts (OSBPs), 
weigh bridges (vehicle weight measuring scales), and inland container 
depots (ICD), all of which constitute international transit corridors. CBTI 
also includes legal systems related to various cross-border matters, such 
as cross-border traffic regulations (police check), customs, international 
agreements, quarantine, and bond/security systems, as well as 
organization control/legal systems for smooth operation and 
maintenance of physical infrastructure.
1.  The Current Conditions of Trading and Physical Distribution 
and Issues of Cross Border Transport Infrastructure in Africa
1.1 Trading/physical distribution
The value of exports in the whole of Africa including North Africa 
1. This is based on the definition in JICA “Cross Border Transport Infrastructure Feasibility 
Study Phase 3 (Project Study)” (March 2009)
226
Chapter 8
rapidly increased from 2003, dipped in 2009, and reached 594.2 billion 
dollars in 2011 (433.3 billion dollars for the Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) 
region) (Figure 1). The ratio of exports to Europe has been high, but 
recently trading with emerging countries including China and India has 
been expanding. Africa has been attracting global attention as a region 
rich in fuel and mineral resources, and the development of its resources 
has taken off and caused the export volume to surge.2 The value of 
imports increased from 481.5 billion dollars in 2008 (342.1 billion dollars 
for the SSA region) to 559.5 billion dollars in 2011 (404.1 billion dollars 
for the SSA region). Trading in Africa is on the rise and increased from 
12.03 billion dollars in 2000 (8% of total trading volume) to 62.48 billion 
dollars in 2010 (12% of total trading volume).
Figure 1. Transition of African Export Value by Destination (1999–2011)
There are many issues concerning the time and cost of importing and 
exporting by countries in Africa. According to the Logistic Performance 
Index (LPI) in the world, which is an analysis of indexes related to 
2. According to 2011 data, fuels and minerals account for 64% of import value.
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import, export, and trading of 155 countries in the world (IBRD/WB, 
2012), the highest ranked country in the SSA region is South Africa (23rd) 
followed by Benin (67th), Botswana (68th), and Malawi (73rd). Other 
countries in the SSA region were ranked below 80th.
The number of documents, days, and costs required for export and 
import in the SSA region is higher than the world average (Table 1).3 
Complicated port paperwork, lack of information sharing systems, 
delays in introducing IT, and excessive check points along the routes 
prolong the time for physical distribution and cause delays in cargo 
transportation. Especially, figures for inland countries4 such as Burundi, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Niger, Rwanda, and 
Zimbabwe are particularly poor. Thus, there is a critical need to reduce 
the days and cost requiring for physical distribution in inland countries.
Table 1. Number of Documents, Days, and Cost required for Import and Export
Region Export Import
Number of 
Documents
Required 
Days
Cost
(US$/
Container)
Number of 
Documents
Required 
Days
Cost
(US$/
Container)
East Asia/Pacific 6 21 923 7 22 958
East Europe/Central 
Asia
7 26 2,134 8 29 2,349
South America/
Caribbean
6 17 1,268 7 19 1,612
Middle East/North 
Africa
6 19 1,083 8 22 1,275
OECD High-income 
Countries
4 10 1,028 5 10 1,080
South Asia 8 32 1,603 9 33 1,736
Sub-Saharan Africa 8 31 1,990 9 37 2,567
World Average 6 22 1,470 7 24 1,742
Source: Doing Business, June 2012, World Bank
 (http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/trading-across-borders)
Reasons for long transport time and high transport cost vary from region 
to region. Major bottlenecks include insufficient capacity and the 
3. Compared to the averages in the SSA region for 2006 and that for 2012, days required for 
export have reduced from 36 to 31 and for import have reduced from 45 to 37, showing a 
gradual improvement.
4. For example, the maximum days required for import is 101 days in Chad, the minimum is 
10 days in Mauritius, the maximum import cost is 8,255 dollars in Chad, and the minimum is 
577 dollars in Sao Tome and Principe.
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inefficient physical distribution system of ports. For example, the 
holding time at ports is 2 to 3 days for regions with efficient physical 
distribution systems, less than 7 days for Asia, North Africa, the Middle 
East, and Latin America, but 14 days on average for the SSA region 
(IBRD/WB, 2012). JICA (2009) calculated the economic cost (necessary 
expenses are added to the cost based on the required time for the cargo) 
for exporting a 40ft container from Mombasa in Kenya to Kampala in 
Uganda. The result showed that the cost at ports accounted for 31.6% 
(1,666 dollars) of the entire economic cost by road transport and 69.6% 
(4,402 dollars) of the entire economic cost by rail transport. Nathan 
Associates (2011) evaluated the cost, required time, and reliability of 
ports, railroads, and border facilities for physical distribution in the 
North Corridor and Central Corridor, and found that scores for ports 
and railroads were lower than those for roads and border facilities.
Figure 2.  Comparison of Economic Cost of Transport  
(40ft container from Mombasa in Kenya to Kampala in Uganda)
Source: JICA, 2009
1.2 Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI)
Many transport infrastructures in the SSA region were built and 
developed as corridors connecting ports with hinterlands for exporting 
resources and agricultural products in the colonial period. 
Since African countries gained independence in the 1960s, the conditions 
of roads, railroads, and ports in each country have deteriorated due to 
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insufficient skills and funds for maintenance as well as damage to road 
surfaces caused by overloaded vehicles. As for railroads, in addition to 
aging freight vehicles and tracks, the volume of traffic has decreased on 
many lines due to operational reasons including failure of the 
concessions. The use of containers at ports was introduced in the early 
1990s in Africa, but the development of roads and ports to handle the 
physical distribution of large containers has not kept pace.
The necessity of CBTI development in the SSA region was recognized in 
the 1970s. Aid agencies and regional economic communities (RECs) in 
Africa have pointed out the necessity of a “corridor approach” that 
develops interregional physical infrastructure and legal/procedural 
systems in an integrated manner. For example, the Trans-Africa 
Highway was proposed in 1971, the Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy 
Program in 1987, the Spatial Development Initiative in 1996, and the 
Corridor Diagnostic Study of the Northern and Central Corridors of East 
Africa (CDS) in 2011, as outlined below.
BOX
(1) Trans Africa Highway (TAH)
The concept consists of nine corridors traversing Africa lengthwise and 
crosswise (total length of 56,683 km), and was proposed in 1971. In 2003, the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), African 
Development Bank, and AU examined the development status of the TAH and 
addressed the needs for TAH development, maintenance, and control by 
securing funds for each country along the route. Since then, development of 
the TAH has been promoted mainly by the African Development Bank.
(2) Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP)
This was established in 1987 through the combined efforts of the World Bank 
and UNECA. The SSATP has identified eight important regional economic 
corridors for developing transportation corridors from inland areas to each 
large-scale international port. The SSATP itself mainly conducts research on 
transport infrastructure development and formulates strategies and political 
measures. Under the strategy, each donor and cooperative agency, mainly the 
World Bank, supports individual infrastructure issues.
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(3) Spatial Development Initiative (SDI)
The SDI is a concept proposed in the industrial development strategy of South 
Africa in 1996. Not only physical corridors such as roads, railroads, bridges, 
ports, and inland channels but also electric power, resources development, 
and industry policy were comprehensively considered. The New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) took up this approach and has proposed a 
program for broad-ranging regions.
Figure 3. Major interregional corridors in Africa
Source: JICA, 2010
(4) Corridor Diagnostic Study of the Northern and Central Corridors of East 
Africa (CDS)
Starting in 2009, the corridor diagnostic study of the Northern and Central 
corridors of the five EAC member countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Rwanda and Burundi) was conducted with the support of USAID and DFID. 
In the study, priority projects were specified based on the results of analyzing 
the physical performance of ports, railroads and roads in two target corridors 
and also forecasts for 2030.
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(5) Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA)
In 2010, the African Union Council decided to formulate PIDA, which 
provides a guideline for comprehensive infrastructure development in the 
whole of Africa. Studies were conducted mainly by the African Union 
Commission, African Development Bank, and NEPAD, and PIDA was 
approved by the African Union Summit in January 2012. In the transport 
sector, 24 programs (worth 25.4 billion dollars in total) that should be given 
priority to go forward by 2020 were selected based on the analysis of the 
African Regional Transport Integration Network (ARTIN), TAH, and 40 
important corridors, 19 ports, and 53 airports. PIDA is an innovative program 
that was started by African initiatives. Relevance with PIDA is desired for the 
future development of regional infrastructure. Following approval by AU, 
NEPAD and the African Development Bank have been introducing PIDA to 
stakeholders throughout the world. It is necessary to pay particular attention 
to the future formulation and implementation of the project.
In addition to infrastructure development efforts, it is important to 
consider “Aid for Trade (AfT).” AfT activities promote technical 
assistance related to trading, supply-side assistance including 
improving production capacity and developing distribution 
infrastructure, and structural adjustment related to the deregulation of 
trade by initiatives of the World Trade Organization (WTO), OECD, and 
the World Bank. A regional comparison of assistance to Africa shows 
that the amount committed has greatly increased since 2002, doubling by 
2009 to reach 13 billion dollars. Most of the resources have been used for 
the development of trade-related capacity and infrastructure (Figure 4). 
According to a case study analysis, an increase in AfT leads to an 
increase in export volume and reduction of import cost.5 Especially in 
Africa, it is effective to reduce the cost of container transport (OECS/
WTO, 2011). Trade facilitation in the SSA region is expected to be 
promoted through this initiative.
5. A doubling of AfT related to infrastructure increases import volume by 3.5%, and a 
doubling of AfT related to trade facilitation decreases import cost by 5%. (OECD/WTO, 2011)
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Figure 4.  Aid for Trade by Region and Category, Transition of Commitments 
(2002 – May 2009)
Also, the World Bank and the African Development Bank implemented 
the East Africa Trade Transport Facilitation Project (EATTFP) in four 
countries in East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda) and 
provided assistance for improving systems related to CBTI including 
railroads, roads, ports, customs, borders, and weigh bridges of two 
major corridors. USAID conducted a feasibility study of OSBP 
development of major borders in East Africa and also assisted in 
establishing OSBP for railroads at the Malaba border between Kenya 
and Uganda. Great Britain implemented Trade Mark East Africa (TMEA) 
and Trade Mark South Africa (TMSA) and assisted in regional 
integration such as assistance in enforcement of Tripartite that unites 
three RECs, COMESA, EAC and SADC, and improvement of the tariff 
system.
Recently, countries in Africa formed Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs)6 with neighboring countries to take measures for facilitating 
6. The Africa Union has authorized the following eight agencies as RECs: (1) The Community 
of Sahel-Saharan States (Cen-Sad), (2) Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(CMESA), (3) East Africa Community (EAC), (4) Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS), (5) Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), (6) 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), (7) Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), and (8) Union of Maghreb Arab (UMA).
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trade and physical distribution and regional integration. Issues to be 
focused on and progress of economic integration differ among the RECs, 
but they have promoted discussion and harmonization related to 
regional infrastructure studies, formulation of development plans, 
harmonization of regulations, standardization of cross border 
formalities, union of customs tariffs, and the common market. In recent 
years, they play an important role in the implementation of the CBTI 
development programs supported by aid agencies. The increasing trade 
volume in Africa shown in Figure 1 confirms that regional integration is 
moving forward.7 Since 2010, discussions on establishing an African 
Continental Free Trade Area (C-FTA) have been held in the African 
Union (UNECA, 2012). CBTI is extremely important to support the 
efforts by countries in Africa to accomplish economic growth.
2.  Japan’s Contribution to Cross Border Transport Infrastructure 
Development
Including the period before TICAD IV, Japan has strived to develop 
infrastructure in Africa in cooperation with the international community. 
Below are cases that are especially closely linked to CBTI. Japan has 
focused on three approaches: corridor development, facilitating border 
formalities (OSBP assistance and customs capacity improvement), and 
institutional development of cross border transport systems.
2.1 Corridor development
(1)  Mombasa port and port area road development project 
(North Corridor)
This is a project to improve CBTI by integrally developing Mombasa 
Port in Kenya and roads to strengthen the regional corridor to inland 
countries. Mombasa Port is the only international trading port in Kenya 
and is among the largest in East Africa.8 It functions not only as an 
import and export base in the country but also as a gateway to the North 
Corridor connecting to Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. With steady 
economic growth in Kenya and East Africa since 2003, the volume of 
cargo handled at Mombasa Port has been increasing and reached 695,000 
7. However, many RECs are funded by contributions from member countries. There are 
many issues related to promoting interregional integration because RECs do not have legal 
force over their own project budgets or member countries.
8. In entire Sub-Saharan Africa, the capacity of the Mombasa Port is placed in fifth after 
Durban and Cape Town in South Africa, Lagos in Nigeria, and Abidjan in Cote d’lvoire (JICA, 
2009).
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TEU in 2010 even though the annual container handling capacity is only 
450,000 TEU,9 causing issues such as ships having to wait at sea for 
loading and unloading and the prolonged storage of unloaded 
containers. It is necessary to improve the capacity to handle large 
container vessels, accessibility to ports, and operational efficiency. 
Regarding port area roads, traffic congestion on the road connecting 
Mombasa Port to the North Corridor is already serious, and is expected 
to worsen after 2016 when a new container terminal that is being built by 
an ODA loan project is completed. The only transportation from the 
center of Mombasa including the port to the southern part of the city is 
by ferry which crosses the channel. This is hindering the development of 
the southern city region and the physical distribution toward Tanzania. 
Backed-up physical distribution caused by undeveloped infrastructure 
at Mombasa Port and port area roads is hindering economic growth in 
Kenya and inland countries in East Africa. There is an urgent need to 
facilitate physical distribution through infrastructure development.
To solve such problems, Japan decided to implement the “Mombasa Port 
Development Project” (L/A signed in November 2007) and “Mombasa 
Port Area Road Development Project” (L/A signed in June 2012). These 
two projects will develop a container terminal where large container 
vessels can come alongside the pier, a road connecting the new container 
terminal to the North Corridor, and roads to Mombasa Port (road length 
25.51 km, two long bridges, and one elevated bridge) to increase the 
capacity of Mombasa Port.
9. TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit): Cargo volume converted into the number of 20-foot 
containers.
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Figure 5.
Figure 6.
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When the Port Development project is completed, the container volume 
that can be handled at Mombasa Port will increase from 480,000 TEU in 
2006 to 990,000 TEU in 2017, more than double that in 2006. A significant 
increase of material handling capacity is expected (see Table 2).
Table 2. Expected Benefits of Mombasa Port Development Project
Index Reference Value 
(Result in 2006)
Target Value (2017)
[2 years after project 
completion]
Container cargo volume 480,000 TEU 990,000 TEU
Total tons of vessels 
entered
9 million GT 15.43 million GT
Ratio of container shipping 
(annual)
62% 73%
Vessel waiting time 1.49 days/vessel 1.0 day/vessel
(2) Nacala Corridor in Mozambique
In the Nacala Economic Corridor located in northern Mozambique, there 
are expectations for natural resource development of coal in Tete 
Province, agricultural development using the vast land and abundant 
water resources in Nampula Province, Niassa Province, and Zambezia 
Province, and industrial development based on the potential of Nacara 
Port, which is a natural good port. Development of the Nacala Corridor 
will provide a dependable transport link from Nacala Port not only to 
Nampula Province with the largest population in Mozambique and 
Niassa Province but also to inland Malawi and Zambia at moderate 
prices. Expected benefits include increased physical distribution in 
northern Mozambique, economic vitalization of widespread areas, 
improvement of living standards, and reduction of poverty.
Comprehensive development of the Nacala Corridor under the Nacala 
Corridor Development/Improvement Program is being conducted, as 
shown in Table 3.10 The main project, “Tropical Savannah, Agriculture 
Development Program, Japan – Brazil – Mozambique Triangular 
Cooperation (ProSAVANA-JBM),” is intended to enhance agricultural 
production capacity in Mozambique using the experience in agricultural 
10. Projects in education, water supply, and health fields are implemented or planned in 
addition to infrastructure and agriculture projects, to attain comprehensive development of 
the entire region.
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development of Cerrado in Brazil and to establish an economic model 
that benefits not only food security but also small-scale farmers.11 In the 
Nacala Corridor development, cooperation between governments and 
private sectors in the three countries of Japan, Brazil, and Mozambique is 
emphasized, and the activities are focused on maximizing mutual 
benefits.12
Table 3. Infrastructure Projects of Nacala Corridor in Mozambique
Project Name 
(Cooperation Type)
Expected Result
Montepuez and Lichinga 
Road Project (loan)
Paving, improving and expanding the width of 201 
km of road, which is part of the 516-km national 
road connecting Montepuez to Lichinga and related 
infrastructure improvement
Nampula and Cuamba 
Road Upgrading Project 
(loan)
Road improvement between Nampula in Nampula 
Province and Cuamba in Niassa Province (building 
approximately 350km road and six bridges)
Project for Construction 
of Bridges on the Road 
between Ile and Cuamba 
(grant)
Road development and replacing 13 bridges 
between Ile and Cuamba
Mandimba and Lichinga 
Road Project (loan)
Road improvement of 88.88-km road between 
Mandimba and Lichinga
Project for Urgent 
Rehabilitation of Nacala 
Port (grant)
Improvement of yard capacity for storing new 
containers
Container cargo volume: 89,714 TEU (2011) → 
161,590 TEU (2017)
Nacala Port Development 
Project (loan)
Increase of cargo handling volume at Nacala Port
  ‧  Total cargo volume: 16.39 million tons (2011) → 
47.38 million tons (2019)
  ‧  Container cargo: 89,714 TEU (2011) → 234,000 
TEU (2019)
11. For more discussions on this project, see chapter 5 of this volume. 
12. http://www.jica.go.jp/topics/news/2012/20120514_02.html
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Figure 7. Cooperation Projects of Nacala Corridor in Mozambique
Source: Compiled from various JICA project documents
2.2 Facilitation of border formalities
(1) One stop border posts (OSBPs)
Border posts are installed at many cross border points in the SSA region 
to conduct immigration control and customs clearance, screening, and 
quarantine. There are many time-consuming border points to be crossed, 
for the following reasons:
(1) Insufficient agreements between countries
(2) Complicated paperwork that differs from country to country
(3) Delay in computerizing documents
(4) Quality and moral issues of cross border officials
(5) Undeveloped cross border facilities
One stop border post (OSBP) have been introduced as a solution to these 
problems. In this system, neighboring countries at a border jointly 
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conduct immigration control, customs clearance, and quarantine at the 
one-stop border post. These tasks are handled separately at present.
The experience of OSBP at three places (Chirundu, Malaba, and 
Namanga) in the SSA region is introduced below.
Chirundu (Zambia/Zimbabwe)
Chirundu is at the border between Zambia and Zimbabwe and is located 
on the North-South Corridor. The border is important for the transport 
of inland mineral resources such as copper produced in Zambia to 
Durban Port in South Africa and Beira Port in Mozambique. Japan has 
implemented assistance by drawing up a bilateral agreement between 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, grant aid assistance for the Chirundu Bridge 
Construction Project, and the Chirundu Border Related Facility 
Construction Project by providing non-project grant collateral funds and 
dispatching volunteers. Many partners have participated in this project. 
The World Bank conducted the baseline study13 which analyzed the 
traffic volume and reasons for delays at Chirundu. The British DFID 
allocated a project manager and introduced ICT. Such cooperation 
related to facilities and personnel was accumulated in 2009, and the first 
OSBP in Africa started operating after an OSBP-related legislative bill 
was enacted in the two countries.14
The effectiveness of the OSBP has been confirmed. For example, 
regarding the number of passing trucks, 225 trucks passed per day in 
2007 (120 north-bound trucks, 105 south-bound trucks) but 380 trucks 
passed per day in 2011 (200 north-bound trucks, 180 south-bound 
trucks) (JICA/EAC, 2011). As for time taken to cross the border, that for 
passenger cars was reduced from 1–2 hours to 20 minutes, that for buses 
from 2 hours to 1 hour, and that for trucks from 1–2 days to less than 1 
day. Future challenges are to fully utilize introduced facilities, 
standardize customs formalities, and promote further cooperation 
between the agencies of the two countries.
Malaba (Kenya/Uganda)
Malaba is an important border between Kenya and Uganda in the North 
Corridor. The first OSBP exclusively for railroads in East Africa was 
13. Barney Curtis, “The Chirundu Border Post: Detailed monitoring of transit times”, SSATP 
Discussion Paper No. 10, World Bank, 2009.
14. Zimbabwe One Stop Border Posts Control Act, No. 21 of 2007 and Zambia One Stop 
Border Control Act, No. 8 of 2008.
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established in 2007 at Malaba based on a bilateral agreement concluded 
by the governments of Uganda and Kenya in 2006. Malaba is one of the 
target sites of “Capacity Building for the Customs Administrations of the 
Eastern African Region (Phase 2)”, a technical assistance project by JICA. 
Major activities of this project are introduction of a customs clearance 
system necessary for operating the OSBP (Real Time Monitoring System 
and Cargo Control System: RTMS/CCS) and capacity building through 
training of joint border monitoring and customs clearance work (tariff 
classification and customs valuation).
As a result of introducing the OSBP, the time required for railroad 
crossing has been reduced from 4-7 days to 2 hours. For road cargo, the 
time was reduced from 4 days to 3 hours (JICA/EAC, 2011).15 The 
improvement of yard and customs facilities and the implementation of 
24-hour operation and joint customs screening by the two countries for 
some items (12 items accounting for 30% of all cargo) have influenced 
such improvement.
The handling of extra-territorial rights and administration (management 
and execution) under the bilateral agreement is an issue for the OSBP at 
Malaba.16 The further development of systems is planned.
Namanga (Kenya/Tanzania)
Namanga on the border of Kenya and Tanzania is located on the corridor 
connecting Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, and Arusha, the central city of 
northern Tanzania. Namanga is used for 41% of exports from Kenya to 
Tanzania and 20% of exports from Tanzania to Kenya. In the yen-loan 
“Arusha-Namanga-Athi River Road Development Project” Japan will 
build 104.3 km of road between Arusha and Namanga on the Tanzania 
side, which is part of the international main road (240 km long) 
connecting Arusha in Tanzania to Athi River in Kenya, and will also 
develop infrastructure related to OSBP. This project is co-financed by the 
African Development Bank, which has provided loans for road 
construction on the Kenya side (135.7 km) and part of the Tanzania side, 
15. The Trade Mark East Africa “Review of the impact of trade facilitation instruments”, 2012 
introduces other ex post valuation of OSBP in Malaba (shortened from 3 days to 3 hours, and 
from more than 12 hours to 6 hours on average).
16. For example, regarding criminal investigations of violations of the Immigration Control 
Law, such as large-scale tax evasion, smuggling, and handling of prosecuted defendants, it is 
not clearly stipulated which country’s authority should seize the articles and arrest and 
detain the defendant (JICA, 2009).
241
Cross Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI)
consulting expenses, and OSBP facilities on the Kenya side.
The same as Malaba, Namanga is also a target site of “Capacity Building 
for the Customs Administrations of the Eastern African Region (Phase 
2).” It is planned to develop OSBP operation manuals for the cross 
border related agencies including customs, quarantine bureaus, and 
immigration bureaus and OSBP facility administrative rules to enable 
OSBP to operate smoothly when the facilities are completed.
Based on the experience at Malaba and Namanga, EAC compiled the 
“OSBP Source Book,” a practical guidebook, with the support of JICA. 
This source book outlines steps necessary for establishing OSBP and 
indicates points for developing organizational and institutional systems, 
simplifying cross border formalities, designing facilities, and 
introducing ICT. After the completion of the EAC, workshops related to 
the OSBP source book were held in SADC in Southern Africa and 
UEMOA in Western Africa, and a local-version source book, which 
incorporates the actual conditions in each region, has been compiled. 
The book is expected to be upgraded based on detailed information, 
cases, and lessons in each country and to be used in the future.
Photo: Workshop related to OSBP Source Book (2011)
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(2)  Capacity Development of Customs on the Borders of East Africa, 
Nambia and Botswana
As described in the previous section, JICA is implementing a project for 
improving the customs ability on the borders of five East African 
countries as well as Nambia and Botswana. The abolishment of tariffs in 
the region and the introduction of common external tariffs were realized 
in the five East African countries by 2010. At present, work is underway 
on building a common market. As cooperation for facilitating trade in 
the region, since 2007 JICA has implemented “Capacity Building for the 
Customs Administrations of the Eastern African Region” to introduce 
RTMS/CCS and provide training (Master Trainer Program) for training 
instructors on customs duties including the tariff classification and 
customs valuation.
On the border of Mamuno/Trans-Kalahari between Botswana and 
Nambia, the “Project for the Establishment of the One Stop Border Post 
(OSBP) between Botswana and Namibia at Mamuno/Trans Kalahari 
Border Post” has been implemented since 2010. The border is becoming 
increasingly important because the border connects Walvis Bay in 
Nambia and Johannesburg in South Africa, and the route connects North 
America, Europe, and Southern Africa with shorter times and distances. 
Both Botswana and Nambia have strategic intentions to establish a 
model case of OSBP in the region in order to lead the negotiations with 
other countries in the future. Although the initial project plan has been 
reviewed because of the belated approval of the bilateral agreement 
between the two countries, OSBP is expected to be steadily introduced 
with the support of the Project.
2.3 Harmonization of cross border transport system
In many regions in Africa, overloaded vehicles constantly travel on the 
paved roads, damaging the road surface. However, appropriate 
measures to control overloaded vehicles cannot be taken because 
regulations differ from country to country. Furthermore, there are issues 
such as shortages of appropriate vehicle weighing machines and 
facilities and lack of cooperation by transportation companies. In 
response, the EAC has studied a legal framework of regulations on 
overloaded vehicles since 2010 with the support of JICA (JICA, 2011).
As a result of discussions on harmonizing regulations, five member 
states agreed on 23 items, including vehicle gross weight limit (56 tons) 
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and interlink vehicles (full length of up to 22 m permitted on only 
specified routes), to build the foundation of institutionalization. Going 
forward, institutionalization at the EAC will be undertaken by the 
following process. The EAC assembly will approve an EAC law that 
defines broad principles of vehicle regulation, and the EAC Council will 
proclaim domestic laws and ordinances that stipulate detailed 
operational and administrative matters. The EAC laws and ordinances 
will supersede conflicting domestic laws and ordinances in member 
states.17 This is a strong and immediate mechanism for establishing a 
harmonized institutional system.
3. Direction of Cooperation in TICAD V
3.1 Lessons
(1) Comprehensive corridor development considering the entire corridor
Obviously, trade promotion and economic growth can be achieved only 
by combining a wide range of policies for them, of which CBTI 
development constitutes only a part. CBTI development must be 
positioned in a comprehensive corridor development framework that 
takes into consideration industrial development, resource development, 
and trade promotion of the entire supranational area.
As mentioned above, Japan has undertaken a project at Mombasa Port in 
Kenya with a view to benefiting the entire North Corridor and 
stimulating the economy in the Mombasa region. In addition, regarding 
the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique, Japan has worked on 
comprehensive corridor development linked to agricultural and 
resource development with the cooperation of governments and private 
sectors, aiming to improve the economic performance of the entire 
corridor and deliver benefits to poverty groups. The approach aiming 
for synergy effects by programming multiple issues will serve as a useful 
reference for future projects.
(2)  Importance of a three-way approach involving infrastructure 
development, institutional development, and human resource 
development
To improve CBTI, key requirements are not only the development of 
conventional infrastructure such as ports, roads, and railroads, but also 
assistance in development systems and appropriate operation of 
17. Based on subparagraphs (4) and (5) of Article 8 in EAC law
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regional agreements and domestic regulations, as well as human 
resources development of cross border officials (customs, immigration, 
quarantine, cross border police, etc.) and the private sector (customs 
clearance agencies, transportation companies, etc.) are important. As for 
customs, as implemented in Japan’s technical assistance projects, an 
approach designed to improve capacity in accordance with the 
international standard by cooperating with the international agency, the 
World Custom Organization (WCO), seems to be effective.
(3) Cooperation with Regional Economic Communities (RECs)
When improving the systems (regional agreements, customs system 
standardization, harmonization of traffic laws, bond system, etc.) noted 
in (2) above, a legal framework covering multiple countries needs to be 
introduced. In Africa, RECs have already been established in regions 
with social and economic connections, and institutional improvement 
activities are being carried out in each region. Therefore, focusing on 
CBTI in cooperation with RECs will deliver benefits to business more 
effectively and efficiently.
3.2 Direction of future cooperation
The population of Arica is expected to continue increasing. It is 
important to facilitate trade by developing CBTI in order to develop 
industry and thus contribute to employment creation and regional 
development and also to satisfy the demands of the expanding market. 
Future efforts should target comprehensive corridor development by 
intensively allocating resources to corridors with high development 
potential in order to promote a shift from resource-dependent economies 
to a versatile and advanced regional industrial structure. As specific 
assistance measures for CBTI, it will be effective to form a cooperation 
structure in order to enhance port functions which are bottleneck in the 
physical distribution system, to develop the transport infrastructure to 
promote industrial and agricultural development using regional 
resources, and to assist in facilitating cross border formalities.
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Chapter 9: 
Toward Universal Health Coverage in Africa 
-Achieving MDGs with equity, and beyond
Ikuo Takizawa 
1. Health in Africa: Steady Improvement
The African continent, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), continues 
to be the focus of global health discourse today. Approximately, 1/5 of 
global tuberculosis deaths, 1/2 of child and maternal deaths, 2/3 of 
deaths due to AIDS-related causes and 90% of malaria deaths are 
concentrated in SSA, which counts for only slightly more than 10% of the 
global population (Table 1).
Table 1. Disease burdens (Share of Sub-Saharan Africa in global health issues)
Howev er, many African countries have witnessed an accelerated 
reduction of maternal and child mortality in the last decade. According 
The author would like to thank Prof. Kenji Shibuya for his insightful comments for the draft 
paper. Special appreciation goes to Kiyoshi Kodera, Satoru Watanabe, Masakatsu Komori, 
Taro Kikuchi and other colleagues in JICA for their valuable input. The author, however, is 
solely responsible for the views expressed in the text.
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to the latest estimates by UN agencies, the average annual rate of 
reduction (AARR) in under-five mortality, for which 4.4% or more is 
required to achieve MDG 4 (reduction of child mortality by 2/3 between 
1990 and 2015), increased from 1.5% (1990 – 2000) to 3.1% (2000 – 2011) in 
SSA. The AARR for maternal mortality, for which 5.5% or more is 
required to achieve MDG 5 (reduction of maternal mortality by 3/4 
between 1990 and 2015), increased from 1.4% (1990 – 2000) to 3.9% (2000 
– 2010). As a result, there are significant reductions in the number of 
deaths both of children and mothers. The number of children who die 
before the age of five in SSA decreased from 3.8 million in 1990 to 3.3 
million in 2011 despite the increase in the number of births. The annual 
number of mothers who die of pregnancy-related complications in SSA 
decreased from 192,000 in 1990 to 162,000 in 2010 (Table 2).
Table 2. Accelerated progress (Changes in child and maternal mortality in SSA)
Progress was also made in infectious disease control. The number of new 
HIV cases in SSA has continued to decline since the mid-1990s. The 
annual number of deaths due to AIDS-related causes in SSA peaked at 
1.7 million in 2005 and has been declining ever since, even though a 
better chance of  survival increased the number of people living with 
HIV from 20.5 million in 2001 to 22.9 million in 2010. The number of 
malaria cases in the WHO Africa region stood at 174 million in 2010, 
down from the peak of 191 million in 2005. The number of malaria 
deaths peaked at 748 thousand in 2004 and has been declining ever since.
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The steady progress in health improvements was founded on the bold 
policy initiatives of African countries to strengthen the health systems to 
ensure physical and financial access to essential health services. Rapid 
expansion of high impact health interventions fueled by an increase in 
development assistance also contributed, as is described in a later 
section. For example, the Community-based Health Planning and 
Service program in Ghana, Health Extension Program in Ethiopia, and 
Health Surveillance Assistant in Malawi are good examples of country 
initiatives in improving physical access to essential health services of the 
underserved population. Cases such as the Mutuelles de Santé 
(Community-based Health Insurance Scheme) in Rwanda and the 
National Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana are gaining international 
attention as examples of publicly organized financial protection schemes 
which achieved high population coverage in low income settings in SSA. 
Performance-based financing is being introduced in many countries as a 
strategy to increase service coverage and quality, triggered by success 
stories from Rwanda and Burundi.
It is generally recognized that improvement in health will increase the 
academic performance of children and productivity of adults. There are 
some studies which indicate linkage between an increase in life 
expectancy with an increase in GDP. Improvement in health will reduce 
the cost of medical expenditures, therefore minimizing the risk of 
impoverishment due to high expenses. Health is the foundation for 
human security. The TICAD V process, in principle, needs to be built on 
those achievements in the past decade and should promote the 
continuation and further expansion of many good works which have 
already been started in Africa.
2. Health in Africa: Remaining/Emerging Challenges
Even though there is a clear indication of a steady improvement in 
health in Africa, there is a large disparity in the pace of progress. Many 
countries in SSA continue to struggle in ensuring physical access to 
essential health services to the population. Ensuring financial protection 
especially for the poor is the common challenge for both SSA and North 
African countries.
As for MDG 4, only about 1/4 of the countries in Africa (13 out of 54), 
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including all five countries in North Africa, are likely to achieve the 
target (Figure 1). While AARRs of those 13 countries for 1990 – 2011 
exceeds 4.0%, about 2/3 of the countries (35 out of 54) fall short of 3.0% 
and can be classified as medium or low performers.
Figure 1. Progress toward MDG 4
The prospect for the achievement of MDG 5 is more challenging. There 
are only four countries which exceed AARR of 5.5% and 3/4 of the 
countries (39 out of 52 for which internationally comparable data is 
available) do not even reach 4.0% (Figure 2).1 
1. Taking into consideration the situation, it is quite relevant to keep health-related MDGs 
even beyond the target year of 2015, at least for the countries in SSA, in order to maintain the 
current momentum.
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Figure 2. Progress toward MDG 5
Increased disparity in health status and health service utilization within 
countries is emerging as another equity challenge. According to 
UNICEF, in SSA, 76% of births in urban areas are attended by skilled 
birth attendants (SBAs) compared to only 40% in rural areas. Disparity 
among different income groups is also significant, with 85% of the births 
among the richest 1/5 of the population attended by SBAs, compared to 
only 27% for the poorest 1/5. According to available data, health 
disparity among different income groups tends to be larger among the 
countries with low service coverage, even though a relatively large 
disparity can be found even in some countries with high service 
coverage. 
Figure 3 compares both inter- and intra-country disparity in use of 
essential health services, measured in proportion of births attended by 
SBAs, according to income groups. These are the countries identified as 
high performers for both child and maternal mortality reduction in the 
preceding analysis. The figure reveals a classic pattern of unequal health 
care use by income level. When the country is in an early stage of 
development, service use is low and disproportionately concentrated in 
the richest segment of the population (like in Ethiopia and Eritrea). As 
average service use increases, an increase in the middle and poorer 
segments of the population is observed (like in Madagascar, Morocco 
and Egypt); however, the disparity in the poorest segment persists (like 
in Algeria). 
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Figure 3. Disparity by economic status
It is striking to note the significance of disparity in utilization of essential 
health services by income level in these countries. In fact, the level of 
service use for the richest segment is almost the same regardless of the 
national average. Explicit targeting and strong political commitment is 
needed to address such inequality to realize truly inclusive development 
(Box 1).
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Box 1:  Inclusive development in the making? Cases for Rwanda and 
Malawi
The two countries in Figure 3, Rwanda and Malawi, show a different and 
clearly more equitable pattern in utilization of essential health services. Even 
though they might have an advantage in physical access due to high 
population density, both governments made a strong commitment to improve 
the delivery of essential services. At the same time, both countries adopted 
measures to remove financial barriers for the poor and needy either by 
insurance or fee exemption. 
The figure above compares the changes over time in the under-five mortality 
rate (U5MR) by income groups for those two countries, using a series of 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data. In both countries, the poorer 
segments of the population are benefiting proportionately more in terms of 
child mortality reduction, which means that the income disparity in U5MR is 
reducing over time. Similar patterns are observed in other countries like 
Ghana, Zambia and Tanzania. Even though further analysis is needed on 
diverse country experiences and causal relations with the choice of health 
policies, efforts to ensure physical and financial access to essential health 
services by the poor may be a policy instrument which can effectively realize 
inclusive development, one of the core goals for TICAD V.
Health financing is also emerging as a major development challenge. 
The Task Force on Innovative International Financing for Health 
Systems suggested that a health expenditure of 44 US dollars per capita 
on average is required in order to achieve adequate population coverage 
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with essential health services in low and middle income countries for the 
achievement of health-related MDGs. While 11 countries in SSA spent 
more than 150 US dollars per capita on health in 2009, seven countries 
spent less than 20 US dollars per capita. 
According to the WHO, the risk of impoverishment due to high medical 
bills significantly increases when the proportion of out-of-pocket 
payment (OOP) to total health expenditure (THE) exceeds 20%. In the 25 
African countries out of 51 countries for which internationally 
comparable data is available, OOP occupies 40% or more of THE (Figure 
4). Without proper intervention, there is a risk that the proportion of 
OOP in THE increases as economic development continues in Africa. It 
is important to note that a high proportion of OOP and the risk of 
impoverishment due to high medical bills are serious problems even in 
some of the North African countries such as Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, 
where physical access to essential health services is less of a problem. 
The risk of impoverishment due to high medical bills, together with the 
lack of other social safety nets, could be a threat to social stability in those 
countries.
Figure 4. Financial risk
A recent study confirmed that there is a large disparity among low and 
middle income countries in terms of essential health service coverage, 
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not only in Africa. It is also suggested that broader health coverage 
generally leads to improved overall population health, particularly for 
the poor. Considering the achievements so far and the remaining and 
emerging challenges, it is increasingly necessary to focus on health 
system issues especially equality in access and financial protection, 
which, together, call for concerted efforts toward universal health 
coverage (UHC). It is expected that action toward UHC will further 
accelerate the progress toward health-related MDGs, more inclusively 
benefiting the poor and the socially disadvantaged. It is essential for 
most of the countries in SSA to address physical, financial and 
sociocultural barriers simultaneously. The absolute lack of human 
resources for health, one of the major issues brought up in TICAD IV, 
continues to constrain efforts toward UHC, even though countries are 
taking initiatives to improve the situation as sited in Section 1. The focus 
in North African countries should be given to the expansion of financial 
protection and better targeting of the poor.
In addition, there is increasing concern that non-communicable diseases 
(NCDs) and injuries are on the rise both in North African countries with 
advanced demographic and epidemiological transitions and the low 
income countries in SSA. These transitions also call for more resilient 
health systems with better financial protection. Transformation or re-
organization of health systems and the active participation of 
communities will be needed to provide promotional/preventive 
services and long-term/rehabilitative care which requires a significant 
degree of self-management by patients.
3. Development Assistance for Health in Africa
In response to the global commitment to MDGs and the series of 
initiatives which came out of the G8 Summits and other political arenas, 
development assistance for health (DAH), particularly for SSA, 
significantly increased in recent years. Participation of non-traditional 
actors such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the 
establishment of large-scale global health funding mechanisms such as 
GAVI and GFATM, together with the increase in bilateral commitment 
including emerging donors, contributed to the increase. According to 
estimates by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, DAH for 
SSA increased from 1.1 billion US dollars in 2000 to 8.1 billion US dollars 
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in 2010 in real terms. It is most likely that the rate of increase slowed 
down toward the end of the TICAD IV period.
The increase in DAH made a significant contribution in expanding the 
coverage of essential health services, which in turn contributed to the 
steady reduction of maternal and child mortality, and mortality and 
morbidity from major infectious diseases. Increased DAH contributed 
especially to expanding coverage of essential interventions related to 
focused health programs which address specific health conditions.2 
Coverage of such interventions as long-lasting nets for malaria 
prevention, artemisinin-based combination therapy for malaria 
treatment, anti-retroviral therapy for HIV-infected people, HIV 
counseling and testing, immunizations for children, together with other 
essential life-saving interventions, expanded remarkably in SSA 
supported by focused DAH.
The Government of Japan (GOJ) also significantly increased DAH to 
Africa based on the commitment made at TICAD IV. The total amount of 
grant aid and technical assistance provided for Africa since the Japanese 
fiscal year (JFY) 2008 amounted to 47 billion yen as of the end of JFY2011, 
surpassing the commitment of 43 billion yen. The GOJ through JICA 
supported the training of 203,671 health personnel by the end of 
JFY2010, against a commitment of 100,000, and improved 3,935 health 
facilities by the end of JFY2011, against a commitment of 1,000.3 
JICA focused its assistance on the most challenging regions in Ghana 
(Upper West), Kenya (Nyanza), and Senegal (Tambacounda and 
Kedougou). What was originally started as a pilot scheme was scaled up 
to benefit the whole of Tanzania (regional health and hospital 
management). The scaling up of geographically focused assistance is 
also being undertaken in Kenya and Senegal. Regional hospital 
networks were upgraded through combined capital and technical 
support in Uganda. Information systems to monitor human resources 
for health were introduced in Tanzania and South Sudan that cover the 
entire nation for the first time in those countries. Regional networks for 
health systems management were strengthened through the partnership 
with the African Health Leadership and Management Network 
2. It is estimated that 50% of global DAH is allocated to MDG6 (control of infectious diseases). 
Taskforce on Innovative International Financing for Health Systems, op cit.
3. Data provided by JICA (as of Nov. 2012)
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(AHLMN), a network of higher training and research institutions in 
Africa with a focus on health systems management. A network in HRH 
management was established for Francophone countries. Assistance was 
also provided to improve the management of focused programs like HIV 
and AIDS control in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, and tuberculosis 
control in Kenya and Sudan, in collaboration with funding support 
coming from GFATM and other sources (Box 2).
Box 2:  Expanding service coverage through better management and 
coordinated investment: JICA’s experiences
In Ghana, JICA partnered with the Ghana Health Service (GHS) in the scaling-
up of Community-based Health Planning and Service (CHPS) in the Upper 
West Region, one of the most remote and disadvantaged areas in the country. 
CHPS was promoted by the government as a means to deliver essential health 
services to under-served communities; however, the expansion was slow due 
to multiple constraints. JICA provided technical assistance to the regional 
health office of GHS and other relevant stakeholders for strengthening 
capacity in program management and community mobilization, while 
supporting CHPS facilities and health centers and referral hospitals through 
the provision of medical equipment at the same time. This support was 
provided in alignment with government policy, support from other partners, 
and contributed to the accelerated expansion of CHPS coverage in the region. 
In Tanzania, JICA worked with the National AIDS Control Programme 
(NACP) for quality improvement of HIV- and AIDS-related services. JICA’s 
technical assistance facilitated the standardization of HIV testing and 
counseling and STI care and treatment services, involving all the major 
partners working in the area. The products were adopted by NACP as national 
standards and disseminated nationwide using grants from GFATM and by 
other collaborating partners. The project now assists the strengthening of the 
M&E framework through a combination of comprehensive supportive 
supervision and clinical mentoring, which cut across HIV- and AIDS-related 
services and programs. A similar approach was promoted in Madagascar.
Despite the steady expansion of essential life-saving interventions and 
improvement of health status, resources are not enough to deliver those 
interventions to all the people in need, particularly the poor. As African 
countries expand their health services to geographically and 
socioeconomically hard-to-reach population groups, the unit cost of 
service delivery is likely to increase, creating an additional burden on the 
258
Chapter 9
health systems. The progression of demographic and epidemiological 
transitions and the increase in NCDs and injuries can be another threat 
to the already over-stretched health systems of many African countries. 
However, a further increase in DAH seems very challenging considering 
the current global economic situation, at least for the near future. While 
efforts to strengthen global solidarity to save lives and ensure access by 
all to essential health services in Africa should be continued, a paradigm 
shift is also needed in the TICAD V process. Firstly, DAH should be 
allocated more strategically and catalytically in a way to increase the 
allocation of domestic resources for  health by African countries. As 
many countries in Africa are now experiencing stable economic growth 
and are able to benefit from a demographic bonus, health systems need 
to be strengthened with a long-term vision to establish functional and 
sustainable social protection mechanisms. Secondly, DAH should be 
provided in a way to improve the management of health systems and 
programs. There is growing attention globally regarding improving the 
productivity and efficiency of health sectors through better 
management, reflecting the difficult economic situation and escalation of 
medical expenses. A growing body of evidence is being produced that 
improvement in management can actually increase the outputs and 
improve the quality of health services (Box 3). Proper management of the 
pooled fund may become another area of development concern. Thirdly, 
DAH should be provided in a manner to encourage private investment 
in the health sector. The private sector is already a vital partner in the 
delivery of health services in many African countries. As economic 
growth continues, the prospect for regarding the health sector as an 
industry, i.e., source of income, innovation and employment, will 
increase. Even though the role of the public sector and government 
regulation is essential, particularly on the health financing side in order 
to achieve pro-poor health systems, an environment should be created to 
attract more investment from the private sector in service delivery and 
technological innovations.
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Box 3:  Improving service outputs through better management at the 
health facility level and beyond
JICA is working in partnership with Sri Lanka in applying management 
methodologies developed in Japanese manufacturing industries, i.e., 5S 
(participatory work environment improvement) – kaizen (continuous quality 
improvement) – TQM (total quality management), to improve hospital 
management in over 15 countries in Africa. One of the early pilot hospitals, 
Mbeya Referral Hospital in Tanzania, succeeded in reducing patient waiting 
times, reducing excessive supply stock, and increasing hospital income 
through better processing of insurance claims, through the implementation of 
self-motivated kaizen activities. In addition to the documentation of 
performance improvements through kaizen activities in various departments, 
the impact of the approach on health professional satisfaction and motivation 
is under evaluation.
JICA supported the management improvement of Nyanza Province in Kenya, 
working with local partners such as the Great Lakes University of Kisumu. 
The pilot districts demonstrated a significant increase in the utilization of 
essential health services, even though a rigorous assessment is needed to 
quantify the effect of project intervention. The positive changes in 
management practice were highly appreciated by the national government 
and efforts are now being made to scale-up the support to benefit the entire 
country in collaboration with other partners. In Tanzania, JICA-supported 
managerial capacity development of Regional Health Management Teams 
(RHMTs) was instrumental in triggering the regular allocation of funds to the 
RHMTs from budgetary support provided by other development partners.
Taking into consideration the situation, it is quite relevant that the 
TICAD V process and its Plan of Action continue to focus on the 
achievements of health-related MDGs since most of the countries in SSA 
are unlikely to achieve those by 2015, even with the accelerated progress 
in the past decade. However, increased attention should be paid to the 
more equitable distribution of the progress to address the remaining and 
emerging disparities in utilization of essential health services.
UHC can be a unifying theme for the TICAD V process. It has a strong 
pro-poor focus by calling for equitable access to health services and 
better financial protection, a challenge common to countries in both 
North Africa and SSA. Achievement of UHC requires strong political 
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leadership and effective and efficient mobilization of domestic resources 
for health including the partnership with the private sector. It requires a 
coordinated effort of both national governments and development 
partners. By focusing on UHC, new development partners such as 
BRICS can be brought on board for coordinated DAH to Africa. As these 
are the countries which recently achieved UHC (e.g., Brazil and China) 
or which are currently in the process of achieving UHC (e.g., India and 
South Africa), their experiences are full of vital lessons for the African 
countries in question.
There are many challenges with UHC as a development agenda. Firstly, 
even though it has a universality as mentioned before, UHC needs to be 
promoted in accordance with the evolving capacity and resource 
constraints of individual countries. In accordance with the definition by 
the WHO, UHC should be regarded as a direction, rather than a definite 
goal.4 There exists a large disparity among African countries in terms of 
their position toward UHC. Strategies tailored to the demographic, 
epidemiological, historical, political and economic context of each 
country should be deployed. In many countries in SSA, physical, 
financial and sociocultural barriers need to be addressed first, or 
simultaneously at least, with financial protection. In North African 
countries, financial access and better targeting of the poor should be 
prioritized. 
Another challenge with UHC is measurement. Even though UHC is also 
attracting attention in the post-MDG discussion, there is no consensus 
yet on how to measure the progress toward UHC. Measures for UHC 
should probably be selected from health status indicators (i.e., MDG-like 
indicators), health service coverage indicators (e.g., proportion of births 
attended by SBAs and immunization coverage), and the indicators for 
financial protection (e.g., incidence of impoverishing health 
expenditure, proportion of OOP to THE) to capture its multiple 
dimensions.  
UHC also faces a challenge because of its ‘narrow’ focus on healthcare 
rather than health itself. It is widely recognized that health is not 
produced by healthcare alone. Interventions regarding the social 
determinants of health are needed to address the root causes of ill health. 
4. It is difficult to meet the entire health care needs of the population at an affordable cost even 
in developed countries. UHC is an endless endeavor.
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Improvement in water and sanitation alone can have a significant impact 
on people’s health particularly in the African context. It is important to 
make sure that those issues are adequately addressed in the discourse of 
the relevant sectors.
4. Japan’s Actions in TICAD V Process
Japan’s role in promoting UHC in Africa can be significant. Japan 
celebrated its 50th anniversary of the achievement of UHC in the form of 
universal health insurance in 2011. Japan’s experience with UHC and its 
implications were published in a series of scientific papers for the benefit 
of a global audience. Japan played a major role in the global policy 
process to bring health systems strengthening onto development 
agendas through the G8 Toyako summit in 2008. There is a strong 
political leadership to promote UHC in the global health discourse and 
through the TICAD V process. 
Financial capacity in increasing pooled funding and its population 
coverage is a key to progress toward UHC. Efforts to increase overall 
funding are needed. Japanese DAH is expected to play a catalytic role in 
the mobilization of domestic resources for UHC in Africa, depending on 
the evolving capacity of individual countries. However, an increase in 
funding alone will not be sufficient. Japanese DAH should also be 
provided in a way to regain a ‘can do’ attitude among political and 
technocratic leaders in Africa, which will be the moral foundation for the 
progress toward UHC.5 UHC is a long-term endeavor which requires 
continuous fine tuning of complex elements. Country experiences, 
including the one of Japan, commonly pointed out a critical importance 
of the roles of national political and technocratic leaders in the entire 
5. It was Professor Francis Omaswa, founding Executive Director of the Global Health 
Workforce Alliance (GHWA) and former Director General for Health Services of the Ministry 
of Health, Uganda, who pointed out the loss of the ‘can do’ attitude among political and 
technocratic leaders as a cause for slow progress in health development in Africa. He says, 
“many political and technocratic leaders lost the confidence and the ‘can do’ attitude that was 
prevalent just before and after independence.” And then he maintains “the answer lies in 
growing a critical mass of individuals and institutions in each and every country that are 
active change agents, who are in the regular habit of using good evidence to support policy 
development by their governments and at the same time are able to hold their governments 
to account,” and “the answer also lies in growing the capacity of ministries of health to act as 
good stewards of health systems.” Omaswa F. Reclaiming the ‘can do’ attitude in the delivery 
of health services in Africa. Africa Health 2010; July: 7.
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process.  Building on the achievements and outcomes in the TICAD IV 
process, JICA can contribute to the capacity development of African 
leaders and financial mobilization for UHC through the following 
assistances:
(1) Capacity development for health systems management through 
regional networking and country-focused assistance
JICA can provide assistance for the capacity development of African 
countries in health systems management, through the creation of a 
regional knowledge base and through the strengthening of country 
institutions, organizations and individuals. 
JICA can contribute to creation of a regional knowledge base for UHC 
through, its ongoing partnership with AHLMN. AMREF as a host 
organization of AHLMN and JICA, in collaboration with the 
Government of Kenya, is now offering regional training on health 
systems management. The program has the potential to serve as a 
platform for knowledge sharing and informed policy choices for HSS 
and UHC. Opportunities exist to work with other development partners 
through Harmonization for Health in Africa (HHA) and other networks 
with similar objectives to broaden the impact.6
Improving health systems management at a country level can promote 
UHC through strategic planning, better targeting and more effective, 
efficient and accountable use of resources. Better health systems 
management can improve the performance of focused programs. 
Improving management can encourage decision making and problem 
solving at all levels of health systems, which cultivates professional 
satisfaction and motivation. JICA can extend the management assistance 
provided for national ministries of health and local health offices in 
countries like Kenya, Senegal and Tanzania to wider geographical areas 
or to other countries. In Kenya, for example, discussion among the 
relevant stakeholders is ongoing to scale up the management assistance 
provided to one province to the entire country, in line with the progress 
of decentralization under the new constitution. JICA can also support 
management improvement at the service delivery level, through the 
continued application of the 5S-kaizen-TQM approach in hospitals and 
other health facilities. These assistances are expected to contribute to 
6. Other networks that have focused on UHC include the Joint Learning Network sponsored 
by the Rockefeller Foundation and SHIELD based in the University of Cape Town.
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sustainable improvement in health systems performance when 
combined with financing interventions to incentivize better performance 
(i.e., performance/results-based financing) which are being tried and 
introduced in many countries in Africa.
(2) Capacity development for management of focused health programs 
targeting MNCH, infectious diseases and other emerging health needs
JICA can support countries with focused health programs, such as 
MNCH, major infectious disease control and other emerging health 
needs. Efforts should be made to produce synergistic effects with large-
scale funding for focused programs coming from other development 
partners. 
Despite the accelerated expansion of essential interventions for MNCH 
and infectious disease control in Africa, gaps in service use will remain. 
In addition to the financial contributions by GOJ to the global funding 
mechanisms such as GFATM and GAVI, JICA can support the 
strengthening of the program management capacity of the national and 
local institutions to deliver better services. Assistance such as the 
strengthening of country-led donor coordination mechanisms, 
standardization and harmonization of various technical guidelines and 
tools, integration and unification of M&E frameworks, conducting 
implementation research and impact evaluations, and the strengthening 
of laboratory capacity and external quality control mechanisms (for 
tuberculosis and other infectious disease control) can be provided as part 
of the efforts to improve program management. 
(3) Facilitate mobilizing financial resources for UHC
In combination with the assistance to strengthen the capacity for both 
health systems management and focused programs management, JICA 
can provide assistance to mobilize financial resources for UHC in 
accordance with the evolving capacity of individual countries.
It is essential that the African countries take leadership roles and make 
political decisions to mobilize more domestic resources for health in 
order to move toward UHC. Sound government financing, either 
through a general budget and/or insurance schemes, is indispensable in 
order to maintain health systems accountable to the health needs of the 
poor and their financial protection. However, many African countries 
will continue to face fiscal constraints even with sustained economic 
264
Chapter 9
growth at least for the near future. There has been a remarkable increase 
in DAH to Africa, in particular to SSA. However, the major part of the 
funds is allocated to focused interventions such as HIV and AIDS, 
malaria, and other infectious disease control. Even though there are 
efforts to increase DAH allocation to the health systems strengthening, 
such as the establishment of a joint funding platform by GAVI, GFATM 
and the World Bank, the progress is slow.
JICA can provide financial assistance to eligible African countries 
through a best mix of grant and loan facilities in accordance with the 
evolving capacity of individual countries. Such assistance should be 
provided catalytically to facilitate government initiatives to increase 
domestic financing for health and expand pooled funding. It should be 
provided in a way to promote better management practices in 
government officials and health service providers. It should be catalytic 
to promote investment and innovations from the private sector. 
Combination with the support for management improvement, and 
coordination with support from other development partners is essential.
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Chapter 10: 
Challenges in Educational Development in 
Africa and JICA’s Approach
Kazuro Shibuya 
Introduction
This chapter looks at the challenges that Africa1 faces in education, and 
discusses JICA’s policies toward its development. Section 1 discusses the 
current and overall situation of education in Africa (Sections 1.1 and 1.2). 
The chapter will then discuss specific challenges for countries at 
different educational developmental stages because, obviously, 
countries at different developmental stages must have different 
developmental strategies depending on their respective prioritized goals 
(Section 1.3). As a precursor to later discussions, Section 1.4 will have a 
brief look at future challenges toward 2015 and beyond. 
Section 2 discusses JICA’s approach toward educational development in 
Africa. In its efforts to contribute to education in Africa, JICA has 
conceived a few development models based on its policy focus and its 
comparative advantage built on Japan’ experience in education and 
human resources. Such development models will be intensively 
discussed in this paper while JICA can provide various and wide-range 
support for educational development in Africa
Finally, combining the discussions in previous sections, Section 3 will 
attempt to suggest some policy options for consideration by African 
leaders and their partners participating at TICAD V. 
The author would like to thank Prof. Kazuhiro Yoshida for his insightful comments for the 
draft paper. Special appreciation goes to Kiyoshi Kodera, Hiroshi Kato, Nobuko Kayashima, 
Jun Sakuma, Mitsuko Kumagai, Kazuhiro Tambara, Jun Kawaguchi and other colleagues in 
JICA as well as the World Bank for their valuable input.
1. Since sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is faced with very serious challenges, much of the 
discussion in this chapter will largely be on SSA. The challenges of North African countries, 
however, will be dealt with as appropriate.
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1. Current State of Education Development in Africa and 
Challenges Faced
This section has an overview of education development in Africa: basic 
education and post-basic education.
1.1 Current state of basic education in Africa and remaining challenges
Overall, there has been a substantial advancement in access to primary 
education in Africa. Since the World Conference on EFA (Education for 
All), in Jomtien, Thailand, in 1990, which called for universal access to 
primary education as a fundamental human right, many African 
countries have introduced various policies to achieve universal primary 
education with support from international aid agencies and NGOs. As a 
result, the net enrollment rate in primary education, one of indicators 
measuring achievement of the second MDG, improved from 58% (1999) 
to 77% (2010) and, consequently, the net enrollment rate in secondary 
education also increased from 19% (1999) to 29% (2009) (Refer to Figure 
1). 
Figure 1.  Changes in the enrollment rate in primary education and secondary 
education
Source: UNESCO USI Data 2010
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Also, there has been an advancement with regard to elimination of 
gender disparities in primary and secondary education, i.e., Goal 3 of the 
MDGs; the male-female ratio of the gross enrollment ratio at the primary 
level improved from 100:85 (1999) to 100:93 (2010) in Sub-Sahara Africa. 
This seems to have been achieved thanks to efforts to improve 
educational access for the females through the construction of schools in 
remote areas and the provision of scholarships, as emphasized in MDGs 
and EFA (UN, 2012). Thus, there has been a massive improvement in 
enrollment in basic education. 
However, even with such improvements in basic education enrollment, 
the fact remains that many African countries lag far behind the world 
average (NET primary: 91%, NET Secondary:82%) and that of South 
West Asia (NET Primary: 93%, NET Secondary: 75%); in addition, large 
disparities persist between urban and rural areas and among different 
income groups within countries. (GPE report 2012)  More attention 
needs to be paid to these remaining challenges. 
In contrast to rapid quantitative expansion, the quality of education, as 
represented by the learning achievement of children, remains low. An 
illustration of this can be found in the performance of some African 
countries in TIMSS,2 which measures the achievement in science and 
mathematics of fourth and eighth grade children.  In the 2011 test, 
participants from Africa, namely Botswana, Ghana and South Africa, are 
placed lowest among participating countries, as shown in the figure on 
the below. 
2. Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
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Figure 2. Poor quality of basic education in Africa
(Left: TIMSS; Right: SACMEQ)
As one can see by looking at the SAQMEC data,3 in which two of the 
three countries listed in the TIMSS score (Botswana and South Africa) 
are on a par with other countries, one has to assume that the learning 
achievement of children in most African countries remains low by 
international standard. And in particular, among various aspects of 
learning achievements, the low level of basic literacy and numeracy in 
early grades at the primary education level is a major concern. In Kenya, 
for example, a survey (UWEZO, 2011) found that the level of basic 
literacy and numeracy of about 50% of fourth graders is only equivalent 
to what the Kenyan curriculum requires of the second graders. It has 
also been reported that the learning achievement of sixth graders in 
Africa, on average, is only equivalent to that of second graders in OECD 
countries (GPE, 2012). Such general insufficiency in basic literacy and 
numeracy at lower grades is reported to hinder children’s learning over 
subsequent years, resulting in the deteriorating general cost-
effectiveness of educational investment in Africa (Brookings Institution 
2011). Why, in Africa, does the quality of education remain low, or why, 
in some countries, is it decreasing, despite various inputs made by 
governments and their development partners for the quantitative 
expansion of education? To understand this, one has to look back at the 
policies introduced toward the achievement of EFA, along with their 
policy intentions and consequences. After the introduction of the MDGs 
3. Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality
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and the World Conference on EFA, Dakar, Senegal, both in 2000, 
universal primary education aiming at 100% enrollment and completion 
became the top priority for education policy in many countries; the 
governments were subsequently requested to work out their educational 
sector plans to clarify specific courses of action for the realization of 
these goals. 
However, mostly African countries could not provide the quality 
learning environment (schools, teachers, teaching and learning materials 
etc.) to cope with the rapid expansion of access in basic education. This 
may have led to the deterioration of the quality of education during that 
era. This was observed even in those countries that participated in the 
EFA/Fast Track Initiative (FTI).4 The FTI was established in 2002 as a 
multi-donor fund for the purpose of providing financial and technical 
support for the planning process of these sector plans and to fill in the 
financing gap between the education sector resource requirement and 
the domestically available education budget. “The indicative 
framework” which FTI presented was referred to in the process of sector 
plan formulation by respective countries. They were benchmark figures 
such as the following: “Education share of budget defined as public 
recurrent spending on education as % of total public recurrent 
discretionary spending is approximately 20%,” “Primary education 
share of education budget is approximately 50%,” “Recurrent spending 
on items other than teacher remuneration as % of total recurrent 
spending on primary education is 33%,” “Average annual salary of 
primary school teachers divided by GDP per capita is 3.5”,5 “Pupil–
teacher ratio in publicly-financed primary schools is 40 to 1,” and an 
“Percentage of repeaters among primary school pupils is less than 10%.” 
However, many of the sector plans thus formulated did not necessarily 
turn out to be realistic in the context of each country; they tended to be 
over-ambitious given the insufficient capacities of understaffed 
education administration both at central and local levels, and the low 
capabilities of and insufficient incentives for teachers/staff on the 
ground. Thus, many problems arose such as delays in executing 
education budgets and in the supply of educational materials to schools. 
4. Of the 45 countries involved in the FTI’s support for educational sector planning and 
application for necessary funds, 28 of these countries are in Africa. Therefore, more than half 
of the countries within Africa are participating in the FTI. EFA/FTI has turned to be the 
Global Partnership for Education since 2011.
5. In Bruns et al. (2003), sample data for this indicator ranges from 0.6 to 9.6.
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Apart from these constraints, the shortage of additional financing made 
available was also among obstacles that prevented the expected 
progress. As a result, adequate facilities and materials were not made 
available to schools and students, both of whose number increased 
rapidly as a result of the free primary education policies. All this resulted 
in a deterioration of the learning environment (Cambridge Education, et 
al. 2009). 
This hasty application of the indicative framework of FTI to the 
education sector plans without deliberate consideration of the country 
context could have been one factor that inadvertently brought the 
deterioration of the quality of teachers. This happened because many 
countries quickly increased the number of teachers to live up to the 
indicative pupil-teacher ratio and other indicators of the FTI: teacher 
salaries were lowered, more teachers were employed on a term-contract 
basis on lower salaries, teachers’ training periods were shortened, and 
enrollment requirements for teacher training programs were lowered in 
order to rapidly increase the number of licensed teachers (Aidan 2010, 
TISSA 2007). It is not only in the FTI participating countries but other 
non-FTI participating African countries as well that the deterioration of 
the quality of teachers occurred. Thus, it is worthwhile to further 
examine what education policies has been introduced and what were 
their consequences in such non-FTI participating countries.
It is also reported that the sudden increase of teachers with lesser 
qualifications has resulted in the deterioration of the social status and 
reputation that teachers used to enjoy among community residents and 
parents (Felix 2005). It appears that teachers’ dissatisfaction with their 
salaries and benefits have actually lowered their motivation, thus 
resulting in poor service delivery typically indicated by a high absentee 
rate and limited teaching time. These problems were actually predicted; 
as early as 2003 in the World Bank report (Bruns et al. 2003), which 
served as a theoretical background paper for the FTI’s indicative 
framework. 
These developments, resulting in the deterioration in the learning 
environment (lack of school facilities, textbooks, and teaching materials), 
the poor quality of teachers and their services, are behind the poor 
learning performance of children, even with increased access. 
In addition to these policies, many countries have attempted to promote 
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the decentralization of their educational management aiming to improve 
the efficiency of administration and finance in education; it was also 
expected that decentralization would enhance the accountability of 
education to parents and community residents, thereby improving the 
quality of service delivery.  As part of the policy, governments 
established what are called “school management committees” mainly 
comprising headteachers/teachers, parents, local community members 
and local government officers (local government or local branch of 
Ministry of Education), with the expectation of increased local 
participation in education and hence increased efficiency in school 
management. 
Oftentimes, however, the school management committees have not been 
functioning as expected due to the government’s inability to provide 
sufficient budget allocation, clear delineation of the functions and 
mandates of the committees, and the insufficient ability of the school 
committee members. As such, and for other reasons as well, many 
schools supported by the school management committees ended up 
with inadequate facilities and teaching staff, failing to provide the 
education needed by children and their parents, who eventually lost 
interest in supporting such poorly performing schools. Thus, not 
receiving appropriate support from either the government or from the 
community, the quality of education at such schools eroded.
It is as a result of these inadequate policy developments that Africa’s 
current level of educational quality remains sub-optimal. Many 
indicators point to the need for further efforts: a high dropout rate (30%), 
high repetition rate (15%), and low completion rate in primary education 
(67%) (compared to the world average of 2.5% (2010), 9.1% (2009) and 
91% (2010), respectively). Continuous efforts to solve these problems are 
needed. 
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1.2  Current state of post-basic education in Africa and remaining 
changes
We now turn to post-basic education (upper secondary and higher 
education). 
In recent years, African countries have experienced rapid economic 
growth; however, this has not solved how to make best use of the youth 
in Africa for its industrial development. The youth in Africa still has 
higher share of the unemployment than the adults. In addition, the large 
majority of the youth are underemployed and occupied in low 
productivity household enterprises (AfDB 2011).
Figure 3.  Enrollment rate in upper secondary education and its relevance to 
economic development
Source: Yoshida (2012)
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Figure 4.  Relationship between quality of upper secondary education and 
economic growth
Source: Hanushek 2007
Under these circumstances, the challenges in post-basic education in 
Africa lie in improving the current net secondary education enrollment 
rate of 29% (2009), enhancing the quality of education, and making 
secondary education (or post-basic education) including skills 
development more relevant and responsive to the needs of the society so 
as to produce more qualified human resources to support much-needed 
industrialization. Such efforts for the improvement in the supply of 
skilled labor must proceed in tandem with efforts in industrial 
development and labor policies. Africa also needs to cultivate top-level 
human resources who will move on to higher education and go on to 
play leading roles in industry. Thus, in a number of ways, post-basic 
education must be enhanced both in terms of quality and quantity to 
build up human capital to meet the changing and increasing needs of 
Africa.
Figure 3 represents the relationship between the enrollment rate in 
upper secondary education and economic growth (GNI per capita). This 
infers a correlation whereby countries with higher GNI per capita have a 
higher enrollment rate in upper secondary education. In addition, the 
quality of education, namely, the extent to which students absorb the 
content of the education they receive, is largely related to the economic 
development of each country. Hanushek asserts that there is a 
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correlation between the learning achievement in math (level of 15 year 
olds) and economic growth (annual growth rate of GDP) as indicated in 
Figure 4; and that in addition to the quantity of education (number of 
schooling years), the quality of education (attained learning 
achievement) is also an important element in economic development 
(Hanushek and Wößmann, 2007). 
Let us now turn to higher education. In terms of the higher education 
enrollment rate, Africa, with an average rate of only 6%, lags far behind 
other regions, let alone North America and Western Europe with a 70%. 
With the recent progress of the globalization of higher education, the 
cross-border movement of students has become easier. In Africa, it has 
been reported that approximately 5.9% of the students receiving higher 
education study abroad (Table1). Compared to other regions, the African 
continent has a relatively higher percentage of students who study 
abroad.
 Table 1. Number of students who study abroad in other regions (2010)
Source: UNESCO UIS data (2011)
These low enrollment rates, as well as the relatively high mobility of 
students, can at least in part be accounted for by the insufficiency in 
higher educational institutions within the African continent, in terms of 
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both quality and quantity; they are not sufficient to meet the region’s 
needs, thereby causing a brain drain of scarce and competent human 
resources as they seek opportunities of higher education in other regions 
and not coming back after their study. As a result, there is a severe 
shortage in the number of researchers in Africa, which in turn 
undermines the ability to produce new knowledge and promote 
innovation, particularly in science and technology (Figure 5). 
Figure 5. Number of researchers per 1 million people (2007)
Source: UNESCO 2010
1.3 Diverse stages of educational development in African countries
So far, we have looked at the 54 countries in Africa collectively, but 
obviously, the stages of educational development vary across countries. 
To put this diversity in perspective, I would like to propose a 
categorization of the countries into four groups, by the levels of 
achievement on three scales: the net enrollment rate in primary 
education, the primary education completion rate, and the net 
enrollment rate in secondary education. However, please note that this 
categorization is intended to have a quick overview of African countries 
from the criteria of three leading indicators related to the access (the net 
enrollment in primary and secondary education) and the quality of the 
education system (primary completion rate). This may not be an 
ultimate way of classification of African countries at different 
educational development stages nor excludes the importance of 
secondary and higher education as well as that of the quality 
enhancement of teaching and learning in each Zone. Each country could 
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select its prioritized areas depending on the country context, and the 
education sector plan which discussed and agreed between the 
government and the local education group of development partners. 
Figure 6. African countries as categorized by major outcome indicators
Source: Created by the author based on UNESCO 2007 
Zone 1 consists of countries in which the primary education net 
enrollment rate is less than 70%. These are countries in which 
quantitative expansion of primary education enrollment could be still 
a high priority. This category includes many countries with a low GDP 
per capita.6 
Zone 2 consists of countries in which the primary education net 
enrollment rate is 70% or higher and, at the same time, the primary 
education completion rate is less than 70%. For these countries, 
improving the completion rate by improving the quality of education 
could be the main challenge. This zone includes countries in southeast 
Africa, such as Malawi, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. 
Policy measures to be adopted for countries in Zones 1 and 2 must take 
into account the vast difference in income levels among them. Also, the 
efficiency of the countries’ educational administration and finance must 
6. French-speaking countries, such as Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad, happen to fall into this 
category; some argue that this is in part due to the educational systems in these countries 
where instruction at schools is done only in French starting in the first grade; it is argued that 
this system seems to be creating a language barrier for children resulting in low enrollment 
and completion rates in these countries (K. Robert 2009).  
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be looked at; countries at similar income levels and all with a fairly 
reasonable level of public expenditure in education can sometimes 
display considerably different achievement results in the primary 
enrollment rate. 
Zones 1 and 2 also include post-conflict countries such as the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and South Sudan; policy measures in these 
countries must be designed and implemented with careful attention 
being paid to the history and other social, cultural and economic 
backgrounds. 
Zone 3 includes countries with a primary education completion rate of 
70% or higher, but in which the net enrollment rate in secondary 
education is less than 60%. This zone represents countries in which 
improving the enrollment rate in secondary education could be made 
a priority, and includes countries that are more socially and 
economically stable than those in Zones 1 and 2, such as Kenya, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Ghana.
Zone 4 includes countries in which most people have completed 
secondary education, and in which enrollment in higher education has 
been achieved to a certain extent; this zone includes the Maghreb 
countries in northern Africa, South Africa and Namibia. In these 
countries, industries are diversified and economic structures have been 
developed to some extent; the enrollment rates in primary and 
secondary education have been improved to some extent, and the focus 
has shifted to enhancing higher education.
In summary, countries in different categories have different 
development challenges, and even among the countries that are 
categorized as being at similar developmental levels, specific challenges 
differ from country to country. African governments and their 
development partners must be flexible in devising development/
support measures taking into consideration the stages of educational 
development and their local context in each country. 
1.4 Future global agenda for educational development in Africa
One of the main issues in debates on educational development toward 
the MDG target year of 2015 and beyond is how to achieve “Learning for 
All,” a concept that calls for the assurance of the quality of learning not 
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limited to the primary education level, but at all levels from pre-primary 
up to post basic education. This would be a concept that goes beyond the 
much used interpretation of “Education for All” concept, which is 
mainly aimed at universal primary education. More specifically, there 
are three main arguments about “Learning for All” : (1) providing 
education for children in rural areas, female students, disabled children, 
and ethnic minorities without disparity, encouraging out-of-school 
children to attend school and enhancing the quality of learning; (2) 
making early child development (ECD) interventions as well as early 
grade learning at lower primary school grades (including ensuring the 
learning achievement of children in early-grade literacy and numeracy); 
and (3) improving education linked to the employment and the 
cultivation of human resources (human resources and researchers who 
are engaged in science and technology).
Africa needs to pursue these agendas while continuing its steady efforts 
to address the challenges that we saw earlier. Specifically, efforts must 
continue for the improvement in the completion rate in primary 
education and the resultant increase in the enrollment into secondary 
education, which, in itself, needs to be expanded with the construction of 
schools and enhancement both in the quantity and quality of teachers. 
For the mainstreaming of Learning for All in Africa, various 
development partners have been already actively working.  
In their support toward achieving Learning for All, many development 
partners seem to place strong emphasis on policy making by mobilizing 
budget support, including lending, with policy recommendations. One 
example is an initiative by the World Bank. As part of its new strategy 
(Education Strategy 2020), the World Bank is starting an initiative 
including the construction of a policy benchmarking database called 
SABER (the Systems Approach for Better Education Results). The idea 
behind the initiative is the emphasis on the importance of systematic 
support in informed policy making that is supported by the analysis and 
understanding of what policies are needed to produce the expected 
policy outcomes (such as improvement in enrollment rate, completion 
rate, and learning achievement) using inputs (such as schools, training 
of teachers, etc.). Another example of a policy support instrument is 
what is called results-based financing that development partners like the 
World Bank and DfID of the UK are promoting. This funding mechanism 
requires the achievement of pre-determined policy goals by the recipient 
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developing countries as a prerequisite for the disbursement of funds.  
2. JICA-supported Projects and their Comparative Advantage
Over the years, Japan has been undertaking extensive international 
cooperation in education. The following sections will introduce three of 
JICA’s approaches, which are currently being actively pursued with 
encouraging outcomes, especially in the African context. The first two 
are specific models of educational development: the first one having to 
do with school-based management (Section 2.1) and the second one with 
the improvement of the quality of education through teacher training 
(Section 2.2). Following that, Section 2.3 will introduce JICA’s attempt to 
link the experiences on the ground and policy making at the central 
level.
2.1  Improvement of school management for a better educational 
environment
At the center of measures for improving access to education has been the 
construction of more schools. However, recently, in addition to the 
physical aspect of access, the significance of educational management 
has been highlighted as a key area of intervention. Educational 
management includes, at the central level, formulating a policy 
framework, securing appropriate budget allocation, improving 
administrative and fiscal capacities (budget preparation and execution), 
and information systems development such as EMIS (Education 
Management Information Systems). At the local level, interventions 
include transfer of authority over personnel and budgetary issues to 
local educational administrative bodies as part of decentralization 
policies, improving administrative and fiscal capacities (budget 
preparation and execution), and improvement of school management. 
Among these, one approach that is receiving increasing attention in 
recent years is school-based management (SBM); SBM basically aims at 
enhancing the efficiency and quality of school management by holding 
individual schools more accountable through facilitating parents/
community members’ participation in school management. As a vehicle 
to encourage participatory school management, the school management 
committee is set up, comprising of pupils’ parents, community members 
as well as school principals, teachers and local education administrators. 
Originating in World Bank projects in Latin America – projects with 
encouraging outcomes – this SBM has come to be widely practiced in 
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many parts of the world, including Africa.7
In fact, school management committees have been established in many 
countries in Africa. Oftentimes, however, such committees are not 
properly functioning for various reasons: sometimes the committee 
members could not fully understand their mandates and responsibilities 
due to the lack of the government’s efforts to provide necessary 
guidance and support in the management of the committees; or the local 
educational administration did not get involved as they should; and at 
other times, school management committees did not have the capability 
to fulfill their expected functions owing to lack of proper training 
opportunities. 
In order to help correct such situations, JICA has been trying to introduce 
the SBM in Africa with special emphasis on making the school 
management committees functional. The “School for All” projects 
implemented in four French-speaking countries in west Africa (Niger, 
Mali, Burkina Faso and Senegal) are based on the idea that if school 
management committees are organized and operated in such a way that 
they appropriately accommodate the pressing needs of pupils’ parents 
and community members, they can serve to positively change the 
mindset of the people toward education and contribute to the 
improvement of the educational environment, including the resultant 
improvement in enrollment rates. (For a more detailed description of the 
projects, refer to Box 1). 
In Niger, the number of school management committees (COGES in 
French acronym) based on the model generated by the support from 
JICA has been expanded, and is currently increasing across the nation. 
As the extensive development of functioning COGES, the primary 
education enrollment rate and completion rate have been improved 
(Figure 7).
7. So far, only a few attempts have been made to evaluate the impact of school-based 
management (SBM) in Africa (e.g., an Extra Teacher Program (a program in which schools are 
authorized to employ contract teachers directly) in Kenya) (Patrinos et al. 2011). More work 
needs to be done to collect evidence as to what kind of approach leads to what kind of impact 
in SBM, as SBM can take a variety of forms depending on the levels and width of mandates 
given to school management committees and/or school principals.
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Figure 7.  Acceleration of access to schools after the extensive establishment of 
functioning COGES
Source: Created by JICA based on educational statistics of the government of Niger
Box 1. “School for All” Project in Niger
In its support for the government of Niger, JICA started the “School for All” 
project in 2004 to promote effective SBM and to improve the educational 
environment. Prior to the Project, the government of Niger enacted legislation 
in 2003 that the school management committees be established at each school. 
However, the school management committees had not been functioning and 
not responding to potential demand from parent and community members. 
The project started with an analysis of the reasons behind the sub-optimal 
functions of the school management committees existing at that time. The 
project team spent several months conducting school surveys on 140 schools 
in target districts as well as awareness surveys of pupils’ parents and 
community members as well as local administrators involved in education. 
They also tried to learn from the experiences from the preceding projects by 
other donors. These surveys revealed that the fundamental reason of the then 
dysfunctional school management committees was weak support and sense of 
participation from parents and community members; they were not led to 
foster a sense of ownership toward the school management committees, 
whose leading members as well as the scope of activities were decided in a 
top-down, opaque manner. 
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Thus, based on the discussions between the Nigerien and Japanese project 
members, it was agreed to incorporate into the project the following activities 
to make school management committees more functional: 
(1) Introduction of the system of democratic ballot-type election of leaders to 
make the selection process more transparent and democratic; this was deemed 
necessary to make sure that competent leaders with full support from the 
community are elected; 
(2) Implementation of awareness- and motivation-enhancing activities; this 
was done, for example, by organizing seminars on the necessity of 
participating in decision making through attending community assembly 
meetings; and by encouraging parents and community members to work out 
school action plans and making contributions to their implementation (either 
through monetary contributions or otherwise), stressing that all the project 
activities are just to supplement their own initiatives; 
(3) Nigerien-led project management and implementation; this was stressed 
as critically important not only in view of the strengthening of Nigeriens’ 
capacity, but also, and more importantly, to allow the Nigerien side to nurture 
the sense of true ownership of the whole activity as an endeavor they have to 
shoulder. Practically, the project made sure that major project activities, such 
as the organization of seminars and monitoring, were led and/or conducted 
by the Nigerien project members and administrators without depending on 
expatriate experts;. 
(4) Transparent information sharing; documents and information such as 
school action plans prepared by different school management committees 
were made open for transparent information sharing and mutual learning.
This cooperation expanded in scale and advanced in status over time; it 
started, in 2004, with approximately 130 targeted primary schools in a 
pilot province and then expanded the coverage to 2,800 schools in two 
provinces in 2007. In that year, the model for the school management 
committees developed by this project was officially approved as a 
government policy and was subsequently expanded on a national scale 
using World Bank funds. As of August 2012, school management 
committees have been established in all of the approximately 14,000 
primary schools in eight provinces throughout the country, and of these 
committees, nearly 90% have formulated school action plans and 
mobilized funds of 155,000 F CFA  per committee (2 billion F CFA 
nationwide) (source: JICA-supported School for All project in Niger). 
They are contributing to the improvement of school environments by 
mobilizing funds and local labor, which are used for school facility 
improvement, and the purchase of textbooks and teaching materials. 
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Trials to improve the quality of education or the conducive conditions 
that are necessary for quality improvement have also taken place. Over 
60% of the committees are also involved in the organization of extra and 
nighttime classes to allow pupils to have additional learning time, 
resulting in an increase of 200 hours of learning time on average. This 
achievement can be significant in view of the fact in Niger where, while 
regulations demand 960 hours of instruction per year, many schools had 
ended up satisfying only 50 to 60% of that requirement. 
2.2  Strengthening teacher education for improving quality of students’ 
learning
The second approach that JICA has been promoting in Africa is the 
improvement of the quality of education, attempted through 
enhancement of in-service teacher training (INSET). 
As has been repeatedly pointed out throughout this chapter, improving 
the quality of education in Africa is as important as its quantitative 
expansion, as the poor quality of education (or learning by children) is 
one of the major factors causing high dropout and repetition rates in 
primary and secondary education in Africa. 
The quality of an education system can be affected by many factors: the 
curriculum (objectives, content, sequence, etc.), quality and availability 
of textbooks and teaching materials, and the amount of learning time. 
And equally, or perhaps even more important, is the quality of teachers, 
which is considered as having a major impact on the quality of teaching 
and students’ learning outcome. The quality of teachers depends on a 
number of factors: first, for securing the basic quality of teachers, there 
must be a clear definition and standardization of what is required of 
teachers in the first place, according to which qualified candidates must 
be recruited and trained before they start working. Second, in school and 
classrooms, teachers must be guided appropriately by the leadership 
from the school’s principals, monitored for their performance and, when 
necessary, assisted and mentored. They must be appropriately 
motivated and incentivized in terms of salaries and benefits, and also 
must be given opportunities to improve their teaching skills. 
JICA’s approach has to do with the last approach listed above, i.e., the 
support for teachers in maintaining and upgrading their knowledge and 
teaching skills through the development of in-service teacher training 
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systems. JICA’s flagship project in improving the teachers’ quality is the 
SMASE project, which is short for the “Strengthening of Mathematics 
and Science Education.” The project is premised on two conceptual 
thrusts. 
The first is the idea that science and math education in Africa must be 
upgraded by introducing a student-centered approach to the lessons in 
the classrooms. In science and math classrooms in Africa, typically, 
teachers rarely undertake experiments or use teaching materials; 
instead, they write on blackboards and talk “at” their students, while the 
students simply listen and take notes. This way of conducting classes, 
often called “Chalk & Talk,” is common. Taught this way, students tend 
to develop a passive attitude in class without any willingness to engage 
with other students or think on their own. This passive learning attitude 
of students has often led to low achievements in knowledge acquisition 
in or understanding of the subjects taught. Based on this observation 
JICA has recognized the need to transform the teaching style of teachers 
in such a way that students are encouraged to participate in group 
activities, create hypotheses, do experiments, and to think on their own; 
here the teacher’s role is to support the students to learn. 
The second premise of the project is the idea that INSET could be an 
effective opportunity through which teachers can be motivated to brush 
up their knowledge and skills. One advantage of INSET programs is that 
training participants – teachers – can apply what they learn in training to 
their classes, easily, and immediately (For more details, see Box 2). The 
need for the strengthening of math and science education was judged as 
of particular importance because they are generally believed to be 
difficult subjects to learn, and in fact students perform poorly in these 
subjects, as demonstrated by the low pass rate in national exams. 
Finally, collaboration with other development partners are taking place 
under the education sector plans in each country. For instance, in 
Ethiopia, JICA-supported in-service teacher training for science and 
mathematics teachers project is in well-coordinated partnership with the 
GEQIP program, which is a comprehensive quality improvement 
program of the Ethiopian government using pool-fund financed by the 
World Bank and other development partners. While JICA provides 
technical expertise for the INSET implementation and monitoring 
system as well as the training content in pilot areas, the GEQIP program 
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covers other non-pilot areas supporting the expenses of the INSET 
implementation and its monitoring.  
Box 2.  Approaches toward the improvement of the quality of 
education in science and math education (SMASE)8
JICA’s development model for the improvement of the quality of science and 
math education (SMASE) focuses on the development of INSET programs and 
systems. 
The exercise is premised on three key components. The first is the education 
principle commonly called “ASEI-PDSI.”9 Developed originally in Kenya, 
ASEI-PDSI is an educational paradigm that has guided the project’s activities 
to transform the traditional teacher-centered teaching method into a more 
student-centered, activity-oriented teaching/learning method. The second 
component was in-service teacher training known as the cascade method; this 
is a method whereby knowledge and teaching skills can be conveyed, through 
multiple-layer training programs, from the master trainers at the center to 
individual teachers on the ground in a relatively short period of time. And 
thirdly, the project placed strong emphasis on ownership by the recipient 
governments; the project made sure that its activities were implemented 
within the existing institutional framework and budget of the government, 
without excessively relying on funding from external sources.
Guided by these concepts and management principle, the activities that 
originated in Kenya have been expanded to other African countries, while 
flexibly adapting its project contents to the circumstances in each country (as 
of November 2012, SMASE projects are implemented in 13 countries). 
Whenever a SMASE project gets started in a country, the project activities 
would start with a thorough check and analysis of the actual situation, needs 
of teachers and issues in schools through visits to schools/classrooms and 
baseline surveys on children’s learning achievements. Based on these 
analyses, the project team would then proceed to plan and implement 
teachers’ training programs with a number of trials and errors. The ultimate 
goal is to create sustainable in-service teacher-training programs that would be 
planned, operated, and monitored by local professionals. 
8. For details of the project, see, Ogwel et al (2008), and Ishihara (2012).
9. ASEI-PDSI is explained as a guiding principle of the SMASE projects that “involves 
providing meaningful teaching Activities focused on Student learning mainly 
Experimental/practical work and Improvising resources when necessary. The PDSI 
approach embraces orderly steps of executing learning activity by first Planning for the 
activity, then Doing it while Seeing, observing with intent to evaluate and then finally 
Improvising on the process.” (Ogwel et al. 2008) 
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Over the years, the SMASE projects have increased the variety of the kinds of 
training programs to meet various and/or changing needs of different schools 
and teachers and countries. One was a system of post-training follow-up 
school visits, introduced not only to verify the usefulness of the contents of the 
training programs but also to help the ex-training participants to best apply 
their newly learned knowledge and skills in their class. Also introduced were 
school-based teacher training programs (lesson study) and regional training 
programs to complement the main cascade training. JICA has supported the 
establishment of cascade teacher training programs in Kenya, Malawi, 
Nigeria, and many other countries. Content-wise, the projects have been 
supporting the introduction of various materials such as reference books for 
teachers and workbooks for students in addition to ASEI-PSDI training 
programs.   
Thus, SMASE projects have been instrumental in supporting African 
governments in developing a wide range of alternatives for the upgrading of 
science and math teachers. Overall, these activities can be said to have 
contributed, at the macro level, to the establishment of a country’s system of 
continuous professional development and, at the micro level, to the 
development of capabilities of a countless number of teachers who have been 
enabled to guide their pupils with their newly acquired teaching methods and 
skills.  
Looking back at what JICA has been doing, it appears that one of JICA’s 
comparative advantages in international cooperation in education may 
reside in its ample body of experiences and practical knowhow that it 
can offer for use and consideration by governments and the 
international community for policy formulation.10 The importance of 
science and math education is widely shared among the governments 
and their partners.11 Capitalizing on its experience in this field, JICA is 
prepared to further strengthen its cooperation for the development of 
science and math education in Africa. It is prepared to strengthen its 
contribution both in practice on the ground and for national-level policy 
formulation, fully utilizing the already established network for 
10. In a report on mathematics and science education in the East African Community (EAC) 
countries (World Bank, 2011), JICA is referred to as an agency that enhances teachers’ 
pedagogical capabilities.
11. The World Bank and African Development Bank regard mathematics and science 
education as being essential to sustainable economic growth that utilizes science and 
technology.
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mathematics and science education in Africa (SMASE-Africa12), now 
covering 34 countries. 
2.3 JICA’s approaches that link policy and practice
Different actors in international cooperation have different comparative 
advantages and business domains. Some primarily work on the ground 
implementing specific projects and programs, and others concentrate on 
advocacy and policy making. While not many seem to be involved in 
both, JICA is one of such development partners trying to cover both 
domains of support for policy making and practice on the ground. Over 
the years, JICA has developed its cooperation strategy comprising three 
components: (1) model and content building, (2) capacity development 
of stakeholders, and, (3) support for informed policy making.  
The first component, model and content building, refers to the activities 
through which models of educational development and educational 
contents are developed, tested on the ground and proven for their 
effectiveness. The typical examples of the first component are the 
functional school management committee, the in-service teacher 
training, and the teaching methods for student-centered lessons; these 
have been proven to yield maximum benefits on the ground in different 
local contexts. The second component, capacity development of 
stakeholders, refers to the activities geared to the capacity development 
of educational administrative officers, national and local trainers, 
principals, teachers, and school management committees, and many 
others, who are both developers as well as users of the above-mentioned 
models and contents. And the third component, support for informed 
policy making, refers to the activities leading to policy making and 
systems development on a larger scale needed to scale up and 
institutionalize the good practices on the ground.  
Obviously, education policies are introduced, for example, to determine 
a certain course of action to achieve a certain pre-determined outcome, 
such as improving the quality of learning and the primary education 
completion rate.  Oftentimes in Africa, however, policies such as sector 
development plans tend to be disconnected with the reality on the 
ground, in terms of the goals, objectives, and available resources without 
12. SMASE-Africa is working as a network of 34 countries in Africa to share knowledge and 
experience and conduct south-south cooperation for science and mathematics education 
among the member countries.
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taking into account stakeholders’ capacity. As a result, many policies end 
up facing problematic outcomes. 
To narrow this gap between policy and practice, it is imperative to 
understand the reality on the ground and rigorously analyze the causes 
and contexts of the issues. Then it is critical to identify the potential gaps 
between what the policymakers’ understand/believe/envision and 
what is actually happening or will likely happen on the ground after the 
adoption of the policy. For this gap-filling, careful surveys and research 
must be conducted, and to supplement them, additional information 
obtained through the implementation of actual projects could be 
enormously useful. As a development partner with hands-on experience 
of project implementation, JICA could be in the position to transform an 
ample body of tacit and non-tacit knowledge of the reality on the ground 
to best practices and knowledge which could help the policymakers to 
make informed decisions. This is the notion which JICA should pay 
more serious attention to in terms of the global policy dialogues among 
international community as well as local education groups in each 
country.
There are already several cases where national level policies have been 
formulated, supported or substantiated by knowledge accumulated on 
the ground: in Niger and Mali, for example, the JICA-supported model 
of school management committees was tested on the ground and came 
to be proven effective and applicable in the context of the two countries; 
the models were subsequently adopted as a national policy and have 
been expanded nationwide. 
Concurrently, efforts are underway to distill these experiences further 
into the formulation of policy frameworks. As part of such effort, JICA is 
collaborating with the World Bank’s SABER furnishing the latter with 
the information on the ground related to SBM, indicating the gap 
between policies and practices, and presenting evidence on a workable 
model at the school level. These exercises could lead to the development 
of various policy tools, such as a set of indicators with which to measure 
the real impacts or interim outcomes of various actions, including 
systems reform by the government; if developed, these indicators could 
be used as disbursement indicators in result-based financing.
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3.Towards TICAD V and beyond
The preparatory process for the TICAD V is in progress. While the 
challenges are enormous and varied across countries and regions, the 
conference must come up with clear, prioritized policy messages focused 
on a set of agendas according to which African governments and their 
partners can make concerted efforts toward their achievement. In the 
author’s view, the outcome document of the conference, Yokohama 
Action Plan, must highlight the following as the two pillars of the policy 
message: (1) scaling up of quality basic education, and (2) strengthening 
education that contributes to sustainable growth.
The first pillar, scaling up of quality basic education, demands full 
enrollment in basic education as well as the improvement in the 
completion rate in basic education, particularly primary education; this 
goal is to be achieved through the improvement of the quality of basic 
education, the increase in secondary education enrollment with 
expanded school facilities, and the provision of quality secondary 
education so that students can acquire advanced knowledge and 
practical skills for higher education or  employment. The policy message 
should also pay due consideration to equity in terms of urban-rural, 
gender, and income disparities. 
The second pillar, strengthening education that contributes to 
sustainable growth, demands that quality secondary education, and 
particularly that in mathematics and science, be expanded on the top of 
solid basic education. Added to this, higher education must also be 
expanded to foster, particularly, human resources in science and 
engineering. Technical and vocational education must also be 
strengthened to provide opportunities to learn skills leading to higher 
employability of the working-age population.  
JICA is prepared to contribute to the concerted efforts of the African 
governments and the international community, and take measures as 
shown below, which are combinations of the business models shown 
above and other models and/or modes of cooperation that JICA has at 
its disposal. 
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For the first pillar: scaling up of quality basic education
◆ Enhancing support for “School for All” Project
JICA will continue to expand the model developed in the “School for 
All” project.  Here, with the project model, functional school 
management committees accompanied by strong parent/community 
participation, transparent election of its representatives, and mutual 
learning among school management committees , and continuous 
monitoring by local education administrators, JICA could proceed its 
expansion in the following manner:, (1) scaling up from the pilot 
activities to a nationwide operation, and (2) further improving the 
quality of learning (i.e., securing extra learning time, introducing 
supplementary teaching materials to ensure basic numeracy) in 
countries where the project is already implemented. And, of course, 
the expansion of the model can entail (3) starting projects in new 
partner countries. JICA is of the view that the models developed in 
the School for All projects have been proven effective in bringing 
benefits for those who are in rural and disadvantaged areas, thus can 
contribute to the policy message to be agreed on in TICAD V. 
◆ Construction of school facilities and teacher training institutions 
JICA will continue its support of the construction of schools, while 
fully taking into account the demand/supply of qualified teachers, 
and the need for reducing urban-rural, income, and gender 
disparities. For example, providing girls’ toilets in schools is very 
important to reduce gender disparity in education. In addition, JICA 
will continue its support for constructing teacher training institutions 
to help produce more qualified teachers. JICA is also prepared to 
contribute more to the policy making processes through various 
dialogue channels to offer recommendations on the allocation plan of 
qualified teachers and continuous capacity development of teachers. 
For the second pillar: strengthening education that contributes to 
sustainable growth
◆  Strengthening teacher training (particularly in science and 
mathematics) 
JICA will further reinforce its support for teacher training based on 
the achievements thus far. In so doing, JICA will continue targeting, 
in particular, mathematics and science subjects, as these are 
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important subjects for developing human resources for realizing 
sustainable growth, and yet are difficult for students to master. 
Toward the same goal, JICA will, in particular, make further use of its 
already-established network for strengthening mathematics and 
science education in Africa, namely SMASE-Africa, currently 
covering 34 countries. Using its various models and menus, JICA will 
support the capacity building of teachers in its partner countries. A 
big advantage of SMASE-Africa is that it is a network that enables 
South-South knowledge exchange and co-creation among 
participating countries, with the help of which JICA could partner 
with those partner countries that otherwise are not within easy reach. 
◆ TICAD human development framework 
JICA will support sustainable growth in Africa by reinforcing 
cooperation in science and technology. Typical examples of support 
for the promotion of higher education include those for the Jomo 
Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT) and the 
Egypt-Japan University of Science and Technology (E-JUST). Backed 
by a consortium of Japanese universities, the projects would support 
the upgrading of higher education in these institutions to benefit not 
only the students of the two countries but also many aspiring 
students in the whole of the African continent. In addition, JICA will 
continue to maintain the provision of scholarships. 
For enhancing vocational training, JICA will continue its support for 
related institutions, such as the ones that JICA has supported in 
Senegal and Uganda, which are establishing regional centers of 
excellence (COEs). Such COEs would play active roles in promoting 
intra-region study programs by receiving students from other 
African countries. 
 
Differentiated approaches are needed for countries facing different 
challenges. As illustrated in Figure 6 in Section 1.3, African countries 
could be grouped into four groups. Subsequently, earlier in this 
section, the two important policy messages that TICAD V is likely to 
come up with, has been identified:(1) quality of basic, especially 
primary, education, and (2) the need to intensify human resources 
development for sustainable growth. Finally, four major approaches/
interventions for educational development in Africa that JICA could 
intensify in the coming years have been highlighted. Needless to say, 
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all these approaches and interventions should be put into practice in 
harmony with the sector development framework of the country and 
in consistent with the budgetary (government) and financing 
(overall) framework. For instance, producing more teachers without 
an effective deployment plan or a resource back-up will not improve 
the situations.  Figure 8 shows how JICA’s approaches/interventions 
could correspond to major policy challenges in each Zone. This does 
not mean to limit area and types of JICA’s support for each Zone. 
Specific areas and types of support could be discussed and agreed 
upon through policy dialogues at each country.
Figure 8.  JICA’s support corresponding to stages in education development in 
Africa 
Source: Created by author
For partner countries belonging to zones 1 and 2, the first two of JICA’s 
approaches are to be vigorously pursued. For these countries, the major 
challenges are to improve the primary education enrollment rate and 
improve the primary education completion rate. Thus, the construction 
of primary schools and teacher training institutions will contribute to 
the improvement of such indicators.  This approach will be pursued with 
particular consideration for various social disparities. The “School for 
All” Project will also be intensified vis-à-vis these countries. The 
activities under this approach can improve, in addition to the 
improvement of enrollment in primary education, both the completion 
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rate as well as the quality of primary education. Countries in zones 1 and 
2  also have to address the challenges in the secondary education level, to 
which strengthening teacher training must be stressed, and in 
particular, in science and math that can serve as a foundation for the 
students’ logical thinking abilities and general learning capabilities.
For countries in Zone 3, improving the enrollment rate in secondary 
education is a challenge, and for these countries, JICA could pursue, 
among others, support through  the construction of school facilities and 
teacher training institutions, especially for secondary schools and 
teacher training institutions; more secondary schools are needed to 
accommodate an increasing number of pupils who are to complete 
primary education; and teacher training institutions for supplying 
qualified teachers to meet increasing demands. For countries in Zone 3, 
strengthening teacher training (particularly in science and 
mathematics) is important, since knowledge on science and math is a 
basic need for human resources for further professional training, 
employment and eventually for the country’s sustained growth. And 
finally, countries in this stage of development need to nurture human 
resources competent in science and technology, who will lead the 
country’s industrialization; hence, support for higher education and 
technical/vocational education will be provided through the TICAD V 
human development framework. 
Zone 4 consists of countries that are already beyond the issues of 
enrollment or completion rates up to secondary education, with a 
significant portion of students advancing to higher or vocational 
education. An issue for these countries is how to develop highly 
qualified human resources, particularly in science and technology, by 
developing a system of quality higher education. For these countries, 
support through the TICAD V human development framework would 
be the main vehicle of cooperation. 
In sum, JICA could furthermore commit to work in partnership under 
the education sector program in each country, and contribute to global 
policy dialogues as well as those in local education group with proactive 
and concrete actions and solutions, which could link between policy and 
practice.
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Concluding Remarks
This chapter started with an overview of the current challenges in 
educational development in Africa (Section 1), and then looked at some 
of JICA’s established models of development in education (Section 2). 
Combining these, the paper argued for a possible policy direction that 
JICA could employ in line with the policy message that would be agreed 
on at the TICAD V meeting (Section 3). As I see it, JICA has been active in 
program implementation on the ground, and also, recently, increasingly 
keen to contribute to policy debate at the country and international 
levels. Capitalizing on its comparative advantage that can link policy 
and practice, JICA has a lot to contribute to educational development in 
Africa. The challenges ahead of us are still enormous, and JICA should 
continue providing support for the realization of sustainable growth in 
Africa in partnership with a broad range of actors both from Japan and 
abroad. 
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Chapter 11: 
Countermeasures against Climate Change in 
Africa
Tomonori Sudo
1. Introduction
Climate change is already a reality; various phenomena such as rises in 
global average temperature, floods and drought due to changes in 
precipitation, an increasing number of large-scale typhoons, hurricanes 
and cyclones and other extreme weather events have been observed, 
and, in the long run, rises in sea level caused by the melting of glaciers 
and ice sheets in the Antarctic, and many other serious phenomena 
could be realized. IPCC (2007) predicts that greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
will continue to increase, leading to serious climate change unless 
appropriate actions are taken promptly. The effects of climate change 
could threaten human lives, damage the social capital and the fruits of 
development that both advanced and developing countries have 
accumulated over the decades and centuries.
Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to climate change, 
since in addition to being adversely affected by the consequences of 
climate change such as torrential downpours, drought, the submerging 
of low-altitude areas due to a rise in sea level and so on, their physical 
and social capital is not sufficiently developed to adapt to climate 
change. African continent and other least developed countries (LDCs) 
and small island developing states (SIDS) are countries of particular 
concern for their vulnerability to climate change, as many of their 
inhabitants depend on the natural environment for their livelihoods, and 
those are already vulnerable even under the current climate conditions. 
Thus, climate change will introduce new risks to the Continent, in 
addition to current environmental and socioeconomic stressors. 
On the other hand, Africa contributes the least to ongoing global 
warming, while advanced countries, as well as China, India, and other 
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emerging countries, have attained economic growth while emitting large 
amounts of the GHGs that accompany industrialization.
A number of studies on the impact of climate change, mitigation and 
adaptation and other climate -related activities have been implemented 
in developing countries. Many developing countries have analyzed the 
risks caused by climate change and have formulated mitigation and 
adaptation policies, which have been submitted as National 
Communications to the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (UNFCCC 2012).
Climate change issues are also a critical development agenda, and 
development partners have worked to mainstream climate change 
issues into their development cooperation policies and strategies. The 
OECD has developed policy guidance to integrate climate change 
adaptation into development cooperation (OECD 2009). The World Bank 
featured climate change issues in its 2010 World Development Report 
(World Bank 2010), noting that although climate change is one of many 
issues that developing countries face, “Left unmanaged, climate change 
will reverse development progress and compromise the well-being of 
current and future generations.”(World Bank 2010: 37)
Japan has been an active player in the international community in its 
effort to combat climate change. In1997, the Japanese government 
announced a new initiative named the “Kyoto Initiatives,” advocating 
proactive assistance to developing countries for countermeasures 
against climate change. Of particular note for Africa, the Yokohama 
Action Plan, compiled at TICAD IV in 2008, discusses “Addressing 
Environmental Issues and Climate Change,” along with the need to 
promote measures for mitigating or adapting to climate change, water 
resources conservation, hygiene, and education for sustainable 
development (ESD).
JICA has worked to support countermeasures against climate change in 
Africa based on the Yokohama Action Plan, at the same time revising the 
“Direction of Low Carbon and Resilient Development Cooperation by 
JICA” (JICA 2012). JICA is offering assistance to developing countries in 
their countermeasures against climate change while advocating three 
basic policies: (1) climate compatible sustainable development; (2) 
comprehensive assistance utilizing an array of schemes; and (3) 
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collaboration with development and climate partners.
Against this backdrop, this chapter discusses the challenges and the 
ways to address climate change in Africa. Section 2 gives an overview of 
the general discussion on the importance of such countermeasures; 
Section 3 summarizes the effects of climate change in Africa and the 
situation regarding GHG emissions; Sections 4 through 6 will discuss 
challenges and opportunities regarding climate change, respectively 
focusing on mitigation measures (Section 4), adaptation measures 
(Section 5); and on funding, technologies and market mechanisms 
related to countermeasures against climate change (Section 6). Finally, 
Section 7 proposes five recommendations for the direction of 
international cooperation to be pursued at TICAD V and beyond.
2. Dealing with Climate Change
2.1 Impacts of climate change
Developing countries are highly vulnerable to natural disasters; 
according to a report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) published in 2012, over 95% of the people killed in natural 
disasters between 1970 and 2008 lived in developing countries. They 
suffer not only in terms of human causalities; the economic losses in 
developing countries caused by natural disasters between 2001 and 2006 
were smaller than losses in developed countries in absolute terms, but 
were higher in low-income countries as a percentage of GDP (about 
0.3%) than they were in advanced countries (below 0.1%) (IPCC 2012). 
As shown in Section 1, various phenomena caused by climate change 
will affect to the developing countries severely. Therefore, 
countermeasures against climate change need to include adaptation 
alongside with measures to mitigate exposure to the effects of climate 
change (mitigation). Here, “adaptation” refers to strengthening capacity 
(adaptive capacity) to reduce the vulnerability of people and natural 
systems to risks related to climate change. 
2.2 Mitigation and adaptation
Mitigation includes introducing renewable energy, promoting energy 
conservation, reducing the methane gas generated from livestock waste, 
and increasing CO2 sequestration by afforestation, reforestation and 
forest conservation, and so on. However, these measures must be 
promoted in such a way that they do not impair the benefits of 
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development. Therefore, governments need to formulate appropriate 
plans and strategies to balance both development policies and 
mitigation policies at the national and sectoral level. In addition, 
governments also need to establish socioeconomic systems where 
resources are utilized efficiently and effectively, and to promote 
development and deployment of low-carbon technologies that allow 
these plans and strategies to be realized. 
Measures to deal with the effects of climate change (adaptation) include 
strengthening adaptive capacity against the increasing number of 
meteorological disasters, and infrastructure development to deal with 
the medium- to long-term impact of climate change. However, the 
impacts of climate change are influenced by such diverse factors and 
cannot be fully foreseen. Thus, such adaptation measures need to be 
considered based on the features of the regions, sectors, and 
communities concerned, along with nationwide measures. In order to 
steadily pursue adaptive measures in developing countries, the 
governments need to formulate National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and 
other appropriate strategies and plans at the national and sector level. 
When formulating these plans, it is desirable to take into consideration 
the results of scientific analyses, such as impact assessments, backed up 
by scientific data. However, due to the uncertainty of the impacts of 
climate change, formulating policies based on a precautionary approach 
and a “no regrets policy” will be required, in a way that suits the 
development needs of developing countries.
Furthermore, the governments need to take into consideration the risk of 
“maladaptation” that exacerbates the vulnerability to climate change, 
when they design plans and projects. That is, without appropriate 
measures to avoid maladaptation, the adaptation plan and/or project 
may make the region (or other region) vulnerable further.   Therefore, 
adaptive measures need to be examined with sufficient caution during 
implementation in order to prevent maladaptation, after discerning the 
vulnerability of the targeted strata and how they are affected by climate 
change.
3. Africa and Climate Change
3.1 Greenhouse gas emissions in Africa
As a region, Africa has among the world’s lowest greenhouse gas 
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(GHGs) emissions and contributes the least to climate change. The 
percentage of global GHGs emissions emitted in Africa is lower than that 
of any other region. In 2005, the total GHG emissions from the African 
region were only 6% of the global total. Moreover, GHG emissions in the 
African region are 2.56 tons per capita, which is less than half the global 
average of 5.85 tons per capita (WRI-CAIT 2012). 
At individual country level, however, some countries have large 
emissions. For example, per capita emissions from Equatorial Guinea, 
the Central African Republic, Libya, Gabon, South Africa, Seychelles, 
Angola, and Botswana exceed the global average.
Figure 1. Africa’s Percentage of Global GHG Emissions
WRI-CAIT (2012)
Figure 2. GHG Emissions per Capita in African Countries
WRI-CAIT (2012)
On the other hand, 585 million people (about three-quarters of the 
population in Sub-Saharan Africa) cannot access modern energy, and of 
these people, about 85% live in rural areas and use firewood and other 
biomass fuels for cooking and so on. Furthermore, about 30 countries 
suffer from a chronic shortage of electricity.
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However, energy demands are expected to rise due to the rapid 
economic growth and population increase in recent years. It should be 
noted that if African countries choose to depend on fossil fuels to meet 
these energy demands, GHG emissions from Africa will increase 
significantly (World Bank 2012).
In addition, GHG emissions due to land-use and/or land use change are 
comparatively high in some countries. Those will be increased by further 
land-use change from forest to farms to address increasing food demand 
due to population increase. 
3.2 Impact of climate change in Africa
Africa is one of the regions most impacted by climate change. Table 1 
summarizes climate change trends in Africa and their future impact. In 
Africa, the temperature has risen by 0.5ºC compared to 100 years ago, 
and impacts of El Niño and La Niña phenomena have been aggravated 
due to global warming. Also, the impact of climate change on incomes is 
estimated to reach 1.9–2.7% of GDP. In addition, about 75–250 million 
people will be threatened due to through increased water stress, and 
additional 80 million people be at risk of malaria. 
Table 1.
Trends Impacts
- Africa is warming: Africa is 0.5ºC 
warmer than it was 100 years ago.
Tendency toward greater extremes: 
global warming will exacerbate El 
Niño and La Niña effects.
- Vulnerability is rising: the income 
effects of climate change are 
approximately 1.9–2.7% of GDP in 
Africa.
- Uncertainty remains: the precise 
effects of climate change on Africa are 
not well understood at the country 
level, due to the fact that very few 
countries have their own climate 
change scenarios and risk 
assessments.
- Increased water stress: 75-250 million 
more Africans will be at risk of water 
stress by 2025; arid and semi-arid 
lands are likely to increase by up to 
8%; 25–40% of animal species in 
national parks in sub-Saharan Africa 
are likely to be become endangered.
- Food insecurity: parts of the Sahara 
are expected to suffer agricultural 
losses of up to 7% of GDP.
- Threats to health: an additional 80 
million people will be at risk of 
malaria.
- Sea level rises: coastal zones, 
especially in East Africa, will face 
increased flooding with the 
adaptation bill reaching 10% of GDP.
Source: Adapted from World Economic Forum (2008).
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Climate change seems to have already begun to take its toll in Africa. In 
the past several decades, the average rainfall in Sub-Saharan Africa has 
shown a decreasing trend. Compared to the monthly rainfall between 
1951 and 1980, the average amount in the 2000s has decreased by as 
much as 7 mm. The reduction ratio is 2.5 times that of Asia and more 
than 10 times that of Latin American and the Caribbean countries. The 
instability and decrease in rainfall poses a food security threat to Africa, 
where over 90% of agriculture depends on rainfall (UNDP 2012).
Also, Africa is a region where abnormal temperatures, droughts, 
wildfires, and other climatic disasters take place at the second highest 
frequency in the world, after East Asian and the Pacific. Even though 
other natural disasters such as floods and violent storms occur less 
frequently here than in other areas, their number has increased at the 
second highest rate in the world and the affected population has tripled 
in the past decade (UNDP 2012).
Climate change is believed to aggravate the frequency and intensity of 
extreme weather phenomena. There are concerns that this in turn could 
have serious impacts not only on agriculture and water resources, but 
also on ecological systems and gene resources, as exemplified by the 
expansion of disease vector habitats and the extinction of plant and 
animal species (IPCC 2011).
4. Mitigation Measures in Africa
4.1  Challenges and opportunities regarding mitigation measures in 
Africa
As noted above, Africa contributes the least to ongoing global warming, 
while advanced countries, as well as China, India, and other emerging 
countries, have attained economic growth while emitting large amounts 
of the GHGs that accompany industrialization. In many African 
countries, where economic development and poverty reduction are the 
most urgent issues, expectations are high that economic development 
and poverty reduction will be realized by following the same path 
toward industrialization as these advanced and emerging countries, 
while effectively utilizing their own resources in the region. Moreover, 
there is an urgent need for improved access to energy in view of the fact 
that three-quarters of the population in the region have not had access to 
energy and have endured chronic electricity shortages, and also because 
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energy demands are expected to increase as the economy and 
population grow.
Thus, although the lack of economic infrastructure development is an 
important challenge for Africa, this situation may be an opportunity for 
Africa to move toward greener and more sustainable development, in a 
manner unlike that adopted by  the advanced and emerging countries. 
Africa has a potential to develop renewable clean energy. For example, 
Africa holds 15% of the global hydroelectric power generation potential, 
but only about 10% of this has been developed (World Bank 2012). 
Besides hydroelectric power generation, there is also high potential for 
photovoltaic power, solar thermal power, wind power, geothermal 
power, and biomass energy. By utilizing these resources effectively, the 
risks accompanying fluctuations in the international price of crude oil 
and other fossil fuels may be reduced. In addition, there is a potential for 
Africa to improve efficiency of energy/resource use by leapfrogging to 
more efficient technologies and infrastructure.
Africa also has great potential for carbon sequestration and storage. The 
tropical forests in Africa’s Congo Basin constitute the second largest such 
area in the world. However, these forests have been continuing to shrink 
and deteriorate due to farmland conversion, excessive logging, forest 
fires, and other factors. According to the FAO, the global forest area 
shrank by about 13 million hectares a year on average between 2000 and 
2010, which is equivalent to one-third of Japan’s national land area. Of 
this, Africa accounts for 3.4 million hectares (FAO 2010). The need to 
conserve forests, where these natural resources and carbon are stocked, 
has increased. The Congo Basin is an effective carbon sequestration and 
storage resource, and is also high in biodiversity. Congo Basin may be 
benefitted by Introducing Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES), such as 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation plus 
conservation, the sustainable management of forests and enhancement 
of forest carbon stocks (REDD+), since PES could add new economic 
value to natural resources which has not yet been appropriately valued.
The sections that follow present a sector-by-sector discussion of the 
challenges and opportunities related to mitigation measures.
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4.2 Energy sector
Improving access to energy is important in view of making progress in 
industrialization, the poverty reduction accompanied by industrial 
development, and expanding opportunities to access education and 
medical services. In order to address increasing in energy demands, the 
governments need to consider stable energy supply while also attending 
to preventing pollution and conserving the natural environment. 
Africa also has abundant potential for renewable energy, as exemplified 
by the photovoltaic power and solar thermal power that could be 
obtained from the ample sunlight in the Sahara Desert and surrounding 
areas, the geothermal energy found mainly in the Great Rift Valley, the 
copious source of hydroelectric energy found mainly along large 
international rivers, and the wind power capacity found mainly along 
the coastal areas. Crude oil and other fossil fuels have also been found in 
the region. Those resources could help the government to establish a low 
carbon society, if the government promotes proactive use of renewable 
energy and the cleaner use of limited fossil fuel resources appropriate to 
the economic and technology level of each country.
In addition, GHG emissions could be reduced if a more efficient and 
stable power supply were made possible by developing of efficient 
power transmission networks and regional power interchange systems 
based on power pooling. In remote regions, access to energy could be 
improved by utilizing small-scale power generation by hydroelectric 
power, solar power, wind power, and biomass power, as well as 
independent small-scale grids. However, the use of low-carbon energy 
requires efforts on the user side such as energy conservation in addition 
to those on the supplier side. Energy users in rural areas need to convert 
the traditional types of fuel and methods to modern and more thermally 
efficient methods.
To support African countries’ efforts toward increasing their energy 
efficiency, JICA has assisted in renewable energy projects including wind 
power generation in Egypt and geothermal power generation in Kenya, 
research to utilize solar energy in the Sahara Desert, and the 
development of efficient power transmission and distribution networks 
in Tanzania and Cameroon, and so on.
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4.3 Transportation and urban sectors
Developing the transportation infrastructure is also important to 
promote economic growth. On the other hand, economic growth could 
lead to increasing fuel demands and GHG emissions as road 
transportation demands increase. If the development of high-traffic 
arterial roads is insufficient, the increased traveling time caused by 
traffic jams could hinder economic growth and lead to excessive fuel 
consumption. Also, if the transportation infrastructure is vulnerable to 
the foreseeable natural disasters due to climate change, the transport of 
necessary goods could be impaired in times of disaster, and economic 
activities could be impeded until recovery is achieved. Therefore, the 
introduction of low-carbon transportation systems that have sufficient 
resilience to withstand disasters need to be considered when examining 
transportation system development. 
JICA has assisted African countries in transport infrastructure in various 
ways: one typical example is the development of arterial roads such as 
the Nacala Corridor of Mozambique; another is logistics improvement 
by developing one stop border posts to reduce congestion at borders. 
Urbanization has progressed rapidly in major urban areas. Urban plans 
should be revised by reallocating urban functions more efficiently, 
according to the development stage of the city, and in the medium- to 
long-term, disasters-resilient low-carbon urban development should be 
attempted.  As such medium- to long-term projects, the introduction of 
railroads and Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems may be possible options 
mainly in large- and medium-scale cities.
4.4 Forest management
As discussed above, Africa has an abundance of diverse forest resources, 
as exemplified by the Congo basin, which is the world’s second largest 
area of tropical forests. Forest conservation is important for increasing 
the water-retention capacity of the soil and mitigating the scale and 
frequency of natural disasters, in addition to retaining a resource for 
absorbing GHGs. In other words, forest conservation is expected to have 
both mitigating and adaptive effects. On the other hand, Africa has one 
of the highest percentages of forest reduction in the world. The 
percentage of forest coverage in the Sub-Saharan region fell from 31.2% 
in 1990 to 28.1% by 2010. This reduction is attributed to the excessive 
exploitation of forest resources caused by population growth, the 
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accompanying fulfillment of basic needs, and economic development, as 
well as the conversion of forests to other uses (AUC et al. 2012).
Mitigation measures with the aim of reducing GHGs by curbing forest 
reduction in developing countries were on the agenda for the first time 
at the 11th meeting of member countries to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (COP11). 
Subsequently, Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest 
Degradation (REDD) was officially adopted as one of the topics for 
consideration under the Bali Action Plan at COP13, and it was decided in 
the Copenhagen accord at COP15 to pursue the development of a 
REDD+ framework.
The introduction of Payments for Ecosystem Services, such as carbon 
sequestration and storage by forest resources (REDD+), is expected to 
provide an incentive for forest conservation in the Congo basin and 
other places where forest destruction is underway.1
In forest conservation, it is important for the policy makers and project 
developers to consider residents who depend on forest resources for 
their livelihoods. It is also important for the government to steadily 
promote the sustainable use of forest resources in a way that contributes 
to sustainable forest management, poverty reduction, and regional 
development. Communities that depend on forests for their subsistence 
have sometimes used appropriate forest conservation techniques as part 
of their regional traditions. These indigenous technologies could also be 
used for effective forest conservation. Also, for reviving deteriorated 
forests, sustainable forest management needs to be promoted by trading 
sustainably produced lumber, along with planting and replanting trees 
in Africa and other areas.
5. Adaptation Plans in Africa
5.1 Challenges and opportunities for adaptation plans in Africa
There is growing concern for Africa about extreme weather, such as the 
historical drought in the Horn of Africa in 2011, and on food security. 
Even if a significant reduction in CO2 is realized globally, it will still take 
a long time for GHG concentrations in the atmosphere and the climate 
system to stabilize, and the adverse effects from future climate change 
1. JICA has assisted in forest conservation programs in the Congo Basin, Gabon, Ghana, 
Malawi, and other countries.
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could expand. Especially in Africa, where many of the poor live in rural 
areas and depend on natural resources for their livelihoods, including 
rain-fed farming, the impact of climate change is a huge threat to 
achieving inclusive development, since poor people will mainly be 
affected by the impact of climate change Water resources are not just 
used for drinking water and cultivating food for subsistence, but also for 
many other uses, including for power generation and as industrial 
water. In addition, in urban areas, due to rapid urbanization and 
population increases, improvements in urban infrastructure such as 
water supply, sewerage and drainage systems have been delayed, and 
measures to combat floods are also urgently required. From this 
viewpoint, it is necessary for the governments to consider appropriate 
water resource management including management of forest as source 
of water, improvements in food productivity, improvements in water 
supply and sewerage systems, and the appropriate reuse of water 
resources as cross-sectoral theme.
Another threat to development posed by climate change is loss of 
developmental dividend due to the increase in natural disasters. The 
higher frequency of natural disasters and their increased intensity may 
lead to a loss in the human, social, and natural capital that has been 
amassed thus far, and could wipe out all the efforts to reduce poverty 
that have been made to date. This makes efforts to prevent disasters and 
reduce their impacts essential to securing the benefits of development..
Furthermore, responses to future climate must be considered with 
regard to existing infrastructure as well as in the creation of new 
infrastructure. For example, an irrigation facility would require the 
installation of water-saving equipment so as to withstand the adverse 
effects of changes in precipitation brought by climate change. For 
developing countries to create a society and economy capable of 
withstanding the effects of medium- to long-term climate change, the 
establishment of climate-proof infrastructure will be required.
In many cases, water resource management and disaster prevention will 
require a cross-border response. Especially in Africa, with its many 
international rivers, cooperation among watershed nations is important. 
Since this is an area where benefits are maximized through cooperation 
as opposed to through settlement by disputes, a policy dialogue among 
countries and the formation of cooperative groups involving various 
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stakeholders, such as private enterprises, citizen organizations, and 
communities, could maximize benefits, as well as accelerate regional 
unification, which in turn could lead to expanding markets and new 
business opportunities (AfDB 2012).
To tackle those challenges and to take an advantage of opportunities, 
African countries need to improve climate information for informed 
decision making, tailored solutions including development of early 
warning system, seasonal forecasts and regional level climate change 
projections.
The sections that follow will discuss, sector-wise, the challenges and 
opportunities concerning response measures.
5.2 Agricultural sector
Being dependent on rainwater and lacking adequate distribution 
systems, Africa has traditionally been very vulnerable to shocks such as 
droughts and floods. For example, between 2010 and 2011, the Horn of 
Africa region suffered a severe drought, and more than 10 million people 
faced a serious food crisis. While the region has periodically suffered 
severe damage in the past, in recent years the rainwater cycle has 
become more irregular, and the amount of actual precipitation is falling. 
Agriculture is a source of wealth and poverty reduction in Africa, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. Indeed, the share of employment in agriculture 
is 65% in the region, and still constitutes a large 32% share of GDP, one-
third of the economic development factor (World Bank 2008). In the past, 
Africa increased production by expanding its cultivated acreage; 
however, cultivated acreage per capita has been declining due to 
demographic pressure, and, coupled with stagnant land productivity, 
this has resulted in a drop in grain production per capita.
Economic growth and strong demographic pressure have caused food 
consumption needs to expand rapidly, worsening the domestic supply 
and demand balance and increasing its dependency on food imports. In 
other words, Africa is highly vulnerable to external conditions such as a 
sharp increase in international food prices and bad weather 
accompanied by climate changes.
Although improvements in agricultural productivity are urgently 
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required in Africa, improving productivity alone will not necessarily 
make the region less vulnerable or more resilient. Further measures 
should be considered for the government and farmers; for example, 
agricultural infrastructure development such as irrigation facilities to 
help farmers adapt to climate change, development of crop and 
cultivation methods, and the introduction of agricultural techniques 
adaptive to climate change. JICA is helping to improve the cultivation 
system to respond to the droughts and floods caused by climate change. 
The private sector will play an important role in assisting local farmers 
to improve their productivity and enhancing the commercial values of 
the products through their investment and technology transfer, making 
their agricultural product competitive in the market. Particularly, 
foreign agricultural investments are needed in strengthening the 
production capacity of developing countries, and it is important for the 
governments to continue promoting this.2 On the other hand, if plans are 
poorly structured and implemented, international agricultural 
investment could have unintended negative effects on the political 
stability of the recipient nation, as well as on its social cohesion, human 
security, sustainable food production, food safety on a household level, 
and environmental protection. It may also lead to local residents losing 
access to resources they depend on. Furthermore, land transactions are a 
very sensitive issue. In Africa, where laws and regulations concerning 
land use are not well established and where communal land use is a 
traditional norm, international land transactions can trigger a serious, 
emotionally charged backlash. At the L’Aquila Summit in 2009, the G8 
nations highlighted the Promotion of Responsible Agricultural 
Investment, a comprehensive approach to promoting global agricultural 
development through increased investment while mitigating the 
negative effects of international agricultural investment. In September 
2009, the “Principles of Responsible Agricultural Investment that 
Respects Rights, Livelihoods, and Resources,”3 consisting of seven 
principles, were announced.4 The expectation is that through 
agricultural investments conducted in line with these principles, 
agricultural infrastructure will be developed and technology to improve 
agricultural productivity by sustainable methods will be introduced 
2. See Chapter 4 of this volume for more detailed discussion on investments in agriculture. 
3. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/food_security/pdfs/besshi3.pdf
4. Refer to the Knowledge Exchange Platform for Responsible Agricultural Investment (RAI),
  https://www.responsibleagroinvestment.org/rai/.
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(refer to Chapter 3).
Since the agricultural sector is the most vulnerable to climate change, 
another idea would be to establish a structure to cover losses from 
climate aberrations, such as a climate index insurance policy.
5.3 Disaster prevention and reduction
In recent years, many African countries have been hit by large-scale 
natural disasters, such as floods, droughts, coastal erosion, and 
mudslides. With the increasing frequency of natural disasters, the risks 
they pose and their influence on social and economic development are 
also rising. However, their effects are varied, and a case-by-case 
response is required. At the UN World Conference on Disaster 
Prevention in 2005, the Hyogo Framework for Action was adopted as an 
international framework for disaster prevention. In accordance with the 
Hyogo Framework for Action, it is important for the governments to 
establish disaster prevention plans in line with the priority that each 
country places on them.
To respond to large-scale disasters accompanying future climate change, 
meteorological and climate observation capabilities must be improved, 
and an early warning and evacuation system structure constructed on 
the bases of an accurate meteorological and climate change forecasting 
system. In addition, there is a need to improve climate change risk 
management capabilities in infrastructure development at a sector level, 
such as agricultural development, water resources management, and 
traffic, to mainstream disaster prevention and the rapid recovery from 
disasters.
In addition to conducting disaster prevention training in African 
countries, JICA is cooperating in programs to enhance response 
capabilities in countries including Benin, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, and 
Lesotho, helping to increase their resistance to natural disasters.
Hosono (2012) points out that there are three kinds of gaps between the 
capabilities required for disaster prevention and the actual levels of such 
capabilities, which are (1) the level required for addressing expected 
impact of disaster (a disaster scenario), (2) the level required for a level 
exceeding a disaster scenario, and (3) the level required to respond to 
long-term changes. To close these gaps, there are cases in which the 
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traditional techniques handed down in the community or the 
technologies used in other developing countries are more favorable than 
the latest technology. In such cases, cooperation through South-South 
cooperation or triangular cooperation may be effective.
To respond to a temporary shortage of funds in case a massive disaster 
occurs, systems such as standby-type loans and insurance could be 
utilized as safety nets.
5.4 Water resources management
Water resources are an important component in almost all development 
sectors. Among others, water demand is expected to increase due to the 
expansion of agricultural and industrial production and the energy 
sector as well as increasing demand of safe water supply for human 
lives, while the changes in precipitation accompanying climate change, 
and the decreased water retention capability due to the reduction of 
forest resources are all likely to cause an unstable water supplies. Africa 
has not been able to fully develop the potential of its rich renewable 
water resources (UNECA et al. 2011). Therefore, developing these 
potential renewable water resources and appropriately managing water 
resources are important issues for Africa.
Africa has a number of international rivers like the Nile and the Congo, 
and approximately three-quarters of its surface water resources, 
estimated at 4.6 trillion cubic meters annually, are concentrated in eight 
major international rivers (World Bank 2009). This makes it essential to 
conduct cross-border water resource management and to establish 
master plans and enhance governance to conduct optimal Integrated 
Water Resource Management (IWRM) for each watershed, which would 
include the appropriate development of surface and ground water and 
the purification and recycling of industrial and living discharge water. 
Africa has established an Africa Water Vision for 2025, which aims to 
provide an environment in which all people will have equal access to 
water resources, be able to use these for power generation and 
agriculture, create an enabling environment for IWRM, and integrate 
regions based on watersheds (UNECA et al. 2011).
Reservoirs can be an effective response to an unstable water supply 
(World Bank 2009). However, a safe water supply will have a different 
meaning for urban and rural areas. In urban areas, improvements in the 
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water supply system will be required to deal with the increase in 
population caused by the inflow of people into the areas. On the other 
hand, since many people lack access to safe water in rural areas, one 
urgent issue for the governments is to establish in these communities a 
system and infrastructure for a stable supply of safe water. JICA is 
currently assisting rural water supply projects in Djibouti and Ethiopia.
6.  The Funding, Technology, and Market Mechanisms Associated 
with Climate Change Measures
The demand for funds to implement these measures is huge. As 
discussed in Chapter 7, there is a high demand for funds for 
infrastructure improvement in Africa. AFD-WB 2009 calculated the 
infrastructure funding needs for 2006–2015 to be US$93.3 billion, and the 
financial gap between this amount and that already expended to be 
US$48.0 billion. Of this, the funding gap, excluding the efficiency gap 
(US$17.0 billion), was calculated at US$31.0 billion (AFD-WB 2009). 
According to an estimate by the AfDB 2011, the funding needs 
accompanying climate change measures will be around US$9–12 billion 
annually, if Africa is to take the low-carbon development route, and the 
incremental cost if appropriate measures are not taken now is estimated 
to be around US$13–19 billion (AfDB 2011).
At COP16, the Cancun Agreement was established (UNFCCC 2010), 
which clearly stated that in the three years between 2010 and 2012, 
developed countries would provide funding aid of almost US$30 billion 
to developing countries in the area of climate change (“fast-start” 
finance). It also agreed to establish a Green Climate Fund that would 
make US$100 billion in funds available annually by 2020 (long-term 
funds).
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Figure 3. Flow of Funds to Africa
Source: UNCTAD, OECD/DAC, and World Bank. IMF’s GDP forecast for 2012.
Extracted from Africa Economic Outlook (2012)
As indicated in Figure 3, the flow of funds is on the increase. This fund 
flow includes not only ODA, but also contains a large amount of foreign 
direct investment from the private sector. As private fund is also one of 
major finance sources, government need to consider to mobilise private 
funds, not just public funds, so as to finance in climate change measures. 
For further mobilisation of funds for climate change measures, African 
countries need to strengthen the absorptive capacity for climate funding 
and improve enabling environment for private sectors.
Particularly, the governments need to engage diverse actors 
comprehensively in planning and establishing; climate change policies, 
such as Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) and 
National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), as part of their development 
policies; information sharing and dissemination with related parties in 
transparent manner; and implementation of measures based on an 
appropriate budget. The climate change program loans now being 
implemented in Indonesia and Vietnam are donor support schemes for 
these activities. In these schemes, the donor and the government of the 
developing country engage in dialogues on the provision of financial 
support, through which they monitor and evaluate the implementation 
status of a climate change policy scheme matrix. These schemes provide 
an efficient way for governments to implement climate change policies 
such as NAMAs and NAPs as part of their development policies, work 
toward transparently sharing and disseminating information with 
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related parties, and implement measures based on an appropriate 
budget (Sudo et al. 2008, Katsurai and Murakami 2012). On the other 
hand, Furukawa et al. (2013) have surveyed the effects of general budget 
support in the health sector and concluded that although there have 
been certain improvements in budget allocations in this sector, these 
have had a limited effect on improving health indicators.  They comment 
that general funding support and the complementary effects of the 
projects and programs require attention. The complementary effects 
between policy, budget, and project, as pointed out before, should be 
considered carefully, when policy planner consider to introduce a 
climate change program loan.
There is also a strong need in Africa for appropriate low-carbon 
technologies for enhancing development that is resistant to the effects of 
climate change. The Cancun Agreements also included an agreement to 
establish a Climate Technology Center and Networks, in order to expand 
and promote the development and transfer of technology to assist in 
mitigation and adaptation, and to understand and support technical 
needs in developing countries. To promote the use of appropriate 
technology, various activities, such as formulating systematic 
capabilities and data-gathering capabilities, and establishing systems to 
share knowledge, will be required in addition to training human 
resources.
These technical and investment needs could also create an attractive 
market for private companies. Establishing an attractive market 
environment for private companies to introduce technology and 
investments could help promote climate change measures in the private 
sector.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), one of the market 
mechanisms introduced under the Kyoto Protocol, was expected to 
promote the active participation of the private sector in the mitigation 
business, and over 5,500 projects have been registered to date. However, 
as of the end of December 2012, only 104 projects, a mere 1.9%, were in 
Africa (UNFCCC 2012). It has been pointed out that the current CDMs 
have not been able to fulfill the functions intended at the Kyoto Protocol 
due to the complexity of the applications and fundraising for low-profit 
projects (Yamada and Fujimori 2012). The use of market mechanisms, 
such as a simplified CDM or a bilateral offset credit system mechanism, 
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could act as an incentive for private companies to provide investments 
and technical transfers, and efforts to improve the system and develop 
the ability to effectively utilize these mechanisms are important.
7.  Toward the Effective Promotion of Climate Change Measures 
in Africa
As mentioned above, climate change is a cross-cutting issue and a 
problem that has possible global effects. This means that instead of 
individual actors such as countries, sectors, or communities responding 
in an ad-hoc manner, it requires a comprehensive approach spanning 
various strata from the individual and community level to the 
governmental and regional level, and there is a need to resolve the 
“apparent disconnect” generated between a policy-based top-down 
approach and a community-based bottom-up approach (Bharwani and 
Taylor 2011). In addition, the activities of each actor must be considered 
from the viewpoint of externalities that influences the actions of others. 
For example, an adaptive policy taken by one community might trigger 
a maladaptation that could exacerbate the disaster damage in another 
community. Therefore, to effectively implement climate change 
measures, information sharing among a wide range of actors is 
important, from the international level down to the community level.
Although Africa has the world’s lowest amount of GHG emissions, it is 
affected the most by climate change. For Africa to maximize its natural 
resource potential in a sustainable, low-carbon way, and be resilient to 
external shocks such as the effects of climate change, it must engage in 
sustainable development in which everyone can receive the benefits of 
growth. In other words, Africa is in a position to target sustainable 
development through inclusive and resilient green growth. Africa’s 
climate change measures are themselves the start of a new development 
process.
Regarding its support for climate change measures in developing 
countries, the Japanese government announced the Kyoto Initiative in 
1999, the Environmental Conservation Initiative for Sustainable 
Development (EcoISD) in 2002, the Cool Earth Partnership in 2008, and 
the Hatoyama Initiative in 2009. Climate change was incorporated into 
the Yokohama action plan, at TICAD IV, and as part of the Cool Earth 
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Partnership, US$92.1 million in funding was declared in the action plan 
to support climate change measures in African countries. In the three 
years from 2010 through 2012, a total of approximately US$1.3 billion 
was provided, as support for climate change measures in Africa, 
covering both mitigation measures and adaptation measures. Japan and 
JICA have more than fifteen years of experience in the area of climate 
change measures, and as the largest donor in this field, JICA supports 
many projects and programs. It has extensive knowledge on the 
establishment and implementation of promotion methods and the 
planning and implementation of specific policies related to climate 
change measures (such as energy, traffic, and agricultural policies), as 
well as in the measurement, reporting, and verification of GHG 
reduction effects using Climate-FIT, in vulnerability assessments, and in 
the methods used to assess project effects through post-project 
evaluations. This knowledge should be used effectively to support 
climate change measure policies in Africa. Based on the discussions 
above, we offer the following recommendations for the effective 
promotion of future climate change measures in Africa.
Recommendation 1:
It is necessary to establish climate change policies in accordance 
with the conditions of each country as part of its development 
policies, share and disseminate this information with stakeholders 
in a transparent manner, and implement it with appropriate budget 
allocation.
The climate change policies established by governments, such as 
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) and National 
Adaptation Plans (NAPs), are prepared as part of each country’s 
development policy, and it is desirable for these climate change policies 
to generate co-benefits that will contribute to sustainable development 
(Fujikura and Toyota 2012). Many countries in Africa have already 
created NAMAs. In addition, LDCs have already prepared National 
Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs). These clear, foreseeable, and 
stable policies lend credibility to the activities of actors, including in 
private investment. In establishing these policies, the opinions of actors 
in the private sector and civil society organisations (CSOs), as well as 
those of women and the poor, should also be actively incorporated along 
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with those of the government. Furthermore, although the use of data 
based on scientific analysis is recommended wherever possible, such as 
the amount of GHG emissions and forecasts of the effects of climate 
change (Fujikura and Kawanishi, 2010), it is also necessary for the policy 
makers to respond to the needs of their respective countries based on 
precautionary principles and the concept of a “no regrets” policy, taking 
into consideration the capabilities of the subject sector, region, 
community, and others.
To support these activities, in addition to supporting projects or 
programmes, schemes such as climate change loans can be effective, but 
great care should be taken with regard to the mutually complementary 
nature of policy, budget, and project policy, as well as the leverage effects 
of general funding support.
Recommendation 2:
For effective Green Growth in Africa, support for access to information 
as well as innovation through R&D are important to identify 
opportunities for low-carbon and climate resilient growth and promote 
effective green growth.
Access to information is the most important factor in today’s society, not 
only for disseminating climate change policies, but also for providing 
disaster information or information concerning low-carbon technologies 
and funding access. It is also important for a country in determining how 
it can apply climate change measures implemented by other nations or 
communities, or what effect they could have. Making greater use of 
information and communication technology (ICT) is one way to improve 
access to this information. Sharing information and knowledge through 
policy dialogues is another effective method. In addition, the NAMAs 
established by each country require monitoring, reporting, and 
verification (MRV), and securing the transparency and accountability of 
information through MRV will enable the implementation of 
appropriate climate change policies in a plan-do-check-act (PDCA) 
cycle. Furthermore, access to technical information will promote a 
country’s introduction of technology that is internationally available and 
it can utilize, and could lead to the development of technology enabling 
leap-frogging. We must not forget that appropriate technical information 
includes not only cutting-edge technologies, but also information on 
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traditional technologies, which can be very useful at times. Technology 
transfers are expected to include not only transfers from developed 
countries, but also transfers between developing countries through 
South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation (Hosono 2012).
From the viewpoint of inclusivity using environmental education to 
enhance people’s awareness of climate change is important, particular 
for the poor, who are vulnerable to the effects of climate change, and also 
for women, and future generations.
Recommendation 3:
It is necessary to establish an enabling environment where everyone, 
including the private sector, will participate in various climate change 
measures.
It is important for the public sector to establish a path toward the 
creation of a low-carbon economic society resilient to climate change 
through policies and system improvements. However, the public sector 
itself neither manufactures nor conducts business transactions on its 
own. Everyone, not just private companies and CSOs, but also poor and 
socially vulnerable people, is involved in certain economic and social 
activities. In view of the public and external nature of global-scale 
climate change, the participation of all is required for a low-carbon, 
socio-economic model that is resilient to climate change.
In particular, high expectations are placed on the private sector’s 
participation in climate change measures, in terms of its broad influence, 
funds, technology, and ability to increase employment. As pointed out 
by JICA-RI (2012), in addition to support from the policy side, in order to 
promote the participation of the private sector, actions will be required 
including organizing an investment environment such as stable 
macroeconomic operations, establishing fair and transparent legal 
systems, promoting business models such as public-private partnerships 
(PPPs), and providing support and seed money for establishing projects.
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Recommendation 4:
To promote climate change actions, it is necessary for African 
countries to use market mechanisms effectively along with the effective 
use of funds and promotion of capability development
The implementation of specific climate change measures requires funds 
and implementation capabilities. The Cancun Adaptation Framework 
requires annual funds of US$100 billion to be made available by 2020, as 
well as the structuring of a system to enable effective technology 
transfers; there is also a strong need for funds for climate change 
measures and technology in African countries. The effective use of funds 
is required, as well as the development of ways to maximize the effects 
of development and climate change measures while minimizing 
additional costs. Funding for climate change was discussed at the 2011 
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, and the partnership document 
it adopted calls for the promotion of consistency, transparency, and 
predictability in effective climate change finance and a broad approach 
toward development aid (OECD 2011).
In addition to their effective use for supporting climate change 
measures, public funds are also expected to provide leverage in 
obtaining private funds,. Establishing a structure and environment to 
promote private investment can also contribute to an overall increase in 
private investment, beyond climate change measures. Moreover, by 
monitoring and evaluating the efforts of the donors involved, even more 
effective cooperation could be possible. Lamhauge et al. (2012) have 
conducted studies on monitoring and evaluation methods with regard 
to several donors’ support for adaptation measures. Such monitoring 
and evaluation methods focusing on the role of donors should be 
examined in the future.
Market mechanisms like CDM and bilateral offset credit mechanisms, or 
innovative mechanisms like PES, including REDD+, can be easy for 
African countries to work with. As pointed out by JICA-RI (2012), in 
order for these mechanisms to be used effectively to benefit African 
countries, it is necessary to develop the capabilities of the African 
countries themselves, and to introduce these mechanisms into 
international society so they can become even easier to use.
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Recommendation 5:
JICA needs to function as a Solution Provider by establishing 
partnerships with various stakeholders..
From the viewpoint of the public and external nature of climate change 
on a global scale, an approach to climate change must be taken with the 
participation of all people. Japan and JICA have more than fifteen years 
of cooperation experience in the field of climate change, and also 
constitute the top donor in this field. Particularly, Japan and JICA have 
comparative advantage in effective use of renewable resources, 
improvement of efficiency and productivity with optimal management, 
and so on. There is a need to proceed with cooperation to implement the 
optimal climate change measures, with Japan and JICA providing all the 
cooperation knowledge they have amassed to date for everyone to use. 
In recent years, other donors have also started to provide active support 
for climate change measures. Further knowledge is also being amassed 
in the academic and private sectors. In order to establish a low-carbon 
economic society with the ability to withstand climate change, all this 
knowledge needs to be utilized in an intercomplementary manner so 
that all people, including the poor, will be able to receive the benefits of 
development. Providing an optimal solutions by establishing networks 
with various actors while keeping in mind international negotiations, 
technology, and funding trends in the climate change field will be 
required. To do this, we recommend establishing a broad collaboration 
among international organizations, other aid organizations, CSOs, 
universities, autonomous bodies, private companies and others, as well 
as providing bridges for exchanges among various actors, such as 
mediating policy dialogues between communities and governments.
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Chapter 12: 
State-building and Conflict Prevention in 
Africa
Ryutaro Murotani
1. Introduction
Violent conflicts have been one of the major obstacles to economic 
growth and development in Africa.1 However, in the 2000s, according to 
the UCDP/PRIO datasets, the African continent witnessed a decrease in 
the number of armed conflicts and battle-related deaths compared to the 
1990s. After the end of the Cold War, the number of armed conflicts in 
the world hit its peak in the early 1990s, but started to decline from 1993. 
In Africa, the number continued to increase to 18 in 1998, but started to 
decrease in the early 2000s (refer to Figure 1). The battle-related deaths 
per year in Africa, which used to be some 20,000 to 80,000 in the late 
1990s, are some 3,000 to 10,000 in recent years. Today, Africa is no longer 
a continent with many large-scale violent conflicts.
Although the negative impact of violence has declined, we need to 
remain attentive to potential risks and continue to work on peace-
building and conflict prevention. Conflict risks are still major concerns 
for foreign investors. According to a JETRO survey (2013), political and 
social instability is the largest concern for Japanese investors in Africa, 
and more companies are worried about it in 2012 than in 2007.
In the past, some countries suddenly became unstable and fell into 
violent conflict; there are only 15 countries in Africa that have gone 
through the past three decades without any armed conflict (based on 
UCDP/PRIO’s criteria). Besides, many countries experienced the 
1. Although the statistics provided in the first section cover the entire African continent, the 
main focus of this chapter is countries in Sub-Sahara Africa. Having gone through the Arab 
Spring in 2011, many of the countries in North Africa are facing the challenge of a transition to 
more stable democratic rule. Though there are some similarities and inter-connectedness in 
challenges of state-building in North Africa and Sub-Sahara Africa, contexts and 
characteristics differ so widely that it would be difficult to address both regions in the limited 
length of this chapter.
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recurrence of conflict in a transition period from conflict to sustainable 
peace. As discussed in World Bank (2011), post-conflict peace-building is 
a long-term endeavor, which requires more than a decade of institution-
building efforts. 
Alarmingly, a new type of conflict is on the rise in recent several years, 
producing an upward trend in the number of armed conflicts. Today, 
there are many conflicts in which trans-national non-state actors such as 
Al-Shabaab, AQIM, FDLR, and LRA are involved. The recent tragic 
incident in Algeria demonstrated the political and security risks posed 
by these non-state armed groups to foreign investors.
Figure 1.  Number of armed conflicts in Africa (top) and in the rest of the world 
(bottom)
Source: Author’s calculation based on UCDP/PRIO datasets2
2. “Internationalized” conflicts are ones that occurred between the government of a state and 
one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary 
parties) on one or both sides. “Extrasystemic” armed conflict occurs between a state and a 
non-state group outside its own territory (mostly colonial or imperial wars).
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As the characteristics of violent conflicts have shifted from purely 
internal strife to violence and fragility caused by transnational non-state 
actors, capable state institutions that provide basic public services, 
including public safety in remote areas, are a significant element in 
preventing these problems. The lack of such capable institutions is one of 
the reasons that allow transnational non-state actors to be active in these 
fragile areas. The building of an “effective, legitimate, and resilient state” 
(OECD 2008, 7) is definitely necessary to address such problems.
Coercive measures are frequently needed to counter terrorists, however, 
it is also essential to look at structural problems that lead to these 
phenomena. To prevent the spread of the general public’s support for 
these non-state armed groups, poverty, inequality, and other social 
problems need to be addressed. It also requires a political/social 
mechanism that articulates citizens’ expectations and enables the state to 
respond to society’s demands. In this sense, state-building is a vital 
endeavor for achieving a stable and peaceful Africa.
The chapter discusses the challenges of state-building in Africa, 
particularly in relation to conflict prevention. It first highlights 
important points, which have been raised by existing literature and 
discussions, concerning state-building (Section 2). It emphasizes the 
importance of state legitimacy in the eyes of the people, livelihood 
improvement in addition to public safety, and a long-term perspective 
for state-building. Section 3 then introduces major research findings by 
JICA-RI and a JICA survey of its operations. For donors to help improve 
state legitimacy, the section calls attention to context-sensitivity, 
horizontal inequalities (HIs), and people’s perceptions. In Section 4, 
JICA’s current field experience related to state-building will be 
discussed. On the basis of the analysis in Section 2 and Section 3 and the 
review in Section 4, the final section will present policy implications for 
the future.
2. State-building: Building of Capable and Legitimate Institutions
Through their experiences of post-conflict peace-building, the 
international community, acknowledging the high risk of the recurrence 
of violent conflict, expanded its focus from short-term emergency 
response to long-term institution building. Not only in post-conflict 
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settings but in general, to prevent violent conflicts and establish public 
safety, state institutions with sufficient capacity to maintain law and 
order are indispensable. However, to effectively maintain public order, 
the state needs to be recognized as legitimate by society. In short, 
effective state-building needs the consolidation of a capable as well as 
legitimate authority.
Among various discussions on state-building, the importance of state 
legitimacy, livelihood improvement, and a long-term perspective needs 
to be underlined. Long-term institution building should not only focus 
one-sidedly on public safety but also include the task of supporting 
people’s livelihood. Livelihood improvement is necessary for people to 
understand the dividend of peace and to accept the state as legitimate. 
These perspectives for long-term institution building have to be 
introduced in the early stage of any emergency response to 
humanitarian crises. Development agencies have endeavored to realize 
“seamless” transitions from short-term emergencies to long-term 
development, and have implanted long-term visions into their 
engagement in an early post-conflict period.
Table 1 below summarizes the shift from short-term focus to long-term 
orientation.
Table 1. Conceptual Framework for State-building
Short-term
(emergency response)
Long-term
(state-building)
Public Safety 
(Law and 
Order)
Ceasefire monitoring
Peace by force
Security Sector Reform (SSR)
Rule of Law
Livelihood
Emergency aid Strengthening of (both central 
and local) public organizations
Human resource development
Objectives
Avoidance of humanitarian 
disaster
Building of a capable and 
legitimate state
2.1 Building of capable and legitimate state institutions
In the post-Cold War peace-keeping operations in the 1990s, the 
international community often failed to avoid the recurrence of conflicts 
and recognized the lack of effective institutions as one of the reasons for 
such failures. Failures of international engagement in establishing 
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sustainable peace forced the international community to pay greater 
attention to the building of public institutions that guarantee long-
lasting sound governance. As incidents such as 9/11 increased global 
concerns about security vulnerability spilling over from weakly 
governed countries, scholars, including Fukuyama (2005), Chesterman 
(2004), Fearon and Laitin (2004), Krasner (2005), Ghani and Lockhart 
(2008), and Paris and Sisk (2009), debated the importance of and 
difficulties in state-building in recent years.
This argument also resonated with the international development 
community that has recognized the importance of good governance 
since the 1990s. The donor community started to discuss the need to 
improve its development effectiveness in fragile states, and accepted the 
idea of state-building in that context. In the OECD/DAC, the INCAF 
(International Network on Conflict and Fragility) functioned as an active 
forum to create policy guidance on state-building in fragile states (e.g., 
OECD 2011). Among the donors, state-building is understood as an 
effort to strengthen the capacity and legitimacy of state institutions to 
consolidate effective, legitimate, and resilient states (OECD 2008).3
The lack of capable and legitimate state institutions that protect people 
from human security crises makes the state vulnerable to violence by 
non-state actors. Public safety is one of the most fundamental public 
goods that should be provided by the state. Although such public safety 
may be temporarily and partially provided by international forces and/
or civic groups, the state remains as the primary guarantor of public 
safety. Therefore, the strengthening of the state security capacity is 
fundamentally important to protect human security.
However, the mere reliance on coercive forces does not guarantee long-
term stability. The state will face new challengers to public safety unless 
it has peaceful and stable relations with society. To be accepted by a wide 
range of social forces as the legitimate authority, the state needs to be 
equipped with inclusive institutions. If the state excludes some parts of 
its population from public services and the development process, it 
cannot be regarded as legitimate by the excluded groups. For instance, as 
we discuss below, horizontal inequalities (HIs) and group-based 
3. Leaders of the fragile states themselves formed a group named g7+ and actively participate 
in the debates, contributing to the international dialogue between fragile states and donors 
on designing better international engagement to support state-building in fragile states.
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grievances have been the major causes of violent conflicts in Africa 
(Stewart 2010). What inclusive institutions look like, however, differs 
from one country to another depending on a country-specific context 
(e.g., OECD 2010).
2.2 Peace-building “from below”: greater emphasis on livelihood
Among various aspects of institution building, the past decade has seen 
an increasing focus on public-safety issues, as typified by security sector 
reform (SSR). Critics, however, opposed the imposition of state 
institutions “from above,” and called for promoting the voices “from 
below” (e.g., Hilhorst et al. 2010). The efforts for institution building 
such as the formulation of a constitution, democratic elections, and 
justice sector reform, may not be the primary concern of the local 
populations. Advocates of peace-building “from below” emphasize the 
importance of welfare, livelihoods, and perceptions of the local people 
and communities (Richmond 2009, Shanmugaratnam 2008). 
Improvement of welfare and public service delivery is the key for the 
people to understand the dividends of peace. Richmond (2011) insists on 
the need to localize, contextualize, and hybridize international state-
building policies to adapt to everyday human needs. Roberts (2011) 
suggests the shift of emphasis from political institution-building to 
institutions that serve society. Responding to local human needs would 
help improve the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of local people.
The state’s capacity to deliver services to the people largely depends on 
effective administrative organizations as well as on the ability of public 
officials who actually deliver the services to the people. Institutional 
capacity and human resource development are indispensable to 
improve the state capacity to support people’s livelihood.
2.3  Bridging the “gap” by institutional and individual capacity 
development
In the late 1990s, it was pointed out that there is a “gap” between 
humanitarian assistance and development assistance in a post-conflict 
situation. Development assistance often came too late in the transition 
from humanitarian crises to reconstruction phases. Although short-term 
relief can be provided by external actors, service delivery by local public 
organizations is indispensable for longer-term livelihood improvement. 
Besides, the two instruments have different modus operandi as 
humanitarian assistance tries to address emergency needs, while 
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development assistance aims to support long-term development in more 
stable environments (Crisp 2001, Ogata 2011).
As a consequence of the increasing awareness of the gap, humanitarian 
agencies became more concerned about their long-term sustainability, 
while development agencies started to get involved in post-conflict 
situations much earlier than before. By infusing a long-term perspective 
into post-conflict assistance, the seamless supports aim at a smooth 
transition from short-term emergency to long-term institution building 
for improving the livelihoods of local people.
3. Research Findings from JICA-RI on State-building Efforts
With regard to state-building and conflict prevention, research projects 
at JICA Research Institute (JICA-RI) are mainly concerned with state 
legitimacy. Research findings by JICA-RI indicate that international 
engagement can support state-building by helping improve state 
legitimacy. Some of the findings are being reflected in JICA’s operational 
approach, which will be discussed in Section 4.
3.1 Capacity traps and legitimacy traps
In the article “Capacity Traps and Legitimacy Traps: Development 
Assistance and State Building in Fragile Situations”, Takeuchi, Murotani, 
and Tsunekawa (2011) illustrate how the difference in political 
environment affects the impact of development assistance, and call for 
heightened awareness of the different types of fragility when donors 
decide upon their policies. They categorize post-conflict situations into 
two types: “capacity trap” and “legitimacy trap.” Capacity trap 
countries are those that have failed to improve state capacity to provide 
security and basic social services and consequently have failed to 
establish state legitimacy. Legitimacy trap countries are those that have 
demonstrated the capacity to provide security and services to the 
population but suffer from shaky legitimacy due to expanding 
inequalities and authoritarian management. In this environment, 
improving state capacity may not necessarily improve state legitimacy. 
On the contrary, it can further curtail state legitimacy. These two traps 
create very different contexts in which donors are required to plan their 
strategies carefully.
336
Chapter 12
3.2 Horizontal Inequalities (HIs)
Inequality has always been an important factor that explains grievances 
and instability. To address group-based grievances, the perspective of 
horizontal inequalities (HIs), that is, inequalities between identity 
groups, has been developed.
Based on case studies and quantitative analysis in ten African countries, 
Mine et al. (Preventing Violent Conflict in Africa: Inequalities, Perceptions 
and Institutions, 2013) reconfirms the significance of HIs on instability 
and violent conflict in Africa. Particularly when one group is 
disadvantaged in multiple dimensions of inequalities (political, social, 
economic, and cultural), HIs are most likely to cause violent conflicts as 
demonstrated by the histories of South Africa and Kenya.
In Ethnic Diversity and Economic Instability in Africa: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives, Hino et al. (2012) suggest that ethnic diversity, though not 
leading by itself to inter-group conflict, can be a potent force of 
instability when HIs are high, and particularly when high HIs coalesce 
with high vertical inequality within each ethnic community.
In short, the alleviation of inequalities is a necessary condition for 
enhancing state legitimacy, which is fundamental for long-term state-
building.
3.3 People’s perceptions of inequalities
In assessing the legitimacy of states, people’s perceptions are sometimes 
more important than objective HIs, as people take actions based on their 
subjective beliefs. As advocates for peace-building “from below” argue, 
successful state-building efforts should be based on the understanding 
of the perceptions of local people. According to the analysis of Mine et al. 
(2013), people’s perception of horizontal inequalities (HIs) is not equal to 
the objective inequality that appears in statistical data. For instance, as 
observed in Nigeria and Zimbabwe, a group perceiving itself as the 
poorest is not necessarily the poorest according to social and economic 
statistics. This implies that external actors should pay attention not only 
to objective HIs but also to people’s perceptions.
Mine and his associates’ study demonstrates that this distortion of 
perceptions is most probably associated with political HIs. The groups 
that are politically marginalized tend to regard themselves as also being 
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economically marginalized, even when this contradicts the objective 
evidence. The Igbo in Nigeria clearly show such tendency. On the other 
hand, their analysis also indicates that economically advantaged groups 
tend to behave in a hostile manner through the fear of losing their 
advantaged positions, when political power relations shift rapidly to 
their disadvantage. All this evidence points to the importance of political 
power distribution in post-conflict societies.
Regarding the political HIs, Mine et al. (2013) point to the importance of 
inclusive mechanisms, either formal or informal, that are open to various 
identity groups. Their case studies demonstrate the relative political 
stability of the countries that have power-dispersing mechanisms 
combining sustainable power-sharing based on informal practices and 
advanced decentralization. In various Sub-Saharan African countries, 
informal customs assure every major identity group is represented in 
decision-making. These power-dispersing mechanisms help fortify 
legitimacy by means of the inclusive political participation of major 
groups. If such an arrangement is combined with efficient service 
delivery and citizen safety (state capacity), the efforts for long-term 
institution building are on the right track.
JICA’s survey report titled Livelihood and Employment Promotion in 
Conflict Affected Countries4 (2012) also highlights the importance of 
people’s perception as a lesson learned from its operational experiences. 
This survey demonstrates that, although it is important to support 
socially vulnerable populations such as refugees and IDPs, widows, 
orphans, traumatized people, and handicapped people, exceptionally 
generous treatment of these people created tensions within communities 
in past JICA projects. Special consideration to ex-combatants can also 
create animosity among other people in local communities. External 
actors need to be careful of these sentiments and try to build confidence 
between socially vulnerable people and others within local communities.
4. JICA’s Approach to Support State-building
JICA has already integrated into its field practice many of the insights 
obtained from past research and discussion on state-building. JICA has 
been especially eager to support long-term strengthening of institutional 
4. Details of the report will be discussed in the Section 4.1.
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and individual capacity, especially for the purpose of improving 
people’s everyday livelihood. Helping the recipient government to 
effectively connect itself with local residents to strengthen its legitimacy 
has also been the main goal of JICA activities.
JICA has also promoted “seamless” transition from early humanitarian 
aid for protection to development assistance for empowerment. This 
focus requires JICA to get engaged in institution building from the early 
stages of reconstruction.
Finally, JICA has tried to be more attentive to political contexts in each 
country, and mainstream conflict-sensitivity (“do no harm”) to ensure 
the positive impact of its activities on state-building.
4.1 Enhancing state capacity and legitimacy
The Government of Japan and JICA have focused their attention more on 
post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building since the mid-1990s. The 
revised ODA Charter in 2003 recognizes “human security” as one of its 
five basic policies, and peace-building as one of its four priority issues. 
After Sadako Ogata became the President of JICA, JICA integrated the 
“human security” perspective, especially for conflict-torn countries, as 
its operational philosophy. As a result, Japan’s ODA spending in 43 
countries that the OECD categorized in 2010 as “fragile states”5 
increased its share in total ODA spending (net ODA total, excluding debt 
relief) from 9.86% in 2000 to 24.24% in 2009 (refer to Figure 2).
5. For statistical purposes, OECD chose 43 countries and areas as “fragile states” in 2010 by 
using CPIA of the World Bank, ISW (Index of State Weakness) of the Brookings Institution, 
and CIFP (Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Fragility Index) of Carlton University as 
their benchmarks.
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Figure 2.  Share of Fragile States in Japanese ODA (Net ODA total, excluding debt 
relief)
Source: Author’s calculation based on OECD Stat.
In some of these countries (e.g., the Democratic Republic of Congo), JICA 
engaged in the capacity building of security forces. However, JICA has 
been more active in the area of livelihood improvement. JICA regarded 
the capacity of public institutions and public officials directly involved 
in livelihood improvement efforts as the core function, and provided 
support to strengthen this function in post-conflict countries such as 
Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, and Cote d’Ivoire. This core function 
centers on health, education, vocational training, and local 
administration.
JICA’s programs for community-based development and vocational 
training intend to simultaneously strengthen the capacity for public 
service delivery and improve people’s welfare. In doing so, it aims to 
enhance both state capacity and legitimacy, as improved service delivery 
by the central or local government organizations would enhance 
people’s welfare and their trust in the state. Emphasis on enhancing 
people’s trust is important particularly in fragile situations. Although 
their direct impact is limited to project areas, JICA anticipates that these 
local actions will eventually be scaled up to contribute to the broader 
and longer-term endeavor of state-building.
JICA’s survey report (Livelihood and Employment Promotion in Conflict 
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Affected Countries, 2012) contains evaluations of twelve such projects for 
community development and vocational training in nine countries and 
areas, including seven projects in five Sub-Saharan African countries: 
South Sudan, Rwanda, Uganda, Eritrea, and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC). The following are some of the findings from JICA’s 
activities aiming at enhancing the capacity and legitimacy of state 
institutions, especially for livelihood improvement. Though the report is 
based on simple evaluations not as rigorous as academic research, the 
lessons learned from the field are suggestive.
■ Capacity development of local public officials
In these projects, as the lack of individual and organizational capacity is 
acute in fragile situations, the process of implementation was designed 
to encourage capacity development of local government organizations. 
These entities were assigned the responsibility of jointly delivering 
public services with JICA experts, so that they could learn how to 
effectively provide services to the local population as on-the-job training.
The Project for Livelihood Improvement in and around Juba for 
Sustainable Peace and Development (LIPS) in South Sudan and the 
Study on Community Development in Cataracte District, Bas-Congo 
Province in the DRC are representative of JICA’s approach to community 
development, which primarily features the capacity development of 
government (both local and central) institutions, instead of the provision 
of benefits to farmers directly or via NGOs. When the LIPS project 
started in 2009, the government of the Southern Sudan had just four 
years of experience. Basic policy guidelines and strategies had not been 
well articulated, and local officers had little experience of working in the 
field. In the project, the community development officers, after receiving 
training, cultivated the land in cooperation with farmers, built schools, 
and supported local farmers in starting businesses. This firsthand 
experience enhanced the officials’ capacity and motivation. In the Bas-
Congo Study, local government officials were directly engaged with 
local communities in conducting and monitoring pilot projects.
■ Feedback of data and knowledge into national policies
On several occasions, local governments’ experience of actual service 
delivery had a feedback effect of updating and improving the policies at 
higher levels including national development strategies. As most of the 
conflict-affected countries do not have sufficient statistical data, 
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firsthand information from the field can link the voices from below with 
national policy planning.
One good example is the LIPS project mentioned above. South Sudan’s 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had had little information on 
agricultural activities in rural villages until the LIPS project provided 
them with community development manuals and agricultural 
technology packages. These documents were prepared on the basis of 
the field surveys, training, and sub-projects implemented in the LIPS 
project. The documents and information provided are being utilized to 
formulate a national agricultural development policy.
In Rwanda, the Project for Strengthening the Capacity of Tumba College 
of Technology (TCT) resulted in the TCT turning into a model for other 
vocational training centers. More specifically, the TCT conducted in-
company training to strengthen the link between trainees and local 
companies. The Workforce Development Agency (WDA) of the 
Rwandan government subsequently adopted in-company training in 
other vocational training centers.
■ Building confidence in local government institutions
The nurturing of state legitimacy is important particularly in conflict-
affected countries because public service delivery has been suspended 
for a long period and people may look upon the government as a 
predatory body rather than a service delivery organization. Under such 
circumstances, service delivery improvement through participatory 
planning and implementation can enhance communication between 
local government officials and citizens and help the local government 
build confidence among people.
In South Sudan, where public service delivery had barely existed during 
the war that lasted for more than 20 years, a LIPS sub-project – 
agricultural extension workers trying to help local farmers – contributed 
to cultivating local people’s confidence in the new government. Local 
communities established their own rural development committees and 
directly negotiated with local governments. Communication between 
the two has been strengthened significantly in the process.
In the case of northern Uganda, local governments did not have even 
basic facilities such as city halls and offices; so the Project for 
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Community Development for Promoting Return and Resettlement of 
IDPs in Northern Uganda provided offices and multi-purpose halls for a 
variety of public events such as public meetings, training courses, music 
festivals, and cooking contests. Local governments intended to foster the 
sense of affinity among local residents, particularly women’s groups. 
They also worked closely with returnees in designing sub-projects, so 
that local people’s trust in government officials would be enhanced.
4.2 Seamless assistance
Under the leadership of President Sadako Ogata, JICA adopted the 
human security perspective as one of the key pillars for its operation. 
The human security perspective emphasizes both protection through 
emergency relief and empowerment for long-term development.
When Ogata became the president of JICA, she stressed the importance 
of “seamless” support bridging the gap between humanitarian and 
development assistance. In its mission statement of 2008, JICA endorsed 
“seamless assistance that spans everything from prevention of armed 
conflict and natural disasters to emergency aid following a conflict or 
disaster, assistance for prompt recovery, and mid- to long-term 
development assistance” as one of its four strategies.
In Sudan and South Sudan, for example, JICA joined the international 
joint assessment mission while separately conducted its own survey 
even before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 
2005. This rapid engagement resulted in quick impact projects in the 
early recovery period in South Sudan, such as the Juba River port 
reconstruction. These projects were soon followed by larger 
development assistance including human resource development to 
serve long-term development.
4.3 Mainstreaming of conflict-sensitivity 
JICA has also tried to become more sensitive to negative effects on 
conflicts and state legitimacy that may be inadvertently caused by the 
donor’s activities. To avoid such pitfalls, JICA has introduced the Post-
Conflict Needs Assessment (PNA) mechanism by which it analyzes 
potential conflict risks in each context, and pays due consideration to the 
impacts of such risks on state legitimacy. It stresses the importance of 
taking into account the coexistence and reconciliation between different 
social groups within local communities in designing community 
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development projects. JICA also plans to introduce the evaluation 
guideline that incorporate conflict-sensitivity for projects in conflict-
affected areas.
One example of such consideration is JICA’s efforts in Sudan and South 
Sudan that aim at mitigating grievances stemming from economic and 
social disparities among different regions. In South Sudan, in parallel 
with the assistance to the Juba areas, JICA has intensified its support to 
less developed regions such as Malakal. In Sudan, JICA has extended its 
support to less developed areas including Darfur, the eastern provinces, 
and Three Protocol Areas.
5. Conclusion
State-building and conflict prevention remain as vital challenges in 
Africa. Bearing in mind the changing nature of conflicts throughout the 
continent, the international community has increasingly focused on 
state-building. To prevent violent conflicts and establish long-term 
stability, building capable and legitimate state institutions, which look 
after both public safety and livelihood improvement, is essential.
JICA-RI’s research findings also demonstrate that successful state-
building needs the strengthening of state capacity and legitimacy. 
Legitimacy building is an especially difficult task because it is deeply 
affected by changeable perceptions of the people. To nurture state 
legitimacy, horizontal inequalities (HIs) and other inequalities must be 
tackled. At the same time, inclusive institutions need to be constructed to 
foster a sense of fairness among the population. 
JICA, as well as other development partners, has already started to 
integrate some of these insights into its planning and implementation. 
Coordination and mutual learning between donors will also be essential. 
However, in order to make their efforts to help state-building and 
conflict prevention more effective and efficient, greater and more 
persistent attention should be directed to the following points:
(1) Building of inclusive institutions
Inclusive institutions are key to consolidating state legitimacy based on 
stable state-society relations. Inclusive institutions can mitigate the 
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adverse effects of HIs. This, however, does not mean that attending HIs 
is not important. HIs need to be reduced since they are a root cause of 
violent conflicts. Meanwhile, inclusive institutions will help foster 
consensus and compromise among contending forces. However, 
institutions should not be imposed upon people by external actors since 
institutions can be securely established only when major stakeholders 
accept them as legitimate. What donors can do is to provide the recipient 
country with the opportunity to learn about current and historical 
experiences of other countries.
(2) Human security perspective: protection and empowerment
In tackling the challenges of state-building, the human security 
perspective should always be remembered, as it can provide a 
comprehensive understanding on state-building (Newman 2011). 
Human security integrates top-down measures to protect people and 
bottom-up measures to empower them. Capable institutions to protect 
people and empowered communities to hold the state accountable and 
legitimate are essential for bringing about a stable state that can maintain 
public safety and improve people’s livelihood. The human security 
perspective supports the seamless transition from emergency relief to 
long-term development. While top-down measures are necessary to 
protect people in emergencies, the empowerment of people and local 
communities are crucial for long-term development.
(3) Local context sensitivity
External actors need to be sensitive to local contexts so they can avoid 
doing harm while maximizing the positive impact of their activities. In 
such assessment of local context, they need to be aware that people’s 
perceptions are not necessarily equal to statistical data. While HIs need 
to be reduced, at the same time, donors need to pay attention to how 
their efforts for HI reduction are perceived by various stakeholders and 
carefully design their projects. This caution is valid not only at the 
planning stage but also at the operation stage in which local people 
directly observe donors’ behavior. Donor coordination and information 
sharing must be crucial to avoid harming people’s perceptions.
Since the beginning of the millennium, Africa has started to witness a 
declining number of armed conflicts and battle-related deaths. Though 
trans-national non-state armed groups may impose new types of 
challenges on peace-building in Africa, structural problems such as 
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poverty, inequality, and other social issues remain crucial for peace and 
security, and state-building remains imperative for a stable and peaceful 
Africa. African leaders have strived to establish sustainable peace 
throughout the continent. Donors can help their efforts by supporting 
the building of capable and legitimate states if they are sensitive enough 
to local contexts. TICAD will provide a forum for a wide range of 
stakeholders to discuss how we all can collaborate to address this crucial 
challenge.
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Chapter 13: 
South-South and Triangular Cooperation for 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s Development  
–With special emphasis on knowledge 
exchange and co-creation
Shunichiro Honda, Hiroshi Kato and Yukimi Shimoda
1. Introduction 
This chapter looks at South-South Cooperation (SSC) and Triangular 
Cooperation (TrC) in the context of the development of Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA). The reason for our focus on SSC and TrC1 is twofold. First 
and most importantly, SSC/TrC has been one of the central principles 
underpinning and guiding the TICAD process since its beginning in 
1993. And second, SSC/TrC has become the key theme both in the UN 
fora (UN 2012a) and the global process on development effectiveness 
agenda especially since the 2011 Fourth High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness (HLF4) in Busan, which strongly highlighted SSC as well 
as TrC (Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 
2011).2
This paper has two specific objectives. One is to give a broad picture of 
1. As to the definition of SSC and TrC, we rely on the definition of the UN, which reads as 
follows: 
“South-South cooperation development is a process whereby two or more developing 
countries pursue their individual and/or shared national capacity development objectives 
through exchanges of knowledge, skills, resources and technical know-how, and through 
regional and interregional collective actions, including partnerships involving 
governments, regional organizations, civil society, academia and the private sector, for their 
individual and/or mutual benefit within and across regions. South-South cooperation is not 
a substitute for, but rather a complement to, North-South cooperation (UN 2012b, p.5).”
“Triangular cooperation involves Southern-driven partnerships between two or more 
developing countries supported by a developed country (ies)/or multilateral organization(s) 
to implement development cooperation programs and projects (UN 2012b, p.5).”
2. HLF4 emphasized that “South-South and triangular cooperation have the potential to 
transform developing countries’ policies and approaches to service delivery by bringing 
effective, locally owned solutions that are appropriate to country contexts” (Global 
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 2011: p.9).
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the current state of SSC vis-à-vis SSA, given the increasing interest and 
actual involvement in African development by the Southern partners. 
And the other is to take a closer look at, among various forms of SSC/
TrC, how knowledge exchange and co-creation is happening, based on 
JICA’s experiences in facilitating such processes by means of TrC.3 
The body of the chapter consists of two parts. Section 2 is an overview of 
SSC/TrC targeting SSA. Section 3 will try to share some of Japan’s 
experience in supporting knowledge exchange and co-creation through 
TrC. 
2. SSC/TrC: Overview of Trends and Issues  
2.1 Africa as the central actor in SSC
SSC itself is an age-old phenomenon, and Africa, together with Asia, has 
always been at the center of the movement. Cooperation among the 
South, particularly on the aspect of economic cooperation, dates back to 
1955 when the Asia-Africa Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia, 
to discuss Afro-Asian economic and cultural cooperation. In the 
subsequent decades, developing countries pressed further ahead to form 
a group to push their economic interests (Cheru 2011).4 Such a 
movement first culminated in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 
involving more than 100 countries. Then in 1964, G 77, a forum for 
developing countries to articulate and promote their collective interests 
relating to the global economy was formed within the United Nations 
(UN). Throughout, Africa was at the center of the movements.
During the 1970s, several key resolutions and policy documents on 
technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC) were 
adopted, which then culminated in the adoption of “the Buenos Aires 
Plan of Action (BAPA)” at the UN Conference on TCDC held in 1978. 
The action plan laid out both the conceptual and operational framework 
for TCDC promotion, which, to this day, remains as the main reference 
document (UN 1995). Following the launch of BAPA, there were also 
moves on the economic cooperation front, such as the Caracas 
Programme of Action adopted by the High-level Conference on 
3. The South-South knowledge exchange in the context of African development seems to 
have been receiving inadequate attention compared to South-South trade and financing in 
Africa (UNCTAD 2010; UN 2008; Kragelund 2012).
4. The South-South partnership in the field of economic cooperation has until recently been 
termed as Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries (ECDC) in UN fora.
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Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries (ECDC) in May 
1981.
Such high levels of interest in SSC (including ECDC), however, waned in 
the following decades.5 Nonetheless, several notable actions on SSC/TrC 
started in the 1990s. In 1993, the UN General Assembly endorsed the 
strategy and framework for the promotion and application of TCDC 
(UN Resolution 48/172).6 And it was around this time that the first 
TICAD was co-organized in Tokyo by the Government of Japan, the 
Global Coalition for Africa (GCA)7 and the UN. In spite of the rather 
somber situation surrounding SSC at the time, the Tokyo Declaration for 
African Development adopted at the 1993 TICAD underscored the 
importance of SSC, especially the exchange of development knowledge 
and experience between Asia and Africa. The conference declaration 
read as follows:
We, the participants of TICAD, recognize that development 
achievement in East and South-East Asia have
[sic] 
enhanced 
opportunities for South-South cooperation with Africa. We 
welcome the interest shown by some Asian and African countries 
in promoting this cooperation.8
The strong focus on SSC by the first TICAD then led to the holding of the 
Asia-Africa Forum in Bandung in the following year. The subsequent 
Tokyo Agenda of Action adopted during the second TICAD in 1998 
further went on to highlight intra-African cooperation (TICAD 1998). At 
TICAD III in 2003, after the launch of the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) in 2001 and African Union (AU) in 2002, the 
participants reviewed the achievements and challenges of the preceding 
ten years and acknowledged the tangible contributions of the TICAD 
process in continuously upholding and supporting SSC/TrC practices, 
especially Asia and Africa cooperation. Building on the review results, 
its tenth anniversary declaration urged African countries and partners to 
5. Manning pointed out that such decline of development cooperation from non-DAC states 
resulted in the dominance of aid from DAC countries and multi-lateral organizations up until 
the mid-2000s(Manning 2006). 
6. DAC also endorsed the importance of SSC in its document of Principles on the New 
Orientations in Technical Cooperation (OECD/DAC 1991). 
7. GCA was later replaced by the Africa Union (AU) following its establishment in 2002. The 
World Bank joined the TICAD process as co-organizers from the second TICAD.  
8. Tokyo Declaration for African Development 1993 (TICAD 1993 Paragraph 26)
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further strengthen their partnership in the spirit of solidarity (TICAD 
2003). In furthering the achievement of the past TICAD process, the 
“Yokohama Declaration towards a vibrant Africa”, the outcome 
document of the fourth TICAD was presented in 2008 (TICAD2008). 
The centrality of SSC/TrC came to be reaffirmed in December 2009 with 
the Nairobi Outcome Document being adopted at the United Nations 
High-Level Conference on South-South Cooperation in Nairobi (UN 
2010). Organized as the 30th anniversary of the 1978 Conference on 
TCDC in Buenos Aires, the conference set out the overall UN SSC/TrC 
framework.9 Such heightened energy surrounding this theme has also 
started to be felt in other global fora, such as the global monitoring 
process of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. SSC/TrC was 
registered as one of the major agenda items at the HLF4. The outcome 
document of the Busan Forum, namely the Global Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation, strongly featured the theme as a 
highly promising approach for effective development cooperation in 
coming years.
Thus, in the history of the development of SSC/TrC as an effective 
means for development cooperation, Africa has been playing a dual role 
– both the central promoter and beneficiary. We also note that the TICAD 
process has been instrumental in supporting African countries’ efforts in 
SSC.
2.2 The current state of SSC for Sub-Saharan Africa
10 
The limited availability of data makes it nearly impossible to capture 
exactly the magnitude and breadth of SSC and TrC for SSA including 
technical cooperation (TC), which is the main aid instruments for 
knowledge exchange and co-creation. Currently accessible data is from 
the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which incorporates data 
from the limited numbers of non-DAC donors, including non-DAC 
9. The document was formally endorsed at the 66th General Assembly in February 2010. 
After the conference actions to translate the Nairobi outcome document into practice got into 
full swing. A prime example is the annual Global South-South Development Expo (GSSD 
Expo) with the UN office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) as its main secretariat.
10. The Republic of Korea, which has often been included among the emerging donors, is not 
fully covered in this paper as it has been a DAC member only since 2009. Nevertheless, as a 
relatively new donor country, it is worth noting that Korea is among the active donors in 
knowledge promotion such as through its Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) implemented 
by the Korea Development Institute (KDI).
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OECD members.11 Other than CRS, the global AidDATA initiative, 
working closely with the International Aid Transparency Initiative 
(IATI), has made an effort to develop an aid database using a variety of 
sources including CRS, and donor reports. However, the data from most 
non-DAC donors, including those major actors such as China, India and 
Brazil, are mostly on a project basis, which made the analysis difficult. 
(1) SSC for SSA from partners outside Africa
Non-DAC partners in the CRS data12
This paper first looks at the trend of Non-DAC partners reported to DAC 
CRS, which include several major Non-DAC partners such as Saudi 
Arabia, Thailand and Russia.  We will then turn to China, India, Brazil 
and South Africa, on which an increasing number of articles and reports 
are now available, as well as to other non-DAC partners such as North 
African partners, in later sections.
Figure 1 indicates the gross total ODA disbursements by non-DAC 
partners on CRS data at both levels of global and SSA countries covering 
the period between 2004 and 2011. 
Figure 1.  Gross total ODA disbursements by non-DAC partners reported to 
OECD (in millions of US dollars)
Source: Author based on OECD CRS data (OECD Various Years)
11. Non-DAC donors in the CRS data include the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, 
Israel, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, Chinese Taipei, Cyprus, Kuwait, 
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and the 
United Arab Emirates.
12. According to the rough definition provided by OECD on the data, ODA denotes the 
“concessional financing for development (“ODA-like” flows)”(OECD Various Years).
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Figure 2 provides a closer look at the disbursement trend regarding SSA 
from 2004 onwards (indicated by the red columns in Figure 1 above). 
After the sudden decline in 2009, which may be largely explained by the 
global financial crisis in late 2008, it returned to an appreciation trend 
and surpassed the level of 2008 in 2011. The rapid expansion in 2008 and 
the sudden decline in the following year largely reflect the disbursement 
trend by oil-producing Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, which 
accounts for over 60% of CRS non-DAC donor data. Overall, the ODA 
trend toward SSA countries seems to be following the same general 
growth trend of the total ODA by non-DAC partners, at least for the first 
decade in the 2000s.
Figure 2. Gross total ODA disbursements to SSA countries by non-DAC partners 
(in millions of US dollars)
Source: By authors, based on OECD CRS data (OECD Various Years)
In addition to the total volume of ODA disbursement, CRS also collects 
and publishes data specifically on TC. Figure 3 depicts the non-DAC 
members’ ODA disbursement trend for TC to SSA countries. It displays 
an upward trend similar to that of the total ODA. It should be noted 
here, however, that the volume of TC is by far a smaller fraction of the 
total ODA.13 Among the non-DAC partners reported to the CRS data, 
several donors are increasingly active in knowledge exchange through 
TC in support for the development of SSA countries. One example is 
13. The very small volume of TC may also be explained by the composition of CRS data in 
which oil producing non-DAC donors occupy the large proportion of the total non-DAC 
donor ODA reported to DAC. The main aid activities of these countries are the financing of 
infrastructure projects through concessional loan windows such as those of the Saudi Fund 
for International Development. Also, the fact that other non-DAC donors have not provided 
disaggregated figures for technical cooperation may also explain the small volume.
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Turkey. In addition to its neighboring countries such as those in West 
Asia, Turkey has been rapidly expanding its assistance to Africa 
including capacity building assistance through TC in various fields such 
as agriculture, health and vocational training.14
Figure 3.  ODA disbursements (Technical Cooperation) to SSA countries by 
non-DAC partners (in millions of US dollars)
Source: By authors, based on OECD CRS data (OECD Various Years)
Looking at the beneficiaries’ side, we can see that a limited number of 
SSA countries tend to have received a large portion of total non-DAC aid 
disbursements including TC, as shown in Figure 4, which shows that 
conflict-affected countries tend to receive handsome portions of aid from 
non-DAC member countries.
14. It is noteworthy that Turkey has been making efforts in systematizing its cooperation by 
undertaking various actions including the introduction of joint country strategy paper and 
talent bank mechanism, which pools Turkish technical experts for South-South knowledge 
sharing (Gülseven 2012).
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Figure 4.  Share of beneficiaries in reported non-DAC aid to Sub-Sahara Africa, 
2011
Source: By authors, based OECD CRS data (OECD Various Years)
Though most individual non-DAC partners in the CRS data do not 
provide their regional distributions, the most likely major active 
partners for SSA are oil-producing Arab countries, which mainly 
provide assistance to Islamic countries in SSA. Other than that, Turkey is 
an increasingly active donor; it has pledged to provide more aid to least 
developed countries (LDCs) including SSA countries.15
China, India and Brazil
As stated above, our analysis so far has not included the very important 
non-DAC partners of China, India and Brazil, and South Africa due to 
the unavailability of data. Given this shortcoming, we now turn to the 
estimated figures of gross global ODA disbursements of the three 
abovementioned countries between 2005 and 2010, using information 
from the OECD Development Cooperation Report 2012.16 South Africa 
will be dealt with later. 
15. According to the briefing note of Turkey’s development cooperation on the webpage of 
the Turkish government, aid delivered to Africa increased by 67% from 30.9 million US 
dollars to 71 million US dollars in 2010. 
16. There is also a large discrepancy between the DAC estimation and other estimated figures 
in several other papers such as by Kragelund 2012, potentially due to definitional issues, the 
different source of information and other reasons.
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Table 1.  Trend of Gross Global ODA Disbursements by Brazil, China and India 
(in millions of US dollars)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Brazil 158.07 277.21 291.90 336.83 362.21 N/A 
China 911.90 1,033.27 1,466.86 1,807.57 1,947.65 2,010.61 
India 414.50 381.40 392.60 609.50 488.04 639.07 
Total 
Estimate 1,487.47 1,691.88 2,151.36 2.753.90 2,797.90 2.649.68 
Source: By the authors, based on OECD (2012) 17
Table 1 above gives a rough picture of the general trend of these 
countries in expanding their global ODA. In comparison to the ODA by 
non-DAC partners (shown in Figure 1), the figures, likely to be 
significantly underestimated, indicate that considerably larger volumes 
of ODA are being provided by these three countries, especially by China.
Their specific contribution to SSA is hard to discern, since regionally 
disaggregated data is unavailable. The following is a glimpse of their 
profiles by referring to several existing documents.
China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid in 201118 states that 45.7% of China’s 
foreign aid in 2009 was allocated to Africa including North Africa. It also 
reports on China’s foreign aid distribution by income levels for recipient 
countries, namely that 39.7% of the total aid is provided to LDCs, a good 
part of which could be SSA countries. Combining all these, Chinese’s 
sizable foreign aid is likely to be flowing to SSA countries. 
Component-wise, the country has also been continuing and expanding 
TC and knowledge exchanges. The review of the achievements on the 
Sharm el Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012) indicated that the country has 
accepted around 24,000 professionals to the training programs offered 
by the Chinese Government during the three year period in various 
fields like agricultural, education and health (The People’s Republic of 
China 2012).
As regards India’s aid to Africa, major beneficiaries of her concessional 
17. The table is based on the STATLINK data for Figure V33 of the OECD Development 
Cooperation Report (DCR) 2012.
18. This white paper on China’s foreign aid is the first of its kind published by the Chinese 
Government.
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loan aid through the EXIM Bank from 2003 to 2007 (Indian financial 
years) include Sudan (21%), Ethiopia (7%) and Mali (5%) (Kondoh et al. 
2010, pp.33-34). Under the Africa-India Partnership for Enhanced 
Cooperation adopted in 2011, training opportunities for over 1,200 
professionals for Africa have been provided between 2011-12 (AIFS 
2011).
Brazil’s SSC, according to the 2009 figure, amounted to over 362 million 
US dollars,19 out of which 14% is delivered through TC. In spite of the 
traditional focus on its support to neighboring countries in Latin 
American, Brazil is expanding its support to SSA. Moreover, it has also 
started to extend its assistance to non-Lusophone African countries like 
Ghana and Burkina Faso.20 
(2) SSC partners in the African continent
Having looked at the partners outside the continent, we now turn to SSC 
partnerships on the African continent.
Regional mechanisms for intra-Africa collaboration
First and foremost, the regional organs such as the African Union 
Commission (AUC), with its development arm of NEPAD and sub-
regional organs like SADC and EAC, have played and are increasingly 
playing larger roles in intra-Africa development cooperation and 
knowledge facilitation. As part of their mandate, these regional and sub-
regional organs have organized various programs and initiatives, which 
aim to promote the coordinated actions of development cooperation and 
sharing of knowledge and experience among African countries. 
Specifically regarding SSC, the AU and NEPAD formulated the African 
Platform for Development Effectiveness (APDev) in July 2010, with SSC 
as one of the three thematic thrusts (NEPAD n.d.). In more specific fields, 
the AUC and NEPAD Agency and the African Development Bank (ADB) 
have formed an initiative, namely the Programme for Infrastructure 
Development in Africa (PIDA), for the purpose of coordinated region-
wide actions on infrastructure development (e.g., energy, transport, 
water, and ICT) in Africa (PIDA n.d.). In other areas such as agriculture, 
19. This figure only covers the grant portion of aid provided by the Federal Government and 
excludes concessional loans, debt relief and cooperation by state and local governments 
(OECD 2012 p.260).
20. However, according to the report by the Brazilian Government, African Portuguese-
speaking countries still account for 55% of Brazil’s resources for TC in Africa (Brazilian 
International Cooperation Agency 2010).
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the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme 
(CAADP) coordinated by NEPAD has been formulated to create a 
multilateral framework for agricultural development (CAADP n.d.) 
involving a broad range of stakeholders including state institutions, 
NGOs, the private sector and research organs in and outside Africa.21
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is an innovative NEPAD 
initiative worth mentioning. APRM is an African-led self-monitoring 
mechanism for political, economic and corporate governance among 
African countries that voluntarily acceded to it.22 The APRM process of 
review and the follow-up actions involve not only the government but 
also other actors such as civil societies and the private sector. As of the 
end of 2011, 14 countries had been peer-reviewed (APR Secretariat 2012). 
Though criticisms remain on its limited abilities to hold African leaders 
accountable, it has certainly offered rare opportunities for mutual 
learning among African countries on their governance challenges (Grutz 
2010). We now turn to look at individual, prominent SSC partner 
countries in the African continent: South Africa, and North African 
countries, notably Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. 
South Africa23
Being a BRICS country, South Africa is by far the major actor in SSC in 
Sub-Saharan Africa with its GDP roughly 40 times larger than average 
SSA economies. South Africa’s cooperation toward African peer 
countries covers a wide range of activities like aid, trade, security, and 
politics, which goes beyond the OECD-DAC’s categories.24
Since 2009 when President Zuma took office, the process of institutional 
development for SSC has been rapidly progressing, including the 
establishment of the South African Development Partnership Agency 
(SADPA), envisaged to be a unified agency for international cooperation, 
and of the Partnership Fund for Development, which will replace the 
African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF). The 
21. NEPAD has also opened a virtual space for the community of practice involving various 
themes including infrastructure and agriculture. The access to the community of practice for 
food security is http://www.nepad.org/foodsecurity/group.
22.Thirty three member countries were in APRM as at January 2013 (APR Secretariat 2013). 
23. This section draws heavily on Vickers (2012).
24. In 2010, South Africa received about US$1,000 in net ODA. According to Vickers (2012, 
footnote 1 in p. 536), about 2.2 % of South Africa’s ODA was to Africa over the period 2000-
2010.
362
Chapter 13
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), 
renamed from the Department of Foreign Affairs, was also established in 
2010 for the purpose of “promoting South Africa’s national interests and 
values” and “the African Renaissance” (DIRCO 2010, p. 6). In April 2012, 
the concept of SADPA was formally approved by the government. The 
establishment of SADPA will bring a wide range of changes, including 
stricter project assessment, mobilization of multiple funding sources, 
and using various modes of cooperation with emphasis placed on grants 
and TC.
The notable characteristic of South African cooperation is the country’s 
active support in the areas of peace building, democratic governance 
and public sector capacity development including public financial 
management. This largely reflects the historical pathways along which 
the country has traveled in the post-Apartheid era.
South Africa has been contributing to sub-regional integration by 
participating in political and economic regional frameworks, such as the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU), the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), the SADC free trade area, and the 
Spatial Development Initiative (SDI).
Egypt25
Egypt has been an age-old actor of SSC since the 1970s, particularly in 
Africa and the Middle East, while learning from development 
experience gained from other regions including Asia. Egypt prioritizes 
SSC in its foreign policy, with four principle regions: “free trade areas; 
foreign direct investment; TC; and exerting efforts for the region’s 
positive integration into the global economy” (PEMA 2008, p. 8).
There are two funds for Egyptian SSC: one is the Egyptian Fund for 
Technical Co-operation with Africa (EFTCA) and the other is the 
Egyptian Fund for Technical Co-operation with the Commonwealth 
(EFTCC). The EFTCA started its activities in 1991 in order to consolidate 
and support cooperation between Egypt and other African countries. Its 
main activities have been organizing training courses, dispatching 
experts, and offering emergency humanitarian assistance to countries 
affected by natural disasters. Under the framework of the EFTCA, Egypt 
has helped more than 30 African countries, managed at least 45 projects, 
25. This section chiefly draws on PEMA 2008 and JICA 2007.
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dispatched at least 90 short-term and 140 long-term experts in the areas 
of health, agriculture, water resources, and education, and provided 
food, medicine, and logistics assistance to many African countries 
(INSouth n.d.). The other fund, EFTCC, has organized various training 
courses in the areas of tourism, culture, crime and investigation, the 
Arabic language, migration, and medical industries for many CIS 
countries such as Uzbekistan, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Albania, 
Armenia, Tajikistan, Russia, and Mongolia. Egypt also conducts SSC 
with other partners such as the EU, USAID, Norway, China and Korea, 
as well as Japan.
Tunisia26
Under the supervision of the Ministry of Planning and International 
Cooperation, Tunisia has been actively promoting and implementing 
SSC through the Tunisian Agency of Technical Cooperation (ATCT) 
established in 1972. The ATCT is obliged to implement the national 
policy of TC. It has regional offices in Kuwait, Oman, Mauritania, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Its missions include 
mobilizing appropriate Tunisian human resources to work abroad 
through TC, providing training for foreign professionals, carrying out 
technical assistance projects, and promoting SSC/TrC. Tunisia’s SSC for 
Africa covers various areas: poverty reduction, health, vocational 
training, banking, agriculture, water and the environment, 
telecommunications, and women’s empowerment. The ATCT has 
dispatched more than 30,000 Tunisian professionals and experts abroad 
for foreign employers, public and private institutions, and regional and 
international organizations. It also has provided tailor-made training 
and standard training programs for 3,000 foreign professionals from 
more than 39 countries, mainly African countries. These training 
programs are organized in specialized institutions within the country or 
by dispatching experts to participants’ countries, in cooperation with 
WB, UNDP, USAID, IDB, GTZ, and JICA.
Morocco27
Morocco is a member of the League of Arab States and the Arab Maghreb 
Union, and maintains friendly ties with the West. Morocco withdrew 
from the Organization of African Unity (AOU) in 1984 due to its 
territorial dispute over the Western Sahara. It is currently the only 
26. This section draws chiefly on ATCT n.d.
27. This section mainly draws on AMCI n.d. and JICA 2012d.
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African country which is not a member of the AU. However, Morocco 
also places emphasis on measures for Africa. As a foreign policy, 
Morocco has been promoting cooperation with African and Arab 
partners.
The Moroccan Agency for International Cooperation (AMCI) established 
in 1986 has been playing an active role in implementing SSC activities. 
The AMCI provides 1) training, particularly for foreign students and 
executives, 2) technical cooperation, and 3) economic and financial 
cooperation. Morocco receives about 8,000 students (including 6,500 
scholarship recipients) from 42 countries, the majority of whom are from 
African countries. Following South Africa, which is the top investor in 
Africa, Morocco occupies second place.
The TC provided by the AMCI is to strengthen SSC in various areas 
through long-, medium-, and short-term training, study visits, 
dispatching experts, and implementation of joint programs. Partners of 
Morocco’s SSC activities vary: countries of the South for bilateral 
cooperation, traditional donor countries for triangular cooperation, and 
international organizations and agencies for multilateral cooperation. 
The number of beneficiary countries increased from 6 in 2000 to 22 in 
2006.
Morocco has also provided economic and financial cooperation since the 
mid-1990s to support micro-projects in education, health, and small 
hydro.
2.3 TrC and Sub-Saharan Africa
TrC has been increasingly recognized as a vital modality in support of 
SSC. Most TrC is delivered through technical cooperation (TCs) 
including training and dispatch of experts. Its main advantage derives 
from the opportunities it provides for combining the expertise of diverse 
development actors28 – expertise likely to fit the needs of partner 
countries having similar development challenges. Traditional donors 
including DAC bilateral donors as well as multilateral development 
institutions can complement such endeavors through the provision of 
additional financing and knowledge. Hosono argues that “South and 
North can collaborate on knowledge creation, knowledge exchange, 
28. More rigorous analysis regarding the effectiveness of TrC is a remaining challenge 
(McEwan 2012). 
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capacity development, and institution building to implement 
development solutions at scale.” 
Below we will have a brief look at TrC’s development trends and current 
status. In fact, a significant part of SSC reviewed above has been 
conducted as part of the broader triangular partnership.
(1) The trend of TrC by major multilaterals and DAC donors
Globally, the most active bilateral donors in TrC are Japan, Germany and 
Spain, among which Japan has been widely recognized as the long-
standing major actor for years (UN 2008; TT-SSC 2010). Regarding the 
multilateral institutions, UN specialized agencies including the UN 
Office of South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC), former Special Unit for 
South-South Cooperation, UNDP and World Bank are counted as the 
notable promoters of and contributors to TrC.
Aside from Japan, the details of whose TrC practices for SSA will be 
touched on in the next section, Germany has been the major TrC 
contributor mainly through GIZ. Though Latin America has been the 
main region for German TrC, it has also applied TrC to other regions 
including SSA (TT-SSC 2010). One example was the collaboration 
between Germany and Brazil to help strengthen the National Institute of 
Standardization and Quality (INNOQ) in Mozambique to improve the 
quality standards of products in Mozambique building on the capacity 
developed in the National Institute of Metrology, Standardization and 
Industrial Quality (INMETRO) in Brazil with past GIZ assistance (TT-
SSC n.d.a).
As exemplified by the various declarations and guidelines illustrated in 
the preceding sections, the UN system has been a key promoter and 
actor in TrC for many years with UNOSSC as the focal point of the entire 
system. UNOSSC offers diverse modalities for the promotion and 
support of SSC/TrC to its partners. It manages the UN’s major trust fund 
for SSC/TrC, namely the United Nations Fund for South-South 
Cooperation. Through a cost-sharing arrangement, it also cooperates 
with donor governments, including Japan, to support SSC/TrC 
initiatives. Some major events organized by UNOSSC are supported by 
this cost-sharing modality, one of which is the annual Global South-
South Development EXPO to showcase successful Southern 
development solutions to the complex challenges facing the South. 
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UNOSSC also provides management services to various funds including 
the G-77’s Perez-Gurrero Trust Fund for South-South Cooperation and 
the India, Brazil and South Africa Facility for Poverty and Hunger 
Alleviation. It has recently established other new mechanisms such as 
the South-South Global Assets and Technological Exchange (SS-GATE), 
which supports the South-South public-private partnership through the 
provision of financial and other knowledge facilitation support. 
Other UN specialized agencies such as UNEP, UNIDO and ILO have 
long engaged in TrC. For instance, in the furtherance of its TrC, UNEP 
has recently launched the South-South Cooperation Exchange 
Mechanism for capacity development and technology transfer in the 
environmental and sustainable development field, which is the online 
platform to exchange cases of innovative field practices in addition to its 
more traditional support to SSC through training, workshops and 
forums (UNEP n.d.).
The World Bank Institute (WBI), the training and knowledge exchange 
arm of the Bank, is also in the process of further strengthening its 
function as the support organ for south-south knowledge exchange and 
capacity development. WBI is using a broad range of SS exchange 
instruments including the South-South Experience Exchange Trust Fund 
(SSEETF), a catalytic funding mechanism launched in 2008 for demand-
driven SSC initiatives, the Global Development Learning Network 
(GDLN), a mechanism to promote learning by linking affiliated 
institutions with ICT such as video-conferencing systems, and also 
support to regional centers of excellence such as the Zimbabwe-based 
African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), a multi-lateral 
foundation to support capacity development in policy formulation and 
public management.
(2) JICA’s triangular practice for SSA29 
Japan has been widely recognized as the long-standing major bilateral 
actor in triangular cooperation (UN 2008, Fordelone 2009, TT-SSC 2010). 
The advent of JICA’s TrC dates back to 1975, the early days of SSC. Japan 
has been noted for the advancement of institutionalization regarding its 
engagement in SSC/TrC, which is still rare among DAC bilateral donors. 
The SSC/TrC has been clearly stated as one of the central approaches of 
Japan’s ODA in its ODA charter (Government of Japan 2003), mid-term 
29. This section draws on JICA’s internal documents.
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policy (Government of Japan 2005) and JICA’s thematic guideline of SSC 
(JICA 2005).
Over the years, the volume and regional coverage of Japan’s TrC has 
been expanded and diversified for greater impact. The major form of 
Japan’s TrC has been what is called third-country training, or triangular 
training programs (JICA 2011). Many of these training programs in 
various fields are offered by the organizations in developing countries, 
which have built up their expertise and capacity in their respective areas 
through prior bilateral technical cooperation with JICA and other 
bilateral and multilateral aid agencies. 
Among the regions, participants from SSA have steadily increased, 
especially since the second half of the 1990s following the launch of the 
first TICAD in 1993. In 1993, the number of participants from SSA was 
below 200, which is around 11% of the total beneficiaries in the year. By 
2011, the number increased to 1,228 participants; the equivalent of 34% 
of the total participants (3,780). Also, it is noteworthy that several SSA 
countries like Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and Tanzania have become active 
in providing training for other SSA countries, the beneficiaries of which 
amounted to 381 participants in 2011. This implies that regional centers 
of excellence, which have knowledge and experiences to share with 
fellow countries, can be nurtured whatever the level of national income. 
Other than triangular training programs, JICA also helped dispatch 
experts from pivotal countries, though its size remains modest, with 23 
experts in 2011.
To improve the impact, many of these training and expert dispatch 
programs have been combined with other aid instruments such as 
financial assistance within the broader program and project packages 
including the case of the African Institute of Capacity Development 
(AICAD), which we will look at shortly. New types of TrC approaches 
such as the establishment of a regional network as the community of 
practice, the increased use of ICT including videoconferencing and 
Internet-based information sharing have also been increasingly adopted, 
which will also be illustrated later.
To institutionalize TrC, Japan has adopted a system called partnership 
programs. Over the years, Japan has built up a framework to support 
SSC by partnering with countries with substantial capabilities for and 
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willingness to promote SSC (JICA 2009). On the African continent, Japan 
has partnership programs with three countries: Egypt, Tunisia and 
Morocco.
In cooperation with the EFTCA in Egypt, JICA started implementing 
triangular training programs in 1985. In 1998, as an output of TICAD II, 
Egypt and Japan signed a partnership program, namely the Japan-Egypt 
Triangular Technical Cooperation Programme for the Promotion of 
South-South Cooperation in Africa. By 2012, Japan and Egypt 
cooperated in organizing more than 20 training programs on various 
themes such as rice cultivation and infectious disease prevention, and 
accepted about 2,200 participants from 49 SSA countries. The idea of 
cost-sharing was also introduced. Under the Programme, the two 
countries have been jointly implementing TC activities to support the 
socio-economic development of African countries by organizing 
international training and dispatching experts.
Tunisia entered into partnership with Japan in 1999, when the two 
governments signed the Japan-Tunisia Triangular Technical Cooperation 
Programme for the Promotion of South-South Cooperation in Africa. 
Many activities under the framework focus on areas that contribute to 
the achievement of the MDGs, such as agriculture, water, and health/
medical. By 2012, Japan and Tunisia had cooperated in organizing 17 
training programs for about 900 participants and dispatching 20 
Tunisian experts.
Morocco and Japan signed the Japan-Morocco Triangular Technical 
Cooperation Programme for the Promotion of South-South Cooperation 
in Africa in 2003. Under the program, Morocco has been conducting 
international training related to such fields as road maintenance, 
fisheries, and maternal and child health. By 2012, Morocco had 
implemented nine international training courses for 1,009 participants 
from 26 SSA countries. One example is a training program for road 
maintenance engineers of Francophone SSA countries offered by the 
Institute of Training on Road Maintenance and Construction Machines 
(IFEER).30 Using inputs from Japan as appropriate, including Japanese 
30. IFEER was established in 1993 with the support of the Japanese government including the 
capital grant aid for its facility construction as well as technical cooperation for capacity 
development. The institute has become a sub-regional training center for road maintenance 
engineers of Francophone SSA countries. 
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road maintenance equipment widely in use in Francophone SSA 
countries, the course has been providing training fitted to the local 
needs.
Though not having signed a partnership program, South Africa is a 
major partner for Japan in supporting SSC for SSA. One of the notable 
triangular cooperation activities between Japan and South Africa is the 
support for the NEPAD initiative, in which South Africa has been one of 
the major players, hosting its secretariat. As an integral part of NEPAD 
support activities, South Africa’s Public Administration Leadership and 
Management Academy (PALMS) and JICA have been collaborating to 
organize triangular programs for the training of trainers for public sector 
development. Since its start, the program has accepted the trainers of 
management development institutes (MDI) all over SSA countries.
As illustrated by the examples above, Japan’s strength in TrC may lie in 
its accumulated experiences and the wealth of relationships of mutual 
trust it has developed with a number of Southern partners through its 
long commitment in TrC. In recent years, it has been trying to diversify 
its modes of delivery. The remaining task for Japan may be to take stocks 
of its vast past achievements, review them, and come up with innovative 
models fitted to the needs of the 21st century.  
Though sketchy, our overview presented above of SSC and TrC for SSA 
shows that over a long period, starting from the 1950s, there has been 
steady progress in the promotion of SSC and TrC, involving more actors 
and increasing amounts of resources, accompanied by various 
institutional developments. 
3.  Case Studies of Triangular Cooperation for Knowledge 
Exchanges in SSA
So far, we have looked at the history, current state, and major actors and 
magnitude of SSC/TrC for SSA. We will now look at specific cases, 
focusing particularly on knowledge sharing and co-creation. The 
following five cases have been chosen to illustrate the wide variety of 
forms and contents of TrC. 
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3.1 Cases 
(1)  Transferring localized knowledge to neighboring countries: 
Vocational and technical Training31
Senegal’s Vocational Training Center (CFPT) has been playing the role of 
a center of excellence among French-speaking African countries to 
increase human resources for industrial development.
The CFPT was established in 1984 with the support of Japan to meet the 
shortage of entry- and middle-level technical workers, which was an 
important target in the country’s 6th four-year economic development 
plan (81/82-84/85). The center was designed from the outset with the 
idea that Senegalese human resources would be nurtured by Senegalese 
instructors. Since its establishment, the institute has trained about 2,300 
technicians and engineers who completed its two- or three-year 
programs (JICA n.d.).32 These courses have come to be recognized as the 
country’s top level programs, with their completion being treated as a 
certified qualification for studies in France and Canada. In addition, 
CFPT has been providing training and retraining to workers in both 
formal and informal sectors as an implementing organization of the 
Office National de Formation Professonnelle (ONFP)33 since the ONFP’s 
establishment in 1984.
Over the years, the CFPT gradually developed its own knowledge and 
skills best suited to the country’s needs. At first, the training content was 
heavily influenced by what was brought by Japanese experts. With time, 
however, various innovations were made to produce locally adjusted 
technical training systems. One small example of such adaptation is that 
at the CFPT, the students—future leaders in the workplace—are 
expected to maintain the workshop (work place) in an orderly, safe and 
clean fashion, according to the key lessons of the 5S doctrines—Sorting, 
Set in order, Systematic cleaning, Standardizing, and Sustaining. While 
maintaining its original message, this principle was localized and 
introduced into the Senegalese context with due modifications to make it 
suit local labor customs.
31. This section draws on JICA 2012a.
32. Various qualifications obtained through Senegal’s education system are valid not only in 
neighboring countries, but also in France (JICA 2000, p. 324).
33. ONFP is funded by corporate employment insurance, donors, and international 
organizations that provide financial support for vocational training.
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While building up its own capacity, the CFPT started supporting a large 
number of countries—more than 20 of them—in their human resource 
development; in 1999, in cooperation with JICA, it started providing 16 
French-speaking countries with international training programs (JICA 
2012b). Eventually, the Institute came to have about 15% of their BTI and 
BTS trainees coming from other countries.34 Cultural and socio-economic 
similarities with the neighboring French-speaking countries certainly 
facilitated the transfer and sharing of technologies and knowledge. This 
has resulted in making CFPT one of the core institutions for the 
development of human resources in West Africa.
One major beneficiary of such cooperation is the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC). Concurrently with the CFPT project, preparations for 
a JICA-supported project in DRC were under way. The project aimed to 
develop the capacity of the DRC’s National Institute of Professional 
Preparation (INPP),35 in which a group of core instructors had to be 
trained. Since CFPT seemed an ideal resource to support INPP, in 2010, 
discussions between INPP and CFPT began, facilitated by JICA; the two 
institutions worked out cooperation plans to meet the needs of the PP 
with the available resources at CFPT, and cooperation between the two 
started. 
(2)  Seeking relevant knowledge from around the world: Civil Service 
Training Centre in Ghana 
The Ghanaian case presented below illustrates an interesting case where 
a wide range of knowledge was sought and accumulated from a variety 
of sources, and once internalized, such knowledge was shared more 
widely with others. Such knowledge exchange happened in a TC project 
assisted by JICA titled “Capacity Development of Public 
Administration,” launched in 2007. Its aim was to improve the capacity 
of the Ghanaian Civil Service Training Center (CSTC). The project 
focused on two key cross-cutting themes: Ethical Leadership (EL) and 
Quality and Productivity Improvement (QPI).
From the onset, the project tried to seek knowledge and experience not 
34. The number of overseas trainees is limited to 15% of the total due to prioritizing 
Senegalese citizens (JICA 2000, p. 326).
35. The INPP was awarded the International Star Award for Quality (ISAQ) in the Gold 
Category at the 2012 International Quality Awards in Geneva, Switzerland. The ISAQ is an 
award for those who are recognized for investing in the improvement of their products and 
services (ISAQ 2010).
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only from Japan but also from other Asian and Sub-Sahara African 
countries including Singapore, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Tanzania and 
South Africa, which are the members of the Commonwealth and share 
many common features in their civil service. In particular, the Civil 
Service College (CSC) in Singapore played a central role. JICA, with its 
close ties with these partners,36 played the dual role of catalyst and 
knowledge actor.
During the project, the Ghanaian CSTC acquired relevant knowledge 
resources from partner countries through diverse modes of triangular 
cooperation, including face-to-face training sessions as well as video-
conferencing. Extensive and intensive exchanges were promoted 
between Ghanaian officials and their Southern counterparts.
All through these programs, CSTC applied a systematic approach to 
planning, execution and evaluation of training. Complemented by the 
improvement of training facilities, the annual number of training 
programs offered at CSTC has increased from 15 courses to 54 a year, 
which reflects the improved capacity of CSTC in organizing training 
provisions.37
With these achievements, CSTC is now moving toward becoming a 
regional center of excellence in civil service training. Assisted by JICA, 
the center has started offering training opportunities to Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. CSTC undertook training needs assessments in the two 
countries to adjust the training content to suit the needs. The first 
training was successfully launched in September 2011 and will provide 
training opportunities to civil servants from the neighboring two 
countries, with the aim of making them facilitators for future training 
programs in their respective countries.
(3)  Establishing a regional knowledge platform for poverty reduction: 
AICAD38 
The Project of the African Institute for Capacity Development (AICAD) 
is a cooperation project focusing on regional cooperation in human 
36. Japan and Singapore had established close ties, and to facilitate collaboration for TrC, they 
introduced the Japan-Singapore Partnership Programme for the 21st Century (JSPP21) in 
1994.
37. This number includes training programs undertaken outside the project.
38. This section draws on JICA 2012c.
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resource development at the higher education level in East Africa. The 
project is the brainchild of TICAD II, where the idea of establishing a 
human capacity development base for poverty reduction was discussed. 
Later, in 2000, in collaboration with Japan, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda 
reached an agreement to establish AICAD. AICAD was expected to 
work toward poverty reduction in East Africa through cooperation of 
the three countries; it highlighted three functions for community-level 
development activities: 1) research and development, 2) training and 
extension, and 3) information network and documentation.
Since its establishment, AICAD’s functions and organizational structure 
have been steadily developed. Headquartered at the Jomo Kenyatta 
University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT) in Kenya,39 it had 
three country offices: at the Egerton University in Kenya, the Makerere 
University in Uganda, and the Sokoine University of Agriculture in 
Tanzania. Biannually, Governing Board meetings are held to discuss 
important issues of AICAD’s management among the three countries’ 
ministries related to finance and education, science and technology, and 
representatives of the member universities.40
With poverty reduction as its ultimate goal, AICAD and its members 
have been promoting a wide variety of activities. They include, for 
example, in-country training programs and comprehensive multiple-
level “Community Empowerment Programmes” for communities, a 
“Knowledge and Technology Dissemination Programme” for livelihood 
improvement, East African region-wide training,41 and the New Rice for 
Africa (NERICA) dissemination project. These activities resulted in 
enhancing social cohesion of target communities and women’s 
empowerment. Skills and knowledge obtained through these activities 
have also been being disseminated by the participants to communities, 
supporting poverty reduction in member countries.
AICAD’s function of networking with other organizations has also been 
developing. Since 2010, AICAD has been expanding its activities in the 
area of university outreach activities. It has conducted four regional 
training sessions in collaboration with the World Bank Institute (WBI) 
39. JICA had supported the establishment and development of JKUAT since 1980.
40. As of 2012, the participating universities from the three countries amount to 19 (seven 
from Kenya, seven from Tanzania, and five from Uganda).
41. Some of the regional training was organized in collaboration with WBI and WIA.
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and the Wetlands International Africa (WIA). Also, AICAD’s three 
country offices have been constructing good partnerships with various 
organizations from national/local governments to NGOs. 
Cooperating with Asia played an important role in AICAD’s 
development. Starting in 2002, various professional knowledge 
exchanges were conducted between educators of the three East African 
countries and those of Asia, namely Indonesia, Thailand and Japan.
The project had a system of sharing and spreading knowledge and skills. 
For instance, in 2007, a regional training program for export promotion 
was held in collaboration with Indonesia’s Export Trade Center. 
Subsequently, in Tanzania, the knowledge and skills shared from 
Indonesia at the training program spread into society through a cascade 
system of training: to community leaders and then from them to local 
community members.
(4)  Networking for knowledge exchange: Coalition for African Rice 
Development (CARD) 
The “Coalition for African Rice Development”, or CARD,42 is an example 
of a network-based initiative for knowledge exchange and co-creation. 
Launched on the occasion of the 2008 TICAD IV, it is a multi-stakeholder 
platform with a well-established management structure “to support the 
efforts of African countries to increase rice production (CARD 2011).” 
Providing complementary support for capacity development of SSA 
governments in effectively managing rice sector development, it has 
helped interested SSA governments in developing National Rice 
Development Strategies (NRDS) within the framework of Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), agricultural development strategies 
as well as the country framework for the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). So far, 21 out of 23 
African member countries have successfully formulated NRDS through 
broad multi-stakeholders consultation process (CARD 2013). It has also 
provided other kinds of support for creating an environment for rice-
related investment.
One of the hallmarks of CARD is its engagement of diverse actors. The 
steering committee is represented by a broad range of stakeholders 
42. For a general description of CARD and a discussion from an agricultural technology’s 
point of view, see, respectively, Chapters 2 and 3 of this volume. 
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including multi- and bilateral-organs, rice producing partner countries 
in SSA as well as Africa-based regional organs and initiatives. They 
include NEPAD, AGRA, FARA, WB, CGIAR, FAO, IRRI and JICA other 
than for SSA countries (JICA/AGRA 2008; CARD 2011).
With such broad engagement, CARD has tried to act as the forum among 
international and local knowledge organs like research institutions and 
donors. In other words, the CARD network is in itself an initiative and 
mechanism for multi-stakeholder knowledge exchange.
Another notable feature is its demand-driven approach. As the needs 
and priorities for rice production promotion widely differ from country 
to country, CARD specialists assist partner countries to identify the 
bottlenecks in rice production development and then extend the 
necessary support to address the bottlenecks by inviting specialists from 
knowledge partners in the CARD network.
CARD has also started to consciously promote intra-regional as well as 
inter-regional South-South and Triangular learning.43 SSC/TrC has been 
set as one of four pillars of the CARD programs. Lately, CARD has 
embarked on a sub-program of linking Asian partners with SSA 
counterparts. In late 2012, it organized three video conferences for the 
promotion of the South-South learning process with ASEAN partners 
including the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Japan (CARD 2011, 
2012). Also included were government officials and private companies 
like seed sellers and rice millers, as well as farmers’ groups. The 
participants are now in the process of feeding back what they have 
learned from the conference into the implementation process of their 
NRDSs.
As seen from the above, CARD is a dynamic and broad network and 
platform for promoting intra- and inter-regional knowledge exchange 
aiming at higher productivity and more profitable rice production.
(5)  Creating solutions to shared challenges: cross-border road 
transport
Triangular cooperation (TrC) can be an effective way of addressing 
43. As part of the action for promoting information sharing on rice development, CARD is 
now developing a dedicated webpage with ample space for storing relevant information 
with links to all the key African initiatives in rice development (CARD 2011).
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regionally-shared issues among countries. One such example is the 
initiative of promoting One Stop Border Post (OSBP).44
OSBP is a trade facilitation approach through the promotion of 
harmonization and alignment of legal, institutional and procedural 
aspects of trade at borders with concomitant infrastructure 
development. With complementary financial and technical support from 
international donors including JICA, an OSBP for road transport was 
first introduced at the Chirundu border between Zimbabwe and Zambia 
in December 2009 with tangible impacts on smoother and more efficient 
border management. Even though the OSBP’s inauguration has been 
relatively recent, it has already produced significant improvements 
including the reduction of waiting times for border formalities.45 The 
successful launch of Africa’s first OSBP at Chirundu was a case where 
the concept of integrated border management was put into practice. The 
OSBP at Chirundu itself was the South-South partnership between 
Zimbabwe and Zambia assisted by both multilateral and bilateral 
donors including the World Bank, UK DFID and JICA. Right after the 
launch, a workshop on the OSBP for road transport was organized with 
invitees from RECs and representatives of five East African countries, 
which had planned to introduce OSBPs under the coordination of the 
East African Community (EAC).
Following the success at Chirundu, the OSBP practice is now being 
replicated on other borders such as Maraba between Kenya and Uganda 
and Namanga between Kenya and Tanzania as an integral part of the 
regional infrastructure initiative. Recognizing an increasing role of 
regional organizations such as the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and the East Africa Community (EAC) in 
catalyzing exchanges of knowledge and experience of development 
practices as well as for the harmonization of cross-border activities, 
JICA, with other development partners, has helped these regional 
organs in support of their stronger coordination and regulatory capacity 
in scaling-up the OSBP approach.
44. For more details, see Chapter 8 of this volume.
45. It is reported that the required time for completing the border control has been reduced 
from 1–2 hours to 20 minutes for passenger cars, from 2 hours to 1 hour for buses, and from 
1–2 days to less than one day for trucks, respectively (See Chapter 8 of this volume).
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3.2. Modes of SSC/TrC for knowledge exchange and co-creation 
(1) Modes of knowledge exchange 
Knowledge sharing and co-creation through SSC/TrC can take a wide 
variety of forms, depending on the kind of knowledge being dealt with, 
and the environment in which the exchange takes place. Below is a 
simple typology of the forms. It should be noted here, however, that the 
types below are not mutually exclusive and an initiative could evolve 
from one type to the other with time. 
Hub-and-spokes with centers of excellence
In recent years, knowledge exchange through networks has come to 
draw increasing attention as promising architecture. Among the varied 
forms of networks, the first is what can be described as the hub-and-
spokes-type knowledge exchange. This is a simple form of network 
relying, at least initially, on an established central institution as a hub of 
the knowledge sharing activities. And as the network develops, 
spontaneous exchanges and interactions among the network members 
often occur, with which the process of a virtuous cycle could kick in. 
Among the cases presented above, the Senegalese and the Ghanaian 
ones represent this model, where the CFPT in Senegal and the CSTC in 
Ghana played central roles. The effectiveness of having these kinds of 
“centers of excellence” has been proven through a number of cases 
(Hosono 2013). Examples abound worldwide; to cite a few from Africa: 
Tanzania as a hub of quality control in hospital management (Honda 
2012), Kenya as a hub of strengthening science and mathematics 
education (Ishihara 2012), and Egypt as a hub of infectious disease 
prevention and surveillance (TT-SSC n.d.b). 
Complex form of network/platform for knowledge exchange and sharing
Increasingly, more complex network forms of knowledge exchange and 
sharing are being applied in recent initiatives. For this, unlike the case of 
the above hub-and-spokes, no single institution is assumed to be a 
central knowledge organ; rather, the alliance comprised a number of 
interested parties interacting among themselves. 
AICAD links up multiple regional research and training organs such as 
the universities and NGOs. The AICAD headquarters in Kenya plays a 
facilitating role for knowledge exchanges among the members. CARD, 
as its name (the “Coalition”) indicates, is essentially “a consultative 
group of donors, research institutions and other relevant organizations 
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that aims to promote rice cultivation in Africa via information sharing, 
harmonization of existing initiatives and projects and advocacy for 
further investment” (JICA/AGRA 2008; CARD 2011). Within the 
network, these diverse actors, each having specific expertise, share and 
learn a broad range of knowledge, including the formulation of national 
rice development strategies, agricultural extension methods and the 
knowledge on new high-yielding rice varieties. The CARD secretariat 
then plays the role of catalyzing and helps promote such multi-actor 
exchanges. With its expanding stakeholders and increasingly active 
knowledge exchanges, AICAD and CARD now evolve into more like a 
“platform” for knowledge sharing and exchange. 
Partnership for knowledge sharing and joint problem solving
In contrast to the above two types of knowledge exchange based on 
networks, the OSBP cases exemplify a tighter partnership among the 
members seeking solutions to their shared or similar development 
challenges. This process can, however, develop further, once the 
knowledge created proves useful. As illustrated in the OSBP’s case, the 
knowledge and experience created through the tight-knit collaboration 
between Zimbabwe and Zambia are being shared with countries in 
eastern and southern Africa. The case of Ghana in civil service training 
also illustrates the process of a problem-driven partnership for 
knowledge exchange: starting from the core partnership with a few 
commonwealth countries including Singapore, Ghana now further 
disseminates a locally adapted approach for civil service training to 
Sierra Leone. 
(2) Institutional arrangement
Different knowledge exchange requires different institutions. In some 
cases, as in CARD and AICAD, strong institutional arrangements were 
introduced from the very beginning; being large-scale projects involving 
multiple layers of actors, obviously these two projects needed to have a 
solid institutional base, such as organizational structures and governing 
bodies; in the case of CARD, the Steering Committee and other 
structures were put in place, and, for AICAD, networking systems 
connecting the three countries under the Governing Board as the highest 
decision making body were set up.
In contrast, the institutional building process took a quite different path 
in the case of the Senegalese and Ghanaian projects; it was a process of 
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spontaneous and gradual development: the linkages between the core 
organizations (i.e., CFPT in Senegal and CSTC in Ghana) and their 
partner organizations were developed gradually as the knowledge 
sharing expanded by means of workshops and training courses.
These spontaneously developed institutions, however, can sometimes 
grow into more formalized organizations. For example, in a project 
concerning science and mathematics education, a knowledge sharing 
movement started with an initiative by Kenya, and over the years it 
gradually developed into a more formalized organization, comprising 
27 African countries and regions, with well-articulated mechanisms for 
the network’s governance (Ishihara 2012). A similar experience can be 
found in a case of hospital management where, with Tanzania as a 
pivotal country, gradual networking progressed, which eventually grew 
into an organization of mutual learning involving 15 countries (Honda 
2012).
The OSBP’s case illustrates another promising pattern. It is a case where 
the function of regional knowledge sharing on OSBP was strategically 
incorporated into well-established regional economic organizations 
such as SADC and EAC. Such approach of using regional organs in 
knowledge sharing would lead to more harmonized and less 
fragmented SSC/TrC in the region.
(3) The medium of exchange 
As preceding sections have demonstrated, effective knowledge sharing 
requires the strategic and timely applications of diverse instruments; 
they could include face-to-face training sessions, dispatch of technical 
experts, workshops and seminars, and the use of ICT-based information 
platforms. Especially, more and more opportunities have become 
available, taking advantage of ICT for knowledge exchange, as 
exemplified by the WBI’s GDLN, APDev’s Internet-based communities 
of practice, as well as the use of video-conferencing in the case of 
Ghana’s Civil Service Training. 
On the other hand, it has also been widely recognized that face-to-face 
learning opportunities continue to be critical in knowledge sharing, 
particularly with regard to the sharing of tacit knowledge (World Bank 
and Korea Development Institute 2012; Nonaka 2008). To further 
improve the impact of SSC/TrC in coming years, strategic and creative 
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use of these multiple instruments should be explored through the 
sharing of good practices among stakeholders of SSC/TrC.
(4) Capacity development for more effective SSC/TrC  
As an increasing number of countries expand their development 
cooperation activities, they are also strengthening their capacity as 
effective SSC performers. As shown above, the ongoing preparation 
towards the establishment of SADPA in South Africa is an example of 
such endeavor. Capacity development is also critical on the other side of 
SSC/TrC, the beneficiaries. 
An example of systematic joint efforts for the development of the 
capacity as SSC partners is the one by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency 
of the Ministry of External Relations (ABC), UNOSSC and JICA. They 
have recently embarked on an innovative joint capacity development 
program in the management aspect of SSC/TrC planning and 
operations. It is an initiative to provide opportunities for knowledge and 
experience sharing among the government staff in charge of SSC/TrC 
technical cooperation. The target countries include both middle-income 
countries including Brazil mainly as SSC/TrC providers as well as low-
income countries, which are mainly beneficiaries. In March 2013, its 
inaugural “international training course on management of South-South 
and Triangular Technical Cooperation” was organized in Brasília as part 
of the program; the program will span the next three years.46 The 
participants of the first training comprised 39 practitioners from 36 
countries, including 17 African countries. 
Lastly, we maintain that the opportunity for being an SSC cooperation 
provider is open to any country or organization beyond prominent 
emerging economies. As illustrated in the Senegalese and Ghanaian 
cases above, with capacity development, organizations can grow into 
regional centers of excellence for knowledge sharing, as long as the 
countries and/or organizations have strong ownership and a persistent 
will to develop such capacity. Perhaps traditional North-South 
cooperation by means of TrC can have a role to play in facilitating such 
capacity development processes, as exemplified in the above cases. In 
fact, there are countless cases of such capacity development of 
46. In addition to the training opportunities, the program also includes other complementary 
support for SSC/TrC management including online consultation services and advisory 
missions especially for selected focus countries. 
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institutions supported by traditional partners. The international 
community should continue to offer support, by means of appropriate 
TrC and others, as such countries and organizations that wish to develop 
their capacities to grow into cooperation providers.
4. Summary and Some Concluding Remarks and Implications
The discussion in Section 2.1 showed that Africa has been a central actor 
as the promoter and beneficiary of SSC. We also noted that the TICAD 
process has been playing an important role in promoting the momentum 
toward more and better SSC for African development. Though sketchy, 
our discussion in sections 2.2 and 2.3 has revealed that a wide variety of 
actors have long been and are acting as SSC partners for the 
development of SSA including regional organs and North African 
countries, in addition to the oft-cited emerging economies. The lack of 
data on the activities of emerging and other actors is a serious obstacle in 
understanding the whole picture, and more effort is called for in data 
collection and information sharing. 
And in Section 3, we argued, based on the experiences we at JICA have 
accumulated, that knowledge sharing and co-creation through SSC and 
TrC can take a variety of forms with diverse instruments, depending on 
the types of knowledge creation and solutions needed. We also argued 
that knowledge sharing and co-creation should not be monopolized by a 
small number of actors but is a possibility for all aspiring countries and 
organizations. In that regards, the North donors with their extensive 
field office network and long history of close collaboration with 
counterpart organs in SSA countries are well-positioned to provide 
support. It is thus expected that the TICAD process will continue to 
provide space and opportunities for experience sharing and open 
dialogue among broad stakeholders on the furtherance of SSC/TrC 
towards inclusive and dynamic development in Africa. 
Finally, having attempted to provide an overview of SSC/TrC for Sub-
Saharan Africa’s development, the authors renewed their recognition of 
the multi-faceted and complex nature of SSC/TrC; a plethora of issues 
surrounding SSC/TrC remain uninvestigated, such as their geopolitical 
nature and the measurement and evaluation of their impact in the 
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beneficiary countries.47 These remaining but critical questions require 
further research. 
47. McEwan and Mawdsley 2012 argues for the need of more critical analysis of triangular or trilateral 
cooperation beyond the managerial/technical discussions, which most currently available papers 
including this one are limited to. 
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Appendix 1:  
The TICAD Process and Japan
Kei Yoshizawa
This essay attempts to give a quick review of the history of the TICAD 
process. Looking back at the different policies and priorities agreed on at 
TICAD I through IV, and paying particular attention to the roles played 
by the Japanese government, the essay will try to shed light on the 
contributions that the TICAD process has had on African development. 
It will start with a chronological revisit to the process and, toward the 
end, offer some of the author’s views on its 20-year-long evolution. 
TICAD I (October 1993, Tokyo)
TICAD I was held in 1993 in the midst of the drastically changing 
international environment in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. 
On the African continent, many countries were struggling toward 
democracy, while at the same time many were experiencing political 
turmoil and some, civil wars. Western donors, on their part, were 
generally experiencing waning interest in supporting Africa after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, and policy-wise, they were rather frustrated to see 
many African countries remaining stuck with slow improvement of 
macro-economic performance and poor governance. In the meantime, 
Japan, in 1989, had become the world’s top donor in regard to 
development assistance, overtaking the US, and its bilateral aid to Africa 
had been increasing rapidly since the late 1980s, including co-financing 
with the World Bank and IMF through Structural Adjustment Lending 
and Non-Project Grants supporting balance of payments aligning with 
structure adjustments.
Thus, TICAD I was held in an international environment where, on the 
one hand, there was a mounting sense, among African leaders, of the 
“Marginalization” of Africa in international politics, as well as that of 
discontentment vis-à-vis the Breton-Woods institutions and the Western 
donors; on the other hand, there was a mounting expectation toward 
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Japan as an emerging, though a little unfamiliar, development partner. In 
1993, as a multilateral forum, the conference was organized jointly by 
Japan, the UN, the UNDP and the GCA,1 and was participated in by 48 
African countries (5 of which were represented by their heads of state), 8 
international organizations, 12 bilateral donor countries and the EC. 
The first TICAD conference came up with a message that, as I see it, 
mixed the dominant policy orientation in the international aid 
community at the time and Japan’s aid philosophy. The primary 
interests of the international community in the early 1990s were, on the 
economic front, economic reform toward a market economy and dealing 
with the debt crisis still lingering from the 1980s; and on the political/
administrative front, the priority was democratization and 
administrative and financial reforms that the Good Governance 
principle demanded. These agendas inevitably echoed strongly in the 
Tokyo Declaration of TICAD I, but the document also incorporated 
policies and philosophies upheld by the Japanese Government, such as 
self-help efforts, south-south cooperation and sharing Asian experiences 
for African development (Horiuchi 2006:28).
In retrospect, it seems that the Japanese aid policy for Africa at the time 
of TICAD I was rather broad and not as clear as those that would be 
expressed later at TICAD IV. The commitment of the Japanese 
Government was also rather limited at TICAD I. It was later in TICAD II 
and thereafter that Japanese policy orientation took concrete forms and 
were translated into action programs. Despite these limitations, TICAD 
I, and Japan’s determination for African development that it 
represented, enhanced the expectations of African leaders for Japan; it 
was against this backdrop that the holding of TICAD II was announced 
in April 1996 (Horiuchi 2004: 24). 
TICAD II (October 1998, Tokyo)
Following the success of TICAD I, the Japanese government embarked 
on efforts toward taking the lead in agenda setting in African 
development and, more generally, in international development. The 
most notable result was the adoption of the Shaping the 21st Century, The 
1. Global Coalition for Africa, a group of experts and intellectuals on political and economic 
issues regarding Africa
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Contribution of Development Cooperation, adopted at the DAC High 
Level Meeting held in May 1996 (Horiuchi 2004: 25), which was more 
broadly known as “DAC New Development Strategy”. 
The DAC New Development Strategy was different from the then-
dominant development paradigms that called primarily for Structural 
Adjustment and Good Governance. While these policies largely aimed at 
institutional and regulatory reforms, the DAC New Development 
Strategy urged that governments and partners focus on the results to be 
achieved through development, highlighting the importance of self-help 
efforts and clarifying the complementary role of development aid. It also 
introduced numerical targets – an expression of the results-focused 
orientation – on such domains as poverty reduction, social development 
(education, health), and environmental conservation and sustainable 
development.
These principles upheld in the DAC New Development Strategy were 
incorporated in the Tokyo Agenda for Action of TICAD II (Horiuchi 
2004: 25); education, health and poverty reduction were identified as the 
key challenges.2  In addition, eight numerical targets and 370 
development projects, mostly reflecting the targets, were presented.3 
Also, it was at TICAD II that the TICAD framework as we know it today 
started to be shaped and formalized; the principle of “support for self-
help efforts” was adopted as the basic principle of TICAD to be called 
“Ownership and Partnership” (Horiuchi 2006: 30); and other 
characteristics of TICAD emerged, such as the emphasis on poverty 
reduction and social development, a results-oriented approach 
accompanying numerical targets, and support for South-South 
Cooperation.
This TICAD framework constituted a pioneering initiative in 
international efforts toward the adoption of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy by the IMF and the World Bank (1999), MDGs by the United 
Nations (2000) and NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 
2. The Japanese government announced the provision of grant aid of about 90 billion yen over 
the subsequent five years in the fields of education, health and water supply.
3. UNDP reviewed the progress of the implementation of Tokyo Agenda for Action (UNDP 
2003). 
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2001).4 
TICAD II also served as a platform to strengthen various then-existing 
international development-related initiatives. For example, the Tokyo 
Declaration and Tokyo Agenda for Action of TICAD II incorporated the 
HIPC Initiative (Lyon Summit in 1996) and other decisions made before 
TICAD II about external debt issues. Subsequently, the expanded HIPC 
Initiative (Cologne Summit in 1999) was agreed on based on ownership 
and partnership principles and emphasis on poverty reduction and 
social development.  The World Bank became a co-organizer of TICAD 
in 2001. 
TICAD III (September 2003, Tokyo)
The most important topic of TICAD III was to support NEPAD (New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development), which was presented to the 
international community at the TICAD ministerial-level meeting 
(December 2001, Tokyo). NEPAD was consistent with the basic 
principles of TICAD in that it emphasized ownership by African 
countries of their development process (Horiuchi 2006: 34). TICAD III 
agreed to mobilize the support of the international community and 
expand the partnership in its support. Concrete actions for supporting 
NEPAD were subsequently developed reflecting TICAD III outcomes; 
including Cross-Border Transport Infrastructure (CBTI) and One Stop 
Border Post (OSBP) initiatives highlighted in the TICAD IV Action Plan,5 
and the African Infrastructure Development Program (PIDA) 
formulated jointly by the African Development Bank, African Union 
Commission and the NEPAD Agency, adopted at the African Union 
Summit in 2012.
The Summary by the Chair of TICAD III confirmed the three pillars of 
African development, consisting of (1) people-centered development, (2) 
poverty reduction through economic growth, and (3) consolidation of 
peace. Highlighting “poverty reduction through economic growth” as 
the second pillar, this summary could arguably be understood as 
reflecting the position of the Japanese Government: in order to reduce 
poverty, economic growth must first of all be promoted – a position not 
4. For details, see, for example, the Institute of International Affairs (2003)
5. Please see Chapter 8 of this volume.
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necessarily identical with either the market-oriented approach 
promoted by the IMF and World Bank through structural adjustments, 
or with the position of the United Nations that was calling for a 
mobilization of a massive amount of development assistance funds to 
achieve MDGs by 2015. 
Following this, this economic growth agenda became the central issue in 
the subsequent TICAD process, coinciding with the economic growth of 
Africa that had started in the early 2000s led by exports of energy and 
mineral resources. In TICAD IV, “Boosting economic growth” was made 
the first priority. And toward TICAD V, discussions are underway to 
move the agenda more in the direction of further acceleration of growth, 
as summarized by Japanese Foreign Minister Mr. Kishida in the TICAD 
V Ministerial Preparatory Meeting in March 2013. 
TICAD Ⅳ (May 2008, Yokohama)
TICAD IV was held in 2008. A total of 51 (out of 53) African countries 
participated in the conference, with 41 of them represented by heads of 
state or government.  The conference positioned the issue of boosting 
economic growth as the first pillar, and came up with the outcome 
documents titled the Yokohama Declaration and Yokohama Action Plan, 
which clearly stated the commitments of the participants. Japan, for its 
part, announced that it would double its ODA to Africa and provide up 
to $4 billion of new ODA loans over the following five years to support 
the continent’s economic growth, despite its difficult fiscal position. 
Another noteworthy development was the introduction of the follow-up 
mechanism for monitoring TICAD IV commitments and the Yokohama 
Action Plan; since 2009, follow-up ministerial meetings have been held 
every year to monitor the progress of these commitments. TICAD 
Progress Reports are compiled and reported to the ministerial meetings.
The TICAD IV Yokohama Declaration emphasized the importance of 
economic growth even more strongly than ever, putting it before other 
pillars, i.e., those related to MDGs, environmental issues and climate 
change, and consolidation of peace and good governance. The 
prioritization of economic growth in TICAD IV represented a 
remarkable shift from the traditional emphasis on social and human 
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development since TICAD I and toward the development of 
infrastructure, trade and investment, and partnership with the private 
sector. 
However, prior to TICAD IV, Japan was constrained in mobilizing its 
financial resources for supporting economic growth in Africa, due 
primarily to the debt accumulation problem in Africa. This constraint 
was relieved by the final settlement of long-standing debt problems 
agreed on at the Gleneagles G8 Summit in 2005, prompting the Japanese 
government to announce its ODA Loan support package for Africa 
through co-financing with the African Development Bank (EPSA).6 In 
TICAD IV, Japan pledged new ODA loans of up to $4 billion over five 
years focused on cross-border infrastructure projects in transportation 
and the power sector to promote regional integration in Africa. This 
pledge of “Doubling ODA to Africa” under the difficult fiscal situation in 
Japan was initiated by the strong political leadership of the Fukuda 
administration at the time, by switching the main destination of the 
ODA budget, which had been largely directed to other regions.
This also marked a major turning point in Japanese assistance to Africa, 
which had been virtually limited to assistance in social and human 
development mainly through grant aid and Technical Cooperation.7 The 
size of the pledged ODA loans ($4 billion over five years) may not look 
significant enough when compared with the vast financing gap in 
infrastructure investment reported to amount to $48 billion a year 
(World Bank 2008), but it could play an important role in complementing 
other financial resources, for example, through co-financing operations 
with the African Development Bank and the World Bank. 
6. EPSA stands for Expanded Private Sector Assistance for Africa. It aims at the provision of 
ODA loans of $1 billion over 5 years from 2005 through co-financing with the African 
Development Bank.
7. This does not mean that social and human development is no longer emphasized in the 
TICAD IV commitments of Japan; in parallel to infrastructure development, the Japanese 
contribution to the achievement of MDGs has also been strengthened through grant aid and 
Technical Cooperation as part of the commitment.
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Contributions of TICAD to African Development
So far, we have looked at the development of directions and priorities at 
respective TICAD meetings, summarized in Table 1 below. 
Table 1. Priorities in the outcome documents in TICAD I to IV
TICAD I (1993) TICAD II (1998) TICAD III (2003) TICAD IV (2008)
Outcome 
document
Tokyo 
Declaration on 
African 
Development
Tokyo Agenda 
for Action
Summary by the 
Chair
Yokohama 
Declaration , 
Yokohama 
Action Plan
Priorities (1) Political and 
economic 
reforms
(2) Economic 
development 
through 
activities of the 
private sector
(3) Regional 
cooperation 
and regional 
integration
(4) Emergency 
relief and 
development
(5) Asian 
experience and 
African 
development
(1) Social 
development 
and poverty 
reduction: 
Promoting 
human 
development
(2) Economic 
development: 
Promoting the 
private sector
(3) Basic 
foundations 
for development  
(1) People-
centered 
development
(2) Poverty 
reduction 
through 
economic 
growth
(3) Consolidation 
of peace
(1) Boosting 
economic 
growth 
(2) Achieving 
MDGs
(3) Consolidation 
of peace and 
good 
governance
(4) Addressing 
environmental 
issues and 
climate change
(Prepared by the author based on information of JICA et al. (2007 and 2013) and the website of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs)
We now have a look to see what contributions the whole process has 
made to African development. 
To recapitulate, the following are some of the past major achievements of 
the TICAD process: 
 ➢ Respect of the ownership of development through the 
formulation of the “ownership and partnership” principle at 
TICAD II.
 ➢ Facilitation of development initiatives through African ownership 
exemplified in such initiatives as NEPAD, agreed on at TICAD III.
 ➢ Emphasis on poverty reduction through economic growth as a 
pillar of the African development agenda at TICAD III, and the 
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introduction of a growth-oriented development strategy at 
TICAD IV. 
 ➢ Development of action plans based on numerical targets and 
outcome goals as well as the establishment of a follow-up 
mechanism in TICAD IV.
 ➢ Promotion of south-south and especially Asia-Africa cooperation8 
since TICAD I. 
The TICAD process also provided opportunities for the sharing of the 
development and growth experience between Asia and Africa, an 
agenda highlighted from TICAD I. The  ideas drawn from Asian 
development experiences, like the role of the governments, growth-
oriented development strategies, emphasizing the importance of 
infrastructure, and strengthening of ownership, added some values to 
the development strategies in Africa, which had traditionally been led 
by Washington Consensus-based thinking since the 1990s (Horiuchi 
2006: 30, and JICA et al. 2013).
TICAD is different from other fora on African development in its 
character as a global, open, and multilateral forum. While the EU, China, 
Korea, India and Turkey, and others have held similar-looking summits 
or ministerial-level meetings with AU and African governments, these 
meetings are held with the aim of strengthening bilateral partnerships 
between the host government or institution and Africa. Unlike these, 
TICAD is a summit-level meeting on African Development between 
African governments and TICAD co-organizers, i.e., the Government of 
Japan, the UN, the UNDP, the World Bank and the African Union 
Commission. TICAD has a unique character as a forum open to 
international institutions, civil societies, the private sector, and 
academics to discuss and reach consensus on the African development 
agenda and action plan for the next 5 years, not limited to a bilateral 
partnership and commitment between Japan and Africa. 
As an open forum, the TICAD process has attracted the attention and 
participation of NGOs and the private sector. For example, the Japanese 
civil society, with the establishment of the Africa Japan Forum (AJF) in 
1994, has been playing an important role in the TICAD process; their 
contributions included participating in the TICAD meetings, organizing 
side events and consultative meetings with the Ministry of Foreign 
8. For more detailed discussion on south-south cooperation, see Chapter 13 of this volume. 
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Affairs, presenting policy recommendations to TICAD meetings, 
communication with the public on Africa, networking with African civil 
societies (TCSF 2008). The private sector was also an important partner: 
the Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) also holds consultative 
meetings with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs9 and presents proposals to 
the Government of Japan on the TICAD process and public-private 
partnership in Africa (Keidanren 2013). 
With the changing environment surrounding Africa and the whole 
world, the challenge for the future TICAD process could be how it can 
continue to further promote debates and garner resources for African 
development, both in public and private sectors, while strengthening its 
unique character as a global and open forum, and building on the rich 
experience and assets it has created over the last 20 years. 
9. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds meetings with the civil society and the private sector 
for TICAD V (http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/ticad/index.html)
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Appendix 2:  
Japan’s Official Development Assistance to  
Africa 2000-2011
Japan’s ODA (Net disbursements, $ million)
COUNTRY SCHEME 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Algeria
Loan Aid -5.82 -5.00 -2.88 -1.05 -2.70 -2.04 -17.25 1.43 0.47 0.47 13.68 0.00 -22.53 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.18 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.22 1.24 2.71 1.99 0.00 0.02 0.01 8.71 
Technical Cooperation 0.94 0.82 0.65 1.08 1.71 3.68 4.33 3.12 1.57 1.39 1.77 1.42 63.90 
Total -4.88 -4.00 -2.18 0.14 -0.98 1.86 -11.68 7.26 4.03 1.86 15.48 1.43 50.08 
Angola
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.32 
Grant Aid 17.88 18.20 26.09 32.66 24.03 23.40 8.94 20.17 15.40 3.37 34.30 7.65 282.81 
Technical Cooperation 3.59 2.51 1.13 0.44 1.43 2.89 3.46 2.94 2.35 3.39 3.32 3.77 41.14 
Total 21.47 20.71 27.21 33.10 25.47 26.30 12.41 23.10 17.75 6.76 37.62 11.42 323.61 
Benin
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -34.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.14 
Grant Aid 3.26 6.86 3.55 4.02 45.21 16.01 6.84 1.67 21.07 19.34 22.43 18.47 327.39 
Technical Cooperation 2.91 1.40 0.98 2.25 0.74 1.85 3.22 5.13 6.14 6.51 6.70 7.70 58.28 
Total 6.16 8.26 4.53 6.27 11.15 17.86 10.06 6.81 27.21 25.84 29.13 26.18 382.50 
Botswana
Loan Aid -0.86 0.69 -4.30 -4.31 -4.17 -7.97 -6.04 -6.72 -24.60 -4.83 -5.14 -5.66 15.99 
Grant Aid 3.56 2.59 1.21 2.78 0.92 5.28 4.54 2.47 20.52 0.22 12.87 0.27 70.72 
Technical Cooperation 3.35 3.97 2.96 2.79 1.88 1.84 1.75 2.02 1.95 1.99 2.98 5.29 51.72 
Total 6.06 7.24 -0.13 1.27 -1.38 -0.86 0.25 -2.22 -2.14 -2.61 10.71 -0.09 138.41 
Burkina 
Faso
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 16.75 16.56 4.71 3.90 3.32 12.85 11.62 14.70 11.39 37.84 25.47 24.08 308.30 
Technical Cooperation 4.50 3.89 5.31 6.69 5.17 6.03 6.85 5.73 9.58 11.93 16.11 16.22 112.99 
Total 21.25 20.44 10.02 10.58 8.49 18.88 18.47 20.43 20.98 49.77 41.59 40.30 421.99 
Burundi
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.42 3.10 -0.62 -0.77 -35.89 0.00 0.00 -11.22 
Grant Aid 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.27 1.66 11.71 6.96 20.83 52.36 34.22 17.63 224.12 
Technical Cooperation 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.25 0.62 2.18 3.28 3.95 4.84 3.57 24.23 
Total 0.24 0.29 0.09 0.09 0.40 0.49 15.42 8.52 23.34 20.42 39.06 21.20 237.10 
Cameroon
Loan Aid 4.49 36.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.56 -79.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.06 3.96 6.58 
Grant Aid 9.43 2.65 6.11 9.75 13.93 9.04 95.89 16.00 12.50 4.30 31.45 13.03 299.48 
Technical Cooperation 1.89 2.49 1.40 1.03 2.92 1.67 2.49 2.55 3.08 3.81 4.52 6.69 56.44 
Total 15.81 41.32 7.51 10.79 16.86 19.27 18.77 18.55 15.58 8.11 42.03 23.68 362.52 
Cape Verde
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.49 6.73 20.63 28.86 
Grant Aid 9.86 2.63 5.18 10.81 3.65 2.72 1.61 1.44 3.66 14.63 7.35 4.74 126.11 
Technical Cooperation 0.89 0.80 1.13 0.96 0.29 0.11 0.92 0.44 1.64 1.75 3.32 1.17 22.35 
Total 10.74 3.43 6.31 11.77 3.94 2.83 2.53 1.89 5.29 17.87 17.40 26.54 177.36 
Central 
African 
Republic
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.99 -0.57 1.21 -6.12 0.00 -2.01 
Grant Aid 20.94 13.11 12.28 1.40 0.00 0.09 0.00 3.15 12.57 4.70 14.15 38.14 342.26 
Technical Cooperation 1.81 1.94 0.57 0.32 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.39 0.17 0.16 0.06 0.11 24.24 
Total 22.75 15.05 12.86 1.73 0.10 0.10 0.10 2.55 12.18 6.08 8.09 38.25 364.52 
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Japan’s ODA (Net disbursements, $ million)
COUNTRY SCHEME 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Algeria
Loan Aid -5.82 -5.00 -2.88 -1.05 -2.70 -2.04 -17.25 1.43 0.47 0.47 13.68 0.00 -22.53 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.18 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.22 1.24 2.71 1.99 0.00 0.02 0.01 8.71 
Technical Cooperation 0.94 0.82 0.65 1.08 1.71 3.68 4.33 3.12 1.57 1.39 1.77 1.42 63.90 
Total -4.88 -4.00 -2.18 0.14 -0.98 1.86 -11.68 7.26 4.03 1.86 15.48 1.43 50.08 
Angola
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.32 
Grant Aid 17.88 18.20 26.09 32.66 24.03 23.40 8.94 20.17 15.40 3.37 34.30 7.65 282.81 
Technical Cooperation 3.59 2.51 1.13 0.44 1.43 2.89 3.46 2.94 2.35 3.39 3.32 3.77 41.14 
Total 21.47 20.71 27.21 33.10 25.47 26.30 12.41 23.10 17.75 6.76 37.62 11.42 323.61 
Benin
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -34.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.14 
Grant Aid 3.26 6.86 3.55 4.02 45.21 16.01 6.84 1.67 21.07 19.34 22.43 18.47 327.39 
Technical Cooperation 2.91 1.40 0.98 2.25 0.74 1.85 3.22 5.13 6.14 6.51 6.70 7.70 58.28 
Total 6.16 8.26 4.53 6.27 11.15 17.86 10.06 6.81 27.21 25.84 29.13 26.18 382.50 
Botswana
Loan Aid -0.86 0.69 -4.30 -4.31 -4.17 -7.97 -6.04 -6.72 -24.60 -4.83 -5.14 -5.66 15.99 
Grant Aid 3.56 2.59 1.21 2.78 0.92 5.28 4.54 2.47 20.52 0.22 12.87 0.27 70.72 
Technical Cooperation 3.35 3.97 2.96 2.79 1.88 1.84 1.75 2.02 1.95 1.99 2.98 5.29 51.72 
Total 6.06 7.24 -0.13 1.27 -1.38 -0.86 0.25 -2.22 -2.14 -2.61 10.71 -0.09 138.41 
Burkina 
Faso
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 16.75 16.56 4.71 3.90 3.32 12.85 11.62 14.70 11.39 37.84 25.47 24.08 308.30 
Technical Cooperation 4.50 3.89 5.31 6.69 5.17 6.03 6.85 5.73 9.58 11.93 16.11 16.22 112.99 
Total 21.25 20.44 10.02 10.58 8.49 18.88 18.47 20.43 20.98 49.77 41.59 40.30 421.99 
Burundi
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.42 3.10 -0.62 -0.77 -35.89 0.00 0.00 -11.22 
Grant Aid 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.27 1.66 11.71 6.96 20.83 52.36 34.22 17.63 224.12 
Technical Cooperation 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.25 0.62 2.18 3.28 3.95 4.84 3.57 24.23 
Total 0.24 0.29 0.09 0.09 0.40 0.49 15.42 8.52 23.34 20.42 39.06 21.20 237.10 
Cameroon
Loan Aid 4.49 36.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.56 -79.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.06 3.96 6.58 
Grant Aid 9.43 2.65 6.11 9.75 13.93 9.04 95.89 16.00 12.50 4.30 31.45 13.03 299.48 
Technical Cooperation 1.89 2.49 1.40 1.03 2.92 1.67 2.49 2.55 3.08 3.81 4.52 6.69 56.44 
Total 15.81 41.32 7.51 10.79 16.86 19.27 18.77 18.55 15.58 8.11 42.03 23.68 362.52 
Cape Verde
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.49 6.73 20.63 28.86 
Grant Aid 9.86 2.63 5.18 10.81 3.65 2.72 1.61 1.44 3.66 14.63 7.35 4.74 126.11 
Technical Cooperation 0.89 0.80 1.13 0.96 0.29 0.11 0.92 0.44 1.64 1.75 3.32 1.17 22.35 
Total 10.74 3.43 6.31 11.77 3.94 2.83 2.53 1.89 5.29 17.87 17.40 26.54 177.36 
Central 
African 
Republic
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.99 -0.57 1.21 -6.12 0.00 -2.01 
Grant Aid 20.94 13.11 12.28 1.40 0.00 0.09 0.00 3.15 12.57 4.70 14.15 38.14 342.26 
Technical Cooperation 1.81 1.94 0.57 0.32 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.39 0.17 0.16 0.06 0.11 24.24 
Total 22.75 15.05 12.86 1.73 0.10 0.10 0.10 2.55 12.18 6.08 8.09 38.25 364.52 
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COUNTRY SCHEME 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Chad
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.00 5.97 9.65 14.33 13.85 13.54 20.39 77.82 
Technical Cooperation 0.21 0.11 0.13 0.23 0.62 2.05 2.77 0.25 0.06 0.13 0.22 0.43 9.14 
Total 0.21 0.11 0.13 0.26 0.66 2.05 8.74 9.90 14.39 13.98 13.76 20.82 86.94 
Comoros
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.11 0.41 2.11 48.25 
Technical Cooperation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.20 0.29 1.55 7.26 
Total 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.03 5.30 0.70 3.66 55.51 
Congo
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 4.97 10.49 0.00 5.46 6.94 36.13 
Technical Cooperation 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.25 0.17 0.40 0.01 0.13 0.38 0.52 0.28 5.71 
Total 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.31 0.17 0.40 4.99 10.62 0.38 5.98 7.21 41.83 
Cote 
d'Ivoire
Loan Aid 4.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 45.79 1.56 163.06 
Grant Aid 9.78 0.35 0.33 0.40 0.47 0.10 0.00 5.48 18.88 9.38 33.94 6.25 404.21 
Technical Cooperation 8.78 3.97 4.87 2.05 1.43 1.27 1.24 1.06 0.62 1.01 1.54 0.36 105.71 
Total 23.40 4.31 5.21 2.44 1.90 1.37 12.95 6.54 19.51 10.39 81.26 8.17 672.95 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 353.89 -4.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.43 -1,029.04 -479.61 
Grant Aid 0.27 0.08 0.66 0.32 48.06 2.72 27.50 20.25 45.32 52.62 66.19 1,206.16 1,641.44 
Technical Cooperation 0.21 0.23 0.19 0.31 0.41 19.65 0.62 2.68 5.89 13.08 14.24 9.62 108.25 
Total 0.47 0.32 0.85 0.63 48.47 376.26 23.17 22.93 51.22 65.70 80.00 186.74 1,270.06 
Djibouti
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 12.01 1.53 4.03 6.08 6.05 5.48 3.50 2.58 2.24 26.52 34.42 11.95 247.74 
Technical Cooperation 1.92 1.46 1.41 1.97 1.11 0.90 1.09 1.09 1.50 2.30 3.56 4.62 33.47 
Total 13.92 2.99 5.44 8.06 7.16 6.38 4.59 3.67 3.74 28.82 37.98 16.57 281.22 
Egypt
Loan Aid 7.06 -11.92 -15.56 -6.92 -17.84 -98.69 -40.23 -49.96 -38.32 -65.11 -73.07 -126.30 1,496.14 
Grant Aid 45.91 41.49 8.02 9.23 69.07 51.55 22.69 10.59 33.22 23.55 20.75 0.14 1,365.22 
Technical Cooperation 32.94 23.10 20.47 19.37 13.63 11.05 12.37 12.33 16.73 22.75 34.59 34.88 613.20 
Total 85.92 52.68 12.93 21.68 64.85 -36.10 -5.18 -27.04 11.64 -18.81 -17.74 -91.29 3,474.55 
Equatorial 
Guinea
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 8.25 
Technical Cooperation 0.06 0.03 0.19 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.32 0.04 3.32 
Total 0.06 0.03 0.19 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.32 0.32 11.57 
Eritrea
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 0.10 3.30 3.92 11.01 0.32 5.48 7.57 6.60 17.24 7.22 8.25 7.25 104.08 
Technical Cooperation 0.30 0.17 0.37 0.73 1.30 1.76 2.34 1.78 0.47 1.56 1.61 2.19 19.86 
Total 0.40 3.47 4.29 11.74 1.61 7.24 9.91 8.37 17.71 8.78 9.86 9.44 123.95 
Ethiopia
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 26.18 43.89 37.02 45.21 22.28 20.79 45.15 24.15 32.88 80.79 65.88 86.12 867.91 
Technical Cooperation 7.85 8.50 13.51 11.32 11.05 13.38 12.71 11.89 14.24 16.98 28.01 33.59 270.13 
Total 34.03 52.39 50.53 56.53 33.33 34.17 57.85 36.03 47.12 97.76 93.89 119.70 1,129.25 
Gabon
Loan Aid -2.49 -1.69 -0.18 -0.31 -0.10 -0.68 -2.20 -2.10 -2.73 -4.89 -1.95 -2.36 -11.66 
Grant Aid 0.30 2.65 3.54 0.37 1.82 5.40 0.12 0.04 0.37 0.13 21.92 8.76 47.55 
Technical Cooperation 0.69 0.62 0.48 1.70 0.97 1.40 1.81 2.31 4.11 4.85 4.80 4.55 33.30 
Total -1.50 1.58 3.84 1.77 2.69 6.13 -0.28 0.26 1.75 0.08 24.77 10.96 69.16 
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COUNTRY SCHEME 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Chad
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.00 5.97 9.65 14.33 13.85 13.54 20.39 77.82 
Technical Cooperation 0.21 0.11 0.13 0.23 0.62 2.05 2.77 0.25 0.06 0.13 0.22 0.43 9.14 
Total 0.21 0.11 0.13 0.26 0.66 2.05 8.74 9.90 14.39 13.98 13.76 20.82 86.94 
Comoros
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.11 0.41 2.11 48.25 
Technical Cooperation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.20 0.29 1.55 7.26 
Total 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.03 5.30 0.70 3.66 55.51 
Congo
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 4.97 10.49 0.00 5.46 6.94 36.13 
Technical Cooperation 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.25 0.17 0.40 0.01 0.13 0.38 0.52 0.28 5.71 
Total 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.31 0.17 0.40 4.99 10.62 0.38 5.98 7.21 41.83 
Cote 
d'Ivoire
Loan Aid 4.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 45.79 1.56 163.06 
Grant Aid 9.78 0.35 0.33 0.40 0.47 0.10 0.00 5.48 18.88 9.38 33.94 6.25 404.21 
Technical Cooperation 8.78 3.97 4.87 2.05 1.43 1.27 1.24 1.06 0.62 1.01 1.54 0.36 105.71 
Total 23.40 4.31 5.21 2.44 1.90 1.37 12.95 6.54 19.51 10.39 81.26 8.17 672.95 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 353.89 -4.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.43 -1,029.04 -479.61 
Grant Aid 0.27 0.08 0.66 0.32 48.06 2.72 27.50 20.25 45.32 52.62 66.19 1,206.16 1,641.44 
Technical Cooperation 0.21 0.23 0.19 0.31 0.41 19.65 0.62 2.68 5.89 13.08 14.24 9.62 108.25 
Total 0.47 0.32 0.85 0.63 48.47 376.26 23.17 22.93 51.22 65.70 80.00 186.74 1,270.06 
Djibouti
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 12.01 1.53 4.03 6.08 6.05 5.48 3.50 2.58 2.24 26.52 34.42 11.95 247.74 
Technical Cooperation 1.92 1.46 1.41 1.97 1.11 0.90 1.09 1.09 1.50 2.30 3.56 4.62 33.47 
Total 13.92 2.99 5.44 8.06 7.16 6.38 4.59 3.67 3.74 28.82 37.98 16.57 281.22 
Egypt
Loan Aid 7.06 -11.92 -15.56 -6.92 -17.84 -98.69 -40.23 -49.96 -38.32 -65.11 -73.07 -126.30 1,496.14 
Grant Aid 45.91 41.49 8.02 9.23 69.07 51.55 22.69 10.59 33.22 23.55 20.75 0.14 1,365.22 
Technical Cooperation 32.94 23.10 20.47 19.37 13.63 11.05 12.37 12.33 16.73 22.75 34.59 34.88 613.20 
Total 85.92 52.68 12.93 21.68 64.85 -36.10 -5.18 -27.04 11.64 -18.81 -17.74 -91.29 3,474.55 
Equatorial 
Guinea
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 8.25 
Technical Cooperation 0.06 0.03 0.19 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.32 0.04 3.32 
Total 0.06 0.03 0.19 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.32 0.32 11.57 
Eritrea
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 0.10 3.30 3.92 11.01 0.32 5.48 7.57 6.60 17.24 7.22 8.25 7.25 104.08 
Technical Cooperation 0.30 0.17 0.37 0.73 1.30 1.76 2.34 1.78 0.47 1.56 1.61 2.19 19.86 
Total 0.40 3.47 4.29 11.74 1.61 7.24 9.91 8.37 17.71 8.78 9.86 9.44 123.95 
Ethiopia
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 26.18 43.89 37.02 45.21 22.28 20.79 45.15 24.15 32.88 80.79 65.88 86.12 867.91 
Technical Cooperation 7.85 8.50 13.51 11.32 11.05 13.38 12.71 11.89 14.24 16.98 28.01 33.59 270.13 
Total 34.03 52.39 50.53 56.53 33.33 34.17 57.85 36.03 47.12 97.76 93.89 119.70 1,129.25 
Gabon
Loan Aid -2.49 -1.69 -0.18 -0.31 -0.10 -0.68 -2.20 -2.10 -2.73 -4.89 -1.95 -2.36 -11.66 
Grant Aid 0.30 2.65 3.54 0.37 1.82 5.40 0.12 0.04 0.37 0.13 21.92 8.76 47.55 
Technical Cooperation 0.69 0.62 0.48 1.70 0.97 1.40 1.81 2.31 4.11 4.85 4.80 4.55 33.30 
Total -1.50 1.58 3.84 1.77 2.69 6.13 -0.28 0.26 1.75 0.08 24.77 10.96 69.16 
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COUNTRY SCHEME 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Gambia
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 2.67 2.04 6.05 5.68 0.32 2.61 8.26 5.81 0.61 10.48 16.25 11.17 130.76 
Technical Cooperation 0.61 1.07 2.15 3.18 2.34 1.77 2.73 0.58 0.47 0.91 0.97 0.18 24.81 
Total 3.28 3.10 8.20 8.86 2.66 4.38 10.99 6.39 1.08 11.39 17.22 11.45 155.56 
Ghana
Loan Aid 53.67 3.98 -5.49 0.00 -888.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -103.16 
Grant Aid 27.18 10.81 12.21 15.54 989.27 28.03 24.66 27.13 33.86 44.93 47.36 22.04 1,684.79 
Technical Cooperation 22.05 19.84 16.83 14.22 14.32 16.19 19.00 19.35 20.18 19.87 22.65 23.90 413.65 
Total 102.90 34.63 23.55 29.75 115.42 44.22 43.66 46.48 54.03 64.80 70.00 45.94 1,995.29 
Guinea
Loan Aid -4.46 -3.96 -2.41 -2.81 -8.67 -0.22 -8.05 -4.08 -0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 38.58 
Grant Aid 20.59 20.10 18.58 20.27 23.09 9.52 21.27 14.54 14.72 16.35 9.96 1.00 430.96 
Technical Cooperation 3.01 1.24 2.40 3.37 2.08 2.65 3.86 1.56 2.37 1.85 0.84 0.98 56.07 
Total 19.13 17.38 18.57 20.83 16.50 11.95 17.07 12.02 16.86 18.20 10.80 1.98 525.60 
Guinea-
Bissau
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 5.07 8.69 15.87 8.71 108.74 
Technical Cooperation 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.76 0.74 0.24 1.07 7.48 
Total 0.00 0.18 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.04 1.08 5.83 9.43 16.11 9.78 116.22 
Kenya
Loan Aid 21.89 2.66 -38.86 -49.92 29.90 7.56 54.40 2.03 -53.06 -50.68 -68.29 -57.17 637.91 
Grant Aid 13.11 14.98 28.52 17.19 14.36 23.39 24.46 28.65 41.59 59.53 68.85 100.53 935.34 
Technical Cooperation 31.85 29.07 27.69 26.14 26.63 29.94 27.29 26.42 20.25 24.81 36.16 36.39 833.84 
Total 66.86 46.71 17.36 -6.59 70.89 60.88 106.15 57.11 8.79 33.66 36.72 79.74 2,407.15 
Lesotho
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 0.30 4.68 3.50 2.48 0.52 6.30 4.45 4.41 12.37 2.33 8.14 19.48 98.82 
Technical Cooperation 0.57 0.54 0.43 1.53 0.70 0.38 0.32 0.46 0.80 0.24 0.70 0.75 10.53 
Total 0.87 5.22 3.93 4.01 1.22 6.68 4.76 4.88 13.16 2.56 8.84 20.23 109.37 
Liberia
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 119.03 -198.24 -55.17 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.19 12.21 12.54 11.06 10.85 240.64 345.80 
Technical Cooperation 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.25 1.43 3.66 4.42 2.14 36.74 
Total 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.40 12.46 13.98 14.71 134.31 44.55 327.37 
Libya
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.13 8.13 
Technical Cooperation 0.15 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.05 0.43 0.19 0.08 0.13 0.05 3.59 
Total 0.15 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.05 0.43 0.19 0.08 0.13 8.18 11.72 
Madagascar
Loan Aid -1.32 -1.25 -1.21 -1.31 0.50 -147.51 6.34 -0.90 -0.48 -0.26 0.00 0.00 -22.35 
Grant Aid 17.58 20.34 4.80 6.47 21.33 178.92 30.05 103.04 11.47 7.39 0.00 0.00 779.22 
Technical Cooperation 10.05 6.36 4.00 4.55 6.13 8.20 7.42 9.05 9.38 11.90 9.62 10.70 162.48 
Total 26.31 25.46 7.60 9.70 27.95 39.61 43.82 111.19 20.37 19.03 9.62 10.70 919.39 
Malawi
Loan Aid -9.93 -8.38 -8.55 -3.54 -19.53 -12.94 -4.78 -181.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -35.38 
Grant Aid 33.02 14.26 16.01 20.94 27.92 18.79 18.00 209.35 16.71 18.98 49.59 11.37 721.98 
Technical Cooperation 15.44 12.42 11.35 14.01 10.58 13.84 10.16 12.47 14.08 16.82 19.86 17.27 306.40 
Total 38.53 18.29 18.81 31.41 18.96 19.70 23.38 40.29 30.79 35.80 69.46 28.64 992.94 
Mali
Loan Aid -2.18 -1.93 -1.87 -0.84 -72.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4.82 
Grant Aid 24.94 16.32 13.36 11.89 84.29 20.39 23.51 6.89 32.01 32.80 34.58 36.70 551.18 
Technical Cooperation 9.42 8.69 5.54 3.00 1.78 2.81 3.22 2.76 2.52 2.71 3.71 7.36 87.23 
Total 32.18 23.08 17.02 14.05 13.69 23.20 26.74 9.65 34.52 35.51 38.29 44.06 633.59 
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COUNTRY SCHEME 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Gambia
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 2.67 2.04 6.05 5.68 0.32 2.61 8.26 5.81 0.61 10.48 16.25 11.17 130.76 
Technical Cooperation 0.61 1.07 2.15 3.18 2.34 1.77 2.73 0.58 0.47 0.91 0.97 0.18 24.81 
Total 3.28 3.10 8.20 8.86 2.66 4.38 10.99 6.39 1.08 11.39 17.22 11.45 155.56 
Ghana
Loan Aid 53.67 3.98 -5.49 0.00 -888.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -103.16 
Grant Aid 27.18 10.81 12.21 15.54 989.27 28.03 24.66 27.13 33.86 44.93 47.36 22.04 1,684.79 
Technical Cooperation 22.05 19.84 16.83 14.22 14.32 16.19 19.00 19.35 20.18 19.87 22.65 23.90 413.65 
Total 102.90 34.63 23.55 29.75 115.42 44.22 43.66 46.48 54.03 64.80 70.00 45.94 1,995.29 
Guinea
Loan Aid -4.46 -3.96 -2.41 -2.81 -8.67 -0.22 -8.05 -4.08 -0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 38.58 
Grant Aid 20.59 20.10 18.58 20.27 23.09 9.52 21.27 14.54 14.72 16.35 9.96 1.00 430.96 
Technical Cooperation 3.01 1.24 2.40 3.37 2.08 2.65 3.86 1.56 2.37 1.85 0.84 0.98 56.07 
Total 19.13 17.38 18.57 20.83 16.50 11.95 17.07 12.02 16.86 18.20 10.80 1.98 525.60 
Guinea-
Bissau
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 5.07 8.69 15.87 8.71 108.74 
Technical Cooperation 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.76 0.74 0.24 1.07 7.48 
Total 0.00 0.18 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.04 1.08 5.83 9.43 16.11 9.78 116.22 
Kenya
Loan Aid 21.89 2.66 -38.86 -49.92 29.90 7.56 54.40 2.03 -53.06 -50.68 -68.29 -57.17 637.91 
Grant Aid 13.11 14.98 28.52 17.19 14.36 23.39 24.46 28.65 41.59 59.53 68.85 100.53 935.34 
Technical Cooperation 31.85 29.07 27.69 26.14 26.63 29.94 27.29 26.42 20.25 24.81 36.16 36.39 833.84 
Total 66.86 46.71 17.36 -6.59 70.89 60.88 106.15 57.11 8.79 33.66 36.72 79.74 2,407.15 
Lesotho
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 0.30 4.68 3.50 2.48 0.52 6.30 4.45 4.41 12.37 2.33 8.14 19.48 98.82 
Technical Cooperation 0.57 0.54 0.43 1.53 0.70 0.38 0.32 0.46 0.80 0.24 0.70 0.75 10.53 
Total 0.87 5.22 3.93 4.01 1.22 6.68 4.76 4.88 13.16 2.56 8.84 20.23 109.37 
Liberia
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 119.03 -198.24 -55.17 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.19 12.21 12.54 11.06 10.85 240.64 345.80 
Technical Cooperation 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.25 1.43 3.66 4.42 2.14 36.74 
Total 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.40 12.46 13.98 14.71 134.31 44.55 327.37 
Libya
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.13 8.13 
Technical Cooperation 0.15 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.05 0.43 0.19 0.08 0.13 0.05 3.59 
Total 0.15 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.05 0.43 0.19 0.08 0.13 8.18 11.72 
Madagascar
Loan Aid -1.32 -1.25 -1.21 -1.31 0.50 -147.51 6.34 -0.90 -0.48 -0.26 0.00 0.00 -22.35 
Grant Aid 17.58 20.34 4.80 6.47 21.33 178.92 30.05 103.04 11.47 7.39 0.00 0.00 779.22 
Technical Cooperation 10.05 6.36 4.00 4.55 6.13 8.20 7.42 9.05 9.38 11.90 9.62 10.70 162.48 
Total 26.31 25.46 7.60 9.70 27.95 39.61 43.82 111.19 20.37 19.03 9.62 10.70 919.39 
Malawi
Loan Aid -9.93 -8.38 -8.55 -3.54 -19.53 -12.94 -4.78 -181.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -35.38 
Grant Aid 33.02 14.26 16.01 20.94 27.92 18.79 18.00 209.35 16.71 18.98 49.59 11.37 721.98 
Technical Cooperation 15.44 12.42 11.35 14.01 10.58 13.84 10.16 12.47 14.08 16.82 19.86 17.27 306.40 
Total 38.53 18.29 18.81 31.41 18.96 19.70 23.38 40.29 30.79 35.80 69.46 28.64 992.94 
Mali
Loan Aid -2.18 -1.93 -1.87 -0.84 -72.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4.82 
Grant Aid 24.94 16.32 13.36 11.89 84.29 20.39 23.51 6.89 32.01 32.80 34.58 36.70 551.18 
Technical Cooperation 9.42 8.69 5.54 3.00 1.78 2.81 3.22 2.76 2.52 2.71 3.71 7.36 87.23 
Total 32.18 23.08 17.02 14.05 13.69 23.20 26.74 9.65 34.52 35.51 38.29 44.06 633.59 
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Mauritania
Loan Aid -2.04 -1.81 -1.75 -0.02 -73.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -11.69 
Grant Aid 29.01 26.25 10.90 19.33 80.20 11.62 9.72 22.13 10.75 6.70 12.53 9.03 484.12 
Technical Cooperation 2.97 5.16 3.88 4.61 4.48 3.10 2.36 1.32 3.73 2.92 2.03 0.96 59.17 
Total 29.94 29.60 13.02 23.93 11.10 14.72 12.08 23.45 14.49 9.63 14.56 9.99 531.64 
Mauritius
Loan Aid -0.64 -0.41 -1.04 -1.18 -1.26 15.55 3.77 2.10 0.11 -3.34 -3.55 -3.85 22.67 
Grant Aid 0.51 0.08 0.10 3.54 2.50 0.85 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.21 0.30 0.27 38.73 
Technical Cooperation 2.26 1.63 1.64 0.56 0.29 0.15 0.24 0.61 0.17 1.06 0.40 1.15 40.92 
Total 2.13 1.30 0.69 2.92 1.53 16.55 4.02 2.77 0.36 -2.07 -2.85 -2.44 102.31 
Morocco
Loan Aid 73.13 71.95 20.49 33.59 45.42 -69.43 43.76 49.71 82.83 85.05 102.78 18.21 898.93 
Grant Aid 15.33 15.00 9.46 15.95 7.81 2.22 8.44 6.01 16.85 4.77 8.23 1.74 275.71 
Technical Cooperation 14.82 14.68 10.84 15.24 13.08 13.02 8.93 8.93 6.16 8.12 10.15 10.16 298.32 
Total 103.28 101.62 40.79 64.78 66.31 -54.19 61.13 64.65 105.84 97.93 121.16 30.11 1,473.00 
Mozambique
Loan Aid -1.03 -0.75 21.73 -0.40 -0.43 -0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 17.21 51.09 
Grant Aid 11.70 26.66 44.81 32.53 16.57 9.91 101.71 17.71 17.58 50.19 48.95 14.20 825.61 
Technical Cooperation 9.29 7.61 3.12 3.14 3.27 5.29 5.12 10.07 6.15 10.49 13.52 17.08 124.27 
Total 19.95 33.52 69.66 35.27 19.41 14.77 106.83 27.77 23.72 60.67 62.85 48.49 1,000.98 
Namibia
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.04 7.15 36.14 36.39 21.69 104.42 
Grant Aid 1.64 0.27 2.04 0.14 0.41 0.00 0.18 1.41 0.61 0.14 0.17 0.15 59.54 
Technical Cooperation 3.78 2.94 1.11 0.68 0.80 0.39 0.83 1.29 1.90 3.54 4.03 3.36 42.06 
Total 5.43 3.21 3.15 0.82 1.20 0.39 1.01 5.74 9.66 39.82 40.59 25.21 205.99 
Niger
Loan Aid -6.68 -1.14 -1.10 -0.60 -22.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -28.63 
Grant Aid 14.27 7.18 7.96 8.37 30.90 17.20 4.49 19.00 5.56 23.91 15.73 11.58 440.12 
Technical Cooperation 7.43 7.00 6.43 5.89 5.54 6.47 7.60 9.29 11.38 11.15 9.43 4.27 188.86 
Total 15.03 13.04 13.29 13.66 14.08 23.68 12.09 28.28 16.93 35.06 25.16 15.86 600.39 
Nigeria
Loan Aid 0.00 -5.03 0.00 -13.84 0.00 63.29 -488.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -182.34 
Grant Aid 0.26 11.46 16.85 17.91 5.91 1.78 2,116.31 22.76 25.21 24.56 16.94 25.26 2,430.38 
Technical Cooperation 2.37 2.45 2.26 2.32 2.76 4.09 4.30 4.08 3.75 4.33 6.93 13.30 131.56 
Total 2.63 8.88 19.10 6.40 8.67 69.16 1,631.61 26.84 28.96 28.88 23.87 38.57 2,379.58 
Rwanda
Loan Aid 2.28 0.07 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.53 
Grant Aid 0.75 0.59 0.16 0.45 0.10 1.78 8.93 13.96 10.26 12.70 11.01 11.84 227.40 
Technical Cooperation 0.33 0.37 0.24 0.24 0.76 1.94 3.81 5.58 7.49 8.64 11.81 12.44 70.15 
Total 3.35 1.04 0.40 0.66 0.86 2.85 12.74 19.53 17.75 21.34 22.82 24.28 303.03 
Sao Tome 
and 
Principe
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 1.11 0.99 1.20 1.34 1.39 1.31 0.00 2.89 7.15 0.21 2.85 3.44 46.30 
Technical Cooperation 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.22 0.03 0.23 0.07 0.21 0.75 0.10 7.22 
Total 1.23 1.05 1.29 1.37 1.46 1.53 0.03 3.11 7.22 0.42 3.54 3.54 53.53 
Senegal
Loan Aid -3.10 -3.90 -2.72 -6.52 -91.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.19 3.83 2.80 0.00 -16.29 
Grant Aid 38.14 12.17 25.41 19.59 125.64 9.62 20.08 18.59 7.89 25.32 30.82 56.34 934.18 
Technical Cooperation 13.45 14.15 15.14 15.61 15.92 18.33 14.42 13.36 14.05 17.58 21.58 26.49 328.15 
Total 48.49 22.41 37.82 28.68 50.42 27.95 34.50 31.95 25.13 46.74 55.21 82.83 1,246.02 
Seychelles
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 0.00 4.44 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 7.79 8.94 1.12 41.25 
Technical Cooperation 0.64 0.63 0.23 0.68 0.67 1.26 1.91 0.76 1.26 1.28 0.63 0.12 18.43 
Total 0.64 5.07 0.51 0.68 0.67 1.26 1.91 0.76 1.62 9.06 9.57 1.24 59.67 
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Mauritania
Loan Aid -2.04 -1.81 -1.75 -0.02 -73.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -11.69 
Grant Aid 29.01 26.25 10.90 19.33 80.20 11.62 9.72 22.13 10.75 6.70 12.53 9.03 484.12 
Technical Cooperation 2.97 5.16 3.88 4.61 4.48 3.10 2.36 1.32 3.73 2.92 2.03 0.96 59.17 
Total 29.94 29.60 13.02 23.93 11.10 14.72 12.08 23.45 14.49 9.63 14.56 9.99 531.64 
Mauritius
Loan Aid -0.64 -0.41 -1.04 -1.18 -1.26 15.55 3.77 2.10 0.11 -3.34 -3.55 -3.85 22.67 
Grant Aid 0.51 0.08 0.10 3.54 2.50 0.85 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.21 0.30 0.27 38.73 
Technical Cooperation 2.26 1.63 1.64 0.56 0.29 0.15 0.24 0.61 0.17 1.06 0.40 1.15 40.92 
Total 2.13 1.30 0.69 2.92 1.53 16.55 4.02 2.77 0.36 -2.07 -2.85 -2.44 102.31 
Morocco
Loan Aid 73.13 71.95 20.49 33.59 45.42 -69.43 43.76 49.71 82.83 85.05 102.78 18.21 898.93 
Grant Aid 15.33 15.00 9.46 15.95 7.81 2.22 8.44 6.01 16.85 4.77 8.23 1.74 275.71 
Technical Cooperation 14.82 14.68 10.84 15.24 13.08 13.02 8.93 8.93 6.16 8.12 10.15 10.16 298.32 
Total 103.28 101.62 40.79 64.78 66.31 -54.19 61.13 64.65 105.84 97.93 121.16 30.11 1,473.00 
Mozambique
Loan Aid -1.03 -0.75 21.73 -0.40 -0.43 -0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 17.21 51.09 
Grant Aid 11.70 26.66 44.81 32.53 16.57 9.91 101.71 17.71 17.58 50.19 48.95 14.20 825.61 
Technical Cooperation 9.29 7.61 3.12 3.14 3.27 5.29 5.12 10.07 6.15 10.49 13.52 17.08 124.27 
Total 19.95 33.52 69.66 35.27 19.41 14.77 106.83 27.77 23.72 60.67 62.85 48.49 1,000.98 
Namibia
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.04 7.15 36.14 36.39 21.69 104.42 
Grant Aid 1.64 0.27 2.04 0.14 0.41 0.00 0.18 1.41 0.61 0.14 0.17 0.15 59.54 
Technical Cooperation 3.78 2.94 1.11 0.68 0.80 0.39 0.83 1.29 1.90 3.54 4.03 3.36 42.06 
Total 5.43 3.21 3.15 0.82 1.20 0.39 1.01 5.74 9.66 39.82 40.59 25.21 205.99 
Niger
Loan Aid -6.68 -1.14 -1.10 -0.60 -22.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -28.63 
Grant Aid 14.27 7.18 7.96 8.37 30.90 17.20 4.49 19.00 5.56 23.91 15.73 11.58 440.12 
Technical Cooperation 7.43 7.00 6.43 5.89 5.54 6.47 7.60 9.29 11.38 11.15 9.43 4.27 188.86 
Total 15.03 13.04 13.29 13.66 14.08 23.68 12.09 28.28 16.93 35.06 25.16 15.86 600.39 
Nigeria
Loan Aid 0.00 -5.03 0.00 -13.84 0.00 63.29 -488.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -182.34 
Grant Aid 0.26 11.46 16.85 17.91 5.91 1.78 2,116.31 22.76 25.21 24.56 16.94 25.26 2,430.38 
Technical Cooperation 2.37 2.45 2.26 2.32 2.76 4.09 4.30 4.08 3.75 4.33 6.93 13.30 131.56 
Total 2.63 8.88 19.10 6.40 8.67 69.16 1,631.61 26.84 28.96 28.88 23.87 38.57 2,379.58 
Rwanda
Loan Aid 2.28 0.07 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.53 
Grant Aid 0.75 0.59 0.16 0.45 0.10 1.78 8.93 13.96 10.26 12.70 11.01 11.84 227.40 
Technical Cooperation 0.33 0.37 0.24 0.24 0.76 1.94 3.81 5.58 7.49 8.64 11.81 12.44 70.15 
Total 3.35 1.04 0.40 0.66 0.86 2.85 12.74 19.53 17.75 21.34 22.82 24.28 303.03 
Sao Tome 
and 
Principe
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 1.11 0.99 1.20 1.34 1.39 1.31 0.00 2.89 7.15 0.21 2.85 3.44 46.30 
Technical Cooperation 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.22 0.03 0.23 0.07 0.21 0.75 0.10 7.22 
Total 1.23 1.05 1.29 1.37 1.46 1.53 0.03 3.11 7.22 0.42 3.54 3.54 53.53 
Senegal
Loan Aid -3.10 -3.90 -2.72 -6.52 -91.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.19 3.83 2.80 0.00 -16.29 
Grant Aid 38.14 12.17 25.41 19.59 125.64 9.62 20.08 18.59 7.89 25.32 30.82 56.34 934.18 
Technical Cooperation 13.45 14.15 15.14 15.61 15.92 18.33 14.42 13.36 14.05 17.58 21.58 26.49 328.15 
Total 48.49 22.41 37.82 28.68 50.42 27.95 34.50 31.95 25.13 46.74 55.21 82.83 1,246.02 
Seychelles
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 0.00 4.44 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 7.79 8.94 1.12 41.25 
Technical Cooperation 0.64 0.63 0.23 0.68 0.67 1.26 1.91 0.76 1.26 1.28 0.63 0.12 18.43 
Total 0.64 5.07 0.51 0.68 0.67 1.26 1.91 0.76 1.62 9.06 9.57 1.24 59.67 
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COUNTRY SCHEME 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Sierra 
Leone
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.77 50.47 -16.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 37.27 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.00 0.06 3.69 0.13 2.14 9.01 42.70 10.13 31.95 6.04 18.42 183.56 
Technical Cooperation 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 1.73 3.21 4.02 4.00 5.50 6.18 8.11 38.85 
Total 0.02 0.02 0.09 3.73 0.19 2.09 62.69 30.11 14.13 37.44 12.21 26.53 259.67 
Somalia
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 38.70 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 3.85 23.24 22.60 29.05 51.96 210.51 
Technical Cooperation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 5.52 
Total 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 3.86 23.27 22.64 29.07 51.97 254.77 
South 
Africa
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 -20.05 -1.44 -0.87 -0.85 -0.81 -0.80 -0.91 -1.01 -1.07 -1.18 5.89 
Grant Aid 13.04 3.81 16.38 11.11 14.23 11.07 12.24 0.81 0.66 0.43 2.05 2.04 113.34 
Technical Cooperation 6.75 9.58 8.36 7.94 5.47 5.87 4.49 4.65 3.92 5.24 6.13 7.25 107.79 
Total 19.79 13.39 4.69 17.61 18.83 16.10 15.92 4.67 3.67 4.67 7.11 8.11 227.01 
South 
Sudan
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 8.71 8.71 
Technical Cooperation 16.85 16.85 
Total 25.56 25.56 
Sudan
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -27.63 0.00 0.00 21.59 
Grant Aid 0.08 0.22 0.42 0.60 0.87 0.48 38.20 44.61 100.51 125.09 92.92 73.45 953.40 
Technical Cooperation 0.59 0.46 0.75 0.87 0.67 1.64 4.53 6.97 9.14 13.57 26.16 23.28 125.72 
Total 0.67 0.69 1.17 1.47 1.55 2.11 42.73 51.58 109.64 111.03 119.08 96.72 1,100.72 
Swaziland
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 1.52 1.02 0.48 21.54 9.63 4.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.53 36.41 
Grant Aid 3.35 3.16 0.47 1.82 3.11 3.51 1.37 2.01 2.31 0.19 2.81 14.43 83.93 
Technical Cooperation 2.65 3.38 2.53 2.18 1.27 0.86 0.61 0.51 0.87 0.99 1.55 0.66 30.92 
Total 5.99 6.54 4.52 5.02 4.86 25.91 11.62 7.26 3.18 1.19 4.36 12.55 151.29 
Tanzania
Loan Aid -12.68 -8.22 -6.54 -1.76 -105.36 0.00 0.00 33.96 5.40 48.56 10.50 37.91 101.97 
Grant Aid 203.16 241.32 39.31 53.90 139.67 14.44 17.68 667.66 43.36 48.68 65.87 43.73 2,454.59 
Technical Cooperation 26.65 27.35 25.43 22.32 18.21 21.67 21.72 20.04 22.23 23.22 28.23 37.80 626.30 
Total 217.14 260.44 58.20 74.47 52.52 36.11 39.39 721.66 70.99 120.46 104.60 119.44 3,182.85 
Togo
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.69 -1.11 -1.05 -1.04 -0.59 12.89 -0.12 -120.44 -44.04 
Grant Aid 8.26 2.61 0.05 0.03 2.13 1.57 1.34 1.16 0.80 20.96 6.65 126.61 257.05 
Technical Cooperation 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.29 0.14 0.33 0.13 0.24 1.01 3.10 11.93 
Total 8.50 2.87 0.34 0.34 0.77 0.76 0.44 0.46 0.33 34.09 7.54 9.26 224.96 
Tunisia
Loan Aid 52.97 70.68 47.92 74.08 50.84 41.44 9.96 12.28 48.04 8.26 14.37 17.13 618.16 
Grant Aid 3.30 4.04 7.10 1.09 0.31 0.57 0.19 0.18 0.03 0.19 12.22 0.16 40.97 
Technical Cooperation 15.85 13.74 8.26 10.35 8.59 9.09 8.41 8.10 5.92 5.97 9.29 7.68 206.91 
Total 72.12 88.45 63.27 85.52 59.73 51.10 18.56 20.56 53.98 14.41 35.87 24.97 866.06 
Uganda
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -57.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.62 6.64 6.44 1.15 19.20 
Grant Aid 16.00 8.93 3.07 3.14 64.25 4.80 13.56 17.83 39.75 23.16 42.06 28.19 462.66 
Technical Cooperation 6.37 5.64 5.01 6.39 5.37 9.64 8.22 9.68 12.64 24.24 22.74 27.79 195.33 
Total 22.37 14.57 8.08 9.54 11.84 14.44 21.78 27.51 57.01 54.05 71.24 57.12 677.21 
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Sierra 
Leone
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.77 50.47 -16.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 37.27 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.00 0.06 3.69 0.13 2.14 9.01 42.70 10.13 31.95 6.04 18.42 183.56 
Technical Cooperation 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 1.73 3.21 4.02 4.00 5.50 6.18 8.11 38.85 
Total 0.02 0.02 0.09 3.73 0.19 2.09 62.69 30.11 14.13 37.44 12.21 26.53 259.67 
Somalia
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 38.70 
Grant Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 3.85 23.24 22.60 29.05 51.96 210.51 
Technical Cooperation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 5.52 
Total 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 3.86 23.27 22.64 29.07 51.97 254.77 
South 
Africa
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 -20.05 -1.44 -0.87 -0.85 -0.81 -0.80 -0.91 -1.01 -1.07 -1.18 5.89 
Grant Aid 13.04 3.81 16.38 11.11 14.23 11.07 12.24 0.81 0.66 0.43 2.05 2.04 113.34 
Technical Cooperation 6.75 9.58 8.36 7.94 5.47 5.87 4.49 4.65 3.92 5.24 6.13 7.25 107.79 
Total 19.79 13.39 4.69 17.61 18.83 16.10 15.92 4.67 3.67 4.67 7.11 8.11 227.01 
South 
Sudan
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 
Grant Aid 8.71 8.71 
Technical Cooperation 16.85 16.85 
Total 25.56 25.56 
Sudan
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -27.63 0.00 0.00 21.59 
Grant Aid 0.08 0.22 0.42 0.60 0.87 0.48 38.20 44.61 100.51 125.09 92.92 73.45 953.40 
Technical Cooperation 0.59 0.46 0.75 0.87 0.67 1.64 4.53 6.97 9.14 13.57 26.16 23.28 125.72 
Total 0.67 0.69 1.17 1.47 1.55 2.11 42.73 51.58 109.64 111.03 119.08 96.72 1,100.72 
Swaziland
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 1.52 1.02 0.48 21.54 9.63 4.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.53 36.41 
Grant Aid 3.35 3.16 0.47 1.82 3.11 3.51 1.37 2.01 2.31 0.19 2.81 14.43 83.93 
Technical Cooperation 2.65 3.38 2.53 2.18 1.27 0.86 0.61 0.51 0.87 0.99 1.55 0.66 30.92 
Total 5.99 6.54 4.52 5.02 4.86 25.91 11.62 7.26 3.18 1.19 4.36 12.55 151.29 
Tanzania
Loan Aid -12.68 -8.22 -6.54 -1.76 -105.36 0.00 0.00 33.96 5.40 48.56 10.50 37.91 101.97 
Grant Aid 203.16 241.32 39.31 53.90 139.67 14.44 17.68 667.66 43.36 48.68 65.87 43.73 2,454.59 
Technical Cooperation 26.65 27.35 25.43 22.32 18.21 21.67 21.72 20.04 22.23 23.22 28.23 37.80 626.30 
Total 217.14 260.44 58.20 74.47 52.52 36.11 39.39 721.66 70.99 120.46 104.60 119.44 3,182.85 
Togo
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.69 -1.11 -1.05 -1.04 -0.59 12.89 -0.12 -120.44 -44.04 
Grant Aid 8.26 2.61 0.05 0.03 2.13 1.57 1.34 1.16 0.80 20.96 6.65 126.61 257.05 
Technical Cooperation 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.29 0.14 0.33 0.13 0.24 1.01 3.10 11.93 
Total 8.50 2.87 0.34 0.34 0.77 0.76 0.44 0.46 0.33 34.09 7.54 9.26 224.96 
Tunisia
Loan Aid 52.97 70.68 47.92 74.08 50.84 41.44 9.96 12.28 48.04 8.26 14.37 17.13 618.16 
Grant Aid 3.30 4.04 7.10 1.09 0.31 0.57 0.19 0.18 0.03 0.19 12.22 0.16 40.97 
Technical Cooperation 15.85 13.74 8.26 10.35 8.59 9.09 8.41 8.10 5.92 5.97 9.29 7.68 206.91 
Total 72.12 88.45 63.27 85.52 59.73 51.10 18.56 20.56 53.98 14.41 35.87 24.97 866.06 
Uganda
Loan Aid 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -57.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.62 6.64 6.44 1.15 19.20 
Grant Aid 16.00 8.93 3.07 3.14 64.25 4.80 13.56 17.83 39.75 23.16 42.06 28.19 462.66 
Technical Cooperation 6.37 5.64 5.01 6.39 5.37 9.64 8.22 9.68 12.64 24.24 22.74 27.79 195.33 
Total 22.37 14.57 8.08 9.54 11.84 14.44 21.78 27.51 57.01 54.05 71.24 57.12 677.21 
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Japan’s ODA (Net disbursements, $ million)
COUNTRY SCHEME 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Zambia
Loan Aid -6.18 -7.89 21.40 -7.68 -7.54 -616.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.44 0.59 -309.45 
Grant Aid 23.75 41.65 32.34 19.55 7.51 732.90 16.79 74.14 18.57 16.21 20.90 19.70 1,616.01 
Technical Cooperation 14.36 13.27 14.64 16.45 14.28 15.19 14.75 20.48 18.57 20.43 23.80 25.79 460.31 
Total 31.93 47.04 68.38 28.32 14.25 131.94 31.54 94.61 37.14 36.64 46.14 46.08 1,766.91 
Zimbabwe
Loan Aid 21.78 16.34 14.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 143.79 
Grant Aid 30.08 4.65 3.52 0.08 0.09 0.15 2.64 7.49 7.69 11.24 17.13 16.09 446.44 
Technical Cooperation 10.51 8.01 5.31 4.93 3.47 3.94 3.90 4.22 2.27 1.14 1.79 2.01 149.64 
Total 62.37 29.01 23.64 5.01 3.56 4.09 6.54 11.71 9.97 12.38 18.92 18.10 739.86 
Source: Japan’s ODA Data by Country, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Note: 
1.  Part of grants through international organizations are included in the category of bilateral Grant Aid 
after 2006 when the grants are earmarked for specific recipients. A wider range of multilateral grants 
has been categorized as bilateral ODA since 2011, in accordance with the direction of OECD/DAC. 
2.  The annual figures for Loan Aid and Grant Aid indicate the sums of funds actually disbursed within 
the calendar year out of the amount committed with exchanged notes. The figures of Loan Aid show 
the balances after subtracting repayments from recipients.
3. Accumulated totals of Loan Aid may be minus figures depending on fluctuations in exchange rates.
4. Technical Cooperation includes projects implemented by relevant ministries and local governments in 
addition to those by JICA.
5. Totals may not always add up due to rounding.
6. The figures in Total show the sum of Japan’s ODA disbursements to the country.
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Zambia
Loan Aid -6.18 -7.89 21.40 -7.68 -7.54 -616.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.44 0.59 -309.45 
Grant Aid 23.75 41.65 32.34 19.55 7.51 732.90 16.79 74.14 18.57 16.21 20.90 19.70 1,616.01 
Technical Cooperation 14.36 13.27 14.64 16.45 14.28 15.19 14.75 20.48 18.57 20.43 23.80 25.79 460.31 
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Loan Aid 21.78 16.34 14.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 143.79 
Grant Aid 30.08 4.65 3.52 0.08 0.09 0.15 2.64 7.49 7.69 11.24 17.13 16.09 446.44 
Technical Cooperation 10.51 8.01 5.31 4.93 3.47 3.94 3.90 4.22 2.27 1.14 1.79 2.01 149.64 
Total 62.37 29.01 23.64 5.01 3.56 4.09 6.54 11.71 9.97 12.38 18.92 18.10 739.86 
Source: Japan’s ODA Data by Country, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Note: 
1.  Part of grants through international organizations are included in the category of bilateral Grant Aid 
after 2006 when the grants are earmarked for specific recipients. A wider range of multilateral grants 
has been categorized as bilateral ODA since 2011, in accordance with the direction of OECD/DAC. 
2.  The annual figures for Loan Aid and Grant Aid indicate the sums of funds actually disbursed within 
the calendar year out of the amount committed with exchanged notes. The figures of Loan Aid show 
the balances after subtracting repayments from recipients.
3. Accumulated totals of Loan Aid may be minus figures depending on fluctuations in exchange rates.
4. Technical Cooperation includes projects implemented by relevant ministries and local governments in 
addition to those by JICA.
5. Totals may not always add up due to rounding.
6. The figures in Total show the sum of Japan’s ODA disbursements to the country.
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